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ABSTRACT
"Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of 
our investigation; the first, the idea, the second the 
complex of human passions; the one the warp, the other 
the woof of the vast arras- web of history."
Hegel, Philosophy of History
The 'mythopoesy' of civility and order is the seminal philosophical 
and theological literature that gave rise to, and reflected, various prob­
lems in Western thought focusing on the relationship between citizen and 
state, in particular, the germinal question of civil obligation: why ought
one obey the law?
Political theorists engage in metaphoric/raythopoeic thinking in a 
variety of ways ranging between the archetypal poles of the 'hedgehog' and 
the 'fox'. Citing the Greek poet Archilochus, Isaiah Berlin interprets the 
symbol of the fox as those persons who take the objects of experience for 
what they are and adamantly reject an all-embracing moral principle of uni­
fying vision. By contrast, Berlin portrays the hedgehog as the writers who 
relate phenomena to a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of 
which alone all that they are and say has significance.
While the hedgehog and the fox do not lend themselves to neat and 
mutually exclusive categories, they nevertheless suggest something impor­
tant about the nature and problem of metaphor in political literature.
Plato and Hobbes are surely hedgehogs; Machiavelli is equally clearly a 
fox; Rousseau, consistent with his work, remains a paradox. We cannot 
claim that the hedgehog is always a monist or nominalist because Plato and 
Hobbes divide on this point. Nor can we assert that foxes are exclusively 
pluralist or naturalist, for Hobbes is not a fox though a nominalist, and 
Machiavelli, though a fox, shows occasional signs of the hedgehog. Any 
dichotomy over-simplifies and in the extreme voids a complex and diverse 
world of its fluidity. Yet, when taken as suggestive points of departure, 
such categories as these aid us in discussing the presuppositions and 
implications of political metaphors.
VThe metaphor upon which this work is articulated is the synecdoche of 
the social contract, the trope of liberal political philosophy. Running in 
two strands, the argument first addresses the idea of the social contract 
and its theoretical underpinnings, combining analysis of the principal con- 
tractarians (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls) with a critical dis­
cussion of the notion in general. The second strand of the thesis places 
the first strand in context, as it were, discussing the milieux and impli­
cations of the contractarian groundwork.
If one accepts the reality and relevance of individuals acting to­
gether in coalitions of mutual interest, three important issues emerge 
regarding political life. First, group interests and activities diminish 
the significance of the Gemeinschaft liehe, 'Hellenic' relationship between 
the individual and the state. Secondly, the mass of 'atomic' individuals 
given prominence by Machiavelli and Hobbes is displaced in the so-called 
hierarchy of power by intersecting and cross-cutting 'life-spaces', groups 
or classes of persons b o m  of specialization and common interest. And, 
thirdly, the patterns of integrated, group solidarity and cooperation take 
on a variety of meanings in the relation of political 'part' to political 
'whole'. The imaginative and persistent individual remains a potential 
force, but that solo force is vectored by the frames of reference that 
characterize the 'life-spaces' in which he acts. Consequently, there 
exists a constant tension between personal potentialities and desires, on 
the one hand, and corporate interests and interpersonal dynamics on the 
other.
The contractarian metaphor serves both as a reflection of these con­
cerns and as an illustration of judicial reasoning in modem G esellschaf- 
ten: not as mere jurisprudential methodology but as the ideal typical mode
of moral reflection of rational citizens in less-than-perfect societies.
The two strands of the thesis thus come together through the juxtaposition 
of the antithetical poles of social life, the just and unjust states. In 
the final analysis, the tension that characterizes this dichotomy provides 
the animus of contractarian thought and makes urgent the resolution of the 
problem of civil obligation. Whether or not the contractarian metaphor 
provides a satisfactory solution, the mere consideration of its parameters 
and approach makes lighter the task of negotiating the problems of order 
and civility.
vi
Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.
You must become an ignorant man again 
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it.
Never suppose an inventing mind as source 
Of this idea nor for that mind compose 
A voluminous master folded in his fire.
How clean the sun when seen in its idea,
Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven 
That has expelled us and our images...
The death of one god is the death of all.
Let purple Phoebus lie in umber harvest,
Let Phoebus slumber and die in autumn umber,
Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was 
A name for something that never could be named. 
There was a project for the sun and is.
There is a project for the sun. The sun 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be.
Wallace Stevens, It Must be Abstract
vii
CONTENTS
page
INTRODUCTION 1
Notes 18
PART ONE
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM: CIVIL OBLIGATION 22
I. Rules and Principles 24
II. Prima Facie and Presumptive Obligations 33
III. Creating Obligations 37
IV. The Scope of Obligations 44
V. Obligation and Ought 49
VI. The Problem of Civility 52
VII. Is, Ought and Commitment 57
VIII. Autonomy and Authority 67
IX. The Problem of Order 73
Notes 83
PART TWO
THE MYTHOPOESY OF CIVILITY AND ORDER 86
I. The New Science 101
II. Norms and Historicity 109
III. Descartes and Bon Sens 113
IV. The Philosophy of Authority 116
V. The Barbarism of Reflection 120
VI. The Transformation of Time 126
VII. Egalitarianism and the Advance of Reflection 130
VIII. Locke and Gesellschaft 138
IX. Reflection Without Barbarism 145
Notes . 149
viii
page
PART THREE
HOBBES AND LOCKE 158
I. The Atomistic Implications of Nominalism 166
II. Leviathan and Obligation 176
III. Hobbes' Contractarianism 188
IV. Locke's Contractarianism 201
Notes 213
PART FOUR
ROUSSEAU: "THE MORAL VIEW OF THE WORLD" 220
I. On the Origin of Inequality 225
II. The Social Contract 236
III. The General Will 248
IV. Rousseau's Contractarianism 260
Notes 262
PART FIVE
RAWLS: THE SECULAR COVENANT 267
I. Rawls' Contractarianism 272
II. Principles of Justice 279
III. Criticisms Considered 285
IV. Civil Obligation 289
V. Hart on Fairness and Obligation 292
Notes 299
PART SIX
THE CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF CIVIL OBLIGATION 303
I. The Question of Generality 305
II. The Just State 309
III. The Contractual Theory of Civil Obligation 310
IV. Citizenship, Fairness and Obligation 317
Criticism and Defense 329V
ix
page
VI. The Limits of the Social Contract 336
VII. Obligation, Obedience and the Social Contract 342
Notes 345
PART SEVEN
CIVILITY AND ORDER 348
I. The Collapse of Antiquity 355
II. The Two Cities 359
III. A Single and Indivisible Sovereign 361
IV. Apophradism and Incongruity 363
V. The "Mortall God" 367
VI. Corps Moral et Collectif 372
VII. Mill and Epictetus 374
VIII. The Speculative and the Existential 380
Notes 389
APPENDIX ONE
I. 394
II. 404
Notes 421
APPENDIX TWO 429
Notes 445
APPENDIX THREE
I. 447
II. 451
III. 457
IV. 461
V. 476
Notes 480
Xpage
APPENDIX FOUR
I. 485
II. 488
III. 500
IV. 507
V. 514
VI. 520
Notes 523
APPENDIX FIVE 531
Notes 544
APPENDIX SIX
I. 545
II. 552
III. 557
IV. 560
Notes 565
APPENDIX SEVEN 568
Notes 572
BIBLIOGRAPHY 575
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly thought that the doctrine of the social contract is 
best understood as a piece of historical anthropology or, alternatively, 
as a constitutional model to explain how civil society came to be wedded 
to political authority. In this thesis a different view will be advocated, 
partly by reference to historical material and partly on the grounds that 
the theory thus interpreted is more powerful, more topical and has greater 
heuristic fertility. Briefly, the view to be developed is that social 
contract theory derives on the whole from the union of a theological meta­
phor - covenant - and a juristic reification - contractual obligation. As 
a conplex metaphor in part combining civitas and ordinatio Dei and, later, 
natural law, social contract theory came to encapsulate, in its various 
manifestations, the central tenets of a particular mythopoeic tradition in 
Western political thought. This tradition, among other things, focussed 
upon civility and order rather than imperium and saoerdotium as the sinews 
of the State. Its 'mythopoeic' character is highlighted not at the expense 
of 'philosophy' but, rather, in order to better describe its highly meta­
phorical, narrative articulation. The dramatic emphasis upon origins and 
transformations in the history of ideas so characteristic of this approach 
is clearly as mach mythopoeic as it is analytical, combining in dialectical 
form a world view with the embodiment of moral norms. "Each contract of a 
particular state", wrote Edmund Burke, "is but a clause in the great prime­
val contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, 
connecting the visible and invisible world....
Underpinning the metaphor, then, is a series of speculations and 
statements about the logic and morality of human associations. Its 
strength derives not frcm its 'factual' basis but from the expectations 
it promotes and attitudes it establishes about civil society. The idea of 
the contract, the idea that political relations ought to be discussed in 
jurisprudential terms rather than in the language of feudalism lends con­
tractarian theories their force and appeal. Consequently, we are presented 
with a heuristic device in terms of which civil societies may perceive the 
facts of their own civility. In a sense, the following account of contrac­
tarianism has a phenomenological inflexion, because its object is to 
explore via a seminal model the 'self-perception' of an entire tradition
2d o m in an t  i n  many W estern  s o c i e t i e s .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  n e i t h e r  a  ' s c i e n t i f i c *  
h y p o t h e s i s  n o r  a m ora l  p o s t u l a t e ,  b u t  an e x e r c i s e  i n  w hat J .G .A .  Pocock has  
te rm ed  " t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  l a n g u a g e " . 2
The d i s j o i n t e d  and o f t e n  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  e le m e n ts  o f  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  
l i t e r a t u r e  compel t h o s e  who w ish  t o  e x p l o r e  i t s  c o n to u r s  t o  b e g in  by a s k in g  
"what i s  i t  t h a t  a l l  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  t h e o r i e s  h o ld  i n  common?". S in c e  th e  
answ er  c a n n o t  r e s i d e  i n  a common a n a l y s i s  o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  ( t h e r e  b e in g  so  
many d i v e r g e n t  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  a n a ly s e s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  c o n d i t i o n )  i t  m ust l i e  
i n  a common body o f  i s s u e s .  Once t h e s e  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
some a p p ro a c h e s  w i l l  seem more a p p r o p r i a t e  th a n  o t h e r s ,  and t h a t  t h e  l o g i c  
o f  one o r  a  number o f  t h e o r i e s  w i l l  p ro v e  more c o m p e l l in g  th a n  t h e  r e s t .
Y e t ,  s u r e l y  t h i s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  c an  g iv e  l i t t l e  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  i f  o n ly  b e ­
c a u s e  t h e  t h o r o u g h l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  n a t u r e  o f  a l l  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  d o c t r i n e s  
h a s  shown each  t o  be l e s s  t h a n  c o n v in c in g  and a l l  t o  be d e f i c i e n t  i n  some 
r e s p e c t .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  we s h a l l  en d e av o u r  t o  
d i s t i l  t h e  m ost a d e q u a te  a rgum en ts  h i t h e r t o  p r e s e n t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  a r r i v e  a t  
a  c o n s i s t e n t  and p o w e r fu l  argum ent t h a t  d e a l s  w i th  a l l  t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e s ,  
a d h e re s  t o  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  common e n t e r p r i s e  and y e t  a v o id s  t h e  p i t f a l l s  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t h e o r i e s .  T h is  e c l e c t i c  d o c t r i n e  w i l l  t h e n  be exam ined  in  
i t s  own r i g h t  t o  s e e  i f  i t  h a s  n o t  o n ly  su rm oun ted  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encoun ­
t e r e d  by i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  b u t  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  i t  can  a l s o  w i t h s t a n d  a s s a u l t s  
made upon  i t  a s  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  i t s  s c h o o l .  Where i t  d o e s  p ro v e  t o  be 
i n a d e q u a t e ,  t h i s  r e v i s i o n i s t  c o n t r a c t  t h e o r y  w i l l  s e r v e  as  a s p r in g b o a r d  
f o r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  m etap h o r  and 
t h e  d a n g e r s  i n h e r e n t  i n  any l i t e r a l ,  p r a c t i c a l  r e n d e r i n g .  The agenda  o f  
t h e  t h e s i s  w i l l  d e v i a t e  frcm t h i s  p r o g r e s s i o n  a t  a number o f  p o i n t s  so  a s  
t o  p e r m i t  e l a b o r a t i o n  upon h i s t o r i c a l  and a n a l y t i c a l  them es k e r n e l  t o  t h e  
a rg u m e n t .  These  d e v i a t i o n s ,  i n  f a c t ,  c o n s t i t u t e  w hat may be s e e n  as  t h e  
's e c o n d  s t r a n d '  o f  t h e  t h e s i s :  a p a r a l l e l  l i n e  o f  a rg u m e n ta t io n  t h a t
p l a c e s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m  w i t h i n  i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n t e x t  and 
p r o v i d e s ,  i n  p a r t ,  t h e  groundw ork f o r  a  c r i t i c i s m  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i e s  
g ro u n d ed  i n  a n a c h r o n i s t i c  a p p e a l s  t o  ' e t e r n a l '  laws o f  n a t u r e  and r e a s o n .
The i d e a  o f  a  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  i s  among t h e  m ost r e s i l i e n t  n o t i o n s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y .  I t  i s  a s  o l d ,  a t  l e a s t ,  as  P l a t o ' s  e a r l i e s t  d i a ­
lo g u e s  and a s  co n te m p o ra ry  a s  John  R aw ls ' A Theory o f  J u s t i c e .  T h is  i s  n o t  
t o  s a y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  c o n t r a c t  t h e o r y  h as  a lw ays p la y e d  a l e a d i n g  r o l e  in
3political thought, or even that it has never fallen from favour. The point 
is that, despite the attacks of thinkers of the stature of Hume and Hegel, 
the idea of a social contract has displayed a remarkable ability to rise 
like the Phoenix and regain its hold on political philosophers. Why has 
this been so? Or, to put the question less historically, why is the idea 
of a social contract so fascinating and, to some, so attractive? This is 
the general question to which the 'first strand' of this thesis is addres­
sed. In order to answer it, however, it is necessary to provide an account 
of the essential features of social contract theory and to determine 
whether a theory of this sort satisfies the problems to which it responds. 
This is not an easy task, of course, for there is no such thing as the 
social contract theory; there are, instead, a number of theories that 
employ the contract metaphor which are alike in some important respects and 
utterly divergent in others. Because of this complication, we approach the 
general question through a series of more specific questions: firstly,
what is the problem which social contract theories try to solve?; secondly, 
are some contract theories adequate while others are not? - i.e. are some 
both internally consistent and satisfactory as responses to the problem at 
hand?; thirdly, can these adequate theories by 'reduced' to the essentials 
of social contract theory?; and, finally, if so, does this abstracted 
theory successfully meet and overcome the objections which have been raised 
against social contract theory?
We deal with these questions in three stages. Part One, which com­
prises the first stage, is concerned with the problem which contract 
theorists seek to solve. This, it is argued, is the ancient problem of 
political or civil obligation, which is often expressed in the question, 
"Why should I obey the law?". Since our understanding of the problem will 
determine in large measure what we want contractarianism to do and how it 
should go about doing it, we devote considerable attention to producing a 
coherent conception of the problem of civil obligation. This entails 
criticising what is here taken to be a serious mistake in the familiar 
formulation of the problem and offering a narrower, more sharply defined 
alternative.
The second stage of the first strand consists of an examination of 
important contract theories in the light of this restricted conception of 
the problem of civil obligation. We analyse the contract theories of
4Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, in particular (in Parts Three,
Four and Five, and Appendices Four, Five and Six) , to see if they meet two 
criteria of adequacy: first, are they really contract theories? - i.e. is 
the idea of a social contract an essential feature of these theories? - and 
second, do these theories 'solve' the problem of civil obligation? It is 
argued that Hobbes fails to meet either of these criteria, but that the 
theories of Locke and Kant meet them in part and those of Rousseau and 
Rawls satisfy both.
In Part Six, the third stage, we shift from the specific to the 
general level. There we present an interpretation of contractarianism as 
an ethical-political theory. Following the analyses of Rousseau and Rawls, 
the crucial features of contractual theory are outlined and subjected to 
criticism.
The first strand of the thesis, then, is concerned with defining and 
locating the cluster of issues at the heart of social contract theory, 
namely, what Rousseau identified as "the fundamental problem of which the 
social contract provides the solution":
" "The problem is to find a form of association which will 
defend and protect with the whole common force the person 
and goods of each associate, and in which each while uniting 
himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain 
as free as before.'
Here the consanguinity of 'authority' and the 'state' make it impossi­
ble for Rousseau to treat them separately, that is, as independent as well 
as distinct notions. If by authority is understood the right (not just the 
power) to be obeyed, then the 'state' is that tangible set of circumstan­
ces, or order, in which some people can and may claim authority over others. 
Civility, in other words, on all its levels of meaning - as good citizen­
ship (conformity to the principles of social order); the community of citi­
zens collectively; behaviour proper to the intercourse of 'civilized' 
people - must reflect what Oakeshott calls "a practice of 'just' conduct":
"The idea of a moral practice, constituting a deliberately 
alterable system of law, and specifying the considerabili- 
ties of a distinguishable relationship of civility, which 
are not commands to be obeyed but conditions to be taken 
account of and subscribed to in choosing performances."4
5Conceived of as a response to the dilemmas of civility, the 'social 
contract' may be regarded as a presumption by which certain philosophers 
made explicit the decisive role of obligation (rather than 'mere' consent) 
in the 'rightful' undertakings of public institutions. It served both as 
a justification of law and a rationalization by which to limit the ambition 
of legislators. Ultimately, it functioned as an explanation and justifica­
tion of one man's voluntary submission of his freedom to the will of an­
other, and the special responsibilities borne by each party with reference 
to themselves and others in similar relation.
In terms of an expressly Lockean formulation, the social contract 
served as an explanation and justification of individual submission to 
authority: why people defer to some manifestations of authority and not
others. Rousseau, on the other hand, sought to determine what constitutes 
authority in the first place and on what grounds people ought to submit to 
its various manifestations. As with Hobbes, the thrust of Locke's argument 
is retrospective, whereas for Rousseau and Kant (and later, Rawls) the 
model is prospective, always current, serving as a framework upon which to 
hang contemporarily relevant social and political morality.
Whereas Hobbes almost exclusively concerned himself with what might be 
termed the problem of natural molestation (physical survival), Locke and 
virtually all the major 'contractarians' other than Hobbes (Rousseau, Kant 
and Rawls) addressed themselves to the problem of institutional molesta­
tion: the infringement of modes of authority and power upon personal and
corporate propriety.5 Granted, the various treatments of this problem 
hinged upon radically different notions of what constitutes an 'individual', 
what makes him a 'person'; but what they all shared in common was an aware­
ness that the 'Law of Nature' does not 'molest' men (since its universality 
and capacity to enforce itself reveals an inbuilt, unarbitrary authority), 
only the laws of men are open to malicious application, injudicious altera­
tion and inept administration. Volatile and fragile as they are, human 
associations must at once stiffen the fabric of their union with sensible 
rules of conduct while guarding against the suffocation of rigidity.
Though obviously an over-simplification of the concern underpinning con­
tractarian thought, it is clear that the thrust of all such thought was not 
so much in the direction of 'liberating' the individual to more fully and 
assertively manifest his individuality, but, rather, to protect the indivi-
6dual as a member of society so that he may more fruitfully and assuredly 
enhance his membership and, thereby, society as a whole. Though they 
approached this problem from opposite directions, Locke and Rousseau tack­
led it by asking two questions in ethics, one anthropological in import, 
the other political: first, what is (social) man?; second, what is it 
(other than calculable common interests and sheer power) that cements poli­
tical associations and in terms of which institutional arrangements are 
sustained, i.e., what is authority? Flowing from these is the further 
question: what is the nature of assent to authority?; from which questions
in toto springs the presumption of the social contract, not as a commitment 
to a particular set of performances but as a reminder that "civil associa­
tion is an intelligent engagement and not a so-called 'pattem of beha­
viour', and that what is constituted in this recognition of respublica is 
relationship in terms of a practice."6
It is the position of the individual within the 'practice' that poses 
the critical dilemma permeating all political thought, indeed, it is the 
very dilemma which gave rise to and sustains political philosophy - the 
conservation of the person within the ecology of power; power that derives 
from any source which generates or accentuates inequalities between men and 
seeks to regulate their relations. That which is being conserved, accord­
ing to contractarianism, is the integrity of the individual as a meaningful 
participant in those processes of change affecting his well-being. Man as 
the bearer of 'natural rights' - as the possessor of a natural, inalienable 
dignity - presumes and contrives contractual relations in order, firstly, 
to ensure mutual respect for and protection of these rights and, secondly, 
to facilitate individual and corporate development in accordance with these 
rights. Moreover, there is an additional element of hedonistic utilita­
rianism implicit in the first point and manifest in the second. For all 
contractarians (Rousseau least of all, Locke in particular) men's lives 
outside of civil associations (in the so-called 'state of nature') are 
relatively nasty, brutish and short, needing of institutions to enhance 
their well-being. The 'contract' is thus concerned with 'growth' to the 
extent that it is a device calculated to make possible those relations 
which leaven an otherwise uncomfortable lot. Further, since activity is 
implicit in agency, the conservation of the individual as a social agent, 
according to contractarianism, entails enrichment of the scope and quality 
of human activities. Development thus became tied to conservatism (para-
7doxically in the case of Rousseau) as both a reflection of and a lenitive 
for the human condition: a pragmatic combination of natural rights theory
and a limited utilitarianism.
The emphasis upon authority rather than power as the focus of civil 
relations reflected the all-consuming concern with legitimacy that pre­
occupied seventeenth and eighteenth century contractarians. The common 
fear echoed by the victors as well as the vanquished of the English Civil 
War that "authority hath been broken to pieces"7 evinced a long-simmering 
apprehension about the moral foundations of the state, its governance and 
governability. The felt need to establish and in part reiterate a deonto- 
logical theory of the state rather than reinforce the prevalent teleologi­
cal position hinted at more than the final collapse of the feudal order; 
rather, in intimated the emergence of the modem European state and the 
instability of its troublesome gestation. The deonotological thrust of 
'consent' theories arose from the desire to firmly establish 'duty' and 
'obligation' in the ambit of practical conduct rather than as the by­
products of coercion, habit and/or received tradition. Consent theories 
of the state stood in direct opposition to teleological theories, such as 
the cruder forms of utilitarianism and medieval, axiological justifications 
of feudalism according to which man is merely the propagator of universal 
values that define the bounds of 'proper' behaviour, not a rule-generating 
bundle of capacities, aspirations and fears. From the teleological pers­
pective, certain values are the measure of man, as opposed to man being the 
measure of all things.
The various notions gathered together under the rubrics 'legitimacy', 
'authority', 'power', 'obligation' and 'consent' represented, and still 
represent, four "clusters of questions" (as they have been characterized by 
Hannah Pitkin) "any or all of which are sometimes taken to define the prob­
lem of political obligation".8 The rebirth of the 'problem' as a modem 
dilemma requiring more than Aristotelian exegesis indicated the dramatic 
shift that had taken place in European thought with regard to the citizen 
and his biospoliticos. The individual was tentatively asserting himself as 
a member of his political collectivity and not just as one of its elements, 
inexorably bound to his clan by some genetic compact. The new dispensation 
ushered in the 'citizen' as representative of his own person and interests
8( in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  p r o p e r t y ) , r a t h e r  th a n  a s ,  a t  b e s t ,  spokesman o f  a n a t u r a l  
c o l l e c t i v e ,  su c h  as  t h e  f a m i ly  o r  c l a n .  The r e s u r r e c t i o n  o f  Roman law 9 i n  
a  number o f  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  n o t a b l y  B o logna  and O x fo rd ,  d u r in g  t h e  e l e v e n t h ,  
t w e l f t h  and t h i r t e e n t h  c e n t u r i e s  r e v iv e d  th e  e s s e n c e  o f  c i v i s  Romanics sum 
-  c i t i z e n s h i p  e n t a i l i n g  p r i v i l e g e s  and d u t i e s  b e f o r e  t h e  law  an d ,  m ost 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  " th e  whole o f  t h e  l a w . . .  r e l a t e s  e i t h e r  t o  
p e r s o n s  o r  t o  t h i n g s  o r  t o  l e g a l  a c t i o n s " 1 0 ; w h e re as  i n s o f a r  a s  a  p e r s o n  i s  
a  c i t i z e n ,  " e v e ry  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  s u b j e c t e d  t o  t r e a t m e n t  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  
h i s  own a c t i o n  and no one i s  made t h e  i n h e r i t o r  o f  th e  g u i l t  o f  a n o t h e r . " 11 
The s t a t e ,  t h e n ,  a s  t h a t  m ost i n c l u s i v e ,  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  s y s te m  o f  la w s ,  
a c c o r d in g  t o  Roman j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  s u b s i s t s  i n  a  n e tw ork  o f  m u tu a l  o b l i g a ­
t i o n s  be tw een  c i t i z e n s  and t h e i r  m u tu a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  common r i g h t s ,  co n ­
s t i t u t i n g  i n  t o t o  t h e  r e s p u b l i c a ,  ' t h e  a f f a i r  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ' .  "The common­
w e a l t h " ,  a rg u ed  C i c e r o ,  " i s  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  a f f a i r ;  and th e  p e o p le  i s  n o t  
e v e ry  g ro u p  o f  men, a s s o c i a t e d  i n  any m anner ,  b u t  i s  t h e  com ing t o g e t h e r  o f  
a c o n s i d e r a b l e  number o f  men who a r e  u n i t e d  by a  common a g re e m e n t  a b o u t  law 
and r i g h t s  and  by t h e  d e s i r e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  m u tu a l  a d v a n t a g e s . " 12
A new com pact was e m e rg in g  i n  p o s t - m e d i e v a l  E u ro p e ,  l e s s  c e r t a i n  and 
l e s s  r e a d i l y  e x p l i c a b l e  th a n  th e  o ld  o n e ,  f o u n d in g  i t s e l f  n o t  on m y s te r iu m  
e v a n g e l i i  b u t  on modes o f  human c o n d u c t ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c i v i l  i n t e r ­
a c t i o n  w i t h i n  a c o r p o r a t e  r a t h e r  th a n  an o r g a n i c  body; th u s  m aking p ro b le m ­
a t i c a l  w hat was h i t h e r t o  c o n s id e r e d  s e l f - e v i d e n t :  t h e  n a t u r e  and e x t e n t  o f
c i v i l  o b l i g a t i o n .  As a 'new ' p ro b le m , t h e n ,  o b l i g a t i o n  s e r v e d  t o  i l l u m i n ­
a t e  and fo c u s  t h e  key i s s u e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  i n  te rm s  o f  w hich  
s u b s e q u e n t  d i s c o u r s e  on man, s o c i e t y  and t h e  s t a t e  would be f a s h i o n e d :
" (1 )  The l i m i t s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  ( ' When a r e  you o b l i g a t e d  t o  
obey , and when n o t ? ' )
(2) The l o c u s  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  {'Whom a r e  you o b l i g a t e d  t o  
o b e y ? ')
(3) The d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  l e g i t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y  and  mere 
c o e r c io n  ( ' I s  t h e r e  r e a l t y  any d i f f e r e n c e ;  a r e  you 
e v e r  r e a l l y  o b l i g a t e d ? ' )
(4) The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  {'Why a r e  you e v e r  
o b l i g a t e d  t o  obey  even a l e g i t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y ? ' ) " 13
Power e n v e lo p e d  i n  t r a d i t i o n  was no l o n g e r  enough a t  t h e  t u r n  o f  t h e  
s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y 14 e i t h e r  a s  s u f f i c i e n t  a d h e s iv e  w i th  w hich  t o  u n i t e  t h e  
m o sa ic  o f  t h e  s e c u l a r  c i t y ,  o r  a s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  o v e r l a p p in g  and 
i n t r i c a t e  p a t t e r n s  c r e a t e d  by c i v i l  l i f e .  Not t h a t  power and t r a d i t i o n
9alone had ever been enough. Rather, the confluence of forces, circum­
stances and ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that eventual­
ly culminated in the watershed of the English Revolution changed the empha­
sis in matters of governance from one sort of insufficiency (namely, 
coercion clothed in habituation) to another (personal liberty constrained 
for its own protection). The movement from a 'pact of government', by 
which the estates accommodated each other within an Aristotelian universe 
of fixed spheres, to a 'social contract' recognizing each citizen as a 
party to the web of influences constituting society, represented not a 
devolution of power in those societies gripped by this notion, but, more 
subtly, the restructuring and diversification of the sources of authority. 
The shift in perspective from estates to individuals, albeit propertied 
citizens, stripped tradition-encumbered power of its 'natural' legitimacy 
and, consequently, refashioned the bonds of obligation enmeshing government 
and the governed.
The belief that the very idea of having a centralized system of 
coercion rests upon the need for stability, security, legislation and ad­
ministration implicitly negates the sufficiency of mere successful and sus­
tained incumbency as the source of legitimacy in government, necessary 
though it may be. While passionately centralist, Hobbes focused his entire 
argument for Leviathan upon the security and well-being of the citizenry, 
not as Filmer did upon the divine right of kings. Sir Edward Coke's formu­
lation of the 'ancient law' as immemorial custom and parliament its arbiter 
not only reinforced sentiment for parliament's 'radical' sovereignty as the 
watchdog of executive power, but provided the ideological underpinnings for 
the Whig victory of 1688.15 Moreover, the clash of 'Court' and 'Country' 
in the Long Parliament debates on the abolition of the 'prerogative' courts 
(established by the Crown to circumvent the common law) threw into sharp 
relief, on the one hand, the romantic linkage of private property, private 
interests and private persons with virtuous rustic arcadia, and, on the 
other, the dishonest, sycophantic tyranny of the city manifest in the 
King's Court.
"Society is made up of a court and country; government 
of court and Parliament; Parliament of Court and Country 
members. The court is the administration. The country 
consists of men and property; all others are servants.
The business of Parliament is to preserve the independence 
of property, on which is founded all human liberty and all
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human excellence. The business of government is to govern, 
and that is a legitimate authority; but to govern is to 
wield power, and power has a natural tendency to encroach.
It is more important to supervise government that to sup­
port it, because the preservation of independence is the 
ultimate political good."16
The congealment of financial and justiciary interests in western 
Europe and Britain at the turn of the thirteenth century, realized in the 
emergence of sovereign states, had granulated, as it were, by the seven­
teenth century and fragmented into disparate and jealously guarded con­
cerns no longer illuminated by the mystery of the Church or the 'cult of 
the State",19 but protected, and thereby enhanced, by an order of civility 
founded in an explicit articulation of personal as well as corporate 
interests. By implication, corporate interests boiled to the surface as 
manifestations of essentially personal contests: each man's struggle for
survival, his victories, defeats, coalitions and isolation of necessity 
gave birth in various arenas to certain equilibria captured and encapsula­
ted in rules of conduct and modes of association. Societies came to be 
regarded as 'buckets' of mutually-acknowledged civility, and the 'State' 
its heroic-mythopoeic expression. Thus, insofar as they ran against the 
tide of sentiment in their time, Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, John 
of Paris and William of Ockham pre-empted and, to a large extent prefashion­
ed seventeenth and eighteenth century contractarian thought.
The clash of ecclesiastical and temporal authority in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries reflected neither the rivalry of church and state 
nor the collision of the spiritual and political in popular affection, but, 
rather, the problem of locating sovereignty in government: whether or not
the laying down of the law (ius diceve) - the steerage of human affairs 
(gubeimaculum) was ultimately the province of priests or kings. Within the 
community of the church, the sacerdotal and the regnal contested each 
other's right to translate the idea of justice into reality and, consequen­
tly, threw into contention the location of original power, "for on that 
question hinged the answer whether or not a government was entitled to 
issue the law."16 The resolution of the conflict in favour of the regnum 
in effect demoted the priesthood to that coterie responsible for the propa­
gation of the foundational myth of Christian civility: a vengeful God who
settles his accounts for this life elsewhere. The primal fear of death 
compounded with the threat of racked immortality served now to reinforce
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the regnum as the executor of auctoritas and imperium, not, as had hitherto 
exclusively been the case, to maintain and replenish the plenitude of 
ecclesiastical power. Faiths of one stamp or another invested monarchs and 
clerical republicans19 alike with a touch of divinity and, where not them­
selves divinely appointed, inspired and/or maintained, temporal powers 
eagerly sought spiritual succour from the vicars of the dominant deity.20 
Nevertheless, reliance on divine mystery as the sinews of the state (as in 
Rome and Persia) or as its backstop (as in feudal Europe) said nothing 
about the nature of power or the mechanics of the state, or how the entire 
enterprise of the state hung together. Yet so long as the raison d'etre of 
the state remained unquestioned its tectonics were not considered problema­
tical. As a natural given, the order of society need not be any more enig­
matic than the order of the beasts, assuming, of course, that the origins 
and fate of each realm are confidently known. The blanket of speculative 
innocence fostered by doctrinaire faith, then, did little to encourage 
political analysis (or at least what we would now regard as such), except 
in the outstanding instances of Augustine and Aquinas, who did not follow 
doctrine so much as shape it, in the case of the former with a theory of 
anti-politics concerned exclusively with salvation from the temporal 
civitas diaboli, and, in the case of Aquinas, with a conception of legiti­
mate temporal authority under the tempering aegis of the church. It was 
not until the emergence of Florentine Realpolitik and, later, Protestant 
natural law that the intestines of the state were laid bare and discussed, 
as it were, in anatomical rather than eschatological terms.
Much of the criticism levelled against contractarianism has focused on 
its 'genetic' approach to civil obligation; in particular, the 'state or 
nature' as either a piece of descriptive history or a fiction abstracted 
from history. As history the notion is no doubt erroneous and, to the 
extent that Locke, especially, considered he was doing history he failed 
quite spectacularly. Viewed as a fiction, however, the idea of a state of 
nature cannot be so readily dismissed. We shall argue that despite the 
varying interpretations of the state of nature, the common attempt in all 
social contract theories to develop a picture of asocial (rather than pre­
social) man is a necessary step in the logical development of any argument 
for civil obligation. Briefly, the idea of the state of nature represented 
a kind of 'thought experiment' the aim of which was to conceptualize man 
both within and without a political context. In this way, the notion
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functioned as a critique of civil society by throwing into sharp relief the 
legal and moral perimeters of political relationships. It provided, in 
other words, an ideal typical model in terms of which theoretical compari­
sons of practical import could be made. In addition, it served as a meta­
phorical expression of the sentiment that even though individual men may 
not be logically or factually prior to civil society they transcend it as 
moral beings. One of the many implications of this view is that it is 
within the scope of human wit and capacity to amend or abandon aspects of 
civil society. This is possible precisely because man's moral ('asocial') 
status ethically and, on occasion, psychologically removes him from his 
artifacts in such as way as to make him (at least potentially) aware of 
their artificiality.
This theme, though variously expressed and pursued by each author, 
reveals an attitude to the world at once akin to and sharply at variance 
with the two most influential schools of Medieval philosophy - Augustinian- 
ism and Thomism. For Augustine, the Fall provides the definitive backdrop 
for all sketches of political society. Had man not fallen from grace and 
thereby corrupted his nature there would be no need for the institutiona­
lized coercion of the state. But man's tainted condition is a fact, argued 
Augustine, and the task before man is to consciously strive for a future 
Christian, non-political salvation. Aquinas took quite the opposite view, 
however, and in the tradition of Aristotle argued that grace represents the 
fulfilment of human nature, not its negation. The political state is 
proper to man, declared Aquinas, the Fall notwithstanding. Emphasizing the 
intellect rather than the will, Aquinas regarded civil law not merely as an 
instrument of coercion, but, when properly framed, as an expression of 
'right reason'. Whereas Augustine held civil law to be nothing other than 
a set of commands founded in some dominant will, Aquinas underplayed sys­
tematic force in favour of rational morality. Frcxn the Augustinian pers­
pective, then, civil law knows no limitations other than those of power, 
while from the Thomist perspective the sovereign is limited by a higher 
law. Since Aquinas did not abide by the Augustinian disjunction between 
fallen man and 'essential' man he could appeal to human reason as a force 
for justice qualifying brute strength. Consequently, the right of resis­
tance is everpresent in the Thomist scheme of things, duly qualified by a 
host of prudential considerations of particular cases in question. Clear­
ly, in Augustinian voluntarism we can see the seeds of Hobbes' Leviathan
13
and John Austin's command theory of law, while in Aquinas we may detect the 
nurslings of Locke's Second Treatise.
The myth of the Fall underpins the notion of 'natural' man and serves 
to make sense of the constant tension between civil society and the 'state 
of nature' in contractarian thought. As the nexus between two worlds, so 
to speak, the 'contract' represents a reconciliation of the insular and 
communal elements of 'human nature'. Insularity manifests itself in modes 
of separation: self-preservation, self-assertion, self-expansion. Commu­
nion resides in contact, union and mutual undertakings. Insularity is 
associated with the enhancement of the ego; in theological terms, pride.
Its objective is dominion over others, whereas communion invites the parti­
cipation of the individual in some larger endeavour of which he is a part. 
As a theological metaphor, then, the social contract reifies both the 
personal and communal consciousness of 'responsibility'. In primitive man, 
or, at least, according to the classical anthropological conception of 
primitive man, this consciousness is principally expressed as collective 
responsibility, in which the awareness of 'self' remains tentative and 
sketchy. Only when the idea of personal responsibility gains substance and 
defies collective constraint does the individual come to the fore. This 
featured most prominently in ancient civilizations during the emergence of 
legal constitutions.21 While aspects of the organic or collective concep­
tion of guilt endured - by which the wrongdoer in conscious or unwitting 
transgression of the norms involved his immediate kin in the magic world of 
curses - the subjective responsibility of the individual emerged as the 
critical factor in the attribution of guilt. Guilt, from being an objec­
tive fate which gathers up the doer in its wake, irrespective of his know­
ledge of and intention with regard to his deed, became a matter of personal 
and conscious responsibility. Nevertheless, it was not arbitrary human 
choice but transcendent divine authority which summoned man to responsibi­
lity. In this way human dignity retained its spark of divinity.
The movement from natural man to civil man in contractarian thought is 
depicted in terms of the growth of personal responsibility, whether it be 
from Hobbesian brutishness, Rousseauan mediocrity or Lockean unreliability. 
The image of natural man is everpresent - lurking beneath the surface, as 
it were - as civil man minus his civility. In other words, the very 
'naturalness' of natural man is not his chronological primacy but, rather,
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his germinal character as the lowest common denominator of humanity from 
which all development must proceed and back to which all regression must 
collapse. The true anthropological import of contractarian thought, then, 
is not the variety of evolutionary schemata it projects onto civil practi­
ces but the manner in which it endeavours to frame, and in part resolve, 
the dilemmas of politics in terms of 'human nature', that is, in terms of 
what man is - his being in the world - and what man might be - moral being 
in a just social order.
"In Justice as fairness the original position of equality 
corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional 
theory of the social contract", writes John Pawls. "This 
original position is not, of course, thought of as an 
actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primi­
tive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely 
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a 
certain conception of justice."22
The Rousseauan and Kantian turning points of contractarianism thus reveal 
themselves conjointly in the most recent expression of the doctrine as an 
avowedly metaphorical deontological approach to moral philosophy.
Precisely what is meant here by the Rousseauan and Kantian turning 
points of contractarianism is in many ways the principal concern of this 
thesis. It is argued that the lack of clarity in the literature with 
regard to the actual thrust of the doctrine springs from confusion about 
what properly constitutes the corpus of contractarianism. The lumping to­
gether of such diverse writers as Hobbes, Locke, Althusius, Spinoza, 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Suarez, Hooker, John Milton, Fichte, Kant, Rousseau, 
Blackstone, Proudhon, Herbert Spencer, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Alfred 
Fouillee and John Rawls, to mention but some of the most prominent among 
those who, since the sixteenth century, have employed the contractarian 
metaphor, is confusing to say the least. Needless to say, the mere use of 
a metaphor is hardly conclusive evidence of an author's commitment to a 
particular doctrine. Nor is a metaphor in isolation necessarily indicative 
of a broader doctrine in terms of which the metaphor may be amplified. For 
a metaphor to have substance it must have a matrix of meaning; for it to 
necessarily suggest a doctrine it must serve as a kind of 'schematization' 
which enables us to differentiate between fundamental and derivative 
details, allowing us to tackle 'structural' characteristics without the
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intrusion of irrelevancies. With regard to the notion of a social cont­
ract, it must be asked 'does the metaphor have a specific ideational mat­
rix?'; that is, may we speak of contractarianism as a doctrine or should we 
consider the contract as nothing other than a legalistic turn of phrase 
properly at home in natural law theory. It will be argued that there is a 
contractarian doctrine, but, in so doing, we will dispute the contractarian 
credentials of Hobbes and Locke, in particular, for whctn, in the final 
analysis, the metaphor remains a heuristic device illustrative of the views 
presented rather than kernel to the argument. Rousseau and (in part) Kant, 
on the other hand, along with their contemporary disciple, John Rawls, 
present 'contractarianism' as a distinct doctrine for which the 'social 
contract' is a constitutive metaphor, that is, a laden expression, the 
systematic unpacking of which will reveal the doctrine in full. The 
various other writers mentioned either employ the social contract as an 
illustrative metaphor in order to illuminate an otherwise unrelated (or 
distinct) theory, or simply reiterate the seminal contractarians. Conse­
quently, we shall initially focus upon Hobbes and Locke by way of differen­
tiating between a non-contractarian theory (Hobbes) and a very weak con­
tractarian theory - i.e. Lockean natural law - and then look at Rousseau, 
Kant and Rawls in order to distil the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a powerful contractarian doctrine.
The common thread uniting all political theories is the generative 
dilemma of civil obligation: the claim of the state upon personal proprie­
ty - whether or not the state may demand each citizen's obedience as a 
matter of right. The most simplistic rendering of social contract theory 
is that citizens ought to obey the laws of the state because they have 
somehow agreed or consented to do so. Insofar as Hobbes and Locke are 
taken to be paradigmatic contractarians this seems to be a reasonable in­
terpretation. But, clearly, the great failing of Hobbes and Locke in this 
regard is that they place too great an emphasis on consent. While con­
tracts are obviously agreements reliant upon the mutual consent of the con­
tracting parties, they are also agreements to do or not to do something. 
That is to say, all contracts are conditional. Aside from a host of other 
difficulties, the problem with both the Hobbesian and Lockean sketches of 
the social contract is that they are almost exclusively concerned with the 
notion of consent to the considerable detriment of the conditions of the 
'contract'. In other words, we are at best presented with a stunted meta-
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phor constrained by the demands of theories not conducive to its full 
development. The thrust of the metaphor when rounded out, as in the works 
of Rawls and Rousseau, is not the manner and timing of individual consent 
to obey the laws of the state, but what kind of state is deserving of 
obedience.
The prospective, rather than retrospective, character of contractar­
ianism thus presents us with the temptation to make political rationality 
less elusive by 'grounding' normative arguments in consensus-ensuring stan­
dards of universal reason. This fond and futile hope of the Enlightenment, 
however, has evaporated in a world which now despairs of ethical unanimity. 
The second strand of this thesis, then, represents an exploration of at 
least one principle for the orientation of 'practical reason' which depends 
neither on trans-historical canons of justice nor on the unrealistic anti­
cipation of a society based on complete harmony and universal agreement.
We call this the principle of apophradismi the anachronistic 'return of 
the dead'. The methodological premise underlying the central argument is 
that political philosophers should always bear in mind the critical trans­
formations that characterise 'social evolution'. The theory of social evo­
lution, it is maintained, may be regarded as a functional equivalent for 
obsolete kerygmatic guarantees: history as process rather than revelation.
Part Two focuses on Giambattista Vico's critique of the doctrine of 
guaranteed natural rights, in particular, his contention that nature is not 
a foundation but a problem: the problem of ataxia - confusion, indeter­
minateness. Although culture is dependent on nature, according to the Hew 
Science, it is always under-detemined by nature. As science is under­
determined by perception, so is marriage by sexuality, law by physical 
force, and property by the satisfaction of needs. Nature simply does not 
of itself contain enough 'information' (so we interpret Vico as arguing) 
to furnish value-discriminating criteria within culture. Such an admis­
sion, however, does not force us into an irrationalist relativism or ad hoc 
conventionalism. To demonstrate this we reconstruct Vico's theory of secu­
larization, that is to say, his theory of social evolution, concentrating 
on the idea that, even without trans-historical canons of justice, politi­
cal irrationality can be identified by a consideration of social apophra- 
dism.
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Appendix Three and Part Seven represent an attempt to develop this 
idea by discussing the surprising continuum between Hellenic politics and 
totalitarianism. The unlikely transition from the polis to the Third 
Reich, so we argue, depends on the functional differentiation of modem 
society into a loose nexus of largely unsynchronised, uncoordinated and 
semi-autonomous 'life-spaces', such as the family, education, law, science, 
religion, economics, politics, and so forth. We first examine how the 
Hellenic 'totalization' of politics (the failure to distinguish between 
polity and society) depended on the structural characteristics of the city- 
state which cannot be reproduced within highly differentiated industrial 
and post-industrial societies. Of special interest are the Aristotelian 
claims that, firstly, the state can be 'subjectified' as a 'family' or 
'colloquy', and, secondly, the individual can 'realize' himself in politi­
cal participation. Plausible for the polis, both these ideas lead to 
personal and institutional deformations when applied to complex modern 
societies. Although they make sense for a Gemeinschaft they are clearly 
out of step with the structural realities of a Gesellschaft. In Part Seven 
we contend that modern philosophical justifications for etatist coercion 
and 'the party line' stem from a 'Hellenising' and apophradic refusal to 
differentiate between polity and society, and from an attendant insistance 
on the classical schematization of society as 'a whole made out of parts'. 
Because of the limited size of the polis, a polytheistic world view and 
other related factors, Aristotle could view the subordination of all 
spheres of life to politics as a subtle moral ideal. By appealing to the 
'structural realities' of social evolution, we believe we can demonstrate 
the contemporary irrationality of such an ideal without the warrant of 
'eternal' laws of nature and reason.
The secular covenant, then, not as the constitution of civitas terrara 
but as the 'thought experiment' of anxious and reflective men.
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PART ONE
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM: CIVIL OBLIGATION
"Philosophy can exclude nothing. Thus it should never 
start from systematization. Its primary stage should 
be termed 'assemblage'."
Alfred North Whitehead
The problem of civil obligation lies at the heart of contractarian 
thought. It is the generative dilemma from which the idea of the social 
contract arose and in terms of which its adequacy must be ascertained.
To this end, it is necessary to investigate the dimensions of obligation 
('civl' or otherwise), and develop a framework for evaluation which will, 
firstly, provide an analysis of the parameters along which obligations 
may be identified; secondly, locate obligation within a broader moral- 
conceptual matrix, in which obligation is related to other moral concepts; 
thirdly, provide an account of the force of ascriptions of obligation, in 
particular, the implications of such ascriptions for what the subject of 
obligation is committed to do, or ought to do, or has reason to do, i.e. 
the phenomenal dimension of obligation; and, fourthly, set forth the 
state of affairs, actions or events which bring obligations into being - 
the grounds of obligation. This last dimension is of particular importance, 
especially with regard to contractarian thought. The grounds of obligation 
are inextricably entwined in the network of rules, roles and relations that 
constitute social practices. That is to say, the applicability of these 
rules, roles and relations to human affairs grounds obligations. Obliga­
tions and institutions are coeval, or, perhaps, obligations exist prior 
to institutions; whatever, the concept is to be understood in terms of 
how it is manifest in social structures. Consequently, any consideration 
of the underpinnings of obligation must explore the rules and institutions 
of social practices.
The grounding of obligations in social practices necessarily makes 
the task of justifying a particular theory of obligation very difficult. 
Firstly, one's acknowledgement of an obligation such that one 'has an
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obligation' will influence what one has reason to do, and the argument 
for a reasonable theory of obligation must endeavour to explain how and 
why having obligations is relevant to the practical reasoning of persons 
who feel themselves to be under an obligation. However, there is the 
additional difficulty in justifying obligations necessarily founded in 
social practices of furnishing criteria by which these practices are 
themselves justified. These two justificatory projects have often been 
regarded as separate issues, one dealing with the question 'Why should 
there be moral rules, or what moral rules should there be?', the other 
dealing with the question 'Why should one do what is "moral"?'. In the 
context of political thought, both questions have merged as different 
aspects of the one problem: the justification of the state. As the most
inclusive set of social practices embracing a number of people in a given 
territory, the state represents "a comprehensive, exclusive, and compul­
sory association".1 Consequently, the questions 'Why should there be laws 
(the rules of the state)?' and 'Why should one obey the law?' may be seen 
as correlative, since an answer to the first question entails a commitment 
to answering the second. This is not to say that in endorsing the state 
one is necessarily committed to obeying the laws of that state, but in 
endorsing the state, one must give reasons for not obeying its laws, 
should one choose to do so. In other words, the ultimate concern in 
offering a justification of the state is to more clearly establish the 
citizen's relationship with the state as an institution which makes claims 
on him, i.e. the state as that institution which may demand personal 
obedience as a matter of right. To ask 'Why should one obey the laws of 
the state?', then, is to question whether the state properly has the 
authority (the right) to make such claims - the problem of civil obliga­
tion as the contestable right of the state to command obedience.
The question 'Why should one obey the law?' is commonly posed in 
terms of an obligation to obey. The way in which one frames the issue 
will naturally be influenced by one's view of what it is to have an obli­
gation. It is in some peculiar way to be required or bound to do some­
thing - the word derives from the Latin obtigare, to bind. If one has an 
obligation to do something then it is no longer simply optional with him 
whether or not he will do it. There is an element of constraint embracing
his freedom to do otherwise. Beyond this, however, there is little agree­
ment, and the differences have been a source of much confusion. To begin
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with, the terms 'legal obligation', 'moral obligation' and 'civil (or 'poli­
tical') obligation' are often employed in different ways, resulting in con­
fusion about the kind of obligation at issue. Secondly, there are different 
notions of what it is to be under an obligation of any kind. For some, the 
question of civil obligation reduces to discussion of whether one has con­
sciously made a commitment to obey the law, while for others, it is the 
issue of whether there is a tacit element of commitment entailing obedience. 
For still others, the question is whether there can be reasons of any sort 
why one should obey the law. The idea of the social contract embodies an 
attempt to deal with the problem, firstly, by showing that there can and 
must be reasons why one should obey the law, secondly, by developing a voli­
tional (or commitment) theory of obligation, and, thirdly, by offering a 
theory of the development of political authority. Before we can assess the 
success or failure of contractarianism, it is therefore necessary to discuss 
in some detail precisely what is meant by the term 'civil obligation'.
The purpose of this Part, then, is to clarify the notion of civil obli­
gation, rather than to propound a particular theory or to develop in detail 
the theory largely held in common by Kant, Rousseau and Rawls. However, in 
the course of discussing obligation in general, we shall focus upon what it 
means to ask 'Why should one obey the law?' and introduce the first step in 
the contractarian argument (as found in Kant, Rousseau and Rawls, rather 
than Hobbes and Locke), namely, that the dilemma is misconceived when 
framed as 'Why should one obey the law?'. Rather, it is argued, the prob­
lem of civil obligation is best posited in the question 'Is one under an 
obligation to obey the law?'.
I
Rules and Principles
Obligation is predicated by rules; civil or political, obligation is 
predicated by the common life of citizens and, consequently, by the rules of 
their intercourse. It is not our concern here to tackle the classical phi­
losophical questions or rules, that is, how we know whether a rule is being 
followed, and how we can individuate rules, problems discussed extensively 
and effectively by Wittgenstein. Rather, we begin by observing that rules 
are most apparent in civil intercourse in the giving of accounts. With com­
plete disregard to the corpus of sociological literature, rules do not
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appear as inductive generalizations of behaviour; they are, properly 
speaking, the principles used by persons to account for, explain, justify, 
or excuse, their conduct. Rules, then, are not mere regularities in 
conduct, but the underpinnings of regulated conduct. Taken in their 
entirety as the assertorical presumptions which articulate civil society 
rules constitute, as it were, the grammar of civil intercourse.
Without belabouring the analogy of grammar, it can be seen that the 
logical relationships between linguistic items in the language of civil 
intercourse will not be reflected faithfully in their superficial repre­
sentation. These relationships are not themselves camouflaged in any 
sense; they are part of the 'linguistic competence' of any speaker of the 
language. The problem lies not in discerning these relationships, but in 
giving sufficient attention to them, and not being distracted by shallow 
analogies. "In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' 
from 'depth grammar'," writes Wittgenstein, "What immediately impresses 
itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the con­
struction of the sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can 
be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say of the
word 'to mean', with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect.
No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about."2
The confusions and ambiguities apparent in much contemporary philo­
sophy arise from an inability or unwillingness to come to grips with the 
nature and functions of language. Above all, remarks Wittgenstein, our 
grammar is lacking in perspicuity. What we must do in order to gain focus, 
is to take what is already open to view, and to make it surveyable by 
rearrangement. We must assemble a synoptic, comparative account of the 
class of concepts which presents difficulty. , However, the order which is 
to be sought in our knowledge of the use of a language is not the order, 
but one out of many possible orders; it is an order with a particular end 
in view, that of clearing away confusions. By attaining a clear view of a 
language we can remove all of the ambiguities of traditional philosophy; 
we can "pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is 
patent nonsense".3 In attempting to remove philosophical confusions, then, 
the concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance.
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There are many possible ways to order a society, but any kind of 
order depends upon commonly recognized rules of conduct. People must be 
able, as Dorothy Emmet puts it,
"....to entertain generally fulfilled expectations about 
how others should behave, so that they can cooperate or 
compete with some reasonable forecast of the sorts of 
things others are likely to do....These fairly stable 
mutual expectations, which are the conditions or purposive 
action in any society, are only fulfilled where there are 
some generally accepted ways of behaving."4
Some of these ways are customary, having developed informally over 
the years, while others have been adopted by persons through more formal 
procedures. In any case, public behaviour has become to all intents and 
purposes standardized, and is generally considered 'correct' or 'right'; 
conduct which deviates from this established pattern is 'incorrect' or 
'wrong'.
There is no term in ordinary English which readily comes to mind for 
this general notion of a standard or pattern of correct behaviour. Never­
theless, it has become an important concept in contemporary philosophy, 
especially in the areas of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. 
The term commonly used is 'rule* ('norm' is too weak), but a rule is one 
specific (if not definite) kind of standard of correctness. (In fact, 
'standard' is also a species of the genus under discussion.) There are 
also regulations, guidelines, precepts, directives, laws, decrees, ordi­
nances, edicts, customs, practices, procedures and precedents. All of 
these imply modes or patterns of conduct, to conform to which in the 
appropriate circumstances is correct, to deviate from which is incorrect 
or wrong. Let us conform to the current practice or fashion and refer to 
all these as rules. Rules, in this broad sense, render certain conduct 
non-optional or, at best, conditional. That is to say, it is not exclu­
sively one's own business whether or not one conducts oneself in certain 
ways. One will be corrected or called to account by others if one's 
conduct does not on the whole conform to the appropriate mode of conduct. 
The syntactical and regulatory functions of rules, then, give rise to 
social meanings in addition to those underpinning their (tacit) promulga­
tion .
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T here  i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  t h o s e  r u l e s  t h a t  have  e v o lv e d  o v e r  a 
l e n g t h y  p e r i o d  ( f o r  ex am p le ,  c u s to m s ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  and p r e c e d e n t s )  and th o s e  
t h a t  have  been  a d o p te d  th ro u g h  fo rm a l  p r o c e d u r e s .  The fo rm e r  may be con­
s i d e r e d  a s  a p a t t e r n  o f  a c t u a l  c o n d u c t ,  a r e g u l a r i t y  o f  b e h a v io u r  w hich i s  
g e n e r a l l y  seen  as  a model o f  c o r r e c t n e s s .  R u les  w hich  have  been  p o s i t e d  
by some a u t h o r i t y ,  on t h e  o t h e r  han d , t h o s e  w hich have  been  e n a c t e d  and 
f o r m a l l y  p ro m u lg a te d  ( r u l e s  in  th e  n a r r o w e r  s e n s e ,  b u t  a l s o  d i r e c t i v e s ,  
g u i d e l i n e s  and e d i c t s )  c a n n o t  be  u n d e r s to o d  i n  q u i t e  th e  same way. In  
many c a s e s ,  t h e r e  would be no mode o f  c o n d u c t  were i t  n o t  f o r  t h e  e n a c t ­
m en t .  No one  would pay  t a x e s ,  o r  v e ry  few a t  m o s t ,  i f  t h e r e  were n o t  a 
r u l e  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  payment o f  t a x e s .  (R u les  i n  t h e  n a r r o w e r  s e n se  m ust be 
g a z e t t e d ,  b u t  cus tom s a r e  n e v e r  g a z e t t e d .  They m ust a w a i t  t h e  a n t h r o p o l o ­
g i s t . )  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  r e g u l a t e d  c o n d u c t  makes i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  
w hat o t h e r s  w i l l  do w i th  some d e g re e  o f  c o n f i d e n c e .  B u t  where a r u l e  i s  
i n v o l v e d ,  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  j u s t  r e g u l a r i t y .  C e r t a i n  c o n d u c t  i s  e x p e c te d  
o f  o t h e r s ,  and t h i s  means more t h a n  t h a t  i t  i s  p r e d i c t a b l e .
T here  a r e  two p r i n c i p a l  s e n s e s  i n  w hich one may e x p e c t  a n o th e r  t o  do 
s o m e th in g .  The f i r s t  we m ig h t  te rm  th e  ' e p i s t e m i c '  o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  s e n s e ,  
f o r  i t  i n v o l v e s  some m en ta l  s t a t e  o r  d i s p o s i t i o n .  E x p e c t in g  in  t h i s  s e n se  
means a n t i c i p a t i n g  o r  l o o k in g  f o r .  We m ig h t  a l s o  c a l l  t h i s  th e  p r o p o s i t ­
i o n a l  s e n s e  o f  ' e x p e c t ' , f o r  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  "B e x p e c t s  C t o  do x" e n t a i l s  
"B t h i n k s  ( o r  b e l i e v e s )  t h a t  C w i l l  do x " . Such e x p e c t a t i o n s  may c o n c e rn  
n o t  o n ly  o u r  f e l l o w s  b u t  any k in d  o f  o b j e c t  o r  e v e n t .  One may e x p e c t  h i s  
s a l a r y  t o  i n c r e a s e  b e c a u s e  he e x p e c t s  t o  be p ro m o te d ,  and t h i s  b e c a u s e  he 
e x p e c t s  t o  r e c e i v e  good r e f e r e n c e s .  Such e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  b a s e d  
upon some k in d  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e ,  o f t e n  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e .  One may 
sp e ak  h e r e  o f  j u s t i f i e d  o r  u n j u s t i f i e d  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  m eaning t h a t  th e  
e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  w e l l -  o r  i l l - s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  a v a i l a b l e  e v id e n c e .
The se co n d  s e n se  o f  ' e x p e c t '  m ig h t  be te rm ed  th e  'n o r m a t i v e '  s e n s e ,  
f o r  i t  i n v o l v e s  more t h a n  a n t i c i p a t i o n .  To e x p e c t  so m e th in g  i n  t h i s  s e n se  
means t o  lo o k  f o r  i t  as due from  a n o t h e r ,  o r  a s  f i t t i n g ,  m ee t ,  o r  a p p r o ­
p r i a t e  t o  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  And, o f  c o u r s e ,  i t  i s  o n l y  o f  p e r s o n s  t h a t  such  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  may p r o p e r l y  be h e l d .  One may e x p e c t  o n e ' s  b a r g a i n i n g  a g e n t  
t o  s u p p o r t  o n e ' s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  One c a n n o t  i n  t h e  same s e n se  
e x p e c t  r a i n  o r  e x p e c t  a c h a i r  t o  s u p p o r t  o n e ' s  w e ig h t .  T h is  second  se n se  
o f  ' e x p e c t '  may be d e r i v e d  from  th e  f i r s t ,  b u t  i t  i s  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  i t :
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one may expect an act from another without believing that the act will be 
performed. One may expect one's agent to be tough while knowing that he 
folds easily under pressure.
There is a special use of 'expect' in the second sense which implies 
an injunction or requisition. A policeman says to a motorist, "I expect 
you to proceed directly to the station". Whereas we only 'have' some 
expectations, we 'place' others as we place injunctions and make requi­
sitions. "I expect" functions here like a performative utterance, in that 
we use the expression "I expect you to... "to expose others to require­
ments. Not every expectation in the normative sense implies a rule, but 
the converse is definitely true, that every rule implies an expectation.
A rule in the broad sense may be thought of as a system of expecta­
tion^: at least, it is grounded in expectations even when not stated as
an imperative. That expectation forms a system means that it is ordered: 
it is communal, mutual and reciprocal. In a certain situation one is 
expected to act in a certain sort of way. The expectation is communal in 
that it is held in common by at least most members of some 'community'.
It is mutual and reciprocal in that it applies to everybody, or, at least, 
to anybody within the 'community'. Not what B would be expected to do, 
but what 'one' is expected to do, what is to be done by anyone in such 
circumstances.
Being systemic (or part of a system) is what warrants an expectation 
or makes it 'legitimate'. If it is grounded in such a system, then it is
not random, capricious, or arbitrary. As Oakeshott puts it, "while the
terms of (a) procedure may be any that commend themselves to the associates 
concerned, it is conditional upon their being recognized as authoritative. 
In other words, legislative procedure in civil association must be composed 
of rules and it must be recognized as itself a component of the system of 
lex. "6 There being a rule, its being systematically expected, is what 
entitles, licenses or warrants one to expect in the particular case. The 
particular expectation is neither justified nor unjustified. It is legi­
timate if it forms part of a system. The system, the rule, is what may be
justified or unjustified. Legitimacy and justification are two quite
different notions, and a great deal of confusion in moral and political 
philosophy has resulted from conflating them. Roughly, legitimacy (or
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validity) is conferred by rules, while justification appeals to ends, 
purposes, or principles.
Something is legitimate if it conforms to or issues through the 
relevant rules or systems of expectation (which include procedures, 
practices, and channels). An expectation would be legitimate, as we have 
seen, if it fits into such a system; but what about the system or rule 
itself? A rule may be legitimate or illegitimate (valid or invalid) if
there is some other rule to which it may or may not conform, some 'rule
for making rules'.
This is, of course, quite possible in the case of laws and other 
rules which are enacted according to certain procedures. We may also
speak of an exercise of authority as legitimate if it is licensed by an
authority-granting rule, and we may speak of a government as legitimate if 
there are rules which govern the assumption of office. On the other hand, 
with customs and other informal moral and social rules there is no question 
of 'validity', for these rules were not, to all intents and purposes, made 
by anybody. Questions of legitimacy or validity can be raised only in 
terms of rules, and this means that the quest for validity must end when 
the rules terminate. A claim or expectation is legitimate if in accord 
with a moral rule, but it is confusing to ask whether the rule itself is 
legitimate, since there are no rules for making rules.
A claim or expectation may be warranted by a legal rule as well.
Here one may question the validity of the rule, since there are further 
legal rules which govern the enactment of laws. However, even with laws 
one must finally encounter rules which have no further rules to validate 
them. Their authority derives from their being accepted. There is no 
'ultimate validity' for moral or legal rules, but this should neither 
alarm nor surprise us. Validation is a kind of examination which is rela­
tive to a rule or system of rules, and it is no defect in the rule or sys­
tem of rules that it may not be examined in the same way. For example, 
linguistic conventions rest upon our social practices; they are constitu­
ted or created by our linguistic acts, which amount to the application of 
our words and sentences. These have a sense only in so far as they form 
a part of a technique in so far as they contribute to a custom or insti­
tution. Possessing a concept and understanding a rule are manifest in a
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person's correct performance, his mastery of a technique. The ascription 
of understanding to a person is justified by reference to his behaviour, 
and this directly entails the impossibility of a private language, one 
which refers to a person's private, immediate sensations, and one which 
only he can understand. The public and conventional nature of language 
readily permits analysis of usage on the grounds of validity even though 
these grounds must themselves remain 'given'.
This may be disturbing to some if it is taken to imply that the rules 
or system of rules are not open to examination or review, that they are, 
in the final analysis, arbitrary. But there is another way in which rules 
may be assessed: we may evaluate or assess them in the light of the
Values which they enable us to realize. Security, stability, prosperity, 
happiness, a freedom which we prize, an equitable distribution of 
resources - whatever it is we think desirable, we may ask whether the 
rules in current usage offer the best possibility of achieving them. This 
is justification as distinct from legitimation, evaluation instead of 
certification, vindication rather than validation. Both these activities 
are forms of assessment, attempts to show that a claim, expectation, or 
rule is not arbitrary: the one by showing it to be systematic, the other
by showing it to be valuable. (Obviously, the term 'legitimate' is often 
used more broadly, but in order to maintain the distinction in view, we 
shall employ the term only for a certain form of assessment.)
It would not be stretching the term too far to speak of the various 
considerations in light of which rules are evaluated as 'principles'. 
Expectations are validated by rules, and rules are justified in terms of 
principles. However, this is not a familiar approach, so it would be 
best to discuss principles and the ways in which we apply and evaluate 
rules.
The term 'principle' is probably the least precise and most complex 
in our moral vocabulary. It is not only, or even primarily, a moral con­
cept. Its uses in science, mathematics, logic and metaphysics have con­
tributed to the complexity of its analysis so that caution seems only 
natural when using the term in moral philosophy. Ordinary usage offers 
little guidance, since the philosophical expressions 'moral principles' 
and 'principles of morality' occur infrequently in our common moral
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discourse. Here one hears of men of principle, of acting on principle, 
or of making something a matter of principle, all of which are somewhat 
at variance with the philosophical notion of appealing to a principle.
The term is also employed in legal deliberation, where 'principles of 
law' are certain broad considerations, both formal and material, which 
guide the adoption and the application of particular legal rules.
Rules and principles figure in moral reasoning in very much the 
same way that they figure in legal reasoning. Rules are applied directly 
to acts; principles are significant both as justifications of the rules 
and as guides in determining whether a given rule should be applied.
Rules are systems of more or less determinate expectations, but principles 
are not. Principles determine or legitimate expectations only indirectly, 
by guiding consideration of when a particular rule should govern a situa­
tion. They do not establish alternative systems of expectation of their 
own.
Naturally, moral reasoning is not limited to the mere application of 
rules any more than legal reasoning is. Decisions are often premissed 
solely upon consideration of principles. This has been historically the 
procedure in Chancery courts or 'courts of equity'. During the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries a second system of courts was developed in England 
supplementary to the King's Bench and other royal courts. Unlike the 
royal courts, the courts of the Chancellor did not apply the common law 
but rendered decisions based upon the principles of justice and mercy.
The Chancellor was to do 'equity' when the common law failed in this 
regard. This dual system of justice persisted until the mid-nineteenth 
century, when the two functions were merged into one unified system. But 
the distinction still remains between an 'action at law' and an 'equitable 
remedy'; though both are now administered by one system of courts, there 
are different rules of practice which govern the two proceedings.
In our own moral deliberations we frequently withhold the applica­
tion of rules because principles militate against them, and we may have 
to make decisions without relevant guiding rules. It is in these cases 
that principles bear most directly on the decisions we make. Considera­
tions of utility or of justice may themselves support a particular deci­
sion, rather than manifesting themselves indirectly through rules. Yet,
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even though we may be tempted to equate principles with rules important 
differences remain. Principles are not 'applied' as rules are, even in 
these cases. We do not conform to principles or act on them as we do 
rules. We often act on principle, but acting on principle is quite dif­
ferent from acting according to rules.
Acting on principle is more like making it a rule to do something 
than conforming to a rule, but it is different in important respects from 
both. When one makes it a rule to do something one does it habitually 
and usually without regard to its utility or practicality in individual 
cases. One could make it a rule to write two thousand words every day, 
or to more zealously observe the Sabbath. If so, then one would do these 
things even when it would be more convenient or more agreeable and not the 
least harmful to make an exception. Making something a rule is different 
from doing something as a rule. If I write two thousand words daily only 
as a rule, then I may write one thousand words on those days when it is 
more convenient to do so. But if I have made this a rule, then I do not 
make exceptions on such grounds. The rules one makes for oneself may be 
just as strenuous and just as rigidly enforced as those imposed by others, 
though, of course, they have only the authority which one chooses to give 
them. Whether one makes exceptions is purely one's own affair. Acting 
on principle is akin to making something a rule in that no public authori­
tative rule is involved. The difference is that when I make something a 
rule it is because I think that doing that sort of thing regularly has 
some value - that it is a good policy because of some benefit to be 
derived or some hazard to be avoided. Writing two thousand words a day 
is conducive to my mental health, and observing the Sabbath may be 
spiritually uplifting. Perhaps I think that if I do not make these acts 
regular features of my life a lapse might occur at the wrong time. So 
even though I feel quite certain no harm would come from any particular 
deviation from routine, I observe each 'rule' as though it were a rule. 
Given this view of rules, a conflict of rules presents a practical per­
plexity, such as a double entry in a diary, not knowing which to honour.
A conflict of principles, however, is not a practical nuisance but a moral 
crisis requiring a basic resolution. Rules are, as it were, the practical 
implications of principles.
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Thus f a r  we have  c o n s id e r e d  r u l e s  and th e  p r i n c i p l e s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  
w h ich  th e y  a re  a d o p te d  and a p p l i e d .  T here  i s  a  t h i r d  e le m e n t in  m ora l 
and l e g a l  r e a s o n in g  w hich h a s  been  c o n s id e r e d  o n ly  i n d i r e c t l y  so  f a r ,  and 
t h a t  i s  ju d g em e n t. The aim  o f  m ora l and l e g a l  r e a s o n in g  i s  u s u a l ly  to  
r e a c h  some c o n c lu s io n  a b o u t w hat o u g h t o r  o u g h t n o t  to  be done . The con­
c lu s io n  may be e i t h e r  p a r t i c u l a r  o r  g e n e r a l .  " I  o u g h t to  t e l l  him  th e  
t r u t h  now t h a t  we a re  s u re  he w i l l  n o t  l i v e  lo n g "  i s  an exam ple o f  w hat i s  
m ean t by a p a r t i c u l a r  ju d g em e n t, a  judgem en t a b o u t w hat o u g h t to  be done 
in  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e .  A more g e n e r a l  ju dgem en t w ould be "A p a t i e n t  s h o u ld  
be t o l d  th e  t r u t h  a b o u t h i s  c o n d i t io n " .  G e n e ra l ju d g em en ts  may be th e  
c o n c lu s io n  o f  a  p ie c e  o f  m o ra l r e a s o n in g ,  o r  th e y  may be in v o k ed  in  j u s t i ­
f i c a t i o n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  m o ra l ju d g em e n t. In  th e  l a t t e r  c a se  th e y  b e a r  a 
re se m b la n c e  to  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s ;  and th e y  may j u s t  a s  w e l l  be c a l l e d  
'm o ra l  p r i n c i p l e s '  a s  g e n e r a l  m o ra l ju d g e m e n ts . (Note t h a t  r u l e s  can be 
c a r r i e d  o u t  by d e l e g a t i o n ,  w h ereas  p r i n c i p l e  co m p liance  c a n n o t be d e le g a ­
t e d  -  one c a n n o t f u l f i l  th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  a p r i n c i p l e  on someone e l s e 's  
b e h a l f . )
In  t h i s  t h e s i s  we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in  e x am in in g  th e  g e n e r a l  judgem en t 
(o r  p r i n c i p l e )  t h a t  one h a s  an o b l ig a t i o n  to  obey th e  law  ( t h a t  i s ,  th e  
r u l e s  o f  th e  l e g a l  sy s tem  o r  sy s te m s  to  w hich one i s  s u b je c t  and th e  
e d i c t s ,  d e c i s i o n s ,  and so on w hich  a r e  i s s u e d  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th o s e  
r u le s )  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  o n e 's  own ju d g em en t o f  i t s  w o r th . Can t h i s  ju d g e ­
m ent be j u s t i f i e d  by a p p e a l  t o  any o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  m o ra l i ty ?  And i f  
i t  c a n , a r e  t h e r e  any c ir c u m s ta n c e s  in  w hich th e  judgem en t m ig h t n o t  
a p p ly ?
I I
P rim a F a c ie  and P re su m p tiv e  O b l ig a t io n s
The te rm  'o b l i g a t i o n '  may be u se d  in  b o th  a c o n c e p tu a l  and a s u b s ­
t a n t i v e  s e n s e .  In  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  s e n se  i t  d e n o te s  th e  g e n e r a l  s t a t e  o r  
c o n d i t io n  o f  b e in g  bound o r  r e q u i r e d ,  w i th o u t  r e g a r d  t o  th e  s o r t  o f  th in g  
one i s  bound to  do o r  to  f o r b e a r  from  d o in g , a s  when we s a y , "He h a s  no 
s e n se  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  to w ard  h i s  f e l lo w  c i t i z e n s " ,  o r  " A r i s t o t l e  and 
O a k e s h o tt  o f f e r  s i m i l a r  t h e o r i e s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n " .  In  th e  s u b s ta n t iv e  se n se
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of the term we speak of particular obligations which a person may be under; 
in this sense the word may be pluralized and given articles. A person may 
have an obligation to pay his taxes, and he may have a variety of obliga­
tions to his family. When we speak of kinds of obligation in the concep­
tual sense we are speaking of the kind of tie or 'bond' involved. There 
are various ways of being bound to perform a given act; one.may be 
required by law, by a rule of social propriety, by a commitment one has 
made, or by other moral considerations. We shall refer to the various 
kinds of obligation in the conceptual sense as the forms of obligation, of 
which there are at least three: legal, moral, and social obligations.
When we discuss the varieties of obligation in the substantive sense 
we are speaking not of the form of the bond but, to put it crudely, of its 
content. One may have an obligation to pay rent, or to educate one's 
children. When we differentiate kinds of obligations in the substantive 
sense we may do so by reference to the kind of act required, the person or 
institution to whom the obligation is owed, or the relationship which 
gives rise to the obligation. Here we speak of financial and family obli­
gations. We shall refer to the different kinds of obligations in the 
substantive sense as the varieties of obligation. It is to be hoped that 
these distinctions will enable us to clear up some confusions in termino­
logy. The term 'legal obligation' has been used to describe a variety of 
obligation, while 'civil' or 'political' obligation has been used for a 
form of obligation7. We shall use the terms 'legal obligation' and 'moral 
obligation' to refer to different forms of obligation, and we shall use 
'civil obligation' to refer to a variety of obligation: the obligation to
obey the law. It is not a variety of legal obligation, since there is no 
law to the effect that the law be obeyed. If there is such a thing as 
civil obligation, it will be a variety of moral obligation. The litera­
ture of politics and government is replete with the plural term 'political 
obligations', which refers to a set of obligations including such things 
as being informed, voting, and otherwise participating in the civil life 
of one's society. So used, however, 'political (or civil) obligations' 
refers to a variety of moral obligation, of which civil obligation in the 
singular - the obligation to obey the law - is one particular obligation.
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Occasionally in the course of daily life we are confronted by con­
flicting obligations. We can fulfil one only at the expense of defaulting 
on the other. Somehow we must determine which obligation we will honour 
and which we must set aside. Which of the two bonds is stronger, which 
more readily broken? At other times, fulfilling an obligation may entail 
bringing about some considerable harm, either to oneself or to others. In 
this situation, too, one must decide whether the obligation is strong 
enough to justify the consequences of keeping it, or whether it might not 
in good conscience be set aside. As Mill remarked, "It is not the fault 
of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules 
of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that 
hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obli­
gatory or always condemnable."8
Considerations such as these have led many philosophers to adopt the 
term 'prima faerie obligation'. A prima facie obligation is an obligation 
which, however strong, can be overridden in concrete situations. To say 
that one has a prima facie obligation to do something is at least to say 
that one has a good reason for doing it, though there may be better rea­
sons in the particular circumstances for doing something else. Indeed, it 
is no doubt the case that most people who claim that there is an obliga­
tion to obey the law would want to say that it is a prima facie obligation 
This means that the mere fact that some action is an act of disobedience 
militates against the performance of the action; its illegality, in other 
words, is a powerful consideration in every case which must be overcome by 
other considerations before the performance of the action can be justified 
However, if one pursues this point an unwanted implication soon surfaces, 
namely, that an obligation which is overridden was not an obligation to 
begin with. What appeared to be an obligation ('prima facie': at first
appearance) turned out on further investigation not to be obligatory.
Yet, surely this cannot be right. An obligation which is overridden is 
nevertheless an unfulfilled obligation. Recognition of the frustrated 
existence of unfulfilled obligations underpins our saying that it is a 
good idea to explain one's actions when one can to those whose expecta­
tions have not been fulfilled, both to protect one's own reputation and in 
order not to undermine confidence in the general reliability of such 
social bonds. This may help explain the fact that many persons who engage 
in civil disobedience feel that they ought willingly to accept punishment
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for their actions. Accepting the punishment would be acknowledging the 
force of the obligation which they feel is overridden in that particular 
situation.
The philosopher's use of the phrase prima facie is different from 
the jurist's. In legal writing the phrase is frequently employed to des­
cribe evidence which is sufficiently persuasive to require rebuttal.5 
This suggests a similar but weaker thesis: that though one does not always
actually have an obligation to obey the law, one usually does. Since it 
is generally the case that one has an obligation to obey, one may in any 
concrete situation be presumed to have an obligation to obey until this 
presumption is rebutted. Because obedience is in most circumstances 
obligatory, in any circumstance there is a prima facie case (lawyer's 
sense) for ascribing a prima facie obligation (philosopher's sense). If 
one may be presumed to have an obligation, it may be said that one has a 
'presumptive obligation' (though, of course, if one has a presumptive 
obligation one may very well have no obligation at all).
The difference between prima facie and presumptive obligations is 
subtle, but it is important to a theoretical account of civil obligation.
If one has a prima facie obligation to obey the law, then one always has 
an obligation to obey; the fact that an act would be illegal must always 
count against doing it in the absence of stronger reasons to the contrary. 
If, on the other hand, one has only a presumptive obligation to obey the 
law, then it is only as a rule that the fact that an act would be illegal 
would count against doing it. Considering the fact of illegality is 
always relevant in both cases, but the fact of illegality itself is not.
If the presumptive case is rebutted, then the illegality of the act is not 
a reason against doing it, and no reason for doing it is necessary to 
justify disobedience.
It may be that there are some obligations so strong that they may 
never justifiably be set aside. If a particular obligation could never 
be overridden by another obligation, or by any other sort of consideration, 
it may be considered an 'absolute obligation'. Would an obligation to 
obey the law be an absolute obligation? If so, one would never be justi­
fied in disobeying the law, regardless of the consequences or the other 
obligations or principles to be sacrificed. This is a very strong thesis,
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one w hich  v e ry  few r e f l e c t i v e  p e r s o n s  w ould d e fe n d . The view  w hich we 
s h a l l  exam ine i s  th e  w eaker b u t  more d e f e n s ib le  view  t h a t  one h a s  an o b l i ­
g a t io n  to  obey th e  law  w h ic h , how ever s t r o n g  i t  may b e ,  can be o v e r r id d e n  
by c o u n te r v a i l in g  c o n s id e r a t i o n s .  How s t r o n g  t h a t  o b l ig a t i o n  i s  w i l l  
u l t i m a t e l y  depend  upon th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  r e a s o n s  w hich s u p p o r t  i t .  I t  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r y ,  b e f o r e  g o in g  on to  c o n s id e r  a b s o lu te  o b l i g a t i o n ,  
to  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  th e  c o n d i t io n s  u n d e r  w hich one may p r o p e r ly  be s a id  to  
have  an o b l i g a t i o n .
I l l
C r e a t in g  O b l ig a t io n s
As d i s c u s s e d  ab o v e , r u l e s  a r e  sy s te m s  o f  e x p e c ta t io n ;  an e x p e c ta t io n  
i s  l i c e n s e d ,  w a r ra n te d ,  l e g i t i m a t e  i f  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  such  a sy s te m . B ut 
t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  o n ly  way an e x p e c ta t io n  may be w a r ra n te d . We have found 
i t  im m ensely  u s e f u l  to  have a way o f  l i c e n s i n g  e x p e c ta t io n s  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
s i t u a t i o n s  n o t  c o v e re d  by any r u l e .  One can  g iv e  a n o th e r  a w a r ra n t  t o  
e x p e c t ,  n o t  o n ly  by p e rfo rm in g  some a c t  w hich  b r in g s  o n e s e l f  u n d e r  a s o c i a l  
r u l e ,  b u t  by m aking a com m itm ent to  do s o m e th in g , by d i r e c t l y  g r a n t in g  a 
l i c e n c e  to  e x p e c t .  In  m aking a com m itm ent, one g iv e s  r i s e  to  and a t  th e  
same tim e  l i c e n s e s  an e x p e c t a t i o n .  We have d e v is e d  a num ber o f  ways o f  
d o in g  t h i s .  We may make a p ro m is e , ta k e  an o a th ,  make a p le d g e ,  e n t e r  
i n t o  a c o n t r a c t  o r  o th e r  a g re e m e n t. Or we may make l e s s  fo rm a l and p e r ­
h ap s  l e s s  b in d in g  com m itm ents s im p ly  by  d e c la r in g  t h a t  we w i l l  do some­
th in g .  One need  n o t  make an e x p l i c i t  d e c l a r a t i o n ;  th e r e  a r e  many o th e r  
ways o f  l e t t i n g  a n o th e r  know t h a t  one i s  t o  be c o u n te d  on to  do so m e th in g . 
( I t  s h o u ld  p e rh a p s  be r e p e a te d  t h a t  we a r e  u s in g  'e x p e c t a t i o n '  in  th e  
s t r o n g e r  n o rm a tiv e  s e n se  d i s c u s s e d  ab o v e . We m ig h t u se  th e  te rm  ' e n t i t l e ­
m ent t o  e x p e c t ' ;  th e  s u g g e s t io n  o f  'o f f i c e '  o r  ' r i g h t f u l  p o s i t i o n '  w ould 
be a p p r o p r ia t e  to  th e  s p e c i a l ,  i f  te m p o ra ry  s t a t u s  w hich  i s  c o n f e r r e d  by 
th e  com m itm ent.)
A com m itm ent one h a s  v o l u n t a r i l y  made i s  th e  one b a s i s  o f  o b l ig a t i o n  
w hich i s  r e c o g n iz e d  by e v e ry b o d y . F o r t h i s  r e a s o n  we may sp eak  o f  v o lu n ­
t a r y  com m itm ents a s  p a ra d ig m  c a s e s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n .  When one makes a com­
m itm en t one c r e a t e s  a k in d  o f  bond betw een  o n e s e l f  ( th e  o b l ig o r )  and th e
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person to whom the commitment is made (the obligee). This bond is the 
expectation which has been created and licensed by the commitment. We 
speak of an obligation when the tie is viewed from the standpoint of the 
obligor, of a right when viewed from the standpoint of the obligee.
The notion of a 'bond' well represents the curious way in which one's 
freedom is restricted by an obligation. In posting bond one puts some­
thing of value in trust to guarantee one's appearance in court, for 
example; and the same is true of commitments. In creating and licensing 
an expectation one also licenses reprisal in case the expectation is not 
fulfilled. When obligations are not discharged the obligee has a right, 
a licence implicitly granted by the obligor, to call the latter's good 
name into question. In so far as one cares or ought to care about one's 
reputation, one has some reason for fulfilling commitments.
In summary, the principal features of the paradigm case are as 
follows: by virtue of some particular act (for example, uttering "I
promise to... ") the obligor has directly licensed the obligee, some
particular person or group of persons, to expect the obligor to perform 
(or refrain from) some further act (or kind of act) which can be speci­
fied. This is to say that the obligee has a right that the act be per­
formed, at least upon demand; moreover, failure to fulfil the expectation 
exposes the obligor to retribution. We shall enumerate these features for 
further use: (1) the basis of the obligation is a voluntary act of the 
obligor, (2) as a result of which some specifiable act is owed to a certain 
person (or persons), (3) who may be said to have a corresponding right to 
the obligatory act, (4) and who may reproach the obligor for failure to 
discharge the obligation.
Needless to say, one may acquire obligations in other ways than by 
directly assuming them. One may incur an obligation by coming under an 
appropriate rule. Breaking a neighbour's window and getting an unmarried 
woman with child are examples of doing something which, by virtue of a 
rule of our society, results in an obligation. Such cases are similar to 
commitments in that the obligor owes a more or less specific act to parti­
cular persons (feature (2) ), and we may speak of the obligee's right as 
well as the obligor's obligation (feature (3) ). Failure to discharge the 
obligation also opens one to censure (feature (4) ). As with the first
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feature of commitments, an act of the obligor is necessary, but unlike 
commitments it is not sufficient. The basis of the obligation in this 
case is a rule. An act is required to bring one under the rule, but with­
out the rule there would be no obligation. The expectation is warranted 
by the rule, not directly licensed by the obligor. The debt is not under­
taken as part of the act, but is imposed upon one as a result of the act. 
This last point may be misunderstood. The difference is not between 
direct avowal on the one hand and custom on the other. It is, rather, 
between doing something which constitutes undertaking an obligation on the 
one hand, and doing something which places one under an obligation on the 
other. There are customs which enable one to assume obligations, and cus­
toms which force obligations upon one as a consequence of one's acts.
Commitments are assumed by voluntary acts. Is a voluntary act neces­
sary to incur an obligation? One would think not, at least not in the 
usual sense of a deliberate and purposeful act. One may incur an obliga­
tion as a result of someone else's act, as when one's son hits a cricket 
ball through a neighbour's window. Nor does the act have to be voluntary 
in the straightforward sense. An obligation results from an indavertent 
lob through the window as well as from a deliberate hit. A special case 
of incurring an obligation is the acceptance of a gift, favour, or other 
benefaction. The rules that govern reciprocation, more or less elaborate 
in different societies, are an important part of the basis of the obliga­
tion, but there are other factors as well. Reciprocation is like commit­
ment in that there is something voluntary about it. One accepts the bene­
faction in the knowledge that one thereby incurs an obligation. But there 
the similarity ends. The promisor creates an obligation ex nihilo, but we 
cannot say this of benefactions. With reciprocation what one is doing is 
accepting a gift, and only indirectly by virtue of a convention assuming 
an obligation. Incurring an obligation sounds better, but even this is 
not quite right. For it obscures the difference between breaking a window 
and so by one's own action falling into an obligation, and accepting a 
gift and so being placed under an obligation by the giver. The difference 
is that the basis of the obligation is not a rule under which I place my­
self, but a rule under which I am placed by the act of another. It is 
partly my own doing, since I can refuse, but not primarily. And so we 
speak sometimes not of creating, assuming, or incurring, but of being 'put 
under' an obligation.
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An obligation to repay benefactions is akin to the other cases dis­
cussed in that something is owed to a specific person or group of persons, 
but what is owed may not be so easily specifiable. One frequently speaks 
of feeling some obligation, and there is often uncertainty whether one has 
any at all. If one does feel a need to do something to set the books 
straight, as it were, it may not be at all clear just what would be 
appropriate. This is especially so in societies, such as ours, which have 
less elaborate and less formal codes of reciprocation. It is here, in the 
penumbra of obligations, that ingenuity and creativity are particularly 
valuable assets. It is partly for this reason that we do not normally 
think of the obligee as having a correlative right: since there is no 
specific act which is called for, there is nothing to claim or demand. 
There is a further reason: a certain tension in the notion of a gift or
other benefaction carrying a price. A present seems not really a gift if 
something is owed in return. Yet there is value in gifts being generally 
reciprocated. So we go half way and speak of one being put under some 
obligation, while not speaking of a correlative right which one acquires 
by his beneficence. For both these reasons we feel that reprisals are not 
in general appropriate when obligations of gratitude go unfulfilled. When 
nothing is forthcoming after a reasonable period of time one may take 
offense and perhaps offer a mild reproach, but public censure is usually 
out of the question. Continual disregard of such obligations does reflect 
on one's good name, however, and may call one's character into public 
discussion.
There is a third way in which expectations may be warranted, stemming 
from the fact that every person participates in some 'social role', and 
most persons occupy a number of 'roles' simultaneously. • The term 'role' 
is, of course, a dramaturgical concept which has been imported into socio­
logical and philosophical discourse. A role is, obviously, a part of a 
play assumed by a member of the cast. A play can be successfully per­
formed only when each member plays his assigned role or part; that is, 
when each member says and does what is expected of him at the appropriate 
time. The temptation to draw analogies with society is overwhelming.
There are countless tasks which must be performed in a complex society, 
and it is imperative that there be a division of labour, in certain areas 
at least, to ensure the performance of certain tasks. This is best 
achieved by a system of 'standing parts' which carry with them a number
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of more or less specific tasks or functions. These parts include jobs, 
trades, and professions, but also kinship and marital relations, office, 
status, and rank. When a person steps into a certain role he acquires 
that role's constituent tasks: there are now certain acts which are ex­
pected of him.
The tasks or functions one may be expected to perform by virtue of 
occupying a role in the theatrum mundi are usually called'duties'. When 
one speaks of having a duty it will ordinarily be appropriate to add 'as
____________ (role)'. We 'assume' duties as we assume a station. We 'do'
or 'perform' our duties as we do a task or perform a function. When one 
changes jobs one's duties change. When one's term of office expires that 
set of duties passes to another who assumes the office. We may also 
speak of duties when there is no role involved if there is some similarity 
to a role-related requirement. Any standing task may be referred to as a 
duty even when it is not an 'official' task. Each member of a household 
may have certain duties to perform in preparing for supper, though these 
are unrelated to the role of husband, wife, or daughter. Similarly, any­
thing which has to be done in an official capacity, anything which 'it
falls to one as ___________' to do, may be spoken of as a duty, even
though the task is not a standing one.
Our relationship to the law is not ordinarily thought of in terms of 
duty, and it should not be difficult now to see why. If duties attach to 
offices, roles or functions, then it should be something special about 
one's position which gives rise to the duty. Speaking generally, the 
reason for assigning duties is to divide up a workload into manageable 
units, to see that certain tasks are performed by making some specifiable 
person responsible for each task. ('Responsibilities' serves in most cases 
as a synonym for 'duties', though it also can be used for a non-standing, 
assigned task having no connection with a role.) Duties differentiate - 
but obedience to the law is not incumbent upon one person or group rather 
than another. One might speak of a duty to obey the law arising from 
one's role as citizen10, though this would stretch the notion of role 
quite thin, it being one which everybody occupies. (I may speak of what 
I ought to do qua citizen, but this serves to differentiate one aspect of 
my life from others; it does not differentiate me from anybody else.) 
Nevertheless, it is intelligible to speak of obeying the law as one of the
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duties of citizenship. The question of civil obligation could then be 
explored by analyzing the concept of citizenship and making a case for 
seriously adopting the role. Despite Kant's arguments to the contrary, 
however, this approach is unnecessarily cumbersome, and we can illuminate 
the issues more easily if we set aside the notion of duty, at least in 
the restricted sense. 'Duty' has been extended, like 'obligation', to 
refer to anything which one morally or legally ought to do; but in this 
sense it is equivalent to the wide sense of 'obligation', so that no new 
complexities are introduced.
Obligations are assumed or incurred by virtue of some particular act 
of the obligor, and they are owed to some specific person or. group of 
persons. The obligating act gives rise to a special relationship between 
individuals. There is a further way of coming by an obligation which 
does not give rise to such a special relationship. Some rules of a soc­
iety apply to all its members - we might call them 'catergorical' rather 
than 'hypothetical rules'. Australian citizens, for example, have an 
obligation to lodge an income tax return by the last day of August. No 
special act is required to bring one under the scope of this rule, nor is 
there any particular person to whom the obligation is owed and who thus 
holds the correlative right. One does not speak here of being put under, 
but of finding oneself under, an obligation. Such obligations are neither 
assumed nor incurred: they are imposed. (Lodging an income tax return is
an example of something I am legally required to do. There are also many 
things I must refrain from doing. Rules which prohibit certain kinds of 
acts far outnumber those which impose requirements. One must not assault 
others or trespass on their property, drive over the posted speed limit or 
in the oncoming lane, and so on.)
The obligations which are imposed in our society are usually if not 
always legal ones. The reason for this may be that the acts required of 
citizens are of such importance to the whole community that legal coercion 
must be available to ensure that they be performed. Of course, this need 
not be the case. In a closely-knit and homogeneous society, moral or 
religious admonition and sanction might be sufficient, but not in a plura­
listic or secular society. Though it may be that all imposed obligations 
are legal obligations, it is certainly not the case that all legal obliga­
tions are imposed obligations. One may have legal obligations which one
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h a s  e i t h e r  assum ed o r  i n c u r r e d .  The law o f  c o n t r a c t s ,  f o r  exam p le ,  i s  
c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  ways in  w hich  one may assume a l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  and 
th e  law o f  t o r t s  s p e c i f i e s  some o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w hich  one would 
i n c u r  a l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n .  W hile  o b l i g a t i o n s  w hich a r e  im posed do n o t  
i n v o lv e  any s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  t h e r e  may n e v e r t h e ­
l e s s  be some r e se m b la n c e  t o  o b l i g a t i o n s  w hich  a r e  assum ed o r  i n c u r r e d .
I t  may be t h a t  some p a r t i c u l a r  a c t  i s  r e q u i r e d ,  su ch  a s  lo d g in g  a t a x  
r e t u r n ,  so t h a t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  may be d i s c h a r g e d  o r  f u l f i l l e d .  But w i th  
p r o h i b i t i o n s  even  t h i s  f e a t u r e  d i s a p p e a r s .  The o b l i g a t i o n  n o t  t o  l i b e l  
a n o t h e r  p e r s o n  i s  n o t  a  s p e c i a l  bond w hich  one assum es o r  i n c u r s ,  and  i t  
makes no s e n s e  t o  speak  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t h i s  o b l i g a t i o n .  I t  i s  a s t a n d i n g  
f e a t u r e  o f  o u r  c i v i l  l i f e ,  n o t  a  t e m p o ra ry  b u rd en  w hich  can be d i s c h a r g e d  
o r  from  w hich one may be r e l e a s e d .  In  f a c t ,  t h e r e  a r e  o n ly  two im p o s in g  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  t h e  p a ra d ig m  c a se  o f  o b l i g a t i o n :  such  o b l i g a t i o n s  a r e
c r e a t e d ,  and  f a i l u r e  t o  f u l f i l l  them w i l l  be met w i th  s a n c t i o n s .
The s i g n a l  f e a t u r e  o f  m aking a commitment i s  t h a t  one c r e a t e s  an 
o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  o n e s e l f .  One p l a c e s  a r e q u i r e m e n t  on o n e ' s  own h e a d .  
O b l i g a t i o n s  w hich  a r e  im posed  a r e  a l s o  c r e a t e d ,  th o u g h  n o t  by o n e ' s  own 
a c t .  They a r e  c r e a t e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  by an a c t  o f  some l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  a  
p e r s o n  o r  g ro u p  o f  p e r s o n s  whose f u n c t i o n  i t  i s  t o  make r u l e s  and i s s u e  
e d i c t s ,  d e c r e e s  and th e  l i k e .  T h is  power o r  a b i l i t y  t o  c r e a t e  new l e g a l  
o b l i g a t i o n s  i s  u s u a l l y  g o v e rn e d  by a c o n s t i t u t i v e  r u l e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  sy s te m , 
b u t  i t  may be a m a t t e r  s im p ly  o f  custom  o r  p r e c e d e n t ,  o r  i t  may be assum ed 
by f o r c e  a s  i n  a m i l i t a r y  coup . However t h e  lo c u s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  i s  d e t e r ­
m ined , i t s  e x e r c i s e  changes  t h e  l e g a l  e n v i ro n m e n t  by g i v in g  r i s e  t o  new 
l e g a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
The seco n d  f e a t u r e  w hich  rem a in s  i s  t h a t  p e n a l t i e s  a r e  p r o v id e d  in  
c a s e  a r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  n o t  f u l f i l l e d  o r  i f  a p r o h i b i t i o n  i s  v i o l a t e d .
Though t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  among assum ed , i n c u r r e d ,  and im posed o b l i g a ­
t i o n s ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  n e a r l y  so  im p o r ta n t  a s  t h i s  common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
One m ust be c a r e f u l  n o t  t o  s t a t e  th e  c a se  t o o  s t r o n g l y ,  how ever ,  f o r  t h e r e  
may be l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  w hich  no s a n c t i o n s  a r e  a t t a c h e d .  I n t e r n a t i o ­
n a l  law  i s  an  exam ple o f  a body o f  r u l e s  w hich  f o r  t h e  m ost p a r t  c a r r y  no 
s a n c t i o n s .  There  i s  no m a c h in e ry  f o r  e n f o r c i n g  t h e  r u l e s  o f  war o r  th e  
ju d g em en ts  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r i b u n a l  a t  th e  H ague. B ut th e n  t h e r e  i s  
a l s o  a h e s i t a t i o n  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e s e  r u l e s  o r  ju d g e m e n ts  a s  d e te r m in in g
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legal obligations. It is for this same reason that international law has 
been held not really to be law at all.11 A better example, perhaps, would 
be a requirement within an ordinary legal system which carried no sanction. 
There are probably a few of these in every legal order. However, sanction­
less requirements and prohibitions are rare, and it must be admitted that 
the possibility of enforcement in almost all cases is necessary if a system 
of imposed obligations is to function effectively.
IV
The Scope of Obligations
It has been seen that one may have an obligation even though it does 
not derive from a voluntary act, and that such obligations need not in­
volve any special relationship between individuals. It is generally held 
that this is true of legal obligation, but some would deny that it is true 
of moral obligation. Not everything that we morally ought or ought not to 
do may be spoken of as a moral obligation, it is argued. It sounds some­
what peculiar to say that we have a moral obligation not to kill another 
human being or that we have an obligation not to rape persons. Of course, 
it would be wrong to do these things, but would it violate an obligation?
It sounds equally peculiar to speak of a correlative moral right not to be 
murdered or raped. Most people regard moral obligations as special bonds 
which one creates or incurs by his own actions. But the obligation to 
refrain from rapine, for example, has not been assumed or incurred, nor is 
it a special relationship: it is one which everybody has toward everybody
else. How are these peculiarities to be explained? We may speak of legal 
obligations which are not special relationships - one does have a legal 
obligation not to rape persons. Why, then, is there anything odd about 
speaking of a corresponding moral obligation? The answer, it seems, 
resides in usage. As the term is ordinarily used, and in all the cases so 
far discussed, when one has an obligation then an act which would otherwise 
be optional has become required (or prohibited) because of some obligating 
act, either of the person himself or of an authority. We have a legal 
obligation not to rape others because an authoritative enactment has 
changed the legal situation: what would otherwise be legally permissible
is, on account of the rule, no longer optional. But this is just what
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seem s t o  be m is s in g  in  th e  c a s e  o f  th e  m o ra l o b l i g a t i o n .  Nobody h a s  made 
i t  wrong to  w a n to n ly  ra p e  o u r  f e l lo w s .  R ap ine  has  n o t  been  c o n v e r te d  from  
a m o ra l ly  n e u t r a l  to  a w ro n g fu l a c t .  P e rh a p s  i t  i s  t h i s  w hich makes one 
h e s i t a t e  t o  a s c r ib e  m o ra l o b l i g a t i o n s  n o t  to  m u rd e r, t h i e v e ,  d e f r a u d  o r  
d e c e iv e .  R e g a r d le s s ,  th e  te rm  'o b l i g a t i o n '  h a s  been  e x te n d e d  to  em brace 
such  c a s e s ,  and in d e e d , to  c o v e r  th e  p a n o p ly  o f  m o ra l ly  r e l e v a n t  c o n s id e r a ­
t i o n s .  One i s  commonly s a id  t o  have an o b l ig a t i o n  to  do a n y th in g  w hich  on 
m o ra l g ro u n d s  one o u g h t to  do . The te rm  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  u sed  in  t h i s  way by 
p h i lo s o p h e r s ,  and n o t  i n f r e q u e n t ly  by o t h e r s .  W illia m  F ra n k e n a , f o r  
ex am p le , w r i t e s  o f  " th e  th e o r y  o f  o b l ig a t i o n "  a s  c o v e r in g  ju d g em en ts  t h a t  
"a  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  o r  k in d  o f  a c t i o n s  i s  m o ra l ly  r i g h t ,  w rong , o b l ig a to r y ,  
a  d u ty ,  o r  o u g h t o r  o u g h t n o t  to  be d o n e " 1 2 . H ere t h e r e  i s  no r e s t r i c t i o n  
a s  t o  w hat m ig h t s e rv e  a s  th e  b a s i s  o f  an o b l i g a t i o n .  In  t h i s  a l l - i n c l u ­
s iv e  se n se  one may sp eak  n o t  o n ly  o f  an o b l ig a t i o n  n o t  to  m u rd e r , b u t  o f  
an o b l ig a t i o n  to  c o n t r i b u te  t o  c h a r i t y ,  to  v i s i t  th e  s i c k ,  o r  t o  d e v o te  
o n e 's  l i f e  t o  some c a u s e . O r d in a r i ly  i t  w ould make s e n se  t o  say  t h a t ,  
a l th o u g h  I  have  no o b l i g a t i o n  to  j o in  th e  Red C ro s s , I  t h in k  I  o u g h t to  
anyway, b u t  n o t  i f  we a re  u s in g  th e  te rm  in  t h i s  b ro a d  s e n s e .
The d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  t h i s  b ro a d  u se  and o t h e r  u s e s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
W hereas o b l i g a t i o n s  in  th e  n a rro w  se n se  c o rre s p o n d  to  l e g i t i m a t e  e x p e c ta ­
t i o n s ,  o b l i g a t i o n s  in  th e  b ro a d  s e n se  n e e d  n o t .  The needy  have no e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s  c o r re s p o n d in g  to  any o b l i g a t i o n  I  m ig h t have to  c o n t r i b u te  to  
c h a r i t y .  The n o t io n  o f  a  l e g i t i m a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  o u t  o f  p l a c e .  I f  i t  
w ere a m a t te r  o f  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  one w an ts  to  s a y , i t  w ould n o t  
be c h a r i t y .  N e i th e r  i s  one a lw ay s  a n sw e ra b le  in  th e  same way f o r  f a i l u r e  
t o  d is c h a rg e  su ch  an o b l i g a t i o n .  In  th e  n a rro w  s e n se  o u r  o b l ig a t i o n s  a re  
s t r i c t l y  n o n - o p t i o n a l . We may be h e ld  a c c o u n ta b le  to  o th e r s  and  l i a b l e  t o  
s a n c t io n s  i f  we b re a k  a r u l e  o r  a  com m itm ent. B u t th o u g h  f a i l u r e  to  d i s ­
c h a rg e  i s  b lam ew o rth y , f u l f i l l i n g  th e  o b l ig a t i o n  i s  n o t  c o n s id e r e d  p r a i s e ­
w o rth y . I t  i s  w hat w ould be e x p e c te d  o f  anybody . One e a rn s  no m e r i t s  f o r  
p e r fo rm a n c e , o n ly  d e m e r i ts  f o r  n o n p e rfo rm a n c e . Many o f  th e  th in g s  I  o u g h t 
to  do a r e  n o t  l i k e  t h i s .  I  o u g h t in d e e d  to  c o n t r i b u te  to  c h a r i t y  and  to  
spend  some o f  my l e i s u r e  tim e  w ith  d is a d v a n ta g e d  p e r s o n s ,  b u t  th e s e  a re  
n o t  among my o b l ig a t i o n s  in  th e  n a rro w  s e n s e .  We o u g h t in  g e n e r a l  to  h e lp  
one a n o th e r  when we c a n , b u t  i s  t h i s  p r o p e r ly  d e s c r ib e d  a s  an o b l ig a t io n ?  
A cco rd in g  to  th o s e  who say  i t  i s ,  i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t  in  a d d i t io n  to  o b l ig a ­
t i o n s  o f  th e  n a rro w e r  s o r t  one h a s  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  h e lp  o t h e r s ,  o r
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perhaps more generally, to bring about good consequences - an 'obligation 
of beneficence'.
This putative obligation has been presented in various ways by such 
diverse writers as William Godwin, Bentham, Kant, Marx, David Ross and 
William James, to mention but a few. "The foundation of morality is 
justice", writes Godwin.
"The principle of virtue is an irresistable deduction 
from the wants of one man, and the ability of another 
to relieve them. It is not because I have promised 
that I am bound to do that for my neighbour which will 
be beneficial to him and not injurious to me. This is 
an obligation which arises out of no compact, direct or 
understood; and would still remain, though it were im­
possible that I should esperience a return, either from 
him or any other human being.... The true ground of con­
fidence between man and man is the knowledge we have of 
the motives by which the human mind is influenced; our 
perception that the motives to deceive can but rarely 
occur, while the motives to veracity will govern the 
stream of human actions."13
De facto claims, or expectations, then, create obligations; and there is a 
good deal of sympathy for this view in contemporary political philosophy.
It seems clear that this view is partly correct and partly wrong, and 
both parts are significant. To begin with the latter, there are conditions 
under which a 'claim' or 'demand' may be legitimate or valid, and this just 
is the way in which the distinction is ordinarily made between acts which 
are obligatory and those which are not. Not every claim or expectation 
constitutes a right, but only those which meet some condition of validity. 
There is an important difference between 'bare' demands on the one hand and 
legitimate demands on the other, and it is one which common sense and ordi­
nary usage rightly recognize. Nevertheless, there is something quite right 
about what Godwin says. A world in which people helped others only when it 
was obligatory, in which the interests of others were considered compelling 
only if a matter of right, this would be a poor world indeed - a cold, lega­
listic world which few would care to inhabit. Insisting upon the distinc­
tion between claims which are legitimate and those which are not does not 
rule out the latter as insignificant. No need, however slight, of any 
creature, however weak, is totally irrelevant to what I ought to do.
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What, then, is the important difference between those demands which 
it is obligatory to fulfil and those which it is not? Or, rather, what is 
the importance of the difference? It is something like this. For people 
to live together there must be some ways of forming expectations or esta­
blishing claims which we can rest assured will be met. This constitutes 
the minimum level of social morality - the level of rights, obligations 
and duties, without which society would surely be impossible. These 
'claims' must be regarded as overriding in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances; otherwise we could not count so heavily on their being met. 
Of course these claims sometimes conflict, so that one must be overridden 
by another of the same order. But only rarely may a legitimate or valid 
claim be defeated by considerations of a different sort, the interests of 
the obligor. But just as there must be some claims which are given this 
status, they could not aVt be so regarded. There must be a sphere in which 
one's own interests take precedence over the demands of others. Many of 
the genuinely difficult and agonizing moral dilemmas which a person faces 
reflect the fact that the boundaries of that sphere have never been 
clearly delineated and probably never could be. There is much room here 
for moral disagreement; but though we disagree about when one's own good 
ought to override the good of others, we may still agree that both goods 
have some claim upon one's consideration. The mere existence of a need or 
even of a desire provides a reason for acting to satisfy it, though in the 
circumstances it may not be sufficient reason. For there are almost 
always needs and desires which 'run the other way'. In summary, then, we 
may concur with Godwin that one's concern for one's fellows should extend 
beyond the strictly obligatory, without losing the distinction between 
those acts which are required or prohibited, and those which are fitting, 
meritorious, or supererogatory. We should remain aware of this distinc­
tion despite the common habit of using 'obligation' to cover both sides 
of it.
Within the general area in which we employ the term 'moral obligation' 
we have first distinguished those requirements which derive from someone's 
obligating act from those which do not, and, second, we have distinguished 
the strictly required from the meritorious. There is one further distinc­
tion which must be made in trying to get the question of civil obligation 
clearly and unambiguously before us.
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There are numerous standards of conduct within a given society which 
may be called moral rules or conventions, as distinct from its rules of 
law or its less important conventions of social propriety. 'Moral obliga­
tion ' may be used to refer to the obligations based upon these rules and 
conventions. On the other hand, one may use 'moral obligation' to express 
one's own considered judgement about how one ought to act, which may or 
may not correspond to the conventional view of the matter. We might speak 
here of one's 'rational obligation' as distinct from one's 'conventional 
obligation'. These three distinctions correspond closely enough to permit 
us to speak in most contexts simply of a narrow and a broad sense of 
'obligation'. In the narrow sense, obligations are strictly non-optional, 
are based upon the prevailing moves, and are special relationships arising 
from some obligating act. In the broad sense, obligations are determined 
by an individual exercising his own judgement, and they may or may not be 
owed to someone in particular. There are several obligations which do not 
fit neatly into either of these two rough categories: for example, the
obligation not to rape one's neighbour is not a special relationship and 
does not result from some obligating act, yet it is socially sanctioned.
But for the most part these exceptions may be ignored, allowing us to 
speak simply of obligations in the narrow or broad sense of the term. And 
it is in this wider sense that the question arises whether we have an obli­
gation to obey the law. However, in doing so it should be emphasized that 
it is only in the narrow sense of the term that we can properly speak of 
civil obligations as 'obligations'. The reason we must move beyond this 
narrow sense when discussing the relationship between people and the law is 
to avoid ignoring an important possibility: that, though one has no obli­
gation to obey the law, one ought nonetheless to obey it on other grounds.
Before we turn to this issue, though, we must further discuss the 
narrow sense of obligation and properly amplify the critical features that 
distinguish the two senses. In doing this we will show the need for the 
distinction and to clarify it by putting it to work. In particular, we 
shall consider the relationship between 'obligation', 'ought' and coercion.
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V
Obligation and Ought
"Often we say that a man ought to do something simply 
because we take it to be his duty", writes Joel Feinberg, 
"On the other hand, there is no absurdity in saying that 
he ought not to do his duty. The word 'ought' has several 
jobs, but at least one of them is not performed equally 
well by 'duty' and 'obligation'. That job is to prescribe 
or give advice. When the word 'ought' occurs in a sentence 
which gives advice, we can call it the 'ought of final 
judgment, all things considered'."14
As Feinberg clearly points out, the distinction between the two 
concepts, 'obligation' and 'ought', stems from the different linguistic 
tasks they perform. This is readily seen in the familiar situation of a 
contested debt. More often than not we conflate acknowledgement of an 
obligation to repay a creditor with the assertion that one ought to repay 
one's creditors. Generally, the debate as to whether or not one ought to 
pay a debt is settled with the clear determination of whether or not a 
loan was transacted and an obligation thereby incurred. In other words, 
the burden of argumentation focuses upon the existence of an obligation, 
subsuming the question of what one ought to do as a mere corollary of what 
one has actually done. Consider, then, the Rabelaisian case in which the 
'moralistic' Panurge happily acknowledges Pantagruel as a bona fide 
creditor, but reguses to repay his debt on the grounds that despite his 
acceptance of the obligation he ought not to discharge it. "For - 
notwithstanding the universal opinion of philosophers, who say that out 
of nothing nothing is made", homilizes Panurge, "although I possessed 
nothing and had no prime substance, in this I was a maker and creator.
"And what had I created? So many good, fine creditors.
Creditors are fine, good creatures - and I'll maintain 
that to everything short of the stake. The man who lends 
nothing is an ugly, wicked creature, created by the great 
ugly devil of hell. And what had I made? Debts. Rare 
and excellent things! Debts, I say, exceeding in number the 
syllables resulting from the combination of all the conso­
nants with all the vowels; a number once computed by the 
noble Xenocrates. If you judge of the perfection of debtors 
by the multitude of their creditors, you will not be far out 
in your practical arithmetic.
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Despite Panurge's belief that ceteris paribus we ought to fulfil our 
obligations, when it comes to matters or debitum the 'ought of final 
judgment, all things considered' weighs against repayment. Pantagruel's 
mere advising Panurge of his obligation does not necessarily entail 
advising him to do anything. However, Pantagruel's reminder that one 
ought to pay one's debts does necessarily involve advising Panurge to do, 
or refrain from doing something. Although Panurge may respond by asking 
"ought I really give you the money?", this merely questions the prudence 
or probity of the advice, not the fact that he has been given advice.
That is to say, there are different grounds for accepting or rejecting 
obligation and ought claims stemming from the different functions of the 
two concepts; and we are forced to respond to the conditions which must be 
met in order to warrant a claim of either sort. In the case of obligation, 
the paradigmatic (and least problematical) condition is that of commitment, 
as discussed above. One commits oneself to do or forbear from doing some­
thing with regard to another party. Ought claims, on the other hand, 
whether moral or prudential, entail neither commitment nor a specific 
relationship. Rather, such claims are justified by appeals to principles, 
desires or consequences. Whereas obligation claims are characterized by 
commitment, ought claims are characterized by their content.15
While there is little dispute that the broad sense of obligation is 
intelligible, the question remains as to whether or not the unreflective 
conflation of 'obligation' and 'ought' is appropriate to philosophical 
consideration of related issues. To use 'obligation' when 'ought' is more 
appropriate merely engenders confusion about what claims are being made 
and the manner in which such claims may be justified. Despite their 
obvious relatedness, the concepts must not be blurred else the relation­
ship itself will become meaningless. Consequently, the scope for defec­
tions from the narrow sense of obligation is limited largely by the uses of 
'ought'. The fact that one is under an obligation to do x may be suffi­
cient reason for saying that one ought to do x, but the converse does not 
hold. The 'ought of final judgment' may eclipse an obligation, but there 
can be no 'obligation of final judgment'. The philosophical boundary of 
even the broadest sense of 'obligation' thus travels the perimeter of the 
question "what am I under an obligation to do?", as distinct from the 
question "what ought I do?".
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According to H.L.A. Hart, obligation exhibits the following features: 
"(1) dependence on the actual practice of a social group, (2) possible 
independence of content, and (3) coercion"17. While all three features 
have been surveyed above, the last is deserving of further examination if 
only to highlight the element of compulsion underpinning obligation. 
Actually, the question before us is whether coercion undergirds obligation 
or merely buttresses it. Hobbes, of course, held the former view - that 
obligation originates in coercion, a view held by all 'command' theorists 
of law. From this perspective we are under an obligation to do x because 
we are bound to do x, rather than being bound as a consequence of having an 
obligation to do x. As Hart has shown in his famous 'gunman allegory'18, 
the reduction of 'having an obligation' to 'being obliged' strips obliga­
tion of its moral connotations altogether, leaving one with purely pru­
dential criteria for consideration. If I am accosted by a gunman I may be 
'obliged* to surrender my possessions (in order to preserve my life) but I 
do not have an obligation to do so. The point of coercion in relation to 
obligation is not that obligations are in any way premissed upon force - 
one is not bound in the sense of submission - but that the institution of 
obligation is enforced and reinforced when wantonly breached. Sanctions 
are required as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily fulfil their 
obligations "shall not be sacrificed to those who would not.... Given 
this standing danger, what reason demands is Voluntary co-operation in a 
coercive system"18.
Reiterating the paradigmatic case of obligation, then, (1) the basis 
of an obligation is a voluntary act of the obligor, (2) as a result of 
which some specifiable act is owed to a certain person (or persons), (3) 
who may be said to have a corresponding right to the obligatory act, (4) 
and who may reproach the obligor for failure to discharge the obligation. 
The obvious differences between 'obligation' and 'ought' springing from 
the latter's inability to slot into the above format leads us to ask 
whether the traditional problematic of political philosophy - "Why should 
one obey the law?" - is better expressed in the question "Is one under an 
obligation to obey the law?" When framed in terms of 'ought' rather than 
'obligation' the question fails to cater for the Rabelaisian proviso that 
even though one may be under an obligation to obey the law, one ought to 
disobey it. Moreover, the instrumental connotations of 'ought' may lead 
one to argue for obedience to the law on purely prudential grounds, because
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it will prove beneficial or because sanctions will be invoked if disobeyed. 
However reasonable this response may seem at first glance, it proves com­
pletely unsatisfactory once it is noted that in so answering the question 
one need not consider obligation claims. Consequently, in approaching the 
problem of civil obligation it must be recognized that two intersticied 
but nevertheless distinct questions are being asked: firstly, the question
of civil obligation proper: "is one under an obligation to obey the law?";
and, secondly, the question of civil obedience: "should one obey the
law?". Therefore, what was earlier characterized as the broad approach to 
the problem of civil obligation may more accurately be termed the problem 
of civility, incorporating as it does the most controversial aspects of 
civil conduct.
VI
The Problem of Civility
An increasing number of contemporary political philosophers argue 
that there is something confusing about the problem of civility (as we 
have termed it), that it is not a genuine problem after all. In her 
influential articles on obligation and consent, Hanna Pitkin argues that 
to suppose "that political obligation in general needs (or can have) a 
general justification" is a sign of "philosophical disorder"20. "It is 
part of the concept, the meaning of 'law', that those to whom it is 
applicable are obligated to obey it."21 It would be similar to asking 
why one has an obligation to do what one has promised. It is not as 
though there are two things, the promise and the obligation, which we 
must connect by argument. To promise is to assume an obligation. "As 
with promises, so with authority, government and law: there is a prima
facie obligation involved in each, and normally you must perform it."22 
It seems that Pitkin is arguing that every valid law creates an obligation 
and so ought to be obeyed, though there are some problems in interpreting 
the text. Her analogy with promising certainly suggests this interpreta­
tion, and if she does not hold such a view there are others who do.23 
This view, according to which questions of civil obligation dissolve into 
institutional obligations, may be termed 'conventionalism'; that is, civil 
obligations are held to be premissed upon the rules of civil practices in
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such a way that to participate in the practice is to incur an obligation 
to obey the laws of that practice. By examining this viewpoint we can 
further explore the relationship between obligation and conventional moral 
and legal rules.
Let us begin with promising. According to Pitkin, to promise is not 
just to utter certain locutions. To promise is to undertake an obligation. 
"A promise is a self-assumed obligation. If you assume an obligation and 
have not yet performed it, nor been excused from it, then you have an 
obligation; in much the same way as someone who puts on a coat, has a coat 
on."24 "Does one have an obligation to do what one has promised?" is a 
question with an obvious answer. "To ask why promises oblige is to ask 
why (self-assumed) obligations oblige. And to the question why obliga­
tions oblige the only possible answer would seem to be that this is what 
the words mean."25 Our question about an obligation to obey the law is 
equally misconceived. "As with promises, so with authority, government 
and law: there is a przma faeze obligation involved in each, and normally
you must perform it.... The existence of a law on this subject normally 
constitutes an obligation, just as having promised normally constitutes an 
obligation, so that one is not free to decide what to do just as if no pro­
mise has been made."26 It is part of the meaning of the word 'law' that 
those subject to it have an obligation, and any question why obligations 
oblige can be answered only by pointing to the meaning of 'obligation'.
The simplest response to this argument would be that it conflates two 
different forms of obligation. Laws necessarily give rise to legal obli­
gations, but the question of civil obligation is whether one has a moral 
obligation to fulfil his legal obligations. It is not simply whether 
obligations oblige, but whether legal obligations oblige morally. One is 
bound legally to do whatever the law requires, but we want to know if one 
is bound in another way as well. It would be convenient to leave the 
matter thus disposed, but more should be said. Our criticism rests upon 
distinguishing two kinds of obligation, and if one is inclined to question 
the distinction or its importance, one may not be so easily convinced.
"An obligation is an obligation", begins a likely reply.27 One may 
argue that although there are different kinds of obligation, the differ­
ence in kind is of little importance. The term 'obligation' is
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univocal, referring to the same condition of being bound or of owing. We 
are not dealing with different senses of the term 'obligation', the 
argument continues, but with different kinds (forms) of obligation, which 
means only that different kinds of ties - moral, legal, or whatever- may 
be involved. If one is bound one is bound, and the kind of rope with 
which one is tied is relatively unimportant. Moreover, the argument con­
tinues, the notion of 'moral obligation' is highly suspect. It is an 
invention of moral philosophers, and it is used by them to cover much more 
ground than is familiar to other less systematic thinkers. Moral philoso­
phers tend to reduce every decision about social conduct to a moral deci­
sion and then to record their findings in terms of an obligation. This 
special 'moral obligation' is thought to occupy a privileged position, for 
only it is unqualifiedly (categorically) connected with action, with what 
one ought to do. However, in ordinary moral talk, it is held, moral obli­
gations are a function of moral rules, just as legal obligations are a 
function of legal rules. Both are considered guides to action, neither 
more fundamental than the other. There are religious and promissory obli­
gations as well. When I say under the appropriate circumstances that I 
promise to do something, I thereby undertake an obligation, and that means 
that I am bound to do what I said I would do, which in turn means that I 
ought to do it. I do not need to be bound by some further moral obligation 
to keep my promises, it is argued, before my promises place me under an 
obligation. That I must have a moral obligation to keep my promises is 
absurd. And equally absurd, it is asserted, is the view that I must have 
a moral obligation to keep my legal obligations.
This reply, although mistaken, has some plausibility. We may agree 
that promises generate obligations in a special way, and that there is 
something strange about the question whether one has a moral obligation to 
do what one has promised to do, However, this is not true of the question 
whether one has a moral obligation to fulfil one's legal obligations. In 
order to see the difference we should recall the distinction between a 
narrow and a broad sense of 'moral obligation'. In the narrow sense, moral 
obligations are tied to commitments and to moral rules, rules of the social 
mores. The broader sense, on the other hand, grants that one's moral obli­
gations are determined not simply by consideration of moral rules, but by 
critical reflection on these rules and on any other relevant features of
55
one's circumstances. Some philosophers have spoken here of 'natural obli­
gations' or 'rational obligations', as distinct from the 'conventional 
obligations' premissed exclusively upon social moves. One may ask: "is
'moral obligation' equivocal or univocal: are there two sense of 'moral
obligation', or is there one sense of the term, but two kinds of moral 
obligations?" It seems reasonable to say that there are two different 
senses, although there certainly is a common element of meaning. Both 
uses of the term express the notion of a practical task, something to be 
done (or withheld), which is grounded in some moral consideration. The 
difference is in the conception of what constitutes a moral consideration; 
that is, in the kind of reason that would be offered in behalf of the 
obligation claim. It is true that this wider notion of obligation is 
derived at least in part from the writings of moral philosophers, and that 
it represents a significant extension of the term from its everyday 
restricted sense. But we must be careful before dismissing a term on such 
grounds. Philosophers can get into difficulties when they introduce a new 
term or give an old one a new meaning, but occasionally there is a legiti­
mate need for such departures from ordinary usage.28 This is especially 
the case here, where the whole idea of 'being bound' is a metaphor trans­
ferred from the sort of ropes making it physically impossible for one to 
move, to making it improper for one to move: impropriety as an invisible
barrier and (negative) stimulus that channels behaviour and modulates its 
implications.
What is the point of talking about natural or rational obligations?
The principal purpose it serves is to allow us to formulate and articulate 
a certain moral point of view - the standpoint of the 'eleutheros': the 
autonomous rational agent.28 There are two fundamentally different ways 
of conceiving morality, in fact two fundamentally different ways of con­
ducting one's life. One may think of morality as primarily a matter of 
being guided by a set of rules externally imposed, or one may think of it 
as a matter of self-direction, of being guided by one's own reason. From 
the former perspective there is no gap between what one has an obligation 
(narrow sense) to do and what one ought to do. From the latter perspective 
there is. The existence of an obligation-imposing rule and the reasons for 
the rule are relevant to a determination of what one ought to do, but the 
rule itself does not determine what one ought to do. This wide sense of
'moral obligation' enables one to contrast being guided directly and
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uncritically by 'conventional obligations', with being guided by a reflec­
tive appraisal of these conventions.
Raising the question of civil obligation in the first place presup­
poses the view of morality as reflective self-direction. This means, on 
the most basic level, that externally imposed requirements and prohibitions 
are subject to critical review; where laws are considered paradigmatic of 
externally imposed requirements and prohibitions. One may ask of particu­
lar laws whether they ought to be obeyed, or one may pose the more embra­
cing question whether all laws should be obeyed. (One may ask "what ought 
I to do, all said?", or "what ought I morally to do?", or "what am I 
obliged to do?". Specifically, we may frame the question from a limited 
point of view: the moral point of view; or, we can ask the more general
question, "ought we obey the law?"). This is what it means to ask if one 
has a moral obligation (broad sense) to fulfil one's legal obligations.
(It would also make sense to ask whether and to what extent one has a moral 
obligation in the broad sense to fulfil one's moral obligations in the 
narrow sense.) Promises, however, are not quite like legal requirements, 
for promissory obligations are voluntarily assumed, not imposed. That is 
why it seems absurd to ask for a moral justification for keeping one's own 
commitments. (Of course, some promissory obligations are recognized and 
enforced by law, and these self-assumed legal obligations would be in no 
more need of justification than nonlegal promissory obligations.) This is 
no doubt one attraction of the contractarian metaphor of civil obligation: 
if one has voluntarily undertaken to obey the law, then it would seem that 
one has an obligation to obey which stands in no further need of justifi­
cation .
The almost tautological character of contractual relations has a 
compelling tidiness conducive to systematic theorizing. The difficulty, 
however, lies in so formulating models of civil conduct as to make the 
contractual analogy not only appropriate but overwhelming. Without moving 
ahead of the argument, it is clear even at this stage that the self-con­
tainedness of contractual relations provides an appealing conceptual peg 
upon which to hang a host of related notions. If the root problem of 
civility is seen to lie in justifying certain civil relations - in parti­
cular, obedience to the law - then what could supply a more appealing 
solution than the commonsensical circularity of voluntary commitment?
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Commitments furnish their own justification, providing, of course, that 
they can be established in the first place. It is tempting to believe 
that many contractarian theorists began with a solution firmly in mind to 
a problem only half-formulated. That is to say, possessing an almost 
intuitive faith in a quasi-aesthetic notion beautiful in its simple whole­
ness, some men must have been moved to frame questions in accordance with 
preconceived answers. ? One can see this clearly in Hobbes and
Locke, in particular. But, naturally, mere employment of an analogy does 
not of itself permit characterization of an argument in terms of that 
analogy. Which brings us back again to the heart of the contractarian 
metaphor - commitment. A genuine contractarian argument must be premis­
sed upon a commitment theory of obligation, else the contractual element 
of the dialectic dissolve into mere rhetoric. Whether retrospective, tacit, 
hypothetical, or prospective, commitment must be central and its logic 
elaborated upon in some detail. Further, to fill in the philosophical 
picture completely, reasons must be advanced to show that one ought to keep 
one's commitments, or at least as a first step, that one ought to keep 
one's promises. That one has an obligation in the broad sense to fulfil 
one's commitments is not an analytic statement. It is a substantive claim 
which can be justified by a moral argument. This is a controversial 
assertion, however, which is perhaps best discussed in the context of a 
wider issue which has been at the forefront of contemporary moral philoso­
phy: the 'is-ought question'. Since the above remarks bear upon the
issue, it is only natural to place them in this larger context.
VII
Is, Ought and Commitment
The 'is-ought question', in general terms, asks whether 'ought' can 
be derived from 'is'; that is, whether a judgement about what one ought to 
do follows from any statement or statements of what is the case. The view 
that the one can be derived from the other may be termed 'descriptivism', 
and the opposite view, 'prescriptivism'. The prescriptivist maintains 
that there is an unbridgable logical gap between 'is' and 'ought', or 
between 'fact' and 'value'. Prescriptivists frequently cite in support of 
their view the famous passage in Hume's Treatise in which he remarks that
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the author of every moral system with which he is familiar passes impercep­
tibly from an 'is' or an 'is not' to an 'ought' or an 'ought not', and that 
it seems inconceivable that this latter relation could be a deduction from 
the former. Hare refers to this statement as "Hume's Law".30
The issue is generally argued in terms of a theory of the meaning of 
moral (or 'value') judgements. The prescriptivist claims that such judge­
ments lack any fixed 'descriptive' or 'factual' content, and more import­
antly, that they contain an extra 'evaluative' or 'prescriptive' meaning 
not found in descriptive or factual statements. The reason for this is 
that value judgements perform a different function from descriptive state­
ments. Their job is not to 'read off' the features of the world but to 
express attitudes toward those features: to praise or condemn, to commend, 
exhort, and so on. It is for these reasons that moral judgements cannot 
be derived logically from statements of fact: their factual content is
not necessarily the same, and even if it were, the extra evaluative compo­
nent could never be found in a purely descriptive statement.
There are two rather different lines of attack upon the prescriptivist 
view. One is represented by the attempts of Phillipa Foot to show a logi­
cal connection between 'good' and certain descriptive notions such as 
'want' and 'need', or, one could say, between certain facts about human 
nature, and what is of value to human beings.3* The other is represented 
by the attempts of J.R. Searle and G.E.M. Anscombe to show a logical conne­
ction between 'institutional facts', facts about social rules or conven­
tions, and what one ought to do. It is this latter view which bears more 
directly upon the present study. The term 'conventionalism' shall be used 
to distinguish it from other descriptivist views.
Pitkin has given a descriptivist and conventionalist view of civil 
obligation, since she maintains that every valid law gives rise, to an 
obligation and so ought to be obeyed. That a given statute has been duly 
enacted seems to fall on the 'fact' side of the fact-value distinction; so 
if it follows from this fact that one ought to do what the law says, we 
have derived an 'ought' from an 'is'. A prescriptivist would argue, of 
course, that the conclusion that one ought to do what the law says con­
tains an extra evaluative or prescriptive component, an endorsement, so to 
speak, of fulfilling one's legal obligations, which could not be present
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i n  t h e  mere s t a t e m e n t  o f  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  a c t  i s  l e g a l l y  r e q u i r e d .  N e i t h e r  
v iew  i s  s a t i s f y i n g ,  how ever ,  and i t  s h o u ld  p ro v e  w o r th w h i le  t o  d e v e lo p  a 
v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  above s t a n d p o i n t s  i n  a d i a l e c t i c a l  f a s h i o n .
C o n v e n t io n a l i s m  i s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  b e c a u s e  i t  seems t o  p r e c l u d e  th e  
r e j e c t i o n  o f  ‘b a d '  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  S l a v e r y  i s  an exam ple o f  a  m o ra l ly  
o b j e c t i o n a b l e  i n s t i t u t i o n  w hich  a l l o c a t e s  a number o f  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a ­
t i o n s .  The c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t  v iew  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  I  o u g h t  t o  r e t u r n  a runaway 
s l a v e  t o  ' i t s '  ' r i g h t f u l  o w n e r ' ,  s i n c e  t h a t  i s  one o f  t h e  r u l e s  t h a t  con­
s t i t u t e  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  s l a v e r y .  N e e d le s s  to  s a y ,  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
such  a v iew  a r e  o v e rw h e lm in g ly  c o n s e r v a t i v e  and c o n f o r m is t .  I t  d oes  n o t  
m e re ly  t e l l  one t h a t  one m ust c on fo rm  t o  e x i s t i n g  r u l e s  and p r a c t i c e s ,  b u t  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no l o g i c a l  room f o r  one t o  c r i t i c i z e  such  r u l e s  and p r a c t i ­
c e s .  The ' c o r r e c t '  u se  o f  o u r  m o ra l  c o n c e p t s ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  l o g i c a l  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h i s  v iew , w i l l  n o t  even  a l lo w  a c o n t r a r y  v iew  to  be s t a t e d .
In  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m ,  p r e s c r i p t i v i s m  seems 
a lm o s t  p ro m is c u o u s .  I n d e e d ,  i t  i s  p e rh a p s  a b i t  t o o  l i b e r a t i n g ,  s u g g e s t i n g  
a s  i t  d oes  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  n e c e s s a r i l y  b i n d i n g  even a b o u t  o n e ' s  own 
com m itm ents. T h a t  one h a s  p ro m is e d  to  do so m e th in g  i s  a f a c t  from  w hich 
no judgem en t c o u ld  f o l lo w  a b o u t  w hat one o u g h t  t o  do . P r e s c r i p t i v i s m  makes 
i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n  a l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e  o f  m o ra l  t h i n k i n g ,  b u t  th e  t h e o r y  o f  
m ean ing  by w hich  t h i s  i s  a c c o m p l i s h e d  seems t o  l e a v e  t o o  many m o ra l  c o n t i n ­
g e n c ie s  .
B o th  Anscombe and S e a r l e  have f o r c e f u l l y  a s s a i l e d  t h i s  weak p o i n t  o f  
p r e s c r i p t i v i s m .  Anscombe a s k s ,  by  way o f  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  w h e th e r  she  o u g h t  
t o  pay  f o r  t h e  g r o c e r i e s  she h a s  o r d e r e d .  T h a t  sh e  h a s  p l a c e d  an o r d e r  
and  t h a t  t h e  p o t a t o e s  were c a r t e d  to  h e r  ho u se  m u st  s u r e l y  f a l l  on th e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  s i d e  o f  t h e  ' i s - o u g h t '  d ich o to m y ; b u t  i t  j u s t  a s  s u r e l y  m ust 
f o l l o w  t h a t  she  o u g h t  t o  pay  th e  g r o c e r ' s  b i l l . 32 S e a r l e  p r o v id e s  a  more 
e l a b o r a t e  ' d e r i v a t i o n '  o f  an 'o u g h t '  from  an ' i s '  -  i n  t h i s  c a se  a p r o m is e .  
I t  r u n s  as  f o l l o w s : 33
1. Jo n e s  u t t e r e d  th e  w ords " I  h e re b y  p ro m is e  t o  pay  you , S m ith ,  
f i v e  d o l l a r s . "
2 . Jo n e s  p ro m ise d  to  pay  Sm ith  f i v e  d o l l a r s .
3. J o n e s  p l a c e d  h i m s e l f  u n d e r  (u n d e r to o k )  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  pay  
Sm ith  f i v e  d o l l a r s .
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4 . J o n e s  i s  u n d e r  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  pay  Sm ith  f i v e  d o l l a r s .
5 .  J o n e s  o u g h t  t o  pay  Sm ith  f i v e  d o l l a r s .
S e a r l e  c la im s  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  e a c h  s t e p  may n o t  ' e n t a i l *  i t s  s u c c e s s o r ,  
th e y  a r e  n o t  j u s t  c o n t i n g e n t l y  r e l a t e d ,  and  " th e  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  make th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  one o f  e n t a i l m e n t  do n o t  need  to  i n ­
v o lv e  any e v a l u a t i v e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  m o ra l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  o r  a n y th in g  o f  t h e  
s o r t . " 3t+ The m ost im p o r t a n t  s t e p  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  be from  4. 
to  5 . S e a r l e  s a y s  t h a t  t h i s  i n f e r e n c e  i n v o lv e s  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  p re m ise  
t h a t  " o th e r  t h i n g s  b e in g  e q u a l ,  one o u g h t  t o  do w hat one h a s  an o b l i g a t i o n  
to  d o " ,  th e  te rm  'o b l i g a t i o n *  b e in g  u n d e r s to o d  i n  th e  n a rro w  s e n se  r e l a t e d  
t o  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and th e  r u l e s  w hich  c o n s t i t u t e  them . S e a r l e  c la im s  
t h a t  t h i s  s u p r e s s e d  p re m ise  i n v o lv e s  no m ora l  d e c i s i o n  o r  commitment, b u t  
i s  l o g i c a l l y  t r u e . 35 The r e a s o n  t h a t  an 'ou g h t*  may be d e r i v e d  from  an 
' i s '  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  t r u e  t h a t  one o u g h t ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b e in g  
e q u a l ,  t o  f u l f i l  o b l i g a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  from  th e  r u l e s  o f  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
We may r e a d i l y  a g re e  w i th  S e a r l e  t h a t  p ro m is e s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  p ro b le m  f o r  t h e  p r e s c r i p t i v i s t  t h e o r y ,  b u t  he i n  t u r n  p r e s e n t s  a 
q u e s t i o n a b l e  r a t i o n a l e .  I f  we a c c e p t  h i s  a c c o u n t  th e n  we a p p e a r  t o  be 
com m itted  t o  th e  u n d e s i r a b l e  c o n seq u e n c e  o f  c o n v e n t io n a l i s m  t h a t  o u r  m ora l  
d e c i s i o n s  a r e ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t ,  made f o r  us by o t h e r s ;  f o r  th e  r u l e s  o f  
s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  govern  much more t h a n  th e  v o l u n t a r y  a s su m p t io n s  o f  
o b l i g a t i o n s .  But e q u a l l y  u n a c c e p t a b l e  a r e  t h e  c o u n te r - a r g u m e n ts  o f  some 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s . Anthony F lew , f o r  ex am p le ,  f i n d s  a w eakness  i n  S e a r l e ' s  
t r a n s i t i o n  from  1. t o  2. A c c o rd in g  t o  S e a r l e ,  t h e  i n f e r e n c e  i s  j u s t i f i e d  
by t h e  f o l l o w in g  s t a t e m e n t  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t :
( l a )  "Under c e r t a i n  ( f a c t u a l )  c o n d i t i o n s  C anyone who u t t e r s  t h e  
words ( s e n te n c e )  ' I  h e re b y  p ro m is e  t o  pay  you , S m ith ,  f i v e  d o l l a r s '  
p r o m is e s  t o  pay  Sm ith  f i v e  d o l l a r s . " 36
Flew t h i n k s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  j u s t  a f a c t  a b o u t  E n g l i s h  u s a g e .  The n o t io n  
o f  p r o m is in g  c o n t a i n s  an e v a l u a t i v e  a s  w e l l  a s  a d e s c r i p t i v e  com ponent, so 
t h a t  ( la )  i s  t r u e  o n ly  i f  one does  n o t  u se  t h e  word 'p r o m i s e '  d e s c r i p t i v e ­
l y ,  'w i t h  r e s e r v a t i o n ' .  I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  ( la )  i s  t r u e  o n ly  i f  one i s  com­
m i t t e d  t o  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p r o m is in g .  Hare a l s o  o b j e c t s  f o r  r o u g h ly  th e  
same r e a s o n s .  The d e r i v a t i o n  c a n n o t  g e t  o f f  t h e  g round  u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  a 
commitment t o  p r o m is e - k e e p in g ,  and t h i s  means t h a t  th e  c o n c lu s i o n  i s  n o t  
d e r i v e d  from p u r e l y  f a c t u a l  p r e m i s e s . 37
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Flew and Hare seem to be saying that there are two different sense of 
’promise': there is one sense which is descriptive in that it merely
reports how certain persons use words, but does not contain the notion of 
taking on an obligation; and there is another sense which is prescriptive 
and from which it follows that one ought to do the thing which is promis­
ed. Searle may well be correct in denying 'promise' its two senses, but 
this is not the real issue. The distinction which needs to be made is not 
between two senses of 'promise' but between two sense of 'obligation'. As 
we have seen, one sense of the term is enmeshed in rules and conventions, 
to 'social institutions'. The other sense of the term - the metainstitu- 
tional sense - is much wider and implies that the fulfilment of obligation 
is dependent in part upon a critical assessment of the relevant conven­
tions. It is in the former sense alone that an 'ought' may be deductively 
derived from an 'is'. It is only in this sense that there is an analytic 
relationship, a connection of meaning between the terms, such that it fol­
lows necessarily from "It is the rule (practice, convention) that one does 
X in circumstances C" and "A is in circumstance C", that A has an obliga­
tion to do X. In the latter sense we might speak of deriving an obligation 
from a set of social facts, but it would not be a matter of logical entail- 
ment. The facts of the matter might support the judgement that one has an 
obligation, but it would not be a case of interchangeable propositions.
Another difficulty embedded in the criticisms of Flew and Hare is the 
idea that one must commit oneself to commitments. What is promising, one 
wants to ask, but the making of a commitment? It seems absurd to say that 
one must commit oneself to commitments before one's commitments have any 
binding force. If one's commitments are not already binding, then how 
could adding another help matters? The reply that this would be a commit­
ment to oneself would not remove the difficulty. One wonders, in the 
first place, whether the notion of a commitment to oneself is as sound as 
it may seem, but aside from this, why should one's commitments to oneself 
be any more privileged than one's commitments to others? Why could one 
not just as easily break a commitment to oneself when it proves advanta­
geous to do so? (It is interesting to note that Hare does for all moral 
obligations, what a crude, that is, 'literal', contractarian does for civil 
obligations by basing them all upon commitments.) A prescriptivist might 
answer, as would a less literal contractarian, that 'commitment' should not 
be taken so literally, that it is not used to refer to an actual event or
62
occurrence but to something like accepting or approving, being in favour 
of, or the like. It is metaphorical or hypothetical commitment which is 
at issue, not an actual pledging to oneself. One would be justified, that 
is, in accepting or approving of the practice and participating in it; 
there are good reasons, in other words, for playing 'the promising game1.
But as with any case of hypothetical consent or commitment, it is the 
reasons which would justify the commitment which do all the work, not the 
fictitious commitment itself. And, of course, one oan give good reasons 
for keeping one's commitments, though they are so obvious that one would 
arouse suspicion if one asked for them outside the context of philosophical 
discussion. There is little dispute that to disregard a promise is to en­
gage in the most abject form of deceit. Promising is the technique we have 
devised to leave absolutely no question of a person's intention to do some­
thing. The promiser, as it were, pawns his good name to guarantee that 
some act will be performed (and this provides an additional reason: the
protection of one's reputation). The plans of others, it is mutually 
understood, may be made in expectation that the deed will be done. One 
would be a parasite upon a practice of utmost importance were one to take 
advantage of it while actively undermining it. In simple terms, there is 
no question of the practice being forced upon one against one's will, 
since promissory obligations must be voluntarily assumed. One could go on, 
but surely there is no need. If there is one basis of obligation requiring 
no serious justification it is voluntary commitment.
However, while it is difficult to imagine an actual situation in 
which one would need to make such a case for promise-keeping, it is, in 
principle, possible to make it. This is the important respect in which the 
prescriptivist is correct even about promising. It is not an analytic 
truth that one ought to keep one's promises, as claimed by Searle, but a 
'synthetic' one, so to speak. The reasons which would establish this 
'ought' are not conceptual but moral or prudential. Just as one may give 
(obvious) reasons why one ought to abide by commitments, one may give 
(specious) reasons why one should not, indeed, why one should reject the 
whole 'institution' of promising as pernicious and even try to subvert it 
from within. Searle even provides a convenient example. "Suppose... a 
nihilistic anarchist argues that one ought never to keep promises because,
O Ofor example, an unseemly concern with obligation impedes self-fulfilment."
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Searle contends that his position does not exclude such a view as logically 
absurd. To argue that it is absurd is to fail to make a distinction be­
tween what is external and what is internal to the institution of promis­
ing.
"The nihilistic argument ... is simply an external attack
on the institution of promising. In effect, it says that the 
obligation to keep a promise is always overridden because of 
the alleged evil character of the institution. But it does 
not deny the point that promises obligate, it only insists 
that the obligations ought not to be fulfilled because of the 
external consideration of 'self-fulfillment."39
This reply may save Searle's view from the charge of conservatism, but 
it does so at a high price. What appeared to be a bold theory has lost a 
great deal of its pluck. Whether an obligation to obey the law could be 
derived in this way without committing any logical mistakes begins to look 
like an uninteresting question. An 'ought' so weak seems hardly worth 
deriving.
It is possible at this stage to step outside the field of battle and 
suggest that it is being fought on the wrong ground. The fundamental issue 
is not the meaning of moral (or 'evaluative') terms; the fundamental issue 
is moral (or rational) autonomy: the responsibility (not just accountabi­
lity) of each person for the moral decisions which he makes or fails to 
make. The fulfilment of socially created obligations must be justifiable 
to the individual if his autonomy is to be preserved. And, once again, 
that is why promises and other commitments seem to be in no need of such 
justification. They are not imposed upon one by any social rule, they are 
voluntarily assumed. With them one's autonomy is not at stake, at least 
not in the same way as with externally imposed requirements. Add to this 
the further reason that the case to be made for keeping promises is so 
overwhelming that to question it seriously seems unthinkable, and one can 
see why promises seem more directly connected with values than are any 
other 'facts of life'. One's commitments do occupy a special position, 
though that status is not a logical one, as some have thought; for the com­
pelling case to be made for promise-keeping, however practically unneces­
sary it may seem, is a moral and not a conceptual one.
The issue of autonomy is not a matter of logic, to be determined by
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analysis of our moral discourse. People use the terms 'obligation' and 
'ought' in different ways, and this difference reflects the fact that 
people govern their lives in different ways. One way of governing one's 
life consists in conforming uncritically to the social order, and in this 
case there is an effortless movement from convention to obligation to 
action. Another way consists in rational self-direction, and on this way 
of thinking the fluid progression is halted. Consequently, mere appeal to 
the manner in which people employ these terms would ultimately prove in­
conclusive. But our point may be made more forcefully. Suppose, contrary 
to fact, that the necessary investigation conclusively supported the con­
ventionalist theory. Would it not still be open to an autonomist to say 
that the linguistic facts simply reflect a strong tendency toward conform­
ism in his society, an undesirable trait which ought to be overcome? And 
were the investigation to arrive at the opposite conclusion, a conventiona­
list or an authoritarian could still claim that our current usage reflects 
the Socratic influence of individualists upon our moral thinking, an 
influence which ought to be counteracted because of the dangers it presents 
to social stability.
What all this suggests is that the case to be made for autonomy is not 
conceptual but'normative' . Two assertions may be made at this point. The 
first is that most persons have the capacity to determine for themselves 
how they ought to act, and they may be held responsible for what they do 
even when it conforms to a social rule or an authoritative command. The 
second is that reflective self-determination is a valuable trait of charac­
ter, one which is worth developing and encouraging others to develop. Mill 
has given perhaps the most forceful contemporary defense of this virtue. 
According to Mill, what is sometimes called 'self-realization' - the full 
development of one's powers and capacities - is unattainable in the absence 
of reflective self-determination.
"The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are ex­
ercised only in making a choice. He who does anything be­
cause it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no prac­
tice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The 
mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only 
by being used."11®
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There are many explications of the notion of 'autonomy' - too many to 
be discussed here. Yet, when reduced to their basic postulates, most con­
ceptions of autonomy reveal a common Kantian ancestry; and it is this semi­
nal formulation which is employed throughout this thesis, in particular in 
the appendix dealing with the Kantian model of rational man and, later, 
Rawls' version of contractarianism.
According to Kant, to be autonomous is to be nothing other than prac­
tically rational: an autonomous agent is one whose will is determined by
reason. Since, for Kant, an 'autonomous agent' is an ideal type, human 
beings are called autonomous insofar as they approximate this ideal type. 
There are other elements, of course, distinguishable from the notion of 
practical rationality, which are associated with or included in the concept 
of autonomy. As a rough first approximation we can list the following:
(a) making one's own decisions and choices;
(b) acting for one's own reasons;
(c) taking responsiblity for one's actions;
(d) taking responsiblity for the values one cherishes;
(e) leading one's own life (being one's own master, being 
independent, self-managing, self-directing).
Now, on the Kantian view of autonomy, all of these elements are seen 
as either constituents or implications of being practically rational, where 
to be practically rational is to have (or to be) a will which is determined 
by reason. One's decisions and wilful intentions are one's own when and 
only when they are the culmination of the exercise of one's practical rea­
son, where reason (practical and theoretical) is said to be one's nature or 
higher self. One acts for one's own reasons only when one acts for reasons 
which one sees to be reasons, and to be sufficient reasons for acting.
One's actions are one's own when and only when they are the realization of 
decisions and intentions which are one's own in the sense stated above.
One is responsible, in the first place, for the reasons or maxims of one's 
intentions and decisions, and responsibility for actions is ascribed on the 
basis of the reason or maxim which informs the intention or decision. To 
be responsible for the values or ends one cherishes is to endorse only 
those ends or values which are such that one judges that one's maxim in 
pursuing them could be a universal law - a law for all rational beings as 
such. Finally, a person whose wilful intentions, decisions, and policies 
are formed in these ways and whose actions are the culmination or express-
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ion os such intentions, decisions and policies is self-directing or self- 
managing in that he is directed by his rational nature, rather than by the 
will of others or by desires which are 'alien' in the sense of not being 
'processed' by that rational nature.
There are conceptions of autonomy which give special or even exclusive 
emphasis to one or more of the elements listed above. Sometimes one of 
these elements, for example, the notion of making one's own decisions or 
choices, is given such singular emphasis that its connection with practical 
rationality is severed or severely strained. In such treatments, which, 
following F. Olafson's terminology, we may label "antinomic extreme volun­
tarist" conceptions, the etymological roots of the term 'autonomy' have 
been scissioned.^1 The notion of a law of reason, or, indeed, of any sort 
of law or rule or principle has been abandoned. It is the Kantian concep­
tion, not any of the various antinomic conceptions of autonomy, with which 
we are concerned, since the latter are so distorted as hardly to qualify as 
conceptions of autonomy at all - and that these distortions make the ideals 
they commend less than rational.
The essence of the Kantian conceptions is that the autonomous agent 
himself actively pursues ends which are his own and will attempt to secure 
the resources necessary for doing so. He does not abdicate to others the 
ultimate responsibility either for determining what those ends are to be or 
for achieving them. There are three further features of what it is to be 
an autonomous person which are of crucial importance to our discussion.
The first is that being autonomous is for human beings a matter of degree. 
One can be more, or less autonomous. This notion that autonomy as practi­
cal rationality is something which can be preserved, cultivated and enhan­
ced, or undermined, diminished and lost, is familiar in Aristotle and 
Butler, as well as in Kant. Second, for Kant, to conceive of oneself as 
an autonomous person is to be conscious of one's freedom and one's respon­
sibility, on the one hand, and of one's vulnerability and limitations, on 
the other. To be conscious of one's freedom and responsibility is, for 
Kant, to be conscious that one is subject to universal laws of freedom - 
the laws of practical rationality. To be conscious of one's vulnerability 
and limitations is to be aware that one is susceptible to having one's 
wilful intentions, decisions determined by desires and by the will of 
others, without the full exercise of one's practical reason. Third, an
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autonomous person desires to pursue his ends in a manner consistent with 
the preservation and enhancement of his autonomy.
But the development of the individual is only one of the results of 
the exercise of rational self-direction. Society as a whole will profit 
from the rational development of its members and from the improvement of 
its institutions flowing in the wake of their critical evaluation. These 
institutions are also less likely to be perverted if they are manned by 
persons who assume responsibility for their actions. All in all, then, 
the fruits of autonomy have much to commend them. Yet, in so saying, 
one is immediately struck by the paradox of civil authority, namely, that 
in submitting to civil authority, one apparently surrenders one's autonomy. 
It is the function of a civil authority to decide what shall and what 
shall not be done in civil intercourse; insofar as we are subject to 
authority, these decisions are largely made for us. There is, therefore, 
an apparent incompatibility between autonomy and authority which may fuel 
yet another a priori argument against the possibility of a theory of civil 
obligation. We return full circle, then, to Rousseau's fundamental prob­
lem and the dichotomy he endeavoured to dissolve: autonomy and authority
as both the grounds and denial of civil obligation.
VIII
Autonomy and Authority
"Government is, in all cases, an evil", argues Godwin, "it ought to 
be introduced as sparingly as possible. Man is a species of being whose 
excellence depends on .his individuality; and who can be neither great nor 
wise, but in proportion as he is independent."112 Since autonomy and in­
dependence are the characteristic feature of human nature, claims the 
philosophical anarchist, the truly autonomous person will be guided by his 
own conception of propriety. His conduct is moulded, as it were, by the 
conviction of his unique understanding. Consequently, the reconciliation 
of authority and autonomy is, if not logically impossible, highly problema­
tical. It follows, then, that since all governmental authority is equally 
illegitimate, there can be no civil obligation. As the 'right to command', 
authority entails a right to be obeyed, and if government has a right to
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be obeyed then the citizen must have an obligation to obey. However, con­
tends the anarchist, such an obligation could be generated only at the 
expense of the moral autonomy of the individual, and nothing could justify 
forfeiting one's autonomy. Briefly, this argument is principally dependent 
upon two claims. The first is that legitimate authority would be a 'moral 
right to rule' and that citizens would have a correlative obligation to 
those in authority to obey their commands. The second is that one could 
not have an obligation to obey another person and still be an autonomous 
moral agent. The first claim, it is here argued, rests upon a faulty 
account of authority, and the second leads us to a closer inspection of 
the notion of autonomy.
Political authority has traditionally been regarded as a right to 
command, to which there is a correlative obligation to obey. D.D. Raphael, 
for example, states that
"the authority to issue commands is not simply a right or 
permission to do something... ; it is also a right against 
those to whom the commands are addressed that they should 
do what they are commanded to do. It is a right to receive 
obedience, and it corresponds to an obligation on the part 
of others to give obedience. ^
The problem with this account is that it presents authority as a right 
which is logically correlated with an obligation to obey, and that this 
obligation is owed to the person(s) in authority. Now, one may readily 
concede that authority is a kind of right, but not one to which there is a 
logically correlated obligation to obey; that is to say, civil obligation 
is misrepresented when framed as an obligation to those in authority. To 
see this more clearly we must consider the different senses of the word 
'right' and how they relate to the notions of obligation and authority.^
Sometimes we may make legitimate demands upon the behaviour of an­
other person, that he perform or refrain from performing a certain act or 
series of acts. This is true whenever the person has an obligation in the 
narrow sense (with exceptions, such as benefaction, discussed above).
When A assumes or incurs an obligation toward B the latter thereby acquires 
a right against A. Whether we speak of the obligor's obligation or the 
obligee's right, it is the same relationship viewed from two different per­
spectives. Let us call this correlative of an obligation a 'legitimate
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claim', hereafter to be abbreviated as 'claim'.
We may also ascribe a right in the sense, not of a claim on the 
actions of another, but of a freedom or privilege to act oneself. To say 
that one has a right to construct a mud hut on a certain block of land is 
not to say that one may legitimately demand that somebody do something for 
him. It is to say only that he is at liberty to construct his hut if he 
so wishes. One might say that this is only a special case of a claim right 
in that the builder may demand of all others that they not interfere with 
his construction, but, properly speaking, this is better described as the 
absence of a claim. To say that I am morally or legally free to do some­
thing if I wish is to say that I have no obligation not to do it, which is 
in turn to say that nobody has a claim against me that I not do it. Let 
us call rights in this second sense 'liberties'. The correlative of this 
kind of right is not an obligation, but simply the absence of a claim.
When we say of Parliament that it has the right to levy taxes we are 
not speaking of a claim that this body has against another person or group 
of persons. Nor are we saying simply that it is at liberty to do something. 
We are saying that the Parliament has been empowered under the Constitution 
(as amended) to perform this function as it sees fit. Parliament has been 
invested with the legal ability or power to create certain requirements, 
such as paying taxes. We might call this third kind of right a 'power' 
right, but there is a more familiar term for it: 'authority'. But the 
authority of Parliament is not absolute. It does not have the legal 
ability or power, for example, to establish a religion or to commercially 
isolate one state of the Commonwealth from the other states. This pre­
sents us with a fourth kind of right: 'immunity'. Australian citizens 
have the liberty to worship or not as they choose, but they also have an 
immunity right to do so, for Parliament has no authority to require or pro­
hibit such acts.
Authority is a kind of right,then, but not the kind to which there is 
a correlative obligation. The correlative of authority is what we might 
call 'liability', being liable or subject to the imposition of requirements 
and prohibitions. Australian citizens and resident aliens are subject to 
the authority of the Australian Parliament while Indonesian citizens are 
not. (To round out the list we may say that a 'disability' is correlative
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to an immunity. 'Disability' simply means 'no authority', just as 'immu­
nity' is equivalent to 'no liability'.)
There is a conceptual relationship between authority and obligation, 
though it is not one of direct correlation. Authority is the legal right 
to create obligations on the part of those who have a correlative liabil­
ity. But these obligations are to do such things as pay taxes, send one's 
children to school, and report traffic accidents, not to obey the law or 
to obey the authorities. Authority as it has been described above is a 
legal concept, so that any obligation which is logically correlative to it 
would have to be a legal obligation. It is not just false to say that 
there is a legal obligation to obey the law, it is absurd, and it is quite 
beside the point of any discussion of civil obligation. We are asking 
here whether one has a moral obligation to fulfil one's legal obligations. 
If such an obligation were a logical correlate of authority, then author­
ity would have to be a moral concept. But what a moral authority would be 
is not at all clear.
What would it be like for someone to have moral authority or to be a 
moral authority? If moral authority is an analogue of legal authority, 
then one with moral authority may make moral rules - but who could possibly 
have such authority? If one were a theist, one might claim that God has 
such authority, but theistic voluntarism has not been a popular view, even 
among theologians. Nobody is a moral authority in the sense of being able 
by an act of will to make something right or wrong. We may use the term, 
however, to refer to somebody who is in a special position to know what is 
morally right and wrong; an omniscient God, for example, or someone with 
special access to the divine wisdom. The authority which a parent exercises 
over his/her children is usually conceived in this way. The parent has a 
right to decide and to discipline, not solely by viture of ownership of the 
children, but as a consequence of superior knowledge and understanding.
But though there may be moral authority in this sense, this is surely not 
the kind of authority which the state is considered to exercise. Political 
authority has indeed been discussed as a variety of paternal authority, but 
this conception is of negligible influence in the present day. A defense 
of anarchism surely must deal with a more lively opponent.
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One reason why Godwin (Winstanley, Kropotkin, Bakunin, Proudhon, 
Fourier, Robert Paul Wolf) adheres to this paternalistic model of civil 
obligation could well stem from his assumption that obligations must be 
owed to someone. There is obviously some connection between political 
authority and civil obligation, and it would be easy to assume that they 
are logically related in such a way that civil obligation must be owed to 
the political authority. But clearly there are other possibilities. It 
may be owed to somebody else, one's fellow citizens for example, or it may 
not be owed to anybody at all, if it is an obligation in the broad sense 
of the term.
We have characterized political authority as a collection of legal 
power rights. There is a difference between simply having the power to 
require and prohibit certain acts of others, and having the legal power to 
do so. The terms 'legitimate authority' and 'de jure authority' are some­
times used to mark this distinction. Someone who is imposing, rules with­
out legal right is said to be only a 'de facto' authority or one with no 
legitimate claim to power. The conditions which confer legitimacy in this 
sense may vary from time to time and from place to place, but they are 
usually such things as succession through established channels, or appoint­
ment or election through constitutional procedures. It is not legitimacy 
in this sense which Godwin denies to all governments, so it must be legiti­
macy in a moral sense. Perhaps here we have something which is correlated 
with an obligation to obey - morally legitimate authority. Not moral 
authority, but authority which is morally legitimate.
First of all, we must recall the distinction between legitimacy and 
justification. It was said that legitimacy is a function of rules, proce­
dures or channels, though we do sometimes use 'legitimate' in a broader 
sense. The fundamental question underpinning our considerations of the 
state is whether political authority is justified. The problem of 'the 
legitimacy of the state', then, is the issue of whether we ought to have 
the institution of government. Surely, one wants to say, there is some 
connection between granting that government is 'legitimate' in this broader 
sense and granting that one ought to obey it. Yet, Godwin grants that 
government may be legitimate in this broader sense: he says that, under a
highly restricted set of conditions, we ought to have governments and that 
we ought to obey them:
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"To a government ... that talked to us of deference 
to political authority, and honour to be rendered to our 
superiors, our answer should be: 'It is yours to shackle
the body, and restrain our external actions; that is a re­
straint we understand. Announce your penalties; and we 
will make our election of submission or suffering. But do 
not seek to enslave our minds. Exhibit your force in its 
plainest form, for that is your province; but seek not to 
inveigle and mislead us. Obedience and external submission 
is all you are entitled to claim; you can have no right to 
extort our deference... ' In the meantime it should be 
observed that it is by no means a necessary consequence 
that we should disapprove of all the measures of government; 
but there must be disapprobation wherever there is a ques­
tion of strict political obedience."^5
It is quite puzzling, then, when Godwin insists that all authority is 
equally illegitimate and that the commands of the state have no 'binding 
moral force'. This brings us to the second important claim on which the 
philosophical anarchist argument rests.
Godwin denies that any authority can be legitimate because submitting 
to authority would conflict with the 'fundamental duty' of the individual 
to preserve his autonomy. Authority would be legitimate, only if it would 
be morally permissible to forfeit one's autonomy and submit one's will to 
the direction of the state. This is the central theme of Godwin's Enquiry, 
though it is somewhat misleading to express it in terms of the legitimacy 
of the state. For Godwin's question is not whether the state would be 
justified in issuing commands and enforcing them, or even whether the 
citizen ought to obey. The question turns out to be whether the state has 
a (moral) right to my unthinking obedience. His answer is that it does not 
because an obligation to obey without question would conflict with a more 
fundamental obligation always to exercise my own judgement.
Yet it is strange to speak of an obligation to act autonomously, even 
when reminded of all that has been said above exhorting the importance of 
autonomy. Is there, one is forced to ask yet again, an irresolvable con­
flict between authority and autonomy? A tension certainly exists, but it 
does not automatically preclude the possibility of an accommodation.
The autonomous person is he who decides what he ought to do on the 
basis of his own deliberation and reflection. One may think that it is
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necessary to have a legal system and a political decision procedure, the 
results of which are generally followed. One may decide after careful 
reflection that one ought to adopt this principle to govern one's own con­
duct. This complicates the situation, but such a decision would not 
accurately be described as forfeiting one's autonomy. There is a differ­
ence between blindly and unreflectively following political authority, and 
doing so because one has judged that it is right to do so. The autonomous 
person is he who acts upon his own considered best judgement, and one of 
those judgements may be that he ought to obey the law, even though he 
might not otherwise have done what the law requires him to do.
A second reason that an autonomous person may recognize a civil obli­
gation is that this obligation is not necessarily an absolute obligation. 
Acknowledging a civil obligation does not entail abandoning one's judge­
ment about the worth of the law or system of laws. It means only that 
one's obedience is not contingent in normal circumstances upon a favourable 
judgement of the law in question. There may, however, be abnormal cases 
when this (prima faci-e) obligation is seriously challenged. It is up to 
the individual to determine when such an extraordinary situation has arisen 
and then to weigh his obligation to obey the law against the competing 
obligations, principles, or values.
IX
The Problem of Order
The problem of civility, as discussed above, bifurcates into two 
definitive questions: firstly, the question of civil obligation proper:
"is one under an obligation to obey the law?"; and, secondly, the question 
of civil obedience: "should one obey the law?". While it may well be
reasonable to argue that the members of a civil society, by viture of 
their membership, are necessarily under an obligation to obey the laws of 
their society, the question remains as to what constitutes civil society 
in the first place, and what are the significant features of membership. 
Moreover, it is necessary to further unpack the notion of civil society 
and distinguish between civil societies proper and those societies charac­
terized more by ubiquitous coercion than civility. Should we fail to draw
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this distinction we would be presented with the difficulty of deriving 
obligation from coercion, or at best, prudential considerations arising 
from the threat of coercion, rather than from commitment (no matter how 
widely interpreted). In other words, if we acknowledge that obligation 
is grounded in something other than mere coercion, then analyses of civil 
obligation must consider the nature of the milieux in which such obliga­
tions are said to exist; or, expressed more forcefully, it must be asked 
"what are the features of a social order to which one may have an obliga­
tion?". The abstract formulation "is one under an obligation to obey the 
law?" is thus transformed into the more palpable question "does one have 
an obligation to obey the laws of a particular social order?" And at this 
point the so-called 'problem of consent' comes to the fore as a dilemma in 
its own right, as the presumed fulcrum on which the matter of personal 
obligation to a particular social order is firmly hinged.
"I cannot help thinking", Joseph Tussman writes wistfully, "how much 
simpler political theory would be ... if we had the equivalent of the 
Ephebic Oath embedded in a ceremonial secular service reminding the native 
citizen that he, too, shares the commitment or agreement which is quite 
explicit in the case of the naturalized citizen. In its absence (the path 
of the contract theorist) is a wearier and hardier one."46 The path is 
hardy because, though there are some public affirmations of citizenship, 
few persons have participated in them intending to assume any kind of obli­
gation. (The ceremonies and affirmations must be understood by the parti­
cipants as the assumption of obligations in order for them to constitute 
voluntary commitments.) Care is taken in the naturalization ceremony that 
the new citizen be fully aware of the nature of the proceedings and of the 
implications of participation in it. The children of the patria, however, 
simply drift into adult citizenship. There is no ceremonial entry at which 
time we can say, "I have now become a full member of this society and ac­
cept the obligations consequent upon membership". Tussman wearily accepts 
these facts and concludes that, since a knowing commitment is a necessary 
condition of having an obligation, there are very few citizens who have an 
obligation to obey the law. None of the contractarians, of course, were 
willing to accept such a conclusion. In the face of these difficulties, on 
the crudest level of interpretation, they substituted a tacit for an exp­
ress commitment.
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The most obvious ways in which we commit ourselves are linguistic, 
but language is by no means necessary. " 'Martha, will you marry me?'
And Martha blushes, sighs, throws herself wordlessly into your arms, and 
embraces you rapturously. It will be a specious defense later if she 
argues, 'But I never said "yes"'. Acceptance usually needs no special 
words - only an intelligible history of act and circumstance."47 In the 
circumstances, the wordless embrace amounts to accepting the proposal of 
marriage. It is not a weaker kind of commitment for not being stated in 
words. The difference between express and implied commitment is not a 
difference in the quality of the commitment, but in the way the commitment 
is made. A tacit agreement is still an actual agreement. But what general 
conditions or circumstances are necessary for a tacit commitment to be 
made? We cannot simply stipulate that X constitutes a tacit commitment to 
do Y. There must be an "intelligible history of act and circumstance" such 
that an intention to take on an obligation may be communicated (or at least 
inferred or understood). As with express commitments, the actor must know 
the significance of his act, that what he is doing amounts to committing 
himself, and his intention to take on the obligation must be communicated 
to somebody else. This latter criterion may be relaxed in cases of commit­
ment to oneself, but it is necessary if a commitment is to be made to 
another. The former criterion, that a person must know that what he is 
doing amounts to making a commitment, is the most interesting and important 
for our purposes. If it is relaxed, if we say that a person may commit 
himself without knowing that he is doing so, then we will have lost the 
connection between committing oneself and voluntarily assuming an obliga­
tion; and it was this that made the 'social contract' such an appealing 
account of civil obligation.
What act could there be which all persons perform, knowing that they 
are committing themselves to obey the law? In Locke's words, "What shall 
be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make 
him subject to the laws of any government?" His answer is that
"... every man that has any possessions or enjoyment of any 
part of the dominions of any government does thereby give 
his tacit consent and is so far forth obliged to obedience 
to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as 
anyone under it; whether this his possession be of land to 
him and his heirs forever, or a lodging for only a week, or 
whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and,
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in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone 
within the territories of that government."48
If we have correctly stated the criteria for tacit commitment, Locke must 
surely be wrong,.for not everyone who travels or resides within a country 
takes this as implying a commitment to obey the law. John Plamenatz cites 
examples of persons conspiring to bring down the government:
"... Thistlewood and his associates lived and travelled 
in (England) for many months after they had decided to 
attempt the destruction of its government. It is most 
improbable that their presence in Cato Street implied a 
willingness on their part to obey all the laws adminis­
tered by the men they plotted to assassinate."48
It may be that some persons understand their residence in a country to con­
stitute a promise to obey its laws, but the number is probably not large.
It may consist entirely of those charmed by the most primitive version of 
the social contract.
Locke speaks of tacit consent rather than tacit commitment, and per­
haps there is a difference here which deserves to be explored. It does 
seem to be possible to bind oneself in a way which is less dramatic and 
more gradual than the ways we have discussed. Accepting responsibility 
does not always involve a single act or a well-defined course of conduct, 
nor does it always imply a single-minded intention to take on an obliga­
tion. Herbert Fingarette provides a good example:
"I am morally culpable if I do not show up for dinner, 
have given my wife no forewarning, remain away until late, 
and cause her grief and anxiety. I am responsible for 
being home reasonably promptly. Yet I never explicitly 
announced I would be home for dinner on this night, nor 
did I ever make some explicit but general commitment to 
the effect that I would always be home for dinner. I just 
do come home every night for dinner, and though this, con­
sidered in isolation, establishes no responsibility, taken 
in connection with other features of my home life, it all 
adds up to the fact that I have accepted this responsibility."50
It is more difficult in such cases to speak of accepting responsi­
bility rather than simply becoming responsible, or of assuming an obliga­
tion rather than incurring one. But it can make sense to say that such
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responsibilities are assumed if the person is at least vaguely aware that 
he is becoming responsible and if he could have avoided the responsibility.
k
"At any point in my domestic career I could have 
acted otherwise than I did, often without betraying 
any of my responsibilities at the time. Had I acted 
differently, my responsibilities would often have had 
a different form. I might not have married domestic 
Martha and chosen doting Mary instead: she would have
encouraged me to indulge myself. I might have married 
Martha but only after we had 'had it out' quite frank­
ly: so far and no further would I go in the domestic
regularities she was inclined to expect. Or I could 
have arranged that if I were not home by an hour before 
dinner, I would not be expected."51
Could we say that living in a country constitutes a tacit consent to 
being governed by all its laws? Such a view was first suggested not by 
Locke but by Plato. In Cv'tto, when Socrates is in jail discussing with 
his friends their offer to help him escape, he points out to them that he 
could have left Athens at any time he was displeased with its laws. His 
remaining in the city thus means that he has agreed to be governed by its 
laws and so has an obligation to obey them. This argument seems very weak 
indeed. In the first place, not everybody has the option of leaving his 
country. Many persons simply do not have the financial means to leave, 
and if they could get the money they might not be granted entry by another 
country. Other persons are forbidden by their own laws to leave; it would 
be ridiculous to maintain that their residence constituted a tacit consent 
to the very laws that keep them from leaving. Hume also finds this argu­
ment quite unappealing:
"Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan 
has a free choice to leave his country when he knows no 
foreign language or manners and lives from day to day by 
the small wages which he acquires. We may as well assert 
that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to 
the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board 
while asleep and must leap into the ocean and perish the 
moment he leaves her."52
In the second place, it would hardly occur to most persons that their 
being in a country constituted any kind of commitment on their part to its 
laws. If they have consented it would come as news to them. In the 
absence of either of these criteria it is difficult to see how such 'con-
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sent' could amount to a voluntary commitment. If 'consent' means 'acquie­
scence' or 'passive residence', then consent is not a kind of voluntary 
commitment. If consent is a kind of voluntary commitment, then mere pas­
sive acquiescence does not constitute consent, especially in cases where 
non-acquiescence has a 'price' attached to it.
Needless to say, this is an unsympathetic and overly literal reading 
of contractarianism; it is all too easy to establish straw men in this 
regard and then do much philosophical huffing and puffing. The seminal 
contractarians had some important insights about civil life, and though 
they expressed them metaphorically through a convenient contractual fic­
tion, the insights themselves are basically sound. The state of nature, 
for example, is a striking way of making the point that authority and 
subjection are not given in the nature of things. Political authority is 
a product of human convention and needs to be justified in terms of bene­
fits which the subject derives from his subjection. The relationship 
should be one to which the subject would consent if the appropriate circum­
stances presented themselves. Government is justified if it is the sort 
of arrangement which would be agreed upon by rational and informed indi­
viduals. Moreover, obedience to the law is not owed to the government, 
but to one's fellow citizens. All these important points are illuminated 
if we think of our obligation to obey the law on the model of a contrac­
tual relationship freely undertaken by equal individuals, one with another, 
for their mutual benefit.
All this is true, but it must nevertheless be said that the real 
basis of our obligation to obey the law is somewhat obscured by the con­
tract fiction. A hypothetical contract binds no one. The social contract 
myth illuminates some aspects of civil obligation, but it does not provide 
its basis. Rousseau was quite clear about this:
"Let us begin then by laying all facts aside, as they 
do not affect the question. The investigations we may 
enter into, in treating this subject, must not be consi­
dered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional 
and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain 
the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual 
origin."53
79
The demythologised social contract is not itself a basis of obliga­
tion but a convenient device with which to build a theory of obligation.
What would be the terms of a contract which reasonable and informed men 
would make? Would it include a provision that every law be obeyed no 
matter what its content, or would some exceptions be built into the agree­
ment? Perhaps laws of a certain sort need not be obeyed. Perhaps they 
would even agree to disobey laws of a certain sort. The terms of the con­
tract are open for argument, and it is these arguments that will determine 
the nature and extent of our civil obligation. "For a legitimate 
government", remarks Pitkin, "a true authority, one whose subjects are 
obligated to obey it, emerges as being one to which they ought to consent, 
quite apart from whether they have done so... Legitimate government is 
government which deserves consent.Government, then, must be deserving 
(or worthy) of obedience, it must encapsulate the principles of a 'moral 
order', as it were, a complexus of just laws fairly administered. In 
endeavouring to explicate civil obligation one must therefore advance the 
conditions (or criteria) of a moral order; and, in delivering oneself of 
a theory of justice, one must outline the features of a paradigmatic social 
order deserving of obedience, i.e. a moral order, or just state. The 
grounding of civil obligation thus exhibits a 'eutopian' inflexion, in that 
it entails fashioning models of 'good places' - as opposed to utopias ('no 
place') - which portray the virtuous possibilities of this world. As 
eutopia, a moral order incorporates the notion of a just state: a satis­
factory moral ecology. In other words, it functions as a paradigm of 
those circumstances which one ought to promote and to whose undergirding 
authority one ought to consent. It is easy to see how the attempt to trans­
late ideals into reality, or at the very least to express ideals in realis­
tic terms, lends otherwise analytical philosophy a mythopoeic modulation. 
Simply, the framing of eutopia is as much an imaginitive endeavour as it is 
a formal legalistic exercise; and, insofar as civil obligation entails an 
awareness of what ought to be the case (even if it is never realized) it 
harbours a mythopoeic vision of human possibilities. "I will venture 
frankly to say", writes Philo Judaeus, "that the statesman is beyond any 
doubt an interpreter of dreams....
"a man accustomed to estimate at its true worth the common, 
universal great dream which is dreamed not only by the 
sleeping, but also by the waking. This waking dream, to 
speak truly, is human life itself.... Inasmuch as life is
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laden with all confusion and chaos and obscurity, the 
statesman must come forward and like some wise inter­
preter of dreams he must sit in judgment on the day 
dreams and fantasies of his fellows who think that they 
are awake - using likely conjectures and reasonable per­
suasions, on such occasions, to show them that this 
beautiful and that the reverse; this good and that bad; 
this just and that unjust. And so, too, with other 
qualities: he will try to show what is prudent, what
courageous, what pious, what sacred, what beneficial, 
what profitable; and again what is unprofitable, what 
unreasonable, what ignoble, what impious, what profane, 
what disadvantageous, what injurious and what selfish. 
And besides these he will also teach other lessons....
Be prepared for change. You have often stumbled: hope
now for a better time. For with men things turn to 
their opposite."55
However, the inadequacy of 'hypothetical consent' as an approach to civil 
obligation reveals itself not in the determination of whether we ought to 
obey an authority which is worthy of our consent, but whether or not we 
are under an obligation to such an authority. Hypothetical consent is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of civil obligation because it omits 
the vital element of citizenship: participation in respublica. Civil
obligation is a function of citizenship, not in the instrumental sense of 
the word 'function' but as a variable quantity in relation to others in 
terms of which it may be expressed or on which its value depends. While 
there may be many social orders worthy of our obedience, we do not have 
civil obligations to them all. The nexus is such that the very participa­
tion in the practices constitutive of a particular social order locates 
the individual as a political being, that is, it grants him locus stccndi 
in matters of civility and order. Consequently, the validity of the hypo­
thetical consent model springs not so much from the reasonableness of its 
application but from its acceptance by those who are in a position to apply 
it. Together, then, the notions of citizenship and hypothetical consent 
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for grounding civil obliga­
tions. Paraphrasing Aristotle, one has an obligation to obey the laws of 
a state when, firstly, one is a citizen of that state and, secondly, one 
considers that state to be worthy of obedience. In other words, there can 
be no fixed answer to the question "is one under an obligation to obey the 
laws of this state?" since the determination of the state's worthiness of 
obedience is as fluid as the considered opinions of its citizens.
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The fusion of civility and (moral) order as the principal criteria 
of civil obligation claims provides perhaps the most damning condemnation 
of the crude rendering of the social contract, not merely as poor history, 
but as rigid, illogical conservatism. A primordial contract which binds a 
nation for all time allows no change, no moral development. Needless to 
say, innumerable changes must have taken place since the initial 'consti­
tutional convention', but the assumption is always that 'now' must be 
forever, as though seventeenth or eighteenth century England were the best 
of all possible worlds and need be retrospectively enshrined in a secular 
covenant. There is a presumption of moral order and a stunted, static 
civility. Yet, despite all the criticism, there is a cogent point to 
literal contractarianism that reflects upon its metaphorical counterpart, 
namely, that, like rule-governed behaviour, civil obligation is systemic 
in nature. If one has a civil obligation to obey the law, then it is to 
obey all the laws of the state and not some particular law. This is not 
to say that one is automatically committed to thoughtless obedience having 
once decided that obedience is warranted, but that in having a civil obli­
gation one has a uniform, universal prima facie reason to obey all the 
laws of the state in the absence of superior conflicting considerations.
Like most dilemmas in political philosophy, the problem of civility 
is readily resolvable in ideal typical eutopian (or dystopian) models. In 
heaven, as it were, there is no problem of civil obligation. Similarly, 
those who participate in a moral order have a civil obligation to it as a 
consequence of its being nothing other than a moral order. The reasons 
for obedience to the law, then, are to be found in the nature of the state, 
and the characteristic modes of participation in its practices. To say 
that one has a civil obligation is to say that one has reasons for obeying 
the laws of,one's state. The problem, however, lies in determining what 
is citizenship (or civility) and what features characterize a moral order.
With this restricted, systemic conception of civil obligation in mind, 
then, we proceed in the following sections to an investigation of the 
theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls. In particular,the
adequacy of their theories qua contract theories will be assessed by pos­
ing two questions: (1) are these theories really contractarian theories?;
and, (2) do they solve the problem of civil obligation? This second
question must be answered, of course, in the light of the conception of
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civil obligation presented above; and this raises two further considera­
tions. The first of these is, do these 'solutions' address the question 
of civil obligation or are they aimed at the question of civil obedience? 
If the answer is the former, then the second consideration arises, and it 
must be asked whether these 'solutions' supply the content necessary to 
complete the formal (eutopian) solution outlined above. Do these contrac­
tarian theories, in other words, provide a suitable conception of civility 
and order?
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PART TWO
THE MYTHOPOESY OF CIVILITY AND ORDER
"The Mythos of Synecdoche is the dream of Comedy, the 
apprehension of a world in which all struggle, strife, 
and conflict are dissolved in the realization of a perfect 
harmony, in the attainment of a condition in which all 
crime, vice, and folly are finally revealed as the means 
to the establishment of the social order which is finally 
achieved at the end of the play. But the Comic resolution 
may take two forms: the triumph of the protagonist over
the society which blocks his progression to his goal, or 
the reassertion of the rights of the collectivity over the 
individual who has risen up to challenge it as the defini­
tive form of community. The first kind of Comic emplotment 
may be called the Comedy of Desire, the second kind the 
Comedy of Duty and Obligation."1
"In the Wars themselves (which is a time, wherein all 
Languages use, if ever, to increase by extraordinary deg­
rees; for in such busie, and active times, there arise more 
new thoughts of men, which must be signifi'd, and varied by 
new expressions) then I say, it receiv'd many fantastical 
terms, which were introduced by our Religious Sects; and 
many outlandish phrases, which several Writers and Transla­
tors , in that great hurry, brought in, and made free as 
they pleas'd, with all it was enlarg'd by many sounds, and 
necessary Forms, and Idioms, which it before wanted."2
It has become a commonplace of contemporary analyses of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century thought that this period represented the 'age of 
reason' in European philosophy. No doubt, as Sir Isaiah Berlin has com­
mented3 , the unprecedented success of mathematical techniques helped forge 
a 'mechanical' model of the universe conducive to rational investigation. 
However, it is all too easy to retrospectively secularize times past and 
import into the thought of persons otherwise disposed a host of notions 
utterly alien to their understanding. Certainly, Hobbes was no more 
rational than Aquinas, nor Locke more reasonable than Augustine. While 
the words 'reason', 'logic' and 'science' figure more prominently in the 
later writers it does not automatically go to say that they were in any 
way more reasonable, or, for that matter, more scientific than their pre-
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decessors. The implicit assumption here, in the labelling of some writers 
as 'medieval' and others as 'enlightened', is that somehow the latter 
managed to free themselves from the shackles of superstition and rigid 
dogmatism; that they put aside doctrinaire theology for the more 'sensible' 
(read 'rational') pursuits of natural philosophy, politics and anthropology 
In other words, it is supposed that the transition from a medieval to an 
enlightened outlook entailed the metamorphosis of theocentric scholasticism 
into cosmocentric 'science' under the catalysis of Renaissance 'humanism'. 
Progress, that is to say, from patristic theology to a 'modern paganism'. 
"The men of the Enlightenment", writes Peter Gay, "united on a vastly 
ambitious program, a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and 
freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms - freedom from arbitrary 
power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one's 
talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral man 
to make his own way in the world.,,L+ Heady romanticism and convivial con­
spiracy theories aside, the fundamental error underlying Gay's description 
is the ready assumption of a thoroughgoing irreligiousness (exceptions 
granted) in late seventeenth and eighteenth century thought. The mistake 
is made of conveniently conflating 'individualism' and 'conscience' with a 
rejection of 'faith', as though the cataclysmic shifts in doctrine of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were an abandonment of religious belief 
rather than a reformulation of its expression and implications. "Seven­
teenth-century thought was God-ridden", writes John Redwood,
"Whenever a man took up his pen and attempted to write 
about the weather, the seasons, the structure of the 
earth, the constitution of the heavens, the nature of 
political society, the organization of the Church, social 
morality or ethics he was by definition taking up his pen 
to write about God. Strive as individuals might to re­
monstrate with their colleagues and contemporaries that 
they were only interested in writing about the shape of 
the stamens of plants or the geological formation of rock 
strata, strain as they might to confine their comments 
upon republics and kingdoms to comments about political 
practicalities and the consequences of pragmatism, they 
always found that they had striven in vain. For, to the 
many clerics who were seriously concerned about the theo­
logical universe they were describing, and to the many 
laymen who proffered loyalty, obedience and humility to 
their clergymen and bishops, the world was God's creation 
and could only be explained within a deist and Christian 
framework."5
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The revisionist surgery performed upon Hobbes' exposition of Christian 
faith in Leviathan provides us with a perfect example of retrospective 
secularization and literary misprision. This case is all the more interes­
ting because of the central role accorded Hobbes in the rise of modern 
rational thought and the 'demystification' of political philosophy. The 
thousands of words spilled in the exegesis and adoration of a sacred his­
tory underpinning human thought and action are dismissed by many Hobbes 
scholars as either lip-service to common practice or cryptic irreligiosity. 
Yet, as J.G.A. Pocock has argued, "scholarship has suffered until recently 
from a fixed unwillingness to give the Hebrew and eschatological elements 
in seventeenth century thought the enormous significance which they posses­
sed for contemporaries." Moreover,
"Hobbes's readers since his own lifetime have found reason 
to doubt if he was a man of deep personal piety and even to 
affirm that he was an atheist.... It has thus come to be a 
near-orthodoxy that he did not believe what he wrote in the 
unread half of Leviathan, and that consequently these books 
have no meaning.... Although esoteric reasons have been 
suggested why Hobbes should have written what he did not 
believe, the difficulty remains of imagining why a notorious­
ly arrogant thinker, vehement in his dislike of 'insignifi­
cant speech', should have written and afterwards defended 
sixteen chapters of what he held to be nonsense, and exposed 
them to the scrutiny of a public which did not consider this 
kind of thing nonsense at all."6
The critical point here is not the daemonization or sublimation of 
Hobbes (depending on one's predilections in this regard) but the manner in 
which the intellectual history of Europe since the Renaissance has been 
subject to the enthusiasms and excitements of those committed to a linear 
conception of the history of ideas as the progress of reason - a not al­
together ridiculous notion, but one subject to much abuse at the hands of 
latter-day phitosophes. The mere assumption of the mutual exclusion of 
faith and reason in a 'Newtonian' world, or at best an uneasy coexistence, 
not only overlooks the richly textured and hybridized modes of thought 
undergirding the so-called rise of reason, but also disregards the eschato­
logical passion energizing speculation and the soteriological addictions 
of all revolutionaries, Utopians, and martyrs of reason and passion. The 
element of 'faith', revitalized by the Reformation, paradoxically served to 
fuel the continuing debate on matters of conscience and freedom. Moreover, 
as the struggles of the Reformation splintered into the scholarship and
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criticism of succeeding generations, what had originally begun as a con­
servative backlash developed into the backdrop for a creative scepticism.
"Works considered entirely secondary to faith by six­
teenth-century reformers and eighteenth-century evangelists, 
began to be stressed by Protestant preachers; creeds and 
ceremonies, always provocative of dispute and even war, were 
scrutinized anew and their necessary role questioned; doubts 
about the essential and total depravity of man, belief in a 
moral sense, debates about the existence and nature of re­
wards and punishments after death, thoughts on the prescience, 
benevolence, and good will of the Almighty were voiced.... 
Skepticism, even at times about reason itself, examination of 
all manner of common assumptions added to a strong desire by 
many for a reasonable basis of belief - these attitudes led 
to a reassessment of 'the good man'."7
The very question 'why should one obey the law?' now made sense in a 
world exposed to a theology of the autonomous conscience, of a transcendent 
God immanent in nature and the deeds of men. Not only did this re-examina- 
tion of criteria for religious truth and Mosaic legal fundamentalism give 
rise to renewed interest in covenantical relationships with the deity, but 
it also gave rise to reconsideration of human relations and the formal cri­
teria for their evaluation. However, to talk of the idea of a social con­
tract as mere projection of a theological metaphor is to miss the point.
It was the search for criteria, for ways of talking about autonomy and 
interdependence, for reconciling 'freedom' with the coercion of the state 
that fashioned a metaphor all the more powerful for its biblical connota­
tions. The social contract, in other words, constituted a synecdoche meta­
phor by which the factors shaping civility and order within the state were 
expressed, and heightened, in both a dramatic and heuristic form.8 The 
complexus of obligations, rights, duties and responsibilities thus came to 
be focused in an intellectual 'test case', as it were, the examination of 
which would unfold in an orderly fashion the diversity it contained.
Through unpacking the synecdoche, then, its literature of origin - its 
mythopoesy - would be exposed to critical investigation.
The fluxion of notions now conveniently packaged into either philoso­
phical or theological spheres happily merged and cross-fertilized through­
out the Reformation and, until recently, in the generations in its wake.
For example, Kant was of the opinion that the whole endeavour which was 
begun by Plato, and which by Kant's time had been going on for many centu-
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ries, to formulate a satisfactory rational demonstration for the immortali­
ty of the soul was a mistake. Kant not only effectively but formally sepa­
rated intellectual enlightenment from moral and religious enlightenment, 
and assigned the Aristotelian theory of 'ideas' (conceived of as immanent 
content rather than transcendent objects of thought) to the former, and the 
Platonic 'idea' (the transcendent object) to the latter. When he argued, 
then, that the arguments for the immortality of the soul are necessarily 
invalid, he was in effect reproducing the Aristotelian objection to the 
Platonic demonstration. The greatest difficulty of Kant's position, be­
sides the ultimate inconsistency of juxtaposing 'idea' as immanent content 
with 'idea' as transcendent object, is the failure to account for an expe­
rience of enlightenment which even in Calvinism is not exclusively reli­
gious or exclusively moral, but also in a very comprehensive sense intel­
lectual. It seems possible to combine immanence and transcendence without 
falling into the implicit contradiction involved in a Kantian division of 
labour. The way in which this may be done is suggested by Kant himself 
when he points out that the link between the realm of immanent content and 
that of transcendent object is the concept of freedom. The point, of 
course, is that this is the line taken by Calvin, enunciated in his soteri- 
ology and replete in his sermons. What both Calvin and Kant understood by 
'freedom' was free will, and the link which they saw between the two realms 
was that in the realm of immanent content freedom appears as a possibility, 
though no more than a possibility, and in the realm of transcendent object 
it appears as a necessary actuality. If the Kantian concept of essential 
freedom is replaced by the concept of effective freedom which figures in 
Calvin's writings, then the two realms which Kant merely juxtaposed begin 
to coalesce. Freedom from this perspective will not be something which 
every man is called upon to achieve, and the degree of freedom a man achie­
ves will be the degree in which the transcendent becomes immanent in him. 
The experience of immortality will thus be the experience of freedom and 
elucidating the experience will mean elucidating the process of liberation.
Herein lie the seedlings of the notion of the social contract and can 
be seen the rationale for linking 'civility' (active participation in the 
life of the polis) with 'order' (as the well-being of the polis) in terms 
of the unfolding of that which is transcendent (the imago Dei) in the 
immanent (temporal Being). Liberation, in other words, as the realization 
of human potential in conduct inter homines, the overall characterization
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of which constitutes the secular covenant; not secular in its irreligiosity 
but, rather, in its concern with temporal manifestations of the 'soul'.
This is not to frame the entire discussion in terms of religious disposi­
tion or to characterize political liberalism as the offspring of theologi­
cal reform, but, rather, to emphasize an often ignored or underrated 
perspective on the rise of contractarianism, namely, the Augustinian 
rejection of Aristotle's 'political' man.
Both Augustine and Aristotle held that man is by nature a social 
animal, that is to say, 'persons' and the transactional interactions that 
characterize their most fundamental relations are coeval. However, where 
Aristotle elaborated upon man's natural sociability by identifying full 
blown humanitas with aptness for oivitas - that is, equating 'personhood' 
with aptness for citizenship - Augustine argued that political institut­
ions are not natural to man. Indeed, the structures of authority and 
coercion endemic to the political state were regarded by Augustine as the 
bitter harvest of man's fall from grace, a direct consequence of the 
'unnatural' condition of a sinful world. Nevertheless, such structures 
fulfil an ameliorative function in a world otherwise predisposed to vicious 
anarchy, holding together the tattered post-Fail fabric of man's lost 
integrity. Aristotle, on the other hand, following Plato, saw in the polis 
the central condition for the attainment of all human tele (the polis 
itself not being teZion) , in much the same way as we make sense of a cell's 
existence by reference to the organism of which it is a part. In rejecting 
the mundane teleology of Aristotle, then, Augustine inadvertently prepared 
the ground for Machiavelli's stridently secular dissolution of the medieval 
political organism and his assertion of the temporal and existential pri­
macy of 'transactional relations' (conduct inter homines) over societas. 
Human interrelations on the level of personal transactions, then, are given 
moral precedence over the sum of such interrelations writ large. In other 
words, rather than arguing from the state or eecZesia back to the indivi­
dual, by way of justifying individual and corporate behaviour in terms of 
an all-embracing political context - the life of the polis - Machiavelli, 
and, later Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant began with the individual and 
argued through to the state. The teleology of public life was reversed in 
favour of the individual, making possible rational discussion on the con­
fluence of private interests and public goals, their sympathies and dis­
harmonies. Though the arguments and conclusions are profoundly different,
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the basic thrust of the Augustinian-Machiavellian logic remains constant 
and ultimately decisive: man is not only prior to political society, he
transcends it.
Hence the idea of the rational divestment of personal rights and 
their placement in some collective repository, be it Hobbes' sovereign or 
Rousseau's general will, bound in a web of reasonable commitments. The 
authority of this 'repository' is a reflection of its collective concen­
tration of the rights of others, their obligations and mutual responsibi­
lities, rather than a manifestation of some natural or mystical commission. 
Consequently, what was referred to as a 'reverse teleology' is not really 
a teleology at all, but a 'tropism' of sorts. The Aristotelian scheme of 
things centres on the relentless movement of substances towards their com­
pletion, the realization of their 'natures'. Hence, one knows some enti­
ty's true nature only if one is aware of its particular end - orientation, 
its 'reason for being'. Since the environment (social and physical) serves 
as the crucible of all tele, given that purposefulness arises from inter­
action and circumstance, a description of some entity's nature must place 
its telos within a pattern of movement. Thus, man is characterized as a 
social animal not so much because he is naturally gregarious but because 
he is telion only in the company of other men: he 'completes himself', so
to speak, through the application of socially-derived (though biologically 
determined) faculties. Opposed to this view, we find implicit in Machia- 
velli, and explicit in Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Rousseau and Kant, an 
'elemental' philosophy disposed towards the 'physics' of life rather than, 
literally, its 'metaphysics'. Men are, as it were, complete in themselves, 
albeit dependent upon others for those things which they hold in common 
and mutually entertain, such as language and ritual. Men do not complete 
themselves in coalescing to realize ineluctable tele, but, rather, to 
realize goals that enhance their personal and collective well-being. They 
are drawn towards circumstances that promise fulfilment of ambition, then, 
rather than the (often) incogitant culmination of their humanity. In 
other words, men contract to achieve a variety of ends perhaps without 
ever considering the ultimate telos towards which Aristotle would have 
them oriented.
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Nevertheless, Aristotle's point was not completely lost on his 
critics; indeed, if anything, it was taken up all the more powerfully in 
being refashioned to meet the needs of a vastly different intellectual 
climate to that of Attic Greece - an issue pursued in the last part of 
this thesis.
The point of this discussion is to stress the significance and inter­
relatedness of four seminal themes underpinning the primary literature of 
contractarianism that together not only made sense of the question "why is 
one under an obligation to obey the law?", but generated 'solutions' that 
have spread beyond their immediate field of concern to permeate all con­
temporary discussions of civility and order. It is impossible to under­
stand the rise of contractarianism, its demise and partial resuscitation 
without paying attention to the intellectual milieux that nourished it and 
struggled with its implications. The need to focus upon critical turning 
points is neither a denial of the importance of other factors nor mere 
acknowledgement of the limitations of this work, but, rather, recognition 
of the fact that while many aspects of contractarianism have been adequate­
ly dealt with in an abundant literature others have been ignored or given 
scant mention. Consequently, there is little discussion here of the rise 
of liberalism or the influence of mercantilism, or the fluxion of European 
geopolitics or the effects of the agricultural revolution; neither are the 
changing fortunes of various political movements recorded and discussed nor 
the machinations of Richelieus and Cromwells dissected. All these matters, 
of course, have been considered elsewhere in great detail and with immense 
erudition. Yet, with regard to contractarianism something has gone amiss, 
and somehow in the midst of encyclopaedic learning the strands of a notion 
until recently much maligned have frayed and submerged. Rather than 
regarding the social contract as a concept within a 'family' of concepts, 
such as 'right', 'duty' and 'obligation', some modern scholars treat it as 
if it were a bit of 'science', i.e. an explanatory hypothesis manufactured 
to explain why there are polities at all. If treated in this way, it is 
all too easy to patronize the notion as if it were an antiquarian interest 
divorced from the main business of political thought. The social contract 
has become, as it were, a marooned metaphor intellectually parted from the 
clusters of issues that collectively constitute its ambience. The salvag­
ing of this notion, it must be pointed out, represents neither an attempt 
to vindicate its contemporary manifestations nor a defense of its classical
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tradition. Rather, the point is critically to assess an idea that grew in 
great part out of the literature now identified as the cornerstone of 
modern political theory: the body of thought that gave rise to the ques­
tion 'why ought one obey the law?'.
The four themes discussed throughout this thesis are dealt with not 
as crisply discrete notions or perspectives and thereby somewhat artificial­
ly isolated in separate sections, but, rather, they are treated as inter­
related aspects of the overall problem of order and civility. It is argued 
in the following sections that the 'secularization' ushered in by the 
enlightenment was neither an overturning of superstition nor necessarily a 
rejection of religious belief but, on the whole, a reflection of the drama­
tic theological, institutional and intellectual changes brought about by 
the Reformation. The critical elements of Reform theology, principally 
fashioned by Luther and Calvin, and, of course, elaborated upon and develo­
ped by others, shattered the intellectual template of European thought, 
making possible ways of discussing the individual and the state that had 
hitherto seemed blasphemous or incoherent. In particular, the notions of 
(1) privity (conscienceful privacy), (2) praxis (active participation in 
the management of one's well-being), (3) a radically refashioned natural 
law doctrine rooted in nominalism and the key metaphors of the Word and the 
imago Dei, and (4) the displacement of the language of 'virtue', by the 
language of 'obligation' served as the groundwork for the development of 
'individualism' in European thought and its most powerful political expres­
sion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - contractarianism.
The notion of 'privity' here serves as a rubric under which a host of 
related concepts are located, in particular, 'autonomy', 'individualism' 
and 'propriety'. The essence of privity is private knowledge or cogni­
zance, one's private thought or counsel. Yet it also denotes any legally 
recognized relation between two parties characterized by mutual interest 
in some transaction or thing. The connection is interesting because it 
illuminates the nexus between autonomy and the pursuit of legitimate inte­
rests, the former reflecting the basis of personal freedom, the latter its 
practical implication. Calvin placed great emphasis upon the mystery of 
'conscience' and the silent, inner sanctity of faith which could, neverthe­
less, be externalized in active participation in the life of one's communi­
ty. Persons, then, are truly spiritual individuals who unite through
95
common c o n v i c t i o n s  and m u tu a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  who make p u b l i c  t h e i r  s e n t im e n t s  
i n  w hat amount t o  o a th s  o f  commitment and p r o f e s s i o n s  o f  f a i t h .  C o n sc ien c e  
m a n i f e s t  i n  a c t i o n  m e d ia te s  t h e  s o u l  and r e v e a l s  an i l l u m i n a t e d  p r o p r i e t y  
a l l  t h e  more p o w e r fu l  f o r  i t s  c o n f e s s i o n s  o f  f a i t h  and l o y a l t y  t o  d e e p ly -  
h e ld  p r i n c i p l e s .  W ith o u t  d i s t o r t i n g  t h e  a n a lo g y  o f  t h e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  p r a c ­
t i c a l  s y l l o g i s m ,  r e a d y  p a r a l l e l s  can be  drawn betw een  th e  v i r t u o u s  p e r s o n  
p u r s u i n g  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  h i s  b e l i e f s  and th e  autonomous b e l i e v e r  a c t i n g  
upon h i s  c o n v i c t i o n s .  The v e ry  m y s te ry  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  e p is t e m o lo g y  
demands such  a f a i t h f u l  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h o u g h t  i n t o  a c t i o n  l e s t  t h e  v e ry  
s u b s ta n c e  o f  c i v i l  l i f e  d i s s o l v e  i n t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  and e q u i v o c a t i o n .
P r a x i s ,  t h e n ,  i s  b o th  t h e  p r i v i l e g e  and  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  p r i v i t y ,  a c c o r d in g  
t o  C a lv in :  th e  mechanism by w hich  p e r s o n s  become c i t i z e n s  and t h e i r  r e l a ­
t i o n s  o r d e r e d .
The nex u s  be tw een  p r i v i t y  and p r a x i s  i s  i n  many ways t h e  m ost  c h a l l e n ­
g in g  a s p e c t  o f  C a l v i n ' s  t h e o l o g y  and i t s  l i n k  w i th  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  t h o u g h t ,  
nam ely ,  m a n 's  i n n a t e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  law . The work o f  t h e  S p i r i t  and 
t h e  o rd in a tio  D e i , a rg u e s  C a l v in ,  c o n s p i r e  i n  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  
o r d e r ,  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  man, and in  t h e  a c h ie v e m e n t  th ro u g h  
man o f  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .  Man, i n  d e f e c t i n g  from  o b e d ie n c e  t o  God, d i s r u p t s  
t h e  o r d e r l y  p a t t e r n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  D e i ty  b u t  do es  n o t  t h e r e b y  d e s t r o y  
i t .  C r e a t i o n ,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r ,  and  man h i m s e l f  a r e  now m arked by c o n ­
f u s i o n  and a ta x ia ,  b u t  n o t  by c h a o s .  The a rgum en t goes  a s  f o l l o w s :  w her­
e v e r  t h e  o rd in a tio  and S p ir i tu s  Dei a r e  c o r r e l a t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  o r d e r ;  where 
t h e  S p i r i t  w orks a p a r t  from  t h e  o rd in a tio  Dei t h e r e  i s  c o n f u s i o n .  S in c e  
t h e  o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  F a l l  i s  c o r r e l a t e d  w i th  th e  w i th d ra w a l  o f  t h e  S p i r i t  
t h e r e  i s ,  a f t e r  t h e  F a l l ,  c o n f u s io n  and  a ta x ia ; b u t  s i n c e  t h e  o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  F a l l  i s  p a r a d o x i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  o r d i n a t i o n  o f  God in  th e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  such  d i s o r d e r  can n e v e r  amount t o  u n r e m i t t i n g  c h a o s  
o r  i r r e v e r s i b l e  d e s t r u c t i o n ;  and  man, by v i r t u e  o f  h i s  v e ry  h u m a n i ty ,  p e r ­
c e i v e s  t h i s  o r d i n a t i o n  th ro u g h  t h e  m i s t s  o f  d i s o r d e r  a s  t h e  le x  naturae  .
Men n eed  gov e rn m en t,  c o n te n d s  C a l v i n ,  b e c a u s e  God p r e d i s p o s e d  them 
to w a rd s  c i v i l i t y .  The ' i n t e g r i t y '  o f  man, w hich  i s  p r o p e r l y  a n a lo g o u s  t o  
t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  s o u l  w h ic h ,  th ro u g h  i t s  c a p a ­
c i t y  t o  t r a n s c e n d  n a t u r e ,  l e n d s  man h i s  c e n t r a l i t y  i n  t h e  o r d e r  o f  c r e a ­
t i o n .  There  i s  an ' i n t e g r i t y  o f  o r d e r ' ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  a r i s e s  from t h e  mundane 
t e l e o l o g y  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  s u p e r im p o s e d  on th e  m echan ic s  o f  l i f e  a s  t h e
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divinely appointed 'function' of nature, namely, human well-being. Since 
the order of man, the socio-political order which men have wrought - the 
imago Dei - is the product of God's gift of reason and its realization, it 
is in the condition and development of the ordinem politicum that man 
demonstrates his rationality. Consequently, each individual is party to 
the ordo politicus by virtue of his humanity, which entails the further 
responsibility of protecting and enhancing the innate imago Dei as the 
determinant of human agency. The realm of conscience is the realm of 
politics. Hence the necessity of post-Fail man to re-establish human 
integrity through the reconstruction of just order and convivial civility. 
Discipline and obedience to the essence of the Word: herein lies the
regeneration of integrity, in the confluxion of the visible and invisible 
churches.
In summary, then, Calvin's argument for the doxie nexus between pri­
vity and praxis goes as follows:
1. Everything is ordained by the Word.
2. Order is the product of the harmonious coexistence of 
the Spirit and ovdinatio Dei.
3. The Fall fractured this unity, making the Spirit 'invisible', 
as it were, and creating disorder in the world.
4. Man, by virtue of his rationality, can perceive the 
principles of order, i.e. morality.
5. These principles constitute the natural law.
6. Therefore, man innately perceives the natural law.
7. Since the withdrawal of the Spirit is preordained, disorder 
can never amount to chaos, and since man perceives this 
ordination as the natural law, man is capable of reconstitu­
ting order through adherence to the one 'visible' manifesta­
tion of the Spirit and ovdinatio Dei - the Word.
8. Therefore, natural law is the realization of the Word.
The unity of Calvinist theology and religious experience, then, was 
wrought in the eminently practical struggle to define a body of practice 
that could assimilate and be assimilated to the Word while, at the same 
time, maintaining a coherence adequate to the variety of historical
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pressures exerted on it. This concern showed itself in the heavy stress 
upon the expression of faith - that is, the Word that stood luminous and 
coherent behind the convolutions of the letter as the perfectly unified 
disclosure of the mind of God. The common assumption throughout Reform 
theology was that all Scripture could be reduced to a consistent body of 
doctrine. The susceptibility of Scripture to such a reduction meant that 
it could be seen simultaneously as a fait accompli, one complete thought 
in the mind of God, and as a dynamic unfolding; and, as it was developed 
in the thought of Locke, Rousseau and Hobbes in particular, this super­
imposition of stasis (i.e. the Word) and cursus (the unfolding of history) 
served as a paradigm for contractarianism, conceived of as that which by 
an advanced stasis - what shall be, or ought to be - colours what is the 
case - at least for what was later to be termed the politics of motion.
The fact, incidentally, that the centrality of faith, reflecting a sup­
posed a priori unity of the Word as well as an achieved coherence of 
praxis, proved itself serviceable in bridging the gap between privity and 
praxis suggests that Calvinism had early attained a fair measure of inter­
nal consistency, whatever judgements may be brought against the adequacy 
or stability of the synthesis.
The displacement of the language of virtue by the language of obliga­
tion was not so much the direct result of Reformation theology proper, but, 
rather, the consequence of its emphasis upon privity and praxis. Whereas 
the language of virtue depicted life in the polis as the mutual endeavour 
of interdependent persons committed to public values as authoritative 
guides to action, the language of obligation focuses upon individual free­
dom - rather than the good life held in common - as the realization of 
personal values. "The question of political obligation seems to arise 
almost naturally from the situation created by the demise of the question 
of how we ought to live," writes Stephen Salkever, "it is the logical can­
didate to fill the vacuum in political philosophy left by the rejection on 
epistemological and metaphysical grounds of the question of virtue.
"If no way of life can authoritatively and finally claim to 
be superior to any other, and if each individual is thus in 
principle free to choose or create his own standards or rules 
of conduct, what are we to say about the ordinary human 
situation characterized by a submission to authority and an 
obedience to laws we never made? To ask this question is to
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state the modern paradox of liberty and authority posed in 
classic form by Rousseau.... What is the ground, the justi­
fication, of the obligation or duty to obey the law? When 
is obedience the result of obligation rather than of 
oppression and coercion? Perhaps the most obvious solution 
is to say that freedom itself is the ground of obligation: 
obedience to the law alone makes possible that security 
which is the necessary condition of freedom. In this manner, 
politics would appear to be justifiable or legitimate (and 
'authority' thus different from 'power') insofar as politics 
exists for the sake of economic man. In other words, we 
ought to obey the law because it is in the interest of our 
freedom to do so. Politics thus conceived appears as a 
second-rate and inconvenient activity, yet one which is 
necessary to protect us in our real (i.e. economic or private) 
existence. Public obedience is the necessary, though unplea­
sant, price of private freedom."9
The pursuit of autonomy in terms of free conscience and political 
freedom, then, gave rise to new ways of talking about man and society. In 
particular, it ruptured the established harmony between ruler and ruled 
such that what had hitherto been taken as given - the status and modes of 
authority - were now cast in doubt. Our concern lies not in determining 
whether or not the principal parties to this process of reevaluation 
rigorously pursued a particular orthodoxy, but, rather, we are concerned 
with what constituted the critical elements in this process. In this 
sense, we seek an overview of the transformations of civility and order.
The characterization of the flux of seminal theological political and philo­
sophical literature informing this overview as 'mythopoesy' emphasizes the 
metaphorical, symbolic and 'created' aspects of contractarianism. That is 
to say, the 'social contract' as a political philosophical notion was born 
out of metaphoric comparisons marshalled to displace medieval modes of 
expression, to provide radically new perspectives by juxtaposing and con­
necting political experience with human potential. The literature giving 
rise to the contractarian metaphor - its mythopoesy - defined phenomena by 
creating a new language of expectations and assumptions that gradually 
revealed the possibility of a new political order. All great political 
theory, one might say, is characterized by the elements of vision, poetic 
rendition and considered judgement relating 'human nature' and 'the human 
condition' to political and social structures. In the symbiotic relation 
of these elements we locate the genesis and power of political ideas; in 
the coherent connection of these elements we discern the process by which 
theorists seek universals for the critical evaluation of thought and
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action; and in the choices rooted in a knowledge of these elements we 
experience the political effort and dilemma of reconciling existence with 
potential. The articulation and consolidation of these elements and their 
relations constitute the creation of dominant paradigms of thought by which 
meaning is imparted to political life. "Poets... late in tradition are 
both Adams and Satans," writes Harold Bloom,
"They begin as natural men, affirming that they will con­
tract no further, and they end as thwarted desires, frus­
trated only that they cannot harden apocalyptically. But, 
in between, the greatest of them are very strong, and they 
progress through a natural intensification that marks Adam 
in his brief prime and a heroic self-realization that marks 
Satan in his brief and more-than-natural glory. The 
intensification and the self-realization alike are accomp­
lished only through language, and no poet since Adam and 
Satan speaks a language free of the one wrought by his pre­
cursors. Chomsky remarks that when one speaks a language, 
one knows a great deal that was never learned. The effort 
of criticism is to teach a language, for what is never 
learned but comes as the gift of a language is a poetry 
already written - ... from Shelley's remark that every 
language is the relic of an abandoned cyclic poem. I mean 
that criticism teaches not a language of criticism... but 
a language in which poetry already is written, the language 
of influence, of the dialectic that governs the relations 
between poets as poets. The poet in every reader does not 
experience the same disjunction from what he reads that the 
critic in every reader necessarily feels. What gives plea­
sure to the critic in a reader may give anxiety to the poet 
in him, an anxiety we have learned, as readers, to neglect, 
to our own loss and peril. This anxiety, this mode of 
melancholy, is the anxiety of influence...."10
In the following sections we explore the modulations of this anxiety, 
principally in terms of an author who felt more anxious than most about 
the permutations and peripeteia of life: Giambattista Vico. According to 
Vico's conception of social evolution, the process of secularization repre­
sents both a gain and a loss, a progress from rigidity to corrigibility and 
a regress from morality to groundlessness. He shows us how the collapse of 
religious guarantees is, indeed, rational, but only in an ambiguous sense. 
Unhindered reflection, Vico argues, progresses by an inner inevitability; 
yet, it contains a potential for barbarism as well as enlightenment. And 
it is precisely his ability to sustain this paradoxical evaluation of the 
'advance' of reflection that makes Vico a major figure in political philo­
sophy. Moreover, Vico presents us with an extremely sophisticated theory
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of what we have termed 'mythopoesy', in terms of which social institutions 
are viewed as "civil histories" and the natural expression of metaphysical 
world views. The intellectual revolution of Reformation thought is thus 
placed in a broader critical context, one that fully develops an overview 
of the mythopoesy of civility and order while at the same time analysing 
and drawing out its implications. Somewhat paradoxically, then, in the 
light of our initial emphasis upon the Reformers, the majority of what 
follows is devoted to Vichian exposition and analysis, while the Reform 
exegesis is dealt with mainly in appendices. The reason for this approach 
is twofold: firstly, the thrust of the argument with regard to the rise of
contractarianism is not that it arose full-blown from the head of Reform 
theology, but that the latter made possible new ways of thinking about 
social relations and man qua citizen that in turn set the stage for con­
tractarianism; secondly, we find in Vico's conception of social evolution 
the seeds for criticism of contractarianism, notions that reflect upon the 
manner in which metaphors are propagated and employed in political thought 
and, in particular, a fertile matrix in which to experiment with the host 
of ideas undergirding or entailed by the social contract.
A Vichian overview of contractarianism aids us in understanding the 
'social contract' as a synecdoche for order and civility: as a microcosmic
representation of the relations that constitute Gesellschaft society. The 
social contract is not so much a trope of realization - an image of what is 
the case - as it is a means of implementation, an active metaphor the 
engagement of which facilitates an understanding of the relations it encap­
sulates. The ballot box, for example, is not a proper synecdoche for 
democracy, but a heuristic metaphor by means of which we illuminate the 
salient features of democracy: those aspects which demand active involve­
ment. The ballot box is the dynamic (albeit partial) synecdoche for demo­
cracy, as the social contract is for Gesellschaft society. It is, as it 
were, a figurative mechanism of implementation for order and civility - a 
scheme to relate the understanding to the manifold of intuition. Once its 
Calvinist roots are exposed, the social contract may be viewed as an imple­
mentation mechanism of natural law, whether it be conceived of as 'right 
reason', the 'general will', or the fruit of Rawls' 'original position'.
The critical point to note here is that ('pure') natural law takes no 
account of institutions and therefore must be 'rephrased' to become appli­
cable to man. Yet, as our awareness dims of the milieu in which the term
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was given life so does the clarity of the metaphor diminish. The process 
of 'rephrasing' is one of reading back into the synecdoche the world view 
from which it arose. However, our tendency to read the synecdoche 
hermeneutically, to understand it in terms of the natural law doctrine 
which is its 'demythologizing', is not historically permanent. It vanishes 
once its milieu has ceased to be common intellectual property: the synec­
doche is no longer understood as metaphor, leading the inquisitive 'out­
sider' to indulge in speculative cultural anthropology. The great danger 
lies in the image remaining after its significance has vanished, like the 
surviving icon of a forgotten deity. How many rituals and liturgies have 
survived throughout the ages as unintelligible 'magic formulae', only to 
be regenerated from time to time through contrived meanings and rationales? 
One is tempted to speculate that modern contractarianism arises from the 
search for new meanings for an old synecdoche for which the Weltanschauung 
in which it was conceived has vanished.
I
The New Science
One of Vico's main goals in the New Science is to refute Grotius' 
enlightened claim that society and justice are possible without religion. 
The premise he shares with his opponent, of course, is that social life is 
unthinkable except on the basis of shared norms. The disputed point made 
by Grotius (as well as by Bayle and others) is merely that this underlying 
common ground might be furnished by a single man's rational insight into 
natural law and need not depend on unexamined faith, moves or tradition. 
Consider Grotius' defense of the thesis that a compulsion toward justice 
is implicit in man's unchanging nature:
"Man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a 
superior kind, much farther removed from all other animals 
than the different kinds of animals are from one another; 
evidence on this point may be found in the many traits 
peculiar to the human species. But among the traits 
characteristic of man is an impelling desire for society, 
that is, for the social life - not of any and every sort, 
but peaceful, and organized according to the measure of 
his intelligence, with those who are of his own kind; this 
social trend the Stoics called 'sociableness'. Stated as
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a universal truth, therefore, the assertion that every 
animal is impelled by nature to seek only its own good 
cannot be conceded."11
Nature, in fact, would impel man to be just even on the hypothesis 
that "there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to 
Him."12 The naturalness of the principles of justice is firmly estab­
lished according to Grotius since "no man can deny them without doing 
violence to himself."13 As a consequence, he believes that it is possible 
to reconstruct human relations on the basis of universal reason alone, 
freeing mankind from all dependence on tradition and prejudice. One 
should recall that Grotius contrasts the "law of nature" with the "law of 
nations"14. Vico at his most ironical replaces this contrast by an 
opposition between the "natural law of philosophers" and the "natural law 
of the gentes"15. His main aim, as he repeatedly says, is to undermine 
the "conceit" of those philosophers (including Grotius) "who will have it 
that what they know is as old as the world".16
According to Vico, first of all, the concept of "nature" cannot be a 
foundation for legal or political justifications. This already follows 
from his explicit agnosticism about what "nature" is really like: "since 
God made it, He alone knows."17 But the New Science contains a more pro­
found critique than this of the "natural law of the philosophers". Nature, 
and this is Vico's main argument, is not a foundation but a problem, a 
problem which all social orders attempt to solve. Provisionally, we may 
call it the problem of 'ataxia'. Like all genuine problems it is "some­
thing thrown in the pathway" (problema) , an obstacle which must be over­
come for a life-process to continue. Technically, one should note, a prob­
lem always underdetermines its solution. It does not contain enough in­
formation to exclude the possibility of alternative solutions.
According to Vico, in other words, an onto-theological fundamentwn, 
far from being a dowry brought by nature for her marriage with culture, 
must always be thematized as an achievement of society. Kerygmatic guaran­
tees, as we shall see in our examination of the New Science below, are 
genetically inseparable from the overall survival orientation of archaic 
and early cultures. Primitive religious narratives, to translate Vico's 
insight into modern idioms, contain a commitment to the 'normative' belief 
that reality could not be other than it is, and therefore help pre-techno-
103
logical societies "interpret away' contingency. Stereotyped codes cannot, 
in and of themselves, master contingency or prevent its outbreak. However, 
they do permit inhabitants of primitive social space to absorb sporadic 
shocks without having to undergo massive and time-consuming readjustments 
in their behavioural expectations. By reducing complexity, such codes 
allow for coordinated orientation through memory and custom. (We shall 
elaborate on these brief remarks later on.) Crucial here is the Durkheim- 
ian idea, anticipated by Vico, that archaic societies, in order to survive 
in a precarious and threatening environment, have to rely heavily on group 
solidarity. Primitive ontology, articulated in mythical narratives and 
ritual performances, seems indispensable for the maintenance of a kinship 
nexus (encompassing nature, men and the gods) upon which social cohesion 
depends. The collaborative wholeness of early Gemeinschaften (a term 
which will be explained below) is the result of a successful socialization 
of all members into the unquestionable rules of a religious world view.
The social genesis of shared ontological "certainty' or a guaranteed homo­
geneity of perspectives enhances group coordination in an unstable world. 
With every advance of technology, however, man wins further access to 
natural contingency, becoming increasingly able to adapt to and control a 
more variegated environment. Secularization in general implies an increas­
ed 'access to contingency' - control of nature and revisability of institu­
tional norms. Thus, technical advance is usually accompanied by the kind 
of impious reflection which undermines religious foundations and ontologi­
cal certainties. Such reflection also tends to undermine familial cohesion 
at the societal level. In spite of Enlightenment faith in a universal 
reason (bon sens) distributed equally among all men, there is no historical 
evidence that irreligious reflection tends to recreate cohesion and con­
sensus at the level of universal humankind. Carried to extremes, impious 
reflection may even produce a new ataxia, a barbaric splintering of pers­
pectives. At any rate, it is this complex genetic and developmental 
analysis of the way 'binding norms' provisionally solve the original prob­
lem of natural overcomplexity which Vico offers as an alternative to 
Grotius' philosophical insight into the eternal (i.e. context-free) lex 
naturae.
In order to understand the first principle of the New Science, that 
"the world of peoples began everywhere with religion" 18 and that "no 
nation in the world was ever founded on atheism"18, we must cast our minds
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back behind society into nature, as it were, behind the achieved 'binding­
ness ' of cultural codes and into the untamed contingency of yet unsociali­
zed mankind, into "the wild estate of dumb beasts"211. Man's pre-social 
nature, according to Vico, is a chaos demanding - but not prefiguring - 
order. The first of the "elements" of the New Science, in fact, begins 
with a reference to the indefinite nature of the human mind.21 Beneath 
the word "indefinite" lies a key to Vico's rejection of modern natural law, 
of the enlightened (Cartesian) idea that scientific or secular reason can 
uncover a functional equivalent to the old kerygmatic and coordinating 
guarantees. For Hobbes, as we shall see in Part Three, man's unchanging 
and essential nature is his fear of violent death. Regarding the fear of 
violent death as a ground or foundation, Hobbes proceeded to 'deduce' from 
it the legitimacy of absolute government. Vico would have none of this 
Galileonizing in the study of society. He repudiated Hobbes' deductive 
continuity between nature and culture and replaced it by a precarious bal­
ance of continuity and discontinuity, by the same sort of balance which 
may be said to exist between a problem and its solution. It is notoriously 
difficult to pin down precisely what Vico means by "providence", but one 
thing the idea certainly excludes is the possibility that a philosopher 
might 'deduce' civil society out of the passions of individuals. Hobbes' 
mistake, as Vico saw it, was to ignore the paragenesis of society with a 
principle that must clearly be understood as "something superior to 
nature"22 - the self-induced terror of an imaginary divinity. Awe-inspir­
ing religious narratives were 'superior' to the mechanical promptings of 
organic life and hence "imposed form and measure on the bestial passions 
of the lost men and thus transformed them into human passions"22. This 
self-narrated myth is the first principle of humanity:
"This principle of institutions Thomas Hobbes failed to 
see among his own 'fierce and violent men', because he 
went afield in search of principles and fell into error 
with the 'chance' of his Epicurus. He thought to enrich 
Greek philosophy by adding a great part which it certainly 
had lacked...: the study of man in the whole society of
the human race. But the result was as unhappy as the 
effort was noble. "2t+
Like his critique of Grotius, Vico's critique of Hobbes (and especial­
ly of the belief which Hobbes shared with Polybius that "if there were 
philosophers in the world, there would be no need or religions" 25, builds
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on the idea that, by nature, man is indefinite or underdetermined. At any 
one point a number of open possibilities are compatible with man's nature 
as it is. But once one choice is made others are precluded, and what was 
once a contingent possibility becomes a determinant fact by its being cho­
sen. In this way, man 'creates' himself; we have no essence, as Sartre 
says, we have facticity. One source of this fundamental Vichian thought is 
Pico, what makes man more worthy of admiration than the angels is his very 
indefiniteness. God first made the cosmos, Pico relates. He populated the 
heavenly spheres with angelic intelligences and excremental parts of the 
lower world with brutish animals. Having exhausted His larder of arche­
types and filled His inventory of niches in the great chain of being, how­
ever, He felt a residual twinge of imperfection. Who was there to enjoy 
His fine work? Who could worship its beauty and wonder at its vastness? To 
fill this gap, God created protean and self-transforming man:
"At last the best of artisans ordained that that creature to 
whom He had been able to give nothing proper to himself should 
have joint possession of whatever had been peculiar to each of 
the determinate kinds of being. He therefore took man as a 
creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning him a place in 
the middle of the world, addressed him thus: 'Neither a fixed
abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar 
to thyself have We given thee, Adam, to the end that according 
to thy longing and according to thy judgment thou mayest have 
and possess what abode, what form and what functions thou thy­
self shalt desire. The nature of all other being is limited 
and constrained within the bounds prescribed by Us. Thou, con­
strained by no limits, in accord with thine own free will, in 
whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the 
limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's center 
that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in 
the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, 
neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and 
with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou may­
est fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou 
shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, 
which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's 
judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine."26
What Vico found in this idea of man's innate indefiniteness was a rea­
son for rejecting all attempts to 'ground political and legal legitimacy by 
an appeal to fixed anthropological constants. Even Grotius' vague "socia­
bleness", given the moral institutional content which it ostensibly pre­
selects, must be ruled out of line. Following Pico, in fact, it becomes 
illicit to justify any regime or social order on the grounds that it allows 
man to realize his timeless "essence", or fosters I'homme do droit divin.
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God's man, prior to his self-transformative action within culture, is an 
amorphous blob (a much harder line than Rousseau's on man's natural inde- 
terminancy) .
The German Romantics, vexed at the Enlightenment notion that man's 
eternal nature was to be an eighteenth century Frenchman of refined urban­
ity and impeccable taste, gave new life to Pico's idea that man has no 
essential nature, or to put it in existential jargon, no essence except the 
absence of an essence. Since then, and especially in the twentieth cen­
tury, we have heard innumerable times that secular reason is left without 
an ultimate foundation ("constrained by no limits") in normative as well as 
theoretical argument. Pico was quoted at length because the idea that it 
is, in principle, impossible to dredge-up any normative compulsions out of 
'human nature' is pivotal both for the main argument of this thesis and for 
our explication of Vico's theory of secularization. With this in mind, it 
may prove fruitful to reformulate Vico's rendering of Pico in contemporary 
jargon, to update his "mental dictionary", as it were.
According to Vico, institutions can be understood as cultural compen­
sation for an otherwise intolerable degree of instability inherent in the 
human organism. Unlike other animals, Vico agrees with Pico, man's instinc­
tual organization is unspecified. His biological equipment can best be de­
scribed in terms of generalized capacities which are never 'precise' or 
'directed' enough to pre-identify a narrow and unique ecological niche: a
species-specific environment, or what Pico called a "fixed abode". In other 
words, congenital privation of instinctual guidance entails an elasticity 
and openness of human action and experience. As a consequence, man is the 
only species so adaptive that he can live anywhere on earth. Organic foun­
dations, it seems, can never specify in advance the content of man's beha­
viour and beliefs. If abandoned to biological imperatives alone, in fact, 
human life would have little stability or direction. Man manages to orient 
himself, Vico argues, only by means of a 'second nature' which history (not 
God) creates. By means of institutions, as Vico puts it, man's "giant
o 7body", his unwieldy bestiality, is reduced to "the proper human form". '
Thus, when Vico denies any isomorphism between organic systems 
(living bodies in environments) and symbolically organized systems of 
action (institutions), he does not mean to slight or ignore the compelling
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social relevance of man's peculiar biology. On the contrary; the possi­
bility or replacing instinctual guidance with some sort of socialization 
into an institutional and symbolic space organized, say, according to kin­
ship status and religious beliefs, depends on the very indeterminacy of 
man’s "nature". This congenital peculiarity of the human species is 
related, in turn, to the (biologically) protracted extrauterine infancy of 
man. Important organic developments which occur during the foetal period 
in other animals take place after birth for man, that is to say, when he 
is already interacting with a social surrounding. This suggestively 
recalls Hegel's (properly, Pico's) assertion that there is no fixed or un­
changing substratum underlying and determining the development of human 
consciousness. For Vico, it means that socialization gets a chance on 
eminently malleable material, a material upon which, quoting Pico again, 
"God has conferred the seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of 
life."28 Against Grotius' consoling idea the "the seeds of virtue have 
been planted in us by nature"28, Pico and Vico both deny man the solace of 
a normative guarantee. The inherent instability of the human organism 
(faced with threats from an undominated nature), always requires symbolic 
and institutional restructuring in order for man to survive.28 But there 
is no guarantee either that this restructuring will be virtuous or that 
all virtues somehow coincide. To be sure, Vico asserts, sounding perilous­
ly like Grotius, that "man is naturally sociable"21. In reality, of 
course, Vico is arguing against Grotius. When he remarks that "men are 
naturally impelled to preserve the memories of the laws and institutions 
that bind them in their societies"22, he does not claim that these laws 
and institutions are 'naturally' as philosophers would want them. Fixated 
patterns of expected behaviour, reciprocal typification and codified boun­
daries of experience have the anthropological function of reducing organi- 
smic and environmental overcomplexity, relieving man from a superabundance 
of outer stimulus and inner impulse and hence sparing him the attendant 
vertigo of excessive decision-making demands. Nothing about this descrip­
tion would lead us to assume that institutional orders are 'limited and 
constrained' by any (natural or divine) pre-condition of culture. In fact, 
this is the systematic relation of human biology to action. Foundation- 
lessness should be understood as man's inescapable problem. To be sure, 
there are intricate correlations between the evolution of, say, the 
extremely flexible human hand and the innovative capacities of social
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systems for technological adaptation to, and control of, the natural 
environment. Just so, reproduction, filiation and prolonged (partially 
'erotic') dependence of offspring on their parents all foreshadow the 
symbolically organized relationships of kinship and socialization. None­
theless, it seems a peculiar characteristic of man that his organic and 
instinctual equipment is so radically 'vague' and 'generalized' that it 
will hardly ever pre-select his actions and interactions in any detail. 
Nutritional imperatives, for example, always underdetermine human ways 
of procuring and eating food. In fact, if we take an anticipatory look 
at the four symbolic "media of communication"33 which play the largest 
role in Vico's conceptualization of culture, we can see even more precisely 
what 'foundationlessness' means. The four media can be labelled: (1) 
science, (2) marriage, (3) law, (4) property. None of these systems, as 
Vico makes clear, is self-sufficient. Each depends on a symbiotic mechan­
ism, on an organic physiological underpinning: science on perception,
marriage on sexual relations, law on physical force, property on immediate 
need satisfaction. Yet each is independent of nature in the sense of 
being under determined by it.34 In other words, for organic life to 'sup­
port culture, it must already be transformed and interpreted by culture. 
Organic foundations are so highly generalized, so open to cultural elabora­
tion, variation and redefinition that they cannot serve as a basis for 
normative selection. They do not contain the "seeds of virtue" any more 
than they contain the germs of iniquity.
Arguments such as these underlie Vico's repudiation of modern natural 
law, and especially of its attempt to provide a secular replacement for the 
old kerygmatic guarantees. Although man is 'by nature' sociable, his 
social life has no value-discriminating fundamentum in nature. Like Pico, 
Vico rejects all efforts to secure intersubjectively binding normative 
claims by an appeal to underlying anthropological invariants. The only 
thing invariable about man is his indeterminancy. Man's nature, therefore, 
like nature in general, is a problem not a foundation. As a consequence, 
enlightened reflections on 'human nature' can never ensure value-unanimity 
or a homogeneity of perspectives. To be sure, the subjectively perceived 
'inevitability' of institutional and symbolic codes may dupe children, 
theologians and philosophers into asserting 'universal natural norms', but 
such coordinated and coordinating misperceptions belong to a post-natural 
(and precarious) achievement of social life itself.
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II
Norms and Historicity
The negative thrust of Vico's argument is that the philosopher's ap­
peal to underlying natural constants can never warrant a normative claim; 
this is the basis of his rejection of Hobbes. Human 'nature', prior to 
cultural elaboration and definition, is simply too unspecified to function 
as a meaningful foundation for law and politics. Since God made nature,
He alone can know it. This does not mean, however, that Vico believes 
there to be nothing binding about norms. He simply thinks that whatever 
'binding force' a norm does have must be understood in all its precarious­
ness and ambiguity - as an intracultural achievement and neither as a gift 
of nature nor as a universally innate idea (c.f. Calvin on natural law). 
Against the powerful Cartesian currents of his time, Vico argued that con­
tempt for tradition is contempt for reason, since the locus of reason is 
neither nature nor the heads of individual enlightened philosophers but, 
rather, the gradual modifications of man's collective historical 'mind'. 
Since rational and moral norms are entwined with the institutional and 
symbolic nexus of a society, he went on to claim, they must be subject to 
the same transitoriness and historicity as society itself. As he once put 
it, even the forms of justification are generated and destroyed.35
To the apparent surprise of Leo Strauss35, however, Vico's denial of 
an underlying human essence and timeless natural law did not lead him into 
a promiscuous historicism or conventionalist relativism. He did not con­
clude that, since normative orders emerge and decay, they are therefore 
'baseless' fancies, fictions of comfort only to the insecure. On the 
contrary, Vico believed, as he says repeatedly, that he had found a "truth" 
in history, a necessity hidden within the contingency of genesis and 
destruction. This "truth" is partially expressed in the insight that "the 
world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its princi­
ples are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human 
mind.".37 One must note that "necessity" here is nothing constant, nothing 
fixed and static beneath the course of human history. It can best be 
described as a kind of 'logic' immanent in the development of history 
itself - a logic, however, unlike Hegel's. Although Vico speaks of "the
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common sense of the human race,"38 he believes that this common sense 
exists only diachronically, within the process of social evolution and 
change. The phenomenon of 'convergence' (that all societies tend to move 
from tribal/particularistic to human/universalistic institutions and 
norms) does not mean that there is only one set of legitimate human values, 
a set of values which enlightened philosophers may hawk in the Theorie 
markt. Far from being the product of philosophical insight, Vico's 
"natural law of the gentes" is coeval with the religious customs of the 
nations and was established "without any reflection"38. In the early and 
middle periods of social evolution (in the ages of heroes and gods), as 
Vico sees it, theocratic and aristocratic norms have a genuinely 'necessi­
tating' force, even though they are, by present-day standards, particula­
ristic and unjust. Inhabitants of such earlier periods perceived such 
norms as 'inevitable' or 'natural', as etched indelibly into the cosmic 
scheme of things. From the fact that eighteenth century academics 
repudiate such norms, says Vico, it would be absurd to conclude that they 
never were valid. In retrospect, as a matter of fact, one must say (1) 
that those norms were experienced as 'binding' in a world which has now 
disappeared, and (2) that the disappearance of that world was simultaneous­
ly good and bad, an advance in flexibility which threatens to tilt into a 
barbarism of reflection.
Following Vico a step further, we reach the age of men. This third 
period of socio-cultural evolution usually comes about by a process of 
secularization culminating in a democratic revolution, an 'enlightened' 
overturning of old theocratic and aristocratic codes and values. The 
universal norms which flourish in this period (like universal human 
equality), although initially improbable, become irreversibly entrenched 
and therefore take on a necessitating or binding force. A crucial misstep 
which Vico attributes to Grotius is his "philosophical conceit" of reading- 
back universalistic principles into the beginnings of society: "Grotius...
begins with nations reciprocally related in the society of the entire human 
race."1*8 This is quite an anachronism, according to Vico, since the 
"origins of humanity" were surely "small, crude and quite obscure"81. The 
first men belonged to "family kingdoms", not to the Stoic brotherhood of 
all mankind.82 Thus, the first thing Vico wants to say is that universalis­
tic norms were not coeval with the cultural break with nature; but rather 
had to be generated in a long course of history - through custom and not
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through philosophical fiat. The second thing he wants to say is that 
these universalistic norms are so formal and 'empty' (open to ad hoc 
reinterpretation and discretionary violation) that we can safely speak of 
a general shift toward reflective corrigibility or a revaluation of arbi­
trariness. Egalitarian justice, which Vico affirms, cannot be separated 
from indiscriminateness and social disintegration (the barbarism of reflec­
tion) , which Vico decries. The new secular or 'cognitive' attitude, at 
any rate, can be understood as a renewal of access to contingency which 
had been provisionally 'buried' at the cultural break with nature. In 
advanced democratic-commercial societies, Vico explains, there is a general 
drift away from obeisance, solidarity and piety toward discussion, scepti­
cism and impiety. This is part of the general transition toward first 
theoretical and subsequently practical revisability. Universalistic norms 
may claim to provide new (finally rational!) rules for social interaction, 
but in fact they are so abstract, they allow so much room for improvisation, 
that advanced societies based on such 'norms' are quickly threatened with 
anarchical fragmentation. This, according to Vico, is that barbarism of 
reflection which is even "more inhuman" than the original "barbarism of 
sense".143 Universalistic norms foster competition, disagreement and self- 
seeking. As we shall see below, they create the kind of society described 
by Locke. Their emergence is hard to distinguish from the disappearance 
of communally shared values in general.
The positive import of these arguments is that the genuinely 'binding' 
character of social norms remains uncompromised by historicity. We fail 
to see this chiefly because of a tacit commitment to the idea that all 
rational value-imperatives must be univocal and mutually compatible. For 
Vico's first two periods of social evolution, things work out fairly well 
since, under primitive conditions, group cohesion demands value-unanimity. 
Difficulties arise in the age of men, however, because (1) the egalitarian 
break with aristocratic and theological traditionalism implies a simultan­
eous legitimation of future-oriented corrigibility and delegitimation of 
the shared customs of the past, and (2) formal and universalistic norms 
permit intrasocial discussion, discord and disagreement. If this revolu­
tionary combination of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' disintegration can be 
called normlessness, it is a normlessness dependent upon democratic-commer­
cial-rationalist-individualist norms. Whatever difficulties are involved 
in affirming both the binding and the historical character of norms, Vico
112
makes clear that he wants to do just that. With this in the background he
44can employ the category 'apophrades' (the 'return of the dead') to forms 
of justification which are historically out of place. The possibility of 
using such a category explains why Vico constructs his "philosophy of 
authority" within the parameters set by a theory of social evolution: no
one is impressed nowadays by an appeal to Jove's thunderbolt. In times of 
sceptical decadence, Vico suggests, there is no univocal ground for sett­
ling normative disputes. When men live in advanced societies, they promis­
cuously develop a repertory of such 'grounds'. They can justify nearly 
everything they do, and eventually become "ready to uphold either of the 
opposed sides of a case indifferently".45 Indeed, such promiscuity is a 
binding condition of secular societies, of societies in the grips of the 
barbarism of reflection. To offer a foundationalist ontology to the inhab­
itants of such a highly secularized society is apophradic. It is like 
appealing to Jove's thunderbolt, since it is asking for nothing less than 
that history begin all over again.
What Vico is arguing for, in other words, and without any appeal to 
natural foundations, is the possible coexistence of normative necessity 
and contingency, of binding norms and historical displacement. He can 
argue for this because he holds that there are humanly 'necessitating' 
norms which happen to be inconsistent with one another, that cannot fit 
together in a single age. His "logic of history", therefore, is not 
Hegelian, does not solace us with a palliative like "history is the story 
of liberty". Of course, in one sense, history is the story of liberty for 
Vico - but not in a comforting or redemptive way. "The unchecked liberty 
of free peoples," he says in the concluding paragraphs to the New Science, 
can be "the worst of all tyrannies"45, and he goes on to describe the 
individualistic barbarism of reflection and destruction of the old communal 
life.
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III
Descartes and Bon Sens
Perhaps Vico's profoundest bete noire is the Cartesian-Enlightenment 
notion of 'progress'. Eighteenth century optimism about the imminence of 
the correct social order was based on a widespread Cartesian confidence in 
universal reason detached from mores and prejudice. If bon sens is dis­
tributed equally in all men (regardless of particular social and institu­
tional mediations, as Descartes and Calvin assert) then individual reflec­
tion can arrive at truths upon which all humanity will agree. This promise 
of consensus omnium contains the covert (to Vico ludicrous) assumption that 
all defensible human values harmonize. The idea of a perfect society, 
following the common progressivist line, is a logically coherent one, what­
ever an occasional pessimist might say about its historical likelihood. 
Already at this point, Vico parted ways with his age. When he says, "There 
must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language common to all 
nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human 
social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these 
same things have diverse aspects"47, he makes no claim that human diversity 
might be fitted into a coherent whole. Never assumed in the concept of 
humanity's "mental dictionary"48 is the wild idea that all utterable values 
to which an intelligent man might subscribe are congruent with one another.
The age of heroes, as Vico reconstructs it, was an age of vigorous 
poetry, of fierce religious and communal loyalties and of forthright 
action. The 'glory' of an archaic society, however, was inseparable from 
its cruelty, its ferocity, its injustice. "Imagination is more robust in 
proportion as reasoning power is weak."48 With the rise of democracy, 
commerce and science (i.e., the onset of the age of men), heroic barbarism 
is replaced by tolerance and equitable exchange under written law. Blood 
vengeance is superseded by due process. Unfortunately, the gain is simul­
taneously a loss. As cruelty and injustice disappear, so do valorous 
deeds, heroic poetry, communal ties and the religious wholeness of life. 
That the cost of advance is irredeemable privation is clear from the fact 
that, when men begin to be "free of subjugation and attain equality"50, 
they turn all their energies "to making laws with a view to the increase 
in wealth"51. The various values which can be expressed through the 
mental dictionary of mankind cannot be woven together in a single web.
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Cartesian 'reason' stacks certainty upon certainty with never a back­
pedal or loss. It admits of no budding incongruities. Vico's repudiation 
of Cartesianism, therefore, can be explained as follows. Reason is the 
capacity to solve problems, and every solution to a problem generates new 
unexpected problems. On the face of it, Vico notes, there is nothing to 
suggest that all problems could be solved at once. Just the opposite is 
the case if all solutions produce new problems. If that is true, then 
there can be no such thing as either a definitive solution to all problems 
or (in social terms) a perfect society. By breaking the old aristocratic 
monopolies on power, truth, marriage and wealth, Vico argues, the "plebs" 
made real progress toward solving the problem of social injustice (of the 
unequal distribution of life chances). But even though egalitarian jus­
tice is rational and valuable, Vico turns around to say, it cannot help 
eroding religious communality. In fact, it sets loose a riot of utilita­
rianism and opportunistic self-seeking. It is unquestionably just, in 
Vico's eyes, for Solon (or whoever) to tell the plebs to reflect on their 
'abstract' sameness with the nobles. What makes reason less cunning than 
some may like, he continues, is that nominalistic universalism ("we are 
all 'men'", where 'humanity' is an empty name rather than a variable 
essence admitting degrees of realization or excellence) contains the seeds 
of social disintegration. Vico views the loss of communal wholeness as a 
direct consequence of the advance of egalitarian justice. The two norms 
of 'equality' and 'solidarity' (or 'quantitative' fairness and 'organic' 
fraternity) are both vital human concerns. Unfortunately, and Vico is 
right in this, they are not quite compatible with one another.
The importance of the New Science for a philosophical alternative to 
Cartesianism and natural law theories in politics can be provisionally 
summarized in these four ideas:
(1) that no normative claim can be established by the appeal 
to a timeless human nature or essence;
(2) that there is something disturbingly 'tyrannical' about 
enlightened philosophical insight detached from mores 
and custom;
(3) that all human values are not a priori compatible with 
one another;
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(4) that the rise of Gesellschaft spells the inevitable 
demise of Gemeinschaft.
Thus, even though Vico's construal of secularization allows us to use 
the category of 'apophrades' in the philosophical discussion of politics, 
the New Science leaves no illusion that history progresses toward a cul- 
minative and redemptive 'highest good'.
The urgency of a Vichian reinterpretation of political reason can most 
easily be discerned against the background of twentieth century attempts to 
fuse Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in a single perfect society. These 
totalitarian 'experiments', complex as they may be, contain an obtuse mis­
perception of the basic inevitabilities of modernization. In pre World War 
I Italy, for example, the average Italian's sense of the world was domina­
ted by the family. As the country industrialized by the war effort, Ital­
ians found themselves suddenly faced with the vast impersonal forces of a 
modem economy. Fascism, at least in part, was an attempt to 'familiarize' 
these forces, to reduce the unwieldy and inscrutable structures of Gesell­
schaft to the tightly-knit domesticity of Gemeinschaft. Following Vico, it 
is true, we must recognize the values of both earlier religiously integra­
ted cultures and modern individualist 'bourgeois' society. But we must see 
modernity's gain as simultaneously an irreversable loss.52 We must not 
try, as totalitarianism does, any philosophical (i.e. apophradic) fusion of 
old and new. It was precisely Hegel's desire to reorganize market society 
like a polis that made him into a hailed progenitor of twentieth century 
'ethical states'. Integral perfection may be an inspiring ideal for philo­
sophers, but it is a destructive one for societies. Indeed, the inspired 
pursuit of utopian goals generally has only one consequence: it makes the
world worse. The inherent illegitimacy of totalitarian regimes, moreover, 
is connected to their systematically apophradic programme. This programme 
requires that they constantly claim to be doing what they could not con­
ceivably be doing. The breach between ideology and reality (lying), car­
ried to Nazi and Stalinist extremes, is rooted in a politics of 'reason' 
detached from custom, in the politics of anachronism and in a politics 
which refuses to recognize the painful fact that human values are not all 
compatible with one another.
In order to substantiate these claims, we will try to follow Vico in 
explaining what is involved in the gradual non-linear shift from Gemein-
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Schaft to Gesellschaft, from inflexible tradition to traditionless flexi­
bility.
IV
The Philosophy of Authority
Since, as Vico says, it is a "vain curiosity"53 to seek a foundation 
for normative reasoning outside of or underneath the symbolic code of cult­
ure, the 'philosophy of authority' must begin with the study of (1) relig­
ion, and (2) kinship. In contemporary terms (which we will take the 
liberty of using throughout), one might say that the two basic principles 
of archaic society are (1) the maintenance of the unity and the 'not other­
wise possible' character of the world through religious rituals and narra­
tives, and (2) the clan-integrating primacy of an elaborate and relatively 
inflexible kinship system. At any rate, we may follow Vico's suggestion 
that the institutionalization of these two basic principles signals the 
cultural break with nature. Not even survival imperatives can be thought 
to be "natural norms" since the action-orienting value of 'survival' is 
culturally dependent on a socially variable concept of the 'good life'.
Jettisoning the fancy that norms come from nature as a given, Vico 
tries to show how they arise in society as an achievement. He underlines 
the intra-cultural genesis of norms by citing the familiar derivation of 
the word 'religion* from reli-gare or 'to bind'. "Religion alone has the 
power to make us practice virtue, as philosophy is fit rather for discus­
sing it."54 Socialization into a religious world view is so potent that 
it can "tame the sons of cyc^opes and reduce them to the humanity of an 
Aristides, a Socrates, a Laetius, and a Scipio Africanus."55
Interestingly, Vico did not believe that pre-cultural life is ordered 
instinctually. In fact, this view would have struck him as quite paradoxi­
cal, since he tended to identify automatic instinctual promptings with 
ataxia and disorder. However, this is unrelated to Vico's main point: 
that man lifted himself out of nature and into culture by the self-induced 
fear of an imaginary divinity. Vico wants to argue that stereotyped codes 
of thought and behaviour sprang up in a seemingly natural way in order to
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circumvent the potentially overwhelming experience of ataxia. The original 
subduing of ataxia coincided with the emergence of yiety or what we have 
been calling the "normative attitude". This is the moment, according to 
Vico, when the "creatures began to think humanly" .58 Notice the implication 
which we have already mentioned (and will return to later on) that humanity 
is coeval with the institutionalization of defenses against terrifying out­
breaks of environmental contingency:
"...at last the sky fearfully rolled with thunder and 
flashed with lightning, as could not but follow from the 
bursting upon the air for the first time of an impression 
so violent. Thereupon, a few giants, who must have been 
the most robust, and who were dispersed through the for­
ests on the mountain heights where the strongest beasts 
have their dens, were frightened and astonished by the 
great effect whose cause they did not know, and raised their 
eyes and became aware of the sky. And because in such a 
case the nature of the human mind leads it to attribute its 
own nature to the effect, and because in that state there 
nature was that of men all robust bodily strength, who 
expressed their very violent passions by screaming and 
grunting, they pictured the sky to themselves as a great 
animated body, which in that aspect they called Jove, the 
first god of the so-called greater gentes, who meant to tell 
them something by the hiss of his bolts and the clap of his 
thunder."87
If we wanted to reduce these unwieldy Neapolitan fancies to proper 
academic form, we might say that an animistic misinterpretation of environ­
mental contingency was functionally indispensable for impeding a relapse 
into pre-cultural ataxia. Vico knows, of course, that a mythical world 
view or "vulgar metaphysics"58 alone could not stabilize the breach between 
nature and society. This requires the additional introduction of a stereo­
typed kinship code, which Vico analyzes into the two principles of marriage 
and burial of the dead.58 These principles must be guarded santis-sima- 
mente for all nations "so that the world should not become again a bestial 
wilderness."80 Not to stay aloof too long from the wilderness of the New 
Science, Vico reveals his dream about the inception of marriage. The 
grunting tantrums of the sky appalled the inchoate men ("stupid, insensate 
and horrible beasts")81 to such an extent that they ceased their sloppy 
habit of fornicating in the daylight.82
Piety, or the "normative attitude", is a pre-reflective and dogmatic 
commitment to a system of cultural codes or action-orienting rules. It
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prohibits, by the threat of divine reprisals, any significant backsliding 
into the promiscuous ataxia of bestiality. Pre-reflective abashment or 
shame is thus the colour of virtue. A primitive individual is socialized 
simultaneously into a religious world view and into a set of (more or less 
intricate) ascriptive kinship relations organized according to sex and 
generation roles. Taken together, so Vico suggests, a mythical interpreta­
tion scheme and a stereotyped kinship system provide a socially produced 
fundamentum ("second nature"), a principle of 'ontological' order which 
appears 'inevitable' or 'incorrigible' and thus helps orient action and 
belief at the societal level. Because a normative order like this cannot 
be questioned ("if you cross this line, the bolt will fall!"), it has enor­
mous selection value, increasing survival capacity by bolstering group co­
ordination .
Of course, when Vico suggests that the double institutionalization of 
myth and kinship signals a "cultural break with nature", he does not imply 
that such a break was perceived as such by the first men themselves. On 
the contrary; as should be clear from the last passage quoted, Vico's 
gvossi bestioni were vigorous animists, interpreting the world anthropomor- 
phically and construing nature as a language. Savages, not unlike child­
ren, "give sense and passion to insensate things," and "take inanimate
6 3things in their hands and talk to them... as if they were living persons". 
In other words, the self-interpretation of archaic man contains no crisp 
differentiation between the social and the natural. One way to put this is 
to say that kinship relations tend to permeate the mythical schemes which - 
received uncritically from previous generations - aid in interpreting both 
man and nature. This "both/and" relation is significant precisely because 
primitive religious narratives (Vico calls them 'theological poetry' or 
'divine fables') end up lending a familial unity to the cosmos which both 
comforts the psyche and helps sustain the all-important group solidarity.5^
Significant here is the suggestion that primitive life is shot through 
with a nervous intolerance for objects and events which cannot be neatly 
fitted away into some tidy slot or groove of a unified world-interpreting 
narrative. As mentioned, the structural incapacity of stone-age economics 
and technology to master fluctuations and instabilities in the environment 
is a probable source of this conspicuous anxiety. The anthropomorphic
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spill-over of kinship codes into nature ("that tree is my wife's brother") 
and heaven ("I am descended from the gods") seems to provide some relief. 
Indeed, familial world views, moral systems and cult practices probably 
play a major role in absorbing the insecurity which stems from a yet un­
mastered (contingent) environment. As long as a society's technology 
remains relatively undeveloped, outbursts of environmental contingency - 
thunderbolts, floods, pestilence, etc. - must be "absorbed by narrative" 
if the world is to preserve its action-orienting unity. As mentioned 
above, these narratives are ontological in the sense that they help re­
construe contingency as necessity. They explain to resourceless men why 
the world could not be other than it is. Later, when technology reaches a 
higher level of development, it becomes impractical (even inefficient) to 
interpret away environmental contingency. It becomes essential to conceive 
nature as a dimension of the "also otherwise possible", as susceptible to 
non-trivial human intervention and control. Thus, technological advance 
is a key mechanism in the non-linear shift from a normative to a cognitive 
orientation. At the more advanced 'cognitive' state, one should note, men 
forfeit the comfort which originally accrued to their ability to interpret 
away the fortuitous. In order to learn how to master contingency through 
their own actions, men have to expose themselves to bitter risks: to the
risks of being responsible when they fail and unsolaced when disaster has 
struck. It is precisely to avoid such disappointment that primitive myths 
'blind out' the possibility that the world could be other than it is. That 
is to say, foundationalist ontology is compensatory for social resource- 
lessness. Without relatively efficient mechanisms for neutralizing sur­
prise and securing cosmic equilibrium, primitive man might be unable to 
avoid hysterical panic.65 Predictably enough, archaic man perceives 
calamitous occurrences animistically, as the embodiment of daemonic purpose 
or of ancestral wrath. He cannot bear the idea that such events are the 
play of chance, that they do not fit into some overarching and inevitable 
scheme and could have been other than they were. To think that calamities 
do not 'have to happen' is simply too much contingency for a resourceless 
man to bear. According to what Vico suggests, in sum, ontological guaran­
tees are fully appropriate only in early undeveloped societies.
Now, this is not to say that holistic and foundationalist world views 
arose in response to early man's fear of contingency. It is impossible to 
accept literally Statius' idea, which Vico repeatedly quotes, that primus
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in orbe deos fecit timor, simply because, without relatively stable struc­
tures, there can be no focused fear. Fear too, as Vico suggests, is an 
evolutionary achievement. Thus, it cannot be the 'fixed' presupposition 
of all evolution; it cannot have 'created' the theological narratives upon 
which depends the stabilization of the breach between nature and culture. 
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to say (what is less extravagantly theo- 
gonic) that primitive religions erect their ceremonial walls around salient 
and menacing 'zones of contingency', zones located in the environment (un­
predictable thunderbolts), in the organism (lawless instinctual promptings), 
in technological acquisitions (control of fire), and in language (the 
possibility of saying "no"). In describing the Trobrianders, Malinowski 
suggests that every advance in technology is accompanied by a retreat of 
ontology: "In the lagoon fishing, where man can rely completely on his
knowledge and skill, magic does not exist, while in the open-sea fishing, 
full of danger and uncertainty, there is extensive magical ritual to secure 
safety and good results."66 Magic, of course, is not identical with ontol­
ogy. Yet both seem to express a technical impotence in the face of nature's 
overcomplexity. At the end of their resources, some men resort to witch­
ery; others break out in litany and hosanna. To support such conjectures 
about early man, at any rate, Vico often adds: "Libertines, too, as they 
grow older, turn to religion, for they feel nature failing them."67 Not 
only environmental nature, but also internal nature can fail us. Birth, 
death, illness and adolescence are four key 'zones of contingency' upon 
which much ceremonial energy and imagination is traditionally spent. Rites 
de passages are the typical institutional response to such organismic pre­
cariousness .66
V
The Barbarism of Reflection
The justification for belabouring this genetic connection between 
foundationalism and contingency is its importance for Vico's philosophy of 
authority. If there is no 'ground' for justice and right outside of 
religion and religiously supported customs, then secularization and the 
advance of 'reflection' implies the demise of traditional forms of legal 
and political rationality. If ontology compensates for resourcelessness
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by ensuring group cohesion, then the technical development of resources 
will inevitably undermine old 'foundations' and loosen old religious 
solidarities. Attendant to the growing awareness that nature is systemati­
cally manipulable (could be other than it is), is the realization that 
institutional norms are systematically revisable. To paraphrase Nietzsche, 
as science arises it becomes harder and harder to think of the gods. At 
any rate, what makes the New Science such a crucial book for political 
philosophy is precisely Vico's exploration of the perplexing relation be­
tween secularization and legitimacy. Vico outlines the three basic stages 
of socio-cultural evolution as follows:
"(1) The age of gods, in which the gentiles believed they 
lived under divine governments and everything was commanded 
them by auspices and oracles, which are the oldest institu­
tions in profane history. (2) The age of heroes, in which 
(the nobles) reigned everywhere in aristocratic common­
wealths, on account of a certain superiority of nature which 
they held themselves to have over the plebs. (3) The age 
of men, in which all men recognized themselves as equal in 
human nature, and therefore there were established first the 
popular commonwealths and then the monarchies, both of which 
are forms of human government."60
It is clear that Vico did not conceive this modernization process as 
simply a transition from conventional norms to natural norms. The emer­
gence of a universalistic ethic is some sort of a progress, according to 
the New Science, but it cannot be a progress toward nature, since 'nature' 
is ataxia and bestiality, precisely that which man has voyaged into culture 
to escape. Moreover, it is not 'progress' at all, if that word is meant 
to be unequivocal. Universalistic ethics must always be understood as 
destructive of man's earlier communal life, as undermining his familial 
inclusion within the organic Gemeinschaft. But to see all the subtleties 
of Vico's concept of political evolution, we must look more closely at 
each of his three stages.
The "world in its infancy"70, according to the New Science, was com­
posed of "family kingdoms". At this germinal stage of political-cultural 
evolution, the primary form of social differentiation was 'segmentation'. 
Vico refers to the roughly equal clans of this stage as "household common­
wealths of monarchic form".71 Each family or clan (a unit based, according 
to Vico, on the double code of residence and descent) has approximately the
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same structure and does approximately the same work as the others. Rudi­
mentary societies like this, of course, do contain differentiations accord­
ing to strata and function, notably along the lines of sex and generation 
roles. Such stratification and functional differentiation, however, are 
normally secondary to a primary differentiation according to family seg­
ments. This arrangement, it seems, is bound to enhance survival potential 
in a menacing environment, since any given segment of society (un regno 
fomigliare) can be destroyed without damaging functions that are vital for 
the entire group. Emblematic for the religious origins of these family 
kingdoms is that "fantastic universal", the totem. The totem has always 
been recognized by anthropologists as a cosmos-integrating symbol. By rep­
resenting an animal (or plant) species, the clan and a divine principle, 
such a fantastic universal links together the subhuman, human and super­
human. This harks back to the need of resourceless men to sustain a narra­
tive unity of the world - the organizational embodiment of this mythical 
cosmic-integrity is the 'inviolable' unity of the clan. The totem, while 
'unifying the cosmos', serves as a drapeau (as Dürkheim put it)72, as a 
ritual mechanism for securing the symbolic boundaries of group identity, 
for coordinating the self-interpretation of a collective 'we'. To bring 
this back to the New Science, we can say that a totem helps organize an 
initiate society into segments, along the lines of a member/non-member 
classification scheme. (Perhaps the ultimate Vichian critique of both the 
Hobbesian and Rousseauan anthropological mythopoems of the 'state of na­
ture' is that 'natural man' could not have conceivably been as the latter 
describe him, namely, isolated and utterly insecure, because 'natural man' 
was bound and protected by his family clan structure.)
The next great evolutionary transition, Vico claims, is the shift from 
the "family state" to the "city state", from a society differentiated pri­
marily by segmentation to a society differentiated primarily by stratifi­
cation. To depart briefly from Vico's version of this shift, we would 
suggest the following: because of various fortuitous factors like the
number of sons, quality of soil, luck, and so forth, lasting inequalities 
tend to develop among originally equal family segments. In other words, 
certain families tend to gain and consolidate wealth, power and functional 
importance (for instance, eligibility to the office of shaman). According 
to the New Science, of course, this is not the way "civil power emerged 
from family power"7 ,^ though the stratified and inequitable outcome des-
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cribed is the same. Metaphorizing perhaps on stratification through con­
quest, Vico reconstructs the story this way: while certain men (the origi­
nal ’fathers') had fled the ataxia of bestiality by establishing fixed 
residences and founding monogamous marriages and thereby becoming "certain 
fathers of certain children by certain women"74, others had neither ceased 
their "bestial wanderings",75, nor their "frequent intercourse with their 
mothers and daughters".75 Still untamed by the religious institutionaliza­
tion of incest-prohibiting kinship codes, these "unchaste, impious and 
nefarious" men remained on the level of pre-cultural beasts. Life for the 
yet unhumanized, however, was far from balmy. Hence,
"after a long time, driven by the ills occasioned by their 
bestial society, weak, astray, solitary, relentlessly pur­
sued by the robust and violent because of quarrels engen­
dered by their infamous promiscuity, they came at last to 
seek refuge in the asylums of their fathers. The latter, 
taking them under their protection, proceeded to extend 
their family kingdoms to include those famuli through the 
clienteles. Thus they developed commonwealths on the basis 
of orders naturally superior by reason of virtues certainly 
heroic."77
Heroic valour lent a 'natural' and 'inevitable' legitimacy to aristo­
cratic power and privilege. And this legitimation through virtue was not 
quite 'fictitious', argued Vico, even though based on an erroneously onto­
logical interpretations of class superiority. The nobles really are more 
virtuous than the plebs since they have had a head start on humanization 
and have thereby consolidated their monopoly on, among other things, "gene- 
rating in human fashion with wives taken under divine auspices1 
Although the newly socialized famuli were now human, they were still not 
as "deeply human" as the original fathers (who had had more practice).
The lower classes were thus 'naturally' subjugated by the upper classes.
For Vico, as stated, the divine right of nobles was partially erroneous, 
"for (the nobles) were after all, men who merely imagined the gods and 
believed their own heroic nature to be a mixture of divine and human".75 
But even if this 'error' could (with a bit of a wrench) be construed as 
'class ideology', Vico makes a great point of showing that it could never 
be called manipulative or intentionally deceptive, because (1) the nobles 
believed it about themselves ("false religions were born not of imposture 
but of credulity")80, and (2) social order and maintenance of the breach 
between nature and culture would have been impossible without some kind of
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centralized control. Significant here is the suggestion that although 
exploitation is 'unnatural', it is not much more 'unnatural' (perhaps less 
so) than the collapse of social order which would follow from hasty equali­
zation.81 When Vico refers to human nature, of course, he means man's 
'second' or institutional nature. Thus, one might resummarize the anti- 
foundationalist argument of section one as follows: it is not that there
is no 'nature' which can support a normative claim; it is, rather, that 
there are too many 'natures' unreconciled with each other - and one of 
them can almost always be called on at a pinch.82
Vico conceived the organizational embodiment of the heroic 'fiction' 
(that the nobles were a superior race) as an aristocratic monopoly not 
merely on solemn marriage rites, but on religion, law, wealth, truth and 
power in general.83 Since religion and kinship are the two basic princi­
ples which lift men up out of nature and into culture, an ambiguous half­
exclusion of the lower strata from access to these principles (combined 
with a convenient 'forgetting' of their own bestial origins by the original 
fathers), ensures the generalized legitimacy of the nobility's power and 
privilege.
Vico often refers to Aristotle's remark that, in the monarchy of 
heroic ages, "the king was a general and a judge and had the control of 
religion"84. This is important because the same process of secularization 
which undermines the religious unity of the cosmos eliminates the possibi­
lity of that radical (and legitimating) role integration whereby a ruler 
might be simultaneously the wisest, the richest, the most powerful and the 
best loved. In primitive societies, one should recall, even home and work­
place remain relatively undifferentiated. The kinship group is the unit 
of residence and the unit of food gathering and production. This back­
ground integrity of life (supplemented, as we have seen, by a narratively 
unified cosmos) is brought into clear focus by the lack of differentiation 
in primitive leadership roles.85 Because, in Vico's age of heroes, econom­
ic88, political and family-founding power is combined with a monopoly on 
divine revelation, the aristocrats are universally perceived as 'naturally' 
superior to the plebs. One of Vico's most persistent interests, among 
these monopolized social codes, is the systematic exclusion of the early 
Roman plebs from the right to 'solemn nuptials' (connubium) or the power 
to found families.• One of the chief mechanisms at work here, according to
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Vico, was the widespread association of bestial ataxia (that which is most 
repugnant) with the inability to tell who is one's father and who is one's 
son. Without the right to found families officially, man is incapable of 
making the definitive (or 'higher) step out of nature, incapable of giving 
his name to his children's children and leaving a trace in history. The 
early plebs "left no name of themselves to their posterity"87, and to that 
extent were indistinguishable from pre^cultural beasts. "The Roman patri­
cian", in contrast, "was defined as one qui potest nomine oiere patrem,
'who can name his father'."88 Equally important from the perspective of 
political power was the fact that their exclusion from sanctified matrimony 
excluded the plebs from having legitimate heirs to their property. Thus, 
as Vico works hard to show, the plebs were systematically excluded from 
accumulating a threatening amount of economic power.88
Another special concern of Vico's was the role played by literacy in 
the initial legitimation and eventual delegitimation of aristocratic privi­
lege and power. In the heroic age, "the nobles, being also priests, had 
kept the laws in a secret language as a sacred thing".80 The secrecy of 
the laws demanded that they remain unwritten, at least in the vulgar 
tongue. If the plebs could read the laws, they might get the irreverent 
idea that the 'heroes' should follow them too: "the nobles want to keep
>r
the laws a secret monopoly of their order, so that they may depend on 
their choice and that they may administer them with a royal hand."81 What 
is worse, if the plebs could read the laws they might get the even more 
blasphemous (read 'cognitive') idea that the law can be changed.
This brings us to Vico's third great evolutionary transition, the 
restructuring of society according to universalistic norms and egalitarian 
ideals. Of course, no society can be organized quantitatively. This would 
mean that there were no functionally specific or strategic positions within 
the social nexus - in itself an impossibility. What Vico means when he 
speaks of the emergence of egalitarian society is not that with the col­
lapse of aristocratic legitimation everyone becomes the 'same', but rather 
that with this collapse (partially causing it, partially caused by it) 
people begin to interpret themselves as all equally human.82
Implicit in this summary account are the two basic strands of Vico's 
concept of the "advance" of reflection: (1) the simultaneous emergence of
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egalitarianism, nominalism and atomistic or competitive individualism, what 
we have called the splintering of old familial forms of social cohesion; 
and (2) the shift to a new concept of time, to a concept which allows 
society to conceive its future as radically different from its past; what 
we have termed the 'cognitive' affirmation of corrigibility and revisabil- 
ity. That these two strands are inextricably woven together may be quickly 
understood by reflection on the fact that an appeal to equality is basical­
ly a denial of the relevance of the past, of family lineage and ascribed 
status for deciding the distribution of life chances or access to opportu­
nities in education, entrepreneurship, nearness to church funds, political 
processes and so forth. Equality under law, in other words, since it can­
not mean that everyone is 'the same', must be understood as a formula for 
legitimating breaks with the past. For expository and analytical purposes 
we must say something about the modern concept of time before delving into 
Vico's theories about egalitarianism and its interrelations with both mar­
ket society and the "barbarism of reflection".
VI
The Transformation of Time
One of the first things to notice about unwritten laws is that they 
are hard to change, or at least hard to change with any precision. Indeed, 
as Vico intuited, it is not so easy even to imagine revising a law unless 
one has seen it written down and (perhaps) growing out of date. With the 
emergence of literacy, however, "the people may fix the meaning of the 
laws."93 Written texts, in other words, rather than rigidifying a culture, 
make for a new flexibility in relation to the past. At the very least, as 
Parsons says, "they permit the differences introduced by innovation to be 
defined more precisely than by oral traditions alone."94 For Vico, writing 
the laws in the vernacular shifts the 'ground' of legality from ancient 
custom and mores to popular utility and choice. The spread of literacy, 
in other words, is crucial to the historical replacement of normative by 
cognitive attitudes. Social evolution, we might say, is a stepwise de­
thronement of the archaic 'primacy of the past' and the eventual coronation 
of modernity's improvisatory 'orientation toward the future'. In relig­
iously bound societies, moreover, even when laws are written down, they
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tend to be regarded with an initial piety: "men of limited ideas take for
law what the words expressly say."55 With the 'advance' of reflection, 
such literal-minded piety is supplanted by a flexible capacity for ad hoc 
reinterpretation on the basis of present needs: "Intelligent men take for
law whatever impartial utility dictates in each case."55 'Intelligence' 
here is coextensive with what we have been calling the cognitive attitude.
It is important to see how the concept of time (that is, the social 
interpretation of reality with regard to the difference between the past 
and the future) is transformed under the impact of the 'advance' of reflec­
tion. The guiding of present life by appeal to the past, of course, seems 
a universal characteristic of religiously integrated societies. Heroic 
legitimacy, as Vico describes it, is based on the relevance of 'origins', 
on the pertinence of the fact that nobles have divinity in their past while 
plebs have bestiality in their past.57 The mythical cosmos-integrating 
and clan-unifying narrative underpinning the social interpretation of 
reality is beautifully borne out in W . E. Stanner's discussion of the 
"Dreaming", the Australian aboriginal ontology. In this narrative, the 
centrality of a "sacred, heroic time long ago" issues in a "metaphysical 
emphasis on abidingness" and "continuity".55 As Stanner depicts it, this 
mythical system is "a kind of narrative of things that once happened; a 
kind of charter of things that still happen; and a kind of logos or princi­
ple of order transcending everything significant for aboriginal man."55 
The conflated quality of this primitive time schematization, the lack of 
differentiation between past, present and future, appears to result quite 
logically in a "reconciliation with the terms of life."100 Early class 
differentials, according to Vico, are stabilized on the basis of an erro­
neous belief that "it has always been thus." The primitive perceives the 
past to have pre-selected the present and future in such detail that he 
has no sense of real alternatives. His attitude toward the unequal distri­
bution of life chances is basically 'normative'. Foundationalist ontology 
has made him see life, in Stanner's striking phrase, as "a one possibility 
thing.ul01
With the 'advance' of reflection, life becomes a many possibility 
thing. The modern emphasis on corrigibility and revisability signals man's 
increasingly conscious access to a multiplicity of alternatives. As stated 
earlier, even the criteria by which we choose among these alternatives tend
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to be cast upon a horizon of other possible criteria, tend to become them­
selves choosable. Such a shift toward 'cognitivity1, at any rate, is 
bound to produce a 'crisis' in political legitimacy. When men realize that 
'it has always been this way' tells us nothing about how things must be in 
the present and future then societies really start to undergo rapid trans­
formations. The emergence of universalistic norms, according to Vico, was 
just such a dissolvent of the past and propulsion into the future. Every­
thing began when the plebians started "to reflect upon themselves and to 
realize that they were of like human nature with the nobles and should 
therefore be made equal with them in civil rights."102 Reflection is the 
cognitive capacity to repudiate the past and readjust prior habits and 
beliefs. Such a capacity is a permanent threat to the political status quo. 
If legitimacy survives the 'advance' of reflection, it survives as a 
'permanently precarious legitimacy'.
The sophistic split between nomos and physis (which will be elaborated 
upon in future sections) arose largely in response to commercial and econo­
mic innovations that compelled some sort of rupture with the 'heroic' value 
commitments of the old landed aristocracy. The destabilizing of old norms 
does not entail the stabilizing of new norms, since a break with the past 
brings with it a lasting possibility of non-compliance. Innocence comes to 
an end when we see the world around us as 'also otherwise possible'. Once 
the social interpretation of time changes in such a way that men perceive 
great discontinuities between the past and the future, then a priori 
ontology has become largely irrelevant to everyday thought and action. Of 
course, it is precisely in a precarious situation like this that we start 
hearing about 'doctrines' of divine right, for it is only at this point 
that the nobles have to go out of their way to convince the plebs (and 
themselves) of what they might not otherwise believe. Before the emergence 
of the reflective or philosophical idea of universal human equality, says 
Vico, "the nations were governed by the certainty of authority."103 The 
incorrigible and rigid quality of heroic law was institutionalized in early 
man's perception that this law was 'natural'. Hence, Vico adds, "if the 
laws turned out in a given case to be not only harsh but actually cruel, 
they naturally bore it because they thought the law was naturally such."104 
Vico does not accept Grotius' interpretation of the universalistic "natural 
law of the philosophers". Grotius, we have noted, thought universalistic 
norms to be incipient in all men since the nativity of mankind. For Vico,
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this was evidence that Grotius had fallen victim to "the conceit of scho­
lars, who will have it that what they know must have been eminently under­
stood from the beginning of the world."105 But, even though Vico does not 
accept Grotius' interpretation of universalistic norms, he believes that 
this interpretation is symptomatic for the reflective age of men. Philoso­
phers assume that their own insights existed from the beginning of time at 
the cost of alienating themselves from the past. If universalistic norms 
are 'timelessly' valid, then no regime or social order has even been legi­
timate and only a few have ever neared the shadow of legitimacy. This 
would be disturbing for 'philosophers', however, only if the past had a 
hold over the present, only if genuine norms had to be mediated through 
(particularistic) moves and customs. But this is precisely what an egali­
tarian age of universalistic norms denies.
At the cultural break with nature, one should recall, religious onto­
logy conceals the menacing contingencies of nature. With the parallel 
advance of technology and reflection, structures and events which had 
customarily been perceived as 'inevitable' are unmasked as 'also otherwise 
possible'. As a priori ontology is undermined, contingency is disinterred; 
man begins to orient himself in relation to probable discontinuities be­
tween the past and the future. It has been argued many times that the rise 
of capitalism, with its emphasis on planning, contributed to the undermin­
ing of the old 'primacy of the past'. After the structural transformation 
of societies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the present 
was no longer guided by feudal reverence for immemorial custom, but rather 
by entrepreneurial guesswork about the trends of the future. One might 
choose to have a past, but one had to choose to have it. In the shift to 
the 'cognitive' age of men, in other words, tradition sinks to the level 
of a 'tool' which sometimes comes in handy, sometimes not. For Vico's 
'heroes', the contours of the past were covertly dependent on the realities 
of the present. For modern men, however, the contours of the past are 
overtly dependent on the utilities of an 'open future'. Something of this 
sort was anticipated by Bruno, Bacon and Pascal in the modernity-initiating 
topos of Veritas filia temporis. Prior to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, time and history had been largely interpreted in such a way that 
the ancients appeared to be 'older' than the moderns. With Bruno emerges 
the innovative twist that modem times are the maturity of ancient infancy. 
When fathers are seen as 'younger' than sons, the bonds of traditionalism
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have been undone. With this opening toward the future comes a possibility 
of that kind of instauratio ab imis Jacobinism which makes modern man seem 
so arrogant to votaries of tradition like de Maistre and Burke. However, 
once the modern conception of time (of an 'open future') becomes widespread, 
it becomes very difficult to either legitimate or de-legitimate the present 
by an appeal to the past. In societies oriented toward corrigibility, 
traditionalists are sadly marginal.
We should add here that an 'open future' does not imply an expanding 
consciousness of time. High discontinuity between past and future can lead 
to a shrinking of temporal perspectives, since the distant future (like the 
distant past) becomes irrelevant to the present. Southern Italian peasants 
will speculate about their grandchildren in the year 2000, while industrial 
workers may have no future awareness beyond payday.
VII
Egalitarianism and the Advance of Reflection
The political focus of Vico's third or 'cognitive' stage of social 
evolution is the emergence of egalitarianism, of the state where all men 
"are made equal by the laws."106 In theocratic and aristocratic ages, Vico 
says, man's mind was not yet 'refined' or developed enought to understand 
"universals or intelligible class concepts".107 Early men were natural 
poets and hence "insensible to every refinement of nauseous reflection."106 
In a word, the primitive imagination could not perceive the abstract same­
ness of plebs and nobles. Once abstract universals or class concepts like 
'man in general' become available, however, the unequal distribution of 
social power and privilege starts to look random and illegitimate. This 
elemental crisis in aristocratic legitimacy, according to Vico, follows 
inevitably from the 'advance' of reflection. The old 'organic' interpreta­
tion of society as a body composed of head, stomach, arms and feet served 
to legitimate a functional differentiation between "an order of a few to 
command and a multitude of plebians to obey them".106 But the acceptance 
of the nobility-legitimating interpretation of society depends on the 
reasonableness of a one-over-many which is concrete or pre-nominalistic.
At the very least it depends on the idea that man has an essence which may
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be realized to greater and lesser degrees. Once the abstraction 'mankind' 
begins to hang loosely and indiscriminately over all heads, it delegiti­
mates all the old 'organic' inequalities, inequalities based on differences 
of 'depth of humanity' and of strategic location within the social organ­
ism. Egalitarian justice dissolves the old bonds of a stratified society, 
but it seems to have nothing concrete enough about it to replace these 
bonds, to provide a functional equivalent for them. Along with a new 
appreciation for an abstract 'human good', says Vico, egalitarianism pro­
motes a growing indifference to the old communal 'public good', to the 
arena in which nobles might give evidence of their superior humanity. Uni- 
versalistic norms issue in an ignoratia reipublieae tanquam alienae110, in 
an ignorance of politics as of something alien and hence in an indifference 
toward noble words and deeds. Perhaps this is the most important embodi­
ment of Vico's idea that all human values are not compatible, that the 
possibilities of man's mental dictionary do not really fit together and 
that the solution to one problem always produces further unsolved problems. 
Solving the problem of ascriptive inequality, Vico comments, produces a 
society where "each man thinks only of hiw own private interest."111 The 
gain of universalistic norms is balanced by the loss of group solidarity 
and the shared life as well as by a levelling of all lives to a common 
worth. Vico christens this new problem "the barbarism of reflection"112, 
a barbarism of indiscriminate egoism and social dissolution. Egalitarians 
find the value of life by dividing the number of legs they see by two.
The profundity of Vico's concept of the 'advance of reflection', in 
other words, lies in the way he sustains the tension between equality and 
solidarity, between two irreconcilable values of man. For Grotius, one 
should recall, universalism was the solution to all major problems in poli­
tics and law. Vico, by contrast, thinks that there is something lost when 
man begins to see himself in the context of the "entire human race". The 
problem can be formulated as follows: personal identity, in earlier socie­
ties, is always formed in relation to an overarching group identity. The 
symbolic boundaries of the 'I' are always secured in relation to a 'member/ 
non-member' classification scheme which allows each individual both to find 
his "station and its duties" and to 'place' all his fellow men. Now,
Vico's point is this: with the emergence of universalistic norms and
interpretation schemes, individuals are pushed toward a situation where 
they must form their identities in relation to a primary reference group
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so diffuse and abstract ('mankind') as to be nearly ungraspable. Since 
there is no determination without negation, the ascent toward 'humanity in 
general' is a voyage into vagueness. Equality means combining an empty 
universality ("I am like everybody under the sun") with a pin-point unique­
ness ("I am like nobody under the sun"). It excludes the old comforts of 
clan solidarity where members fall to this side of the line, non-members 
to that.
Universalistic norms, in other words, leave man naked and exposed, 
leave the individual with nothing between himself and the (non) community 
of humankind. The transition to universalism is an inevitability of re­
flection, says Vico, and yet there is something dreadful and barbaric 
about it. By placing man in the abstract context of all humanity, it 
drives him back to a ruthless selfishness. To interpret Vico in modern 
terms, competitive capitalism (with all its attendant servilities) is the 
logical correlate of universalistic emancipation.
To make this point more forcefully, we may look at Locke's Second 
Treatise. Of course, Locke saw nothing paradoxical or barbaric about the 
atomistic 'age of men'. Nonetheless, in most things Locke's depiction of 
universalistic, individualistic society is quite similar to Vico's. It 
has the advantage, however, of being worked out in much greater detail. 
Unlike Locke, of course, Vico combines a sense of the loss of heroic values 
with a half contempt for the greedy self-seeking of exchange economy. But, 
even though Locke has no idea of the 'barbarism of reflection', he is not 
such a bad example of this barbarism. He is a philosopher of Gesellschaft 
and does not remember what Gemeinschaft means.
Traditional Gemeinschaften, in simplistic terms, interpreted them­
selves according to the following scheme:
WHOLE •*------------- -* ENDS
PARTS +  ----------- *> MEANS
The members of a Gemeinschaft see themselves as subordinated to the group. 
The ends of the whole are eo ipso the ends of the parts. Socialization
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into a shared religious world view (as well as the threat of social sanc­
tions) guarantees the acceptance of communal goals by every individual. 
Specifically, the preservation of the community is the end for which, if 
occasion arises, the individual members would be the self-sacrificing
means.
The emergence of modern universalist/individualist society (to engage 
in another heuristic simplification) reversed all this. The self-interpre­
tation of Gesellschaft, funnelled through Locke, can be schematized as 
follows:
PARTS <------------- ENDS
WHOLE -t------------ ► MEANS
There is something quite objectionable about this Lockean construal 
of modern society, to be sure. But what we should note before considering 
its fallaciousness is the light such a scheme sheds upon the self-interpre­
tation of modernity. The basic idea of Locke's contractarianism is that 
the state is the means to an end. The end for which a state can be 'used', 
moreover, lies in the pre-existent individual, in the preservation of his 
pre-social life, liberty and property. Magically enough, individuals are 
completely themselves in the 'state of nature', prior to the contractual 
emergence of civil society. Indeed, on the basis of an inspection of his 
already fully-developed needs, 'natural man' can decide what sort of 'pro­
tection agency' he must establish in order to best secure his interests.
From the Gemeinschaftliche perspective the individual is a direct 
participant in the activities of the social whole and, consequently, cannot 
shed his moral agency at any time. Mediating structures wedding persons 
and communities are of secondary importance. The ideal-typical Gesell­
schaftliche outlook acknowledges moral agency only as it arises in the 
course of certain practices and 'contractual' relationships, stressing the 
basic purpose of mediating structures as distancing mechanisms facilitating 
personal autonomy, neatly encapsulated in the maxim: "people are entitled
to do as they will providing no one is harmed as a result."113 The is/ 
ought dichotomy is thus firmly entrenched in the Gesellschaft world view
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with a tenacity equalled only by its determined exclusion from Gemein­
schaftliche thought. In other words, the Gesellschaft model presents us 
with a dichotomy between two kinds of agency: (1) agency within broad
'contractual' arrangements under the aegis of civitas e.g. buying and 
selling, standing for political office; (2) private agency: agency out­
side the purlieu of civitas, (what one does in one's chamber). The second 
form has no (public) moral significance in itself: in order to be cast in
a moral light it must be judged in terms of (1). A rough analogy for 
immorality in this schema would be that of 'unconstitutional' action. 
(Needless to say, this is the ideal typical Gesellschaft point of view - 
one rarely pursued by its adherents.) So, either value judgements are 
'written into civitas', so to speak, (as is taken to be the case with the 
Decalogue, for example) and follow from social arrangements, or they are 
purely external importations, i.e. something for which the model cannot 
produce a rationale.
The greater organicism of Gemeinschaft thought, however, produces a 
more substantive moral doctrine, according to which virtually everything 
one does is essentially social in origin and in consequence. Non-social 
virtues are not recognized as 'virtues' in Gemeinschaft theory, though in 
a different way to that of Gesellschaft theory. Virtue is necessarily 
social in both schools, but in the former it is so because worth and virtue 
are fundamentally public notions inexplicable in personal terms, while the 
latter considers the private realm as outside the field of proper political 
discourse, explicable but of no significance, unless, of course, it enters 
the public realm in specific instances of political relevance (as every 
parliamentarian knows and fears all too well).
The instrumentalization of the state, as Vico saw, spells the end of 
the classical idea of politics, an idea which in turn had its roots in pre­
political clan solidarity. Be desocializing and desacralizing 'natural 
right', by regrounding it (though not abandoning it) on the secular ideal 
of individual survival and the calculus of pleasure and pain, Hobbes and 
Locke set the seal on the newly emergent irrelevance of (1) the past, and 
(2) the social whole.
Search the Second Treatise as you may, you will find few references 
to concepts which are central to Aristotle's analysis of the Hellenic
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Gemeinschaft. There is no mention of honour, valour, virtue, patriotism, 
duty, custom, tradition, institutions. There is not even any mention of 
language. For Aristotle these terms are associated with non-instrumental 
communication, or 'the good life in common'. The Gemeinschaft, as Plato 
makes even more explicit, is not a tool which the individual might 'use' - 
the state itself is not a utility. It is, rather, a medium or a space 
within which the individual first comes to 'realize' himself. Locke and 
Hobbes replace the Aristotelian values with safety, peace, absence of pain, 
the preservation of property and industriousness. Taken together, these 
values make up what Locke calls 'the common reason' (the only logos left 
in a Gesellschaft) which he goes on to define as the measure God has set 
to men for their mutual security.
Protectionist theories of the minimal state assume, against Aristotle, 
that man's ultimate values and 'reasons for being' are incipient in the 
pre-political individual. Locke's own commitment to such an atomistic 
individualism is revealed most strikingly in his idea that it is possible 
to 'own property' prior to the existence of society. It is not irrelevant 
in this regard to recall Locke's concept of the epistemological subject as 
a tabula rasa whose ideas are all traceable to sense perception or reflec­
tion on mental operations. The implication is that linguistic communication 
and social interaction in general add nothing essential to experience. In 
practical life, too, Locke believes, political bonds add nothing that was 
not already (physiologically) 'implicit' in the individual. Property, 
which we normally think of as a social institution, is, for Locke, a quali­
ty appertaining directly to the individual by virtue of his innate (physio­
logical) capacity to transform nature through labour or even (less social 
still!) by virtue of his innate capacity to ingest.
Another telling dissimilarity between the age of heroes and the age 
of men, between Aristotle's Gemeinschaft and Locke's Gesellschaft, lies in 
the Lockean reassessment of labour as the fundamental dimension of human 
self-realization. Aristotle, in keeping with the principles of a slave- 
based economy, believed that labour was essentially subhuman. Freedom or 
the possibility of self-realization, Aristotle argues, demands that the 
citizen be unburdened from the time and energy consuming struggle to secure 
daily subsistence. Such an unburdening was the inglorious achievement of 
slaves. Security and survival, from Aristotle's perspective, were means to
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further ends; they are the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
actualization of ultimate human values. One of the basic ideas involved 
in Aristotle's argument is that labour is quintessentially monological.
Even an isolated individual can appropriate consumable goods from nature 
and survive; even an animal can do so. Man's humanness, by contrast, is 
only consummated through language and communicative interaction with other 
men. Labour simply fails the rudimentary dimension of the political life, 
the dimension of intersubjectivity. Because Locke believed that nothing 
could be found in society which had not previously been in the individual 
(by virtue of his 'constitution'), he had no qualms about making labour 
the foundation stone of civil society. This may be the barbarism of 
reflection at its most complacent self-assured.
The same contrast between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft can be made 
by comparing Locke and Aristotle on suicide. For Aristotle, predictably 
enough, suicide is condemned as a betrayal of the community.11  ^ The indi­
vidual owes himself to the polis and cannot simply decide to let his fellow 
citizens go it alone, as it were. Locke too condemns suicide but, unable 
to speak of an individual's 'duty' to society, he ends up saying that man's 
being is 'God's property' and hence not to be tampered with.115 This 
remark does not solve the problem, of course, but it does reveal the im­
possibility of solving it within the framework of a consistently atomistic 
utilitarianism. The problem about conceiving of society as the 'means' 
for the individual's 'ends' has to do with the tacit assumption that man 
sprang fullborn from the 'forehead of Jove'. To say that a society is 
'just' when it allows an individual to 'get what he wants' is to presume 
that 'what he wants' is constituted independently of society. Protestant­
ism (as an 'ontology of privacy') allowed Hobbes and Locke to conceive of 
the individual as constituted pve-socially in his inward relation to God: 
through predestination man as imago Dei and species-being is predetermined 
and, consequently, contains within his being all that he is and may become. 
Moreover, through the Word man has within his reach the principles by which 
to achieve self-realization. Combined, the conceptions of man's self- 
containedness and ready access to all he need know to properly manifest his 
civility challenged the worth and legitimacy of world views rooted in tra­
dition, ritual and mediated kerygmatic guarantees (see Appendix One) . Once 
the old order collapses, however, universalistic norms may well have bar­
baric implications. According to Vico, they suggest the latent tyranny of
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a Cartesian 'reason' uprooted from moves and tradition.
The confluxion of Protestant thought and 'rationalism' in the seven­
teenth century represented more than the convenient marriage of a theology 
in search of a methodology and a methodology in search of a theology; it 
reflected a major change in thinking about natural law and civil society. 
Among other things, the thrust of this merger was to strike a balance be­
tween the view of natural law as simply rational nature, or the order of 
nature itself, and the view that natural law is nothing other than precep­
tive divine law. Through a sometimes uneasy blending of Aristotelian 
scholasticism and nominalism, it was argued that the moral law is binding 
on all men and in principle knowable to all men, not simply in an intuitive 
way but as a consequence of common membership of a linguistic community. 
Natural law, it was claimed, is grounded in nature, but not in the natural 
order of the physical world. Rather, it is founded in 'integral nature', 
in an ideal order made knowable to us through the faculty of thinking which, 
in turn, is possible only in a rational linguistic community. Rationality, 
in other words, is a function of dialogue, and no matter how unique the 
participants, insofar as they share in common certain ideas, expectations 
and modes of expression they are subject to the 'mental language' shared 
by all rational beings. To overcome a hesitant faith in the possibility of 
abstracting 'law' from the natural order, then, that order was 'internali­
zed: an internal order founded in what is innate in all human minds.
What we see in this development is the transition from scholasticism 
to early modem philosophy. The basis of natural law had shifted from the 
order in external nature to the order in what is innate in all rational 
minds. Grotius, for example, tells us that the idea of natural law or 
natural right is not based on general ideas of order in nature but on an 
analysis of human nature. Human beings naturally desire to live in society 
(which everyone in the mainstream of scholastic philosophy would have ac­
knowledged) , but Grotius accounts for this by differentiating mankind from 
other species by virtue of the fact that language use is a commensurate 
property of human beings. Society, in other words, is based on linguistic 
community. Indeed, there is nothing very new in any of this; most of it 
can be found in various ways in Aquinas. However, it is to be found with 
much else and in very different proportion. What was new was very old, 
coming from Aristotle; but the emphasis and, consequently, the predomin-
138
ance of certain ideas changed, and this leads us not only to Cartesian 
linguistics but much more generally to the characteristics we associate 
with the rise of contractarianism: the transition from Gemeinschaftliche
to Gesellschaftliche modes of though reflecting at once that which is 
common to all and that which is unique in all of us (see Appendix Two) .
VIII
Locke and Gesellschaft
Quasi-totalitarianisms of both left and right make a great deal of 
the logical incoherence lying at the root of protectionist and liberal 
doctrines of the minimal state. An academic Marxist like Macpherson can 
sound virtuously Aristotelian in denouncing Locke's failure to recognize 
the "moral claims of society":
"Locke's individualism does not consist entirely in his 
maintaining that individuals are by nature free and equal 
and can only be rightfully subjected to the jurisdiction of 
others by their own consent. To leave it at that is to miss 
its main significance. Fundamentally, it consists in making 
the individual the natural proprietor of his own person and 
capacities, owing nothing to society for them."11®
Since the individual is generated in and through society, so this 
classicizing objection goes, he has duties toward society and not merely 
rights from it. Sophisticated fascists like Gentile also stick close to 
Aristotle in this seemingly cogent anti-contractarian argument.117
It is one of the main tasks of political philosophy to show why, even 
though Locke seems wrong and Gemeinschaft theorists seem right, Locke is in 
some respects more rational than they are. Lockean principles, erroneous 
as they appear, have produced far more free and more humane societies than 
have holistic Gemeinschaftliche principles. This is a fact which requires 
at least some explanation. Now, the first thing we need in order to ade­
quately present the Gesellschaft perspective is a theory of social evolu­
tion which allows us to employ the category of apophvades against would-be 
renewers of Gemeinschaftliche norms. This, as we have seen, is the great 
contribution of Vico's New Science. The content of society in the 'age of
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men' has little to do with familial solidarity or Aristotle's 'good life 
in common'. The content of Gesellschaft, indeed, is that which makes all 
men equal: natural needs. The gain of 'justice' attendant to this formal
equalization is simultaneously a loss of organic communality. The ability 
to see the emergence of Gesellschaft as the irreversible disappearance of 
Gemeinschaft depends on a Vichian recognition that equality and solidarity, 
Locke and Aristotle, are in irreconcilable tension with one another. Thus, 
the minimal condition for a theory of modern politics is the realization 
that conditions for Gemeinschaftliche communality are, for most people, no 
longer at hand. This implies a recognition that political rationality 
evolves and that what was rational at one time is not necessarily rational 
today. It is crucial to keep the evolution of rationality clear at a con­
ceptual level, since (given the burden which universalism puts on indivi­
duals) the psychological temptation to resurrect Gemeinschaftliche values 
and Gemeinschaftliche interpretation schemes is hard to resist.
If we follow Vico, in other words, we do not have to rest content 
with the idea that Locke is wrong in a beneficent way while totalitarians 
are right in a malefic way. Totalitarians are wrong about modern society 
(if we take their arguments as genuine), while Locke darkly intuited some­
thing they luminously suppressed. To explain what this amounts to, how­
ever, we must refer to a more intricate theory of social evolution than 
any we might find in the New Science. The advance of reflection, in point 
of fact, does not mean that atomic individuals pop loose of the old organic 
social web - paying their 'cognitive' disrespects to otiose kerygma. What 
Vico suggests is that the inevitable disintegration of secular and egali­
tarian society is due to (1) a 'vertical' loosening of the bonds of tradi­
tion or increased access to revisability, and (2) a 'horizontal' splinter­
ing of social cohesion and the emergence of reciprocal throat-cutting 
individualism, both of which are affiliate with a loss of shared norms. A 
subtler theory of the 'advance of reflection' must not lose sight of Vico's 
achievements, and especially not of his insight that the desirable rise of 
universalistic norms is inevitably accompanied by the undesirable threat of 
a returned barbarism. What a better theory of secularization will do is 
abandon the perverse Hobbesian and Lockean emphasis on atomic individuals 
(present also in Vico's depiction of the age of men). Such an emphasis, 
one must realize was a functionally profitable self-misinterpretation of 
early modernity. In order to supersede Vico in this regard, we must re-
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place the naive concept of atomization with the idea (borrowed from Kurt 
Lewin)118 of 'life-space'. The life-spaces of an individual consist of 
the person and his psychological environments, as he perceives them. Life- 
spaces incorporate those frames of reference, other persons and things, 
symbols and circumstances that together form a totality of coesixting facts 
which are regarded as mutually interdependent. Modem society is not a 
heap of anonymous pebble-people. It is a loose nexus of quasi-autonomous 
yet interacting life-spaces such as family, law, science, education, art, 
religion, politics, economy and so forth. The Hobbesian and Lockean infat­
uation with Robinson Crusoe reflects the fact that egalitarian individua­
lism emerged out of an interaction context dominated by economy - a context 
where all men were said to have, in principle, an equal right to buy and 
sell on the market. What Locke systematically failed to thematize was the 
fact that his bartering Crusoe could only 'realize himself' (at least qua 
economic agent) within the market life-space. In his 'state of nature', 
Locke could not see the enjungling institution for the individual trees. 
What Locke saw, on the other hand, and what Macpherson challenged, is this: 
simply because a bartering individual owes his "own person and capacities" 
to an exchange organization, it does not follow that he has a duty to 
society in toto. Doubtlessly, state of nature theory would be a complete 
inanity if it implied that man could literally lead a human life pre-socia- 
lly (before learning a language and so forth) and, in that remarkably 
immaculate state, choose whether or not to enter society. Such interpreta­
tions of contractarianism, however, result from an apophradic acceptance of 
Aristotle's identification of society with polity. The rational core of 
contractarian theory, instead, lies in the quite intelligible notion that 
an individual in a Gesellschaft can be a person within non-political life- 
spaces (as scientist, believer, artist, entrepreneur, teacher, and even 
worker) in a way not foreseen for inhabitants of Aristotle's polis.
It seems true, as Aristotle argues, that man can only 'realize him­
self' (or 'realize his humanity') within a context of communicative rather 
than instrumental action, within a symbolically organized 'social space' 
which allows him to 'locate' himself and his interlocutor. 'To live', in 
the Latin idiom, is inter homines esse. Instrumental action, in contrast, 
is basically monological and hence falls below the elemental dimension of 
human life, the dimension of reciprocity. An obvious consequence of 
Aristotle's identification of society with polity is that withdrawal from
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politics means withdrawal from intersubjectivity in general, that is to 
say, from the chief constitutive condition of our humanity. For the 
modern age, at any rate, this is patently a mistake, since leaving the 
context of politics does not imply leaving other communicative contexts 
like science, art, education, family and so forth, contexts which, taken 
together, make up the loose nexus of society. Two main reasons why Hobbes 
and Locke, and other contractarians failed to make this argument were 
(1) their commitment to universalistic norms, and (2) the peculiar charac­
ter of the modern economic system itself. Because universalistic norms 
require man to interpret himself within the primary reference group of 
'humankind', it becomes difficult in the age of men to think coherently 
about the constitutive function of particular subsystems. Furthermore, 
although market economy is an interaction context in which individuals are 
dependent on a pre-existing symbolic and institutional space, this 'depen­
dence ' is mediated through a self-interpretation which stresses the sepa­
rateness and isolation of each competing unit of production, distribution 
and consumption. For contractarians, as a consequence, life outside poli­
tics and 'within economy' often called Robinson Crusoe to mind. Possibly, 
this Lockean and Vichian (universalistic/individualistic) construal of 
Gesellschaft can be corrected if we simply increase the' complexity of our 
social analysis, taking into account the manifold life-spaces (such as 
family, science, education, law, art, and so on) that constitute overall 
social space. It may be that such an analysis will even help thwart the 
barbarism of reflection, the tendency toward levelling and indiscriminate­
ness, implicit in abstract universalism. Modern science and art, for 
example, allow a significant differentiation between excellence and medio­
crity. And this is perfectly consistent with the idea that opportunity to 
try for excellence must be distributed indifferently throughout society.
In describing the break which modernity and capitalism in particular 
made with the medieval world view, R. H. Tawney emphasizes the importance 
of increasing life-space differentiation: "The theory of a hierarchy of
values, embracing all human interests and activities in a system of which 
the apex is religion, is replaced by the conception of separate and para­
llel compartments, between which a due balance should be maintained, but 
which have no vital connection with each other."119 In this sense, the 
emergence of the age of men involves the splintering of the original 
'wholeness' of society into a multiplicity of uncoordinated perspectives
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or behavioural subsystems with no guarantee of synchronization. The chief 
political consequence of such subsystem differentiation is that the state 
should lose the overarching and society-integrating status which philoso­
phers in the classical tradition gave it. Politics, like religion, shrinks 
to the level of just another life-space among life-spaces. Thus, one must 
say that the polity is no longer, as it was for Aristotle and all theoreti­
cians of Gemeinschaft, a whole of which individual men are parts. Instead 
of being parts within the political whole, modern men are more like occu­
pants of a political subsystem's environment. In sum, what lay behind 
Locke's seemingly obtuse assertion that man can exist pre-socially and 
contract into society, was the emergent life-space differentiations of an 
advanced Gesellschaft. What he meant was that man can exist pre-political- 
ly and contract into the polity. The power of the Aristotelian identifica­
tion of polity and society is revealed in the fact that Locke never expli­
citly made such a distinction. Once we make this distinction, however, 
many things become clear. As we will discuss in future sections, for 
example, it allows us to understand the vast difference between Epictetus 
and Mill. When Epictetus identifies 'freedom' with the absence of politi­
cal interference, he implies that man is only free when withdrawn into the 
solitude of his interior domus. When Mill identifies 'freedom' with the 
absence of political interference, in contrast, he implies that man is 
free when socially engaged in non-political contexts like science, art and 
family. This juxtaposition is meant to suggest that political philosophy 
should never depart too far from a Vichian investigation of social evolu­
tion. One should not underestimate the importance for Locke of the idea 
that an individual is initially constituted in his 'private' relation to 
God; liberal democracies may even now depend in part on a residual commit­
ment to the Protestant 'ontology of privacy'. Yet the content of liberal 
freedom is not withdrawal into inner silence, but rather a varied engage­
ment in the diverse life-spaces of a pluralistic society. And we can only 
understand such a freedom after we have clearly distinguished between 
society and polity.
With the idea of life-space differentiation in mind, we can now re­
interpret Vico's suggestion that there is a great psychological burden 
involved in living in the age of men. The problem is not so much that an 
individual belongs to no 'groups' (symbolic units which allow him to 'lo­
cate' himself and employ a 'member/non-member1 schematization of his fellow
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men), but rather that he belongs to too many unrelated or at least unco­
ordinated interaction contexts, and that he does not belong to any of them 
constantly, exclusively or (perhaps) even primarily. This brings to mind 
the insight shared by Aristotle, Vico and Radcliffe-Brown that primitive 
social structures allow for a high degree of role-integration. If you are 
the best war-dancer, fashion the sleekest canoes, then you may marry the 
chieftain's daughter. This seems less true in a highly differentiated 
society, in a society where the old religious and political synchroniza­
tions have vanished. In fact, even to have a somewhat 'integrated life', 
modern man must be fairly imaginative in his improvisations of 'integration 
formulae' which can, on an ad hoo basis, link together the discontinuous 
stages of his biography and the disjointed roles of his daily life. The 
point to make is that this precarious and improvised 'integration' is not 
usually an achievement of shared norms, but rather must be invented in un­
likely self-narrations which occur 'behind the scenes' of the various coded 
interaction contexts. In societies where home and workplace are still un­
differentiated, one imagines, these ad hoo integration formulae play no 
such systematic role. In travelling back and forth between home and work 
modern man has a chance to explain to himself how the various aspects of 
his life fit together. Peculiarly modern about this 'freedom in the traf­
fic' is that there is no guarantee that a man's life will look briefly 
'whole', and even if it does, it is almost certain that he will have to 
make it look that way again tomorrow, once more without assurance of suc­
cess. If I, for example, discover while typing my thesis that my mother 
has packed me a banana sandwich (something I detest), I have to make an 
imaginitive effort to translate my family fury into a professionally ex­
pressible form. I can do this, of course, but translation rules for going 
from one life-space to another must be largely improvised. Translations 
of this sort, moreover, usually retain a touch of the facetious about them. 
Most of the time, in fact, I recognize that there is something inapprop­
riate about de-differentiations such as mixing family and business or 
science and love. If I try too hard for an 'integrated life', I will be 
making the faux gas into a moral imperative.
We can emphasize the evolutionary uniqueness of this state of affairs 
by recalling Levi-Strauss' La Geste d'Asdiwal.12° Primitive man does not 
perceive the world as differentiated into autonomous and (quasi) mutually 
opaque spheres. In the Saga of Asdiwal, the reciprocal transparency of
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what we now regard as heterogeneous domains of reality seems to be due to 
relationships of equivalence which primitives erect between binary struc­
tures underlying each 'separate1 field. Examining four such structures 
(east-west, heaven-earth, man-woman, scarcity-surplus), it is possible to 
see how each offers a 'key' for the others. Geography, cosmology, family 
and economy seem all of a piece. The translatability of each domain into 
the others provides a background unity of life which a banana-detesting 
thesis writer can not help but admire. Yet any attempt to resurrect such 
a unity in a highly differentiated society is plainly anachronistic. To 
make a Gesellschaft take on the semblance of a Gemeinschaft requires some­
thing like totalitarian coercion. This is the point of 'ideologically 
integrated' societies, of Hitler's Gleichschaltung and of Lenin's 'demo­
cratic centralism'. We will underestimate the attractiveness, and hence 
the danger, of totalitarianism if we do not comprehend Vico's insight that 
social evolution involves the painful loss of old moral-emotional community 
and the old foundationalist guarantees. And we will be unable (theoreti­
cally) to resist the nostalgia for Gemeinschaft if we do not see that the 
very structure of Gesellschaft is such that the old values themselves can 
never be retrieved, but only their ideological (and therefore) despotic 
semblance.
If it is 'natural' for man to feel uncomfortable without a priori 
ontological foundations and group solidarity, then Vico's message to 
modernity is that political rationality must now involve strategies for 
helping man survive the discomfort affiliate to provisory action and dis­
jointed rules. A democratic election in a mass society, while not emotion­
ally or 'humanly' satisfying, is one such strategy. It helps us tolerate 
both groundlessness and differentiation by (1) shifting the burden of 
legitimacy away from incorrigible ascriptions (by lineage and self-appoint­
ment) and toward an institutionalization of precariousness whereby a regime 
is thought legitimate because it might not be confirmed in the next elec­
tion, and (2) by replacing the old myths of consensus omnium (which now 
imply conformism under threat of force) with the idea that legitimacy de­
pends on cleavages of interest in the society and a working dualism of 
government and opposition within the polity.
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IX
Reflection without Barbarism
Vico's problem is how to be reflective without being barbaric, how to 
'think' the loss of the past without repeating Descartes' angelic flight 
into 'ahistorical truth'. Against all attempts at secular or philosophical 
foundationalism in politics, Vico presses the notion that man's 'nature'
(the ostensible 'foundation') is indefinite. By saying that human nature 
is indeterminate, he means to suggest (as does Pico) that it is overcomplex. 
Humanity's mental dictionary is so complex, in fact, that it contains con­
tradictory entries, utterances and values at war with one another. For 
Descartes, one recalls, disagreement is due solely to biases inherent in 
diverging traditions. Cut through this muck of the past, and the univocal 
light of reason will gush down upon our thankful heads. Enlightenment 
optimism that the correct social order can and will be attained was ultima­
tely based on the idea that bon sens is equally distributed in all men, 
providing the basis for a 'rational' consensus omnium. This innate guaran­
tee of unanimity released Descartes from the need to understand the diffe­
rences of opinion which were perspectivally (that is, socially) condition­
ed. Given enough time, at any rate, all problems can be definitively 
solved, since natural reason is naturally universal and self-consistent.
It is precisely this sort of ahistorical naivete which Vico sets out to 
demolish in the New Science.
Vico's positive aim is to reconcile the necessity of 'binding norms' 
with the contingency of their genesis and decay, to find reason within 
history, truth within social structures and customs. In order to do this, 
according to the reading we have given of the New Science, we must simply 
abandon the Cartesian thesis that practical reason is a self-consistent 
and closed totality. For ahistorical philosophers like Descartes, of 
course, a 'reason' which contradicted itself would be indistinguishable 
from irrationality. Such a synchronic abridgement of reason, Vico believ­
ed, makes it impossible to see the ambiguities and inner tensions of his­
torical life. The New Science, in contrast, makes us aware of our troubles, 
aware that every increase in flexibility is a lapse of order, that the rise 
of universalistic norms implies a loss of group cohesion, and that this 
loss, in turn jeopardizes personal identity. One value of such a 'logic of
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history' lies in the possibility it provides for using the category 'apo- 
phrades' in political philosophy. If we can give cognitive content to this 
category it will be possible to make normatively compelling arguments with­
out appealing to timeless authorities and transhistorical canons of jus­
tice. The widespread (and apophradic) desire to recreate a sense of 
Gemeinschaft in the midst of contemporary Gesellschaft has been an impor­
tant factor - though certainly not the only one - in twentieth century 
totalitarian movements. At any rate, Vico's 'logic of history' helps us 
explain some of the things which are patently irrational about totalitar­
ianism (as well as to explain what is attractive about it) without forcing 
us to make arbitrary claims concerning the violation of man's timeless 
essence. In fact, by suggesting that we always look for reason within his­
tory, Vico already points the way for an analysis of the social structures 
underlying Locke's commitment to universalistic/individualistic norms. By 
showing how democratic-liberal ideals are rooted in the life-space differ­
entiations of modern society, we can explain the coercively barbaric 
character of totalitarian 'integration' or Gleichschaltung in a way which 
philosophers of 'eternal reason' and the 'inviolable individual' could 
never hope to do (see Appendix Three) .
There is, finally, an obvious gap in the schematic depiction of social 
evolution as a transition from inflexible tradition to traditionless flexi­
bility, from a barbarism of rigid custom to a barbarism of dissolute re­
flection. It immediately comes to mind that something like flexible tradi­
tion or traditional flexibility should find its place between the two ex­
tremes. Not only does the New Science itself fall into this middle zone, 
but so does our normal concept of the 'good life'. We all want to be both 
exploratory and secure, open and coherent, playful and serious, wanton and 
restrained. We do not want our fathers to dictate our lives, but we desire 
the kind of responsibility toward the future which implies some sort of 
respect for the past. We want, in sum, to avoid the crude choice between 
normative and cognitive attitudes, between conviction and flexibility. I 
want to surprise myself, but I want to recognize that I am doing the sur­
prising; I want to 'learn', but not with every gust of social wind.
It is our tentative claim that this precarious balance of opposing 
values was originally Hellenic. It seems that something of the sort was 
realized in fifth century Athens. It is quite certain that its echoes can
14 7
be heard throughout Aristotle's Politics, especially in the conception of 
the 'polity' as an ideal balance between authority and liberty, oligarchy 
and democracy. According to the Politics, the mean between domination and 
servility, between contempt and envy, is the political reciprocity of 
ruling and being ruled in turn. This requires both a talking and listening, 
a 'synthesis' of piety and reflection. Perhaps its traditional flexibility 
(or flexible tradition) is what distinguishes the Hellenic polis from its 
more stereotyped tribal origins. What the polis shares with all Gemein­
schaften, in any case, is the holistic integration of life into one co­
ordinated system, or at least the ideal of such an integration. For our 
purposes, this is the decisive fact. Aristotle's assertion that the 
subtlest human values can be realized in the society-encompassing system 
of politics has had an unsurpassable impact on political philosophy in the 
West. With the collapse of the Hellenic polis, however, this assertion 
became anachronistic. Of course, a 'trivial fact like this could not stop 
it from inspiring generations doomed to live less integrated lives in less 
integrated worlds.
In Appendix Three we explore the Hellenic background of what may be 
termed 'totalitarian apophrades'. With the help of Vico's 'logic of his­
tory' we hope to show how, improbable as it may seem, the dream of the 
moral polis engendered the totatitarian state.
Many categories with which modem thinkers approach the problem of 
legitimacy are still essentially Hellenic. For this reason they are also 
essentially apophradic. Almost without our noticing it, they have been 
worn out by time. The two theses of classical Greek political philosophy 
which concern us most are (1) that the state can be 'subjectified' as a 
family or 'colloquy', and (2) that the individual can 'realize' himself 
through political participation. Plausible for the polis, both of these 
ideas lead to personal and governmental deformations when applied to highly 
differentiated modern societies. Although they may make sense for a 
Gemeinschaft, they are clearly out of step with the structural realities of 
a Gesellschaft. Still, their continuing influence on (and attractiveness 
for) modern political theory can hardly be denied.
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Verbally, of course, it is possible to defend the 'modernity' of 
Aristotle and Plato. It may even seem decisive that both of them believed 
the source of political legitimacy to lie in 'participation' and 'repre­
sentation'. Yet the prima facie modernity of these ancient ideas is really 
quite deceptive. Each concept (including 'legitimacy' and 'politics' as 
well as 'participation' and 'representation') has specific Hellenic conno­
tations in' the tradition-defining works of Plato and Aristotle. These 
polis-bound connotations, moreover, are quite incongruous with the core 
meanings of politics, participation, representation and legitimacy as they 
developed in eighteenth century democratizing bourgeois contexts. This 
conceptual displacement has caused a lack of focus in the philosophy of 
politics. It is argued that the Vichian category 'apophrades' can help us 
find our way out of this murky situation; for example, it will now be 
possible to show (with Vico's theory of social evolution in the background) 
that the totalitarian schematization of society as a 'whole' made out of 
'parts' is erroneous simply because it depends on the - now apophradic - 
refusal of the Greeks to differentiate between polity and society.
The first two sections of Appendix Three explore some general charac­
teristics of Hellenic social theory while concentrating on (a) the classi­
cal identification of ethics and politics, and (b) the way this identifica­
tion clashes with modern ideas about moral individualism. The third 
section then contains a brief discussion of Plato's 'whole/part' schema­
tization of the polis; the main argument here revolves around the twin 
ideas of homonoia and paideia. In the fourth section we turn to Aristotle's 
much subtler identification of ethics and politics, focussing specifically 
on his concepts of freedom, custom, language and praxis. In the fifth 
section we explore Vico's suggestion that the rise of universalistic norms 
is attended by a dissociation of ethics from politics. Our chief interest 
throughout is to show how these developments are coupled to the structural 
obsolescence of the Hellenic conflation of polity and society.
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PART THREE
HOBBES AND LOCKE
"As traditional moral and political philosophy was, to 
some extent, based on traditional metaphysics, it seemed 
necessary, when traditional metaphysics were replaced by 
modern natural science, to base the new moral and politi­
cal philosophy on the new science. Attempts of this kind 
could never succeed: traditional metaphysics were, to use
the language of Hobbes's successors, 'anthropomorphistic' 
and, therefore, a proper basis for a philosophy of things 
human; modern science, on the other hand, which tried to 
interpret nature by renouncing all 'anthropomorphisms', 
all conception of purpose and perfection, could, therefore, 
to say the least, contribute nothing to the understanding 
of things human, to the foundation of morals and politics."*
Thomas Hobbes is generally regarded as the first 'modern' social con­
tract theorist; that is to say, he is seen as the first notable post- 
Hellenic scholar to explore the parameters of the contract metaphor in the 
course of developing a doctrine of civil obligation. Assuming that we can 
grant Hobbes 'genetic' primacy over such seminal thinkers as Manegold of 
Lautenbach, Marsilius of Padua, and Marius Salamonius, can we automatically 
consider Hobbes to be the first 'contractarian', or, indeed, a 'contracta­
rian' at all? Needless to say, this appears to be an extraordinary ques­
tion of an author whose works are no less than congested with references 
to all manner of contracts, compacts, covenants and bargains. The very 
idea of the social contract seems to be the lynchpin on which the bulk of 
Hobbesian political philosophy is articulated. Yet, as is often the case, 
appearances may be misleading, and, as has been argued by some commentators£ 
Hobbes' so-called contractarianism is in many respects peripheral to his 
treatment of the problem of civility.
On the other hand, there are those, such as Brian Barry, who contend 
that Hobbes' theory of obligation is both an adequate account of civil ob­
ligation and that contractarianism is central to his explication.3 In 
arguing that Hobbes provides a satisfactory contractual solution to the 
problem of civil obligation, Barry focuses on two pertinent questions. 
Firstly, is the social contract central to Hobbes' theory of obligation?; 
and, secondly, does Hobbes, regardless of his use of the social contract,
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offer an adequate account of civil obligation? In order to set the stage 
for a criticism of Barry’s interpretation, we shall survey the three 
principal interpretations offered by Hobbes scholars and the manner in 
which they address these questions.4 All these interpretations concur on 
the superfluousness of the social contract, although they differ on the 
adequacy of the theory itself. Largely in keeping with these interpreta­
tions, it will be argued that Barry's interpretation ultimately comes un­
stuck because of what Hobbes himself says about civil obligation. However, 
before proceeding with a detailed analysis of Hobbe's theory of civil obli­
gation and its contractarian status, we must first place Hobbes in context 
and highlight an aspect of his political philosophy that in many ways pre­
figured contemporary analyses of contractarianism, namely, the atomistic 
implications of Hobbes' nominalism.
The experimental study of nature identified with the Renaissance in 
many ways reflected the widespread adoption of the principal tenets of 
nominalism. The belief in the sole reality of physical particulars and 
its corollary, the disbelief in the 'reality' of universals, were largely 
responsible for the doctrine of philosophic empiricism in which modern 
science historically found its beginnings. According to empiricism, the 
investigator into the nature of reality was no longer allowed to remain at 
his desk and, working only with logical possibility as a basis, record the 
laws of existence. The pendulum had swung to the other extreme; the so- 
called laws of nature were discredited unless it could be shown as a certi­
ficate of validity that they were answerable to physical particulars. No 
preconceived theories were admitted into the examination of "irreducible 
and stubborn facts".5 This movement, which had its flowering with Francis 
Bacon, Kepler, Galileo and Copernicus, was entirely nominalistic.
Copernicus challenged the theologic-anthropomorphic order of the Church by 
overthrowing the conception of a geocentric universe; Bruno paid with his 
life for the right to believe in a cyclical theory of history. Bacon, the 
spokesman for early empiricism, insisted that the deductive method of the 
later scholastics was invalid for science; science, he said, depended upon 
induction and experimentation. But the greatest of these empiricists was 
Galileo who, in dividing sense qualities into subjective and objective 
groups, began the contradiction between scientific theory and practice 
which was to have so long a life and to be the source of so much confusion 
outside physical science.
160
While these developments were taking place in 'natural' philosophy, 
the Church, beset on all sides by the triumph of nominalism, suddenly had 
to counter the challenge of a nominalistic schism within. As mentioned 
earlier, according to the Reformers, the individual is at liberty to com­
mune with God regardless of the intermediation of the Church. Theoretical­
ly, at least, those who believe themselves to be acting in good conscience 
may unite to worship as a group of complete, unbound individuals. Thus 
the Church is a whole greater than the sum of its individual parts, where­
as the Protestant ecclesia is a collection of individuals. By implication, 
if physical particulars alone are real, then they alone can reflect the 
image Dei; the world of physical particulars is ultimate, the historical 
order is to be accepted as the only one, and there can be no justification 
for the imposition of any other order. While the claim of the Reformers to 
the right to abandon the whole baggage of Catholic dogma, ritual and autho­
rity had its 'realistic' side, it arose historically as a nominalistic 
affair.
On all sides, then, it was clear that European man was breaking his 
medieval bonds; on all sides he was being given new freedom, being subjec­
ted to new insecurities, and opening up new vistas to individual accompli­
shment. Yet as an individual he lived among his fellows and shared all 
manner of intangible relations with them. Thus, in the light of the 
intellectual ferment welling up all around, it remained for the problems 
of order and civility to be treated nominalistically. It was the work of 
men like Machiavelli and Hobbes which had the broadest and most lasting 
effect, The Prince and Leviathan, and not the Platonic Utopia of More. 
Machiavelli set himself against such medieval institutions as the Church 
in favour of the new (or, rather, revitalized) institution of the State; 
he was a Ghibelline and not a Guelph. Under the State, considered as a 
convenient fiction rather than a romantic reification, the individual could 
retain the personal authority denied him by the medieval Church. Hobbes, 
of course, carried the emphasis further, employing a contractual metaphor 
to emphasize the uniting of particular interests for the mutual well-being 
of discrete individuals. The State, merely because it is a social instru­
ment and not entirely an affair of individuals, was regarded by Hobbes as 
a necessary evil, so extreme was his nominalism. Both Machiavelli and 
Hobbes were influential, however, precisely because their social philoso­
phies were reflections of the same nominalism which saw the Church weaken-
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ing and the State emerging triumphant.
Hobbes' theory of obligation represents an attempt to fashion a theory 
of prudential reasoning according to which a person's voluntary renuncia­
tion or 'transfer' of a right provides an especially powerful reason for 
acting in a particular way, namely, in accordance with obligations. 
"Hobbes's nominalist theory of the state might be summarized thus," writes 
J.W.N. Watkins,
"a multitude of men becomes a body politic when each of 
them gives to one (or a number) of them the free use of 
his name, so that the sovereign thereby created may, in 
the name of them all, allocate such names as just and 
unjustgood and evil, and cause men, by threat of puni­
shment, to conduct themselves toward each other in 
accordance with the civil principles of justice thereby 
created."6
The conception of obligation that emerges fron Leviathan combines a view of 
morality as structured, mutually-advantageous relations between persons, 
with a view of practical rationality which presupposes no objective values 
or principles, but only the prudential reasoning of acting effectively to 
realize one's ends. Obligations are not derived a priori from the concept 
of practical rationality; only within a civil society and as a consequence 
of the empirical circumstances of civil intercourse do persons have obli­
gations to one another. The individual, as a discrete bundle of interests, 
wants, capacities, and foibles, stands for Hobbes as a Democritean atom in 
a mechanistic world, a world informed by a strinct ontological homogeneity. 
Hobbes may not have sired what C.B. Macpherson has called "the political 
theory of possessive individualism", but perhaps more than any other philo­
sopher before him, with the outstanding exception of Machiavelli, Hobbes 
shattered the harmony of feudal organicism; and in so doing set the intel­
lectual groundwork for the transition from an image of civil society pre­
mised upon a pact of government between estates to a fundamentally mercan­
tilist conception of civility as privity, that is, legally sanctioned 
contractual relations between persons founded in a mutuality of interests.
"(Hobbes') reduction of human beings to self-moving and 
self-directing systems of matter, enabled (and required) 
him to assume that the continued motion of each was equal­
ly necessary. His acceptance of the assumption of the new 
science, that continuous motion did not require the appli-
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cation of continuous outside force, enabled him to dis­
pense with any postulate of moral purpose imposed from 
outside, and to assume that moral values, rights, and 
obligations were entailed in the capacities and needs of 
equally self-moving mechanisms. Since motion is equally 
necessary to each mechanism, and since there is nothing 
else but motion, the only morality there can be must be 
deduced from that motion. Morality is what is most con­
ducive to continued motion. Hence, at a primary and simple 
level, each has a right to its continued motion. And each, 
being a rational, calculating, self-correcting machine, is 
capable of obligating itself to those rules which can be 
shown to be necessary to ensure the maximum chance of con­
tinued motion. Since their motions, if not self-corrected, 
would bring them into continual collision, with resultant 
loss of motion, the correction (i.e. a moral system of ob­
ligation) is necessary as well as possible."7
The atomistic, mechanistic metaphysics underpinning Hobbes' political 
philosophy not only established the groundwork for his own particular 
theory of obligation, but, more importantly, expanded and moulded the 
vocabulary of subsequent political discourse. While in some respects sym­
pathetic with Macpherson's analysis of Hobbes, the following discussion is 
not so much concerned with Hobbes as a rough-hewn prototypical liberal as 
it is with Hobbesian nominalism as a watershed in the "politics of lan­
guage". "This impact was formal and structural rather than substantive", 
remarks Thomas Spragens, "more mythological than logical."
"The model of motion provided a principle of limitation, not 
content, but this contribution was extremely significant.
Strauss is quite correct, however, in pointing out the logi­
cal flaw which Hobbes never escaped - the impossibility of 
finding any human, political content in the model of reality 
which he adopted. This dilemma is one of the characteristic 
impasses of objectivism, and Hobbes resolved it in a manner 
which is also fairly characteristic. He simply resorted to 
his own observations and beliefs about human psychology and 
drew upon them to provide the substance of his model."®
In the following sections the metaphysical setting of Hobbes' politi­
cal philosophy will be explored, leading into a discussion of his theory 
of obligation in particular. It will be argued that in some respects 
Hobbes may be considered to be the first 'modern' political philosopher - 
to Machiavellig goes the distinction of being the first 'modern' political 
'scientist', so-called - and that in many ways his modernity resides in 
his atomistic conception of humanity and its civil expression. The true
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import of Hobbes' 'contractarianism' therefore does not lie in the faith­
ful expression of a particular doctrine, but in the development of a meta­
phor which, when used in concert with a number of related notions, made 
possible new ways of reasoning about civility and order. Ultimately, these 
new modes of commentary captured the essence of seventeenth century 'indi­
vidualism' - the idea that persons are psychological, civil and biological 
1individuals identifiable as largely self-sufficient clusters of concerns 
and capacities; and that what can truly be said of politics can be reduced 
to statements about individuals. The 'boundaries' or 'limits' of each 
individual and his 'life-spaces' thus serve to locate each atom within its 
molecular environment, as it were, and thereby establish possible realms of 
interaction. Contractual relations, according to this scheme, are explicit 
statements of genuine (or legitimate) limitations. Individual limitations 
in effect represent the limitations of human powers. Our psychological, 
physical and spatio-temporal limitations determine and prefigure our poli­
tical limitations and modes of cooperation. In this sense, the idea of 
'limit' - or articulation and definition - means a sense of end; not, that 
is, an end to the search for knowledge, but an end to the qualities that 
are to be explored in an attempt to fully know a subject. The basic issue 
with respect to the limit is not what is known, but what is knowable about 
something; conversely, that which is unlimited is not merely unknown, but 
is conceptually unknowable. The issue is as much one of concepts as it is 
of states of affairs. The whole logic of the limit, as first expressed in 
the preSocratics and then in Hobbes, is the assumption that a thing can be 
fixed; it is not necessarily a given fix - that is, this one or that, and 
whether man has knowledge thereof - but it is intended to exclude any con­
ceptual calling that evades the function or capacity of fixing the articu­
lation of something. Thus, as with the logical positivists of the twen­
tieth century, the idea of the occult involves not the unknown, but the 
unknowable.
In many respects, man's intrinsic egoism is the crucial issue for 
Hobbes. If, contra possibilitatem, man could function self-sufficiently 
then he would, because dependence on one's fellows is always the least- 
favoured option of true men. So, as it were, the conditions of civility 
grow out of human inadequacies (or limitations) against our own inclina­
tions. The sense of inadequacy, in other words, predisposes us towards 
civil life. The social contract metaphor in Hobbes, therefore, does not
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so much address the problem of civility by way of positing answers to the 
enigmas of obligation and obedience, but, rather, aids in the definition 
of the limits of civility as a reflection of order. That is to say,
Hobbes' principal concern lay with specifying the crucible within which, 
so to speak, the spontaneous reaction of civility would take place, and in 
so doing lend a crypto-scientific air of predictability to civil affairs - 
the physics of public life.
Locke elaborated upon this development of nominalism but in a far more 
subtle fashion, paying attention to the implications of the new outlook 
rather than its mechanics. Moreover, he realized that once the focus and 
meaning of the political is taken to be the materially wilful individual - 
that is, the person -  bounded by the limitations of life-spaces, opportuni­
ties, capacities and motivations, the same logical qualities apply to poli­
tics, and the political individual thus conceived, as apply to atomism and 
the atom. The indivisibility3 uniformity and autonomy of the atom carry 
over into political discourse, rendering politics as a subject a 'fractur­
ed' discipline, having no real being except in constituent individuals.
The individual is seen as the limited particular of the subject, whose 
being consists of certain universal qualities, basically given, which merge 
with circumstantial experience to structure any unique political situation. 
The standard for fising the indivisibility of the political in the person 
is liable to vary from one theory to the next but, in general, it is asso­
ciated with the notion that personality is a cognitively self-aware and 
basically self-serving entity, and is thus the locus for the coalescence of 
the individual will.10 That is, the sequence of circumstances giving rise 
to political phenomena is seen as more or less uni-dimensional, having its 
genesis in the autonomous rationality of the individual, without recourse 
to more fundamental factors (such as, for example, society itself). The 
basic limit implicit in the indivisibility of the individual also gives 
structure to the understanding of political phenomena in that if the indi­
vidual will were not taken for granted - if, that is, the individual will 
were infinitely divisible into finer and finer sub-ordinal parts - the 
whole meaning of politics would be lost in an infinite regress, and no 
definite theory of comprehension and order could evolve. The individual 
and his will, understood in terms of a few externally conceived qualities, 
comprise the fixed unit factor of politics.
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With this common premise between the atomistic inflexion of nominalism 
and political ideas, other correlated points begin to take shape. The 
individual, like the atom, is seen as discrete and autonomous in the con­
text of political affairs; he is fundamentally separate, and this takes the 
shape of disclaiming the natural interrelatedness that would otherwise con­
strue political society as fundamentally whole and organic. Within this 
autonomy, the factor of efficiency or motion becomes the 'rationality' of 
the individual, grounded in a premise of self-interest. The autonomous 
individual, acting basically on his own behalf, reasons his own condition 
and its possibilities, and from there constructs a format and impetus for 
action. The implementation of such action, aggregated with other such 
realizations of action, creates a given political situation, and these to­
gether comprise the whole of the subject of politics. While the concept 
of self-interest is variable, generally formulated to account for the 
grounding of politics in individual wills, the rest of this scheme is basi­
cally atomic in nature. The autonomy of the individual, the discrete 
uniqueness of its impetus and motion, the idea that political phenomena are 
reducible to constituent elements, all conform to the basic scheme of atom­
ism. Additionally, the notion that political man exists in a state of 
autonomous detachment, without any natural links to his fellows means that 
he is in a state of natural freedom, or independence, precisely correlative 
to the notion that atoms exist in a basic void. Thus., the idea that poli­
tical order is an artificial and derivative condition, superimposed upon 
the 'natural' condition of man, is one and the same as the notion that 
atoms in free space engage in combination only in their experiential exis­
tence, and not as a function of natural relatedness.11 It is in these pre­
cise conformities between atomism and the political theory of methodologi­
cal individualism that the claim is made that the Hobbesian and Lockean 
political theories are no more than a development of nominalism.
With the possible exception of Rousseau, no philosopher is more close­
ly identified with the theory of the social contract than John Locke. 
Indeed, Locke's Second Treatise of Government is generally acknowledged to 
be the classic statement of the contractual position. It is much more 
unusual, consequently, to question Locke's credentials as a contractarian 
than it is to suspect Hobbes'. But it is not at all unusual to question 
the success of Locke's attempt to solve the problem of civil obligation. 
Most commentators agree that the social contract metaphor is essential to
166
his theory but the theory itself is unsatisfactory. And many would go 
beyond this to claim that the difficulties and flaws in Locke's argument 
are difficulties and flaws to be encountered in any contract theory. If 
the best statement of the contractarian position is unacceptable, then why 
not reject contractarianism altogether?
If we grant that Locke's theory is unacceptable, three responses can 
be made to this objection. One is to deny that Locke's is the best expo­
sition of contractarianism. This obliges the respondent to point to a 
better one. A second response is to admit that the Second Treatise is the 
best statement of contractarianism there is, but to deny that it is the 
best there can be. This puts the respondent under the burden of doing 
better than Locke. Finally, we may undercut the objection completely by 
denying that the idea of the social contract is essential to Locke's theory. 
This is the course taken in this thesis. Locke, it is argued, offers a 
theory of civil obligation grounded in natural law, not in contract, and 
we may reject (or accept) Locke's argument without rejecting (or accepting) 
the contractarian solution to the problem of civil obligation.
Although it is argued here that both Hobbes and Locke fail to develop 
adequate contractarian theories of obligation, it is not the intention to 
assimilate Locke to Hobbes as some scholars have done12, nor to minimize 
their differences. As political philosophers, Hobbes and Locke certainly 
have much in common; but from the perspective of a study of the social 
contract, their differences outweigh their similarities.
I
The Atomistic Implications of Nominalism
The concept of circumscription is in many ways the most significant 
notion in philosophical atomism. The 'limit' determines the atomic morpho­
logy inasmuch as it demands a fixed and inviolable being to be immanent in 
a divided universal substratum; but it also compels the iron-clad determi­
nism that is associated with motion and the dynamics of atoms. Consequent­
ly, within the theoretical confines of atomism, one is forced to assume a 
kind of fixed, rigid, and inert programme in the situational dynamics of
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the subject, whether it be a chemical molecule or citizen of a state. That 
is, one is forced to assume the explicit absence of such tenets as sponta­
neity, as, for example, in the traditional model of so-called 'rational' 
man as a utility-maximizing efficiency expert. We can see this quite 
clearly in Democritus' theory of psychology, which presumed the mechanical 
interaction of very special kinds of 'soul' or 'mind' atoms - especially 
fine particles which had a remarkable capacity for moving and being moved. 
There was, in his psychological theory, no element of an unknowable human 
factor, and, in fact, no element of free-will. As with Democritus' theory 
of psychology, social theories involving atomistic characterizations - and, 
of course, to the extent that atomism is the controlling premise - human 
spiritual factors become indefinite and meaningless, and the entire under­
standing is given over to only the primitively knowable and the palpable - 
ultimately of matter, void, and motion. The point is that atomism, as a 
paradigm theory of human qualities and/or human dynamics, compels a sense 
of mechanical determinism upon its subject matter. To the extent that we 
may see in the seventeenth century the same kinds of philosophical forces 
at work as underlay the evolution of atomism in the preSocratic tradition, 
we may begin to understand and explain the emerging and increasing quality 
of determinism associated with political thought and civil life, and, of 
course, the accompanying normative perspective on political man - that of 
a primarily materialistic, somewhat insecure stimulus/response mechanism.
Hobbes and the preSocratic tradition shared two rather abstract but 
nevertheless effective philosophical premises. The first of these is the 
claim that the nature of existence is in some sense accounted for in terms 
of a fundamental unity, and that all that is a part of the world, as re­
ported by veritable sense apprehension (in spite of diversity and apparent 
disjunction) is a part of that unity. The second is the casting of the 
nature of the universe in terms that are certain and determinable, accord­
ing to the standards dictated by the quality or capacity of human knowledge 
- in other words, the concern to 'limit' the world, and give it a precision 
that merges with the most fundamental terms of knowledge. It is in the 
very basic nature of these premises that the two distinct philosophies 
develop substantially approximate ontological structures, leading both to 
a doctrine of atomism.
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Because we are discussing two distinct philosophies, we must establish 
the grounds of correlation. The comparison between Hobbes and the pre- 
Socratics involves the former's political theory as against the latters' 
universal ontology. Hobbes' political atoms are the individual wills of 
men in the context of civil life. Civil society and its constituent ele­
ments are isomorphic, according to Hobbes; the compostion of society as a 
cluster of individual wills is, as it were, metaphysically guaranteed.
Thus, the touchstone of the indivisible minima of his theory is the human 
psychology. It is arguable that this factor was underlain by material 
atoms - indeed, Hobbes' construction of psychology was certainly material - 
like, if not altogether materialistic - just as it is arguable that Hobbes' 
theory of the universe was one basically of atomism.*3 But this is not the 
point of the argument. Whatever was the truth about Hobbes' natural philo­
sophy in this respect, his political philosophy, as a result of its meta­
physical matrix, culminated in atomism. Moreover, the fact that an atomi­
stic doctrine was the outcome of Hobbes' political theory was not the 
result of his drawing on a metaphor based upon, say Epicurus or Democritus, 
nor was it an attempt to create a theory of atoms within the scope of poli­
tical phenomena as a result of a pre-concluded philosophy of atomism.
Hobbes' arrival at a theory of political atomism was probably as unantici­
pated as the theory of philosophical atomism had been for the preSocratic 
tradition. It was simply that the logical effect of Hobbes' philosophical 
argument necessitated the evolution of atomism in his political theory. 
Hobbes had enclosed himself in certain (nominalistic) philosophical man­
dates, derived from his methodological and epistemological metaphysics, 
that could lead him nowhere but toward some construction of phenomena that 
conformed in every essential detail to the atomic theory. Indeed, Hobbes' 
writings represent the first significant expression of political atomism in 
the modern western political tradition, and in this he laid down the ground­
work for a paradigm of thought and political action that was to exist and 
pervade up to present times: an image of political man as an indivisible,
autonomous, and homogeneous being, existing in a free void of political 
space and having a motion identical only with his own circumstantial his­
tory and fate.
The theme of unity and 'separateness' is the dominant concern in 
Hobbes' writings. As with the artist who creates recurrent compositions 
and movements in his works, Hobbes plays with this theme on many different
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levels in his discussions of physics, psychology, and politics. It is 
manifest in his method in terms of composition and resolution; it is basic 
to his materialist theory as matter and its manifestations; it is found in 
his theory of psychology in terms of human nature counterpoised against the 
nominal autonomy that characterizes the individual personality; and, most 
importantly, it is manifest in his political theory in terms of individual 
wills14 and the rational basis of civil life. In each of these instances, 
Hobbes is forever moulding his subject in terms of the transcendent and 
singular conjoined with the various and plural. Hobbes was, first and 
foremost, a systems builder. He was concerned with the interrelatedness of 
things: the connection of ideas, the connection of modes of experience, as
well as the conjunction of ideas with modes of experience. That all these 
relationships are resolvable with one another is both the thrust and defi­
nition of Hobbes' philosophy.
To a large extent, Hobbes took for granted the first principles and 
simplest elements of the body politic, and most of the development of his 
political philosophy was a deduction from this axiomatic point forward. He 
was aided somewhat in this by the fact that the elementary components of 
the subject, the political, were already most evident: individual persons
as the 'cellular' constituents of the body politic. It remained for him 
merely to characterize the basic disposition of these fundamental parts - 
the basic principles thereof, as it were - and work deductively forward to 
a correct formulation of civility. Even in this, the task was nearly com­
plete: "Whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when
he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds: he
shall thereby read and know, what are thoughts and passions of all other 
men upon the like occasions."15 This was the evidentiary condition from 
which he worked; consequently, for Hobbes, society, being for the most part 
already 'decomposed', needed only a clarification of its parts and there­
after a compelling demonstration of its right order.
Unity and disunity take their shape in the experience of reason, as 
against the experience of the senses. The essential qualities that unify 
an existentially pluralistic world of entities are apprehended in the ex­
perience of reason, and, apart from the extraordinary care that Hobbes 
takes to attend to the epistemological question, this is precisely the 
theoretical configuration developed by the preSocratic atomists. Hobbes'
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political theory, grounded as it is in his metaphysics, represents the 
contrast between disunity and unity by way of the two dimensions of expe­
rience: on the one hand, it casts the political in terms of the autonomous
individual and the unique perspective held by each such person; on the 
other hand, it views the political in terms of certain commonalities, or 
universals, that bear upon all men and have political relevance. In each 
instance the subject is the same, only the medium for its apprehension and 
understanding have changed. In the context of disunity, each individual 
exists in mental isolation; his thoughts are his own, and even if he wished 
to he could not transfer their precise nature to another. He is, as with 
any 'effect', the aggregate of 'accidents' shaped by the unique conjunction 
of 'antecedent causes'. But as a unity, all men have certain uniform 
qualities that determine their humanity, qualities that, as it were, vector 
the causes of those accidents manifested in each and every individual.
What is evident here is that Hobbes is dealing with two divergent perspec­
tives on the same subject. Admittedly, the medium for each perspective is 
different, and for reasons grounded in the context of the times in which he 
wrote, he was apt to stress one perspective over the other; but, in the 
final analysis, the premier consideration of Hobbes' political theory is 
the 'existential' perspective as against the 'essential': the psychologi­
cally unique individual rather than ubiquitous human nature.
The presentation of unity and separateness in Hobbes was initially 
what compelled a form of political atomism in his doctrine. His basic 
depiction of the civil condition as a unity - not to be confused with the 
theoretical dynamics which led him to culminate civility in a singularized 
sovereign - resided in the universal qualities that he attributed to all 
men, and which warranted the establishment of political authority. On the 
other hand, the civil condition as 'separateness', as variety and plurality, 
was to be found in the several and diverse psychological particulars that 
each physical individual represented. In other words, Hobbes, like the 
preSocratics, devised a split in the phenomenology of his subject between 
its essential presence, and thus a unity, and its existential presence: a 
recognition of plurality and variety. He needed, above all, an organizing 
principle to, first, draw together the strands of his conception of the 
political, and, second, to place in a common matrix the individuals consti­
tutive of the civil condition. On the other hand, his theory had to account 
for the circumstances of civil strife. Hobbes' doctrine of civility, then,
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had to reconcile those universals characteristic of formal, 'political man' 
with the disunited, existential particularity of each political being; and 
only a form of political atomism could consistently portray the diverse and 
plural circumstances of civil life.16
Yet, atomism represented the culmination not merely of the goal of 
unity and an accounting of separateness, but also a conception of the world 
as a limited entity; that somehow, amid a process of division there was 
some basis for focussing on a specific unity, settling on a fixed point of 
being. Hobbes characterized his world, and perception and reflection there­
upon, in terms that incorporated a sense of the 'end of the qualities and 
magnitudes' of things. He was constantly mindful that the limit of his 
subject was the confinement in which he must move, in natural, social, or 
political arenas. The attempt to limit the subject and the particulars of 
civility added yet greater momentum to the drive towards atomism. Moreover, 
this had implications far beyond the mere articulation of the parts of the 
political whole - the descriptive quality of civility penetrated the pre­
scriptive nature of Hobbes' doctrine, carrying with it the notion of the 
limit, with all the undertones of theoretical precision and absolute de­
terminism embedded in the basic inertness of the subject. Political theory 
was, for Hobbes, not a detached and independent enterprise such as we might 
consider it today, especially under the burden of a 'value-neutral' sense 
of the term. Rather, it was an involved activity, incorporating the realms 
of reason and experience. Hobbes knew full well that thought and action 
are inseparable in man: "For the actions of men proceed from their opin­
ions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing 
of men's actions, in order to their peace, and concord".17 Hobbes recog­
nized that civil philosophy, like geometry, and unlike physics, is a 
created kind of enterprise. That is, whereas physics entails the factual 
foregoneness of the subject, the presence of a civil philosophy is one and 
the same as the apprehension of it: "The matter thereof, and the artificer;
both of which is man."18 Like geometry, which is also, as it were, the 
created apprehension of a subject, civil philosophy is the product of man: 
"Geometry therefore is demonstrable, for lines and figures from which we 
reason are drawn and described by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demon­
strable, because we make the commonwealth ourselves."18 Therefore, know­
ledge of the commonwealth is knowledge of ourselves, and our own senses:
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"For the causes of the motions of the mind are known 
not only by ratiocination, but also by the experience of 
everyman that takes the pains to observe those within 
himself. And, therefore, not only they that have attained 
the knowledge of the passions and perturbations of the 
mind, by the synthetical method, and from the very first 
principles of philosophy, may by proceeding in the same way, 
come to the causes and necessity of constituting common­
wealths. "20
Thus, it is not altogether necessary to know from the outside, as one 
knows the things of physics, the nature of the political; man the 'artifi­
cer' need only look within himself - the 'material' of the political - for 
he is the creator of his own condition: "Power be derived from the wills
of men that constitute such power."21 But it was Hobbes' intention to 
cause men to recognize their own status in the whole process, and from this 
to consider the correct manner by which they may manage their station. He 
wanted to construct a treatise that would "well-govern" the ideas of men so 
as to permit them to reason rightly a civil condition:
"The cause, therefore, of civil war is, that men know 
not the causes neither of war nor peace, there being but 
few in the world that have learned those duties which unite 
and keep men in peace, that is to say, that have learned 
the rules of civil life sufficiently. Now, the knowledge 
of these rules is moral philosophy. But why they have not 
learned them, unless for this reason, that none hitherto9 ohave taught them in a clear and exact method."
To Hobbes, reason is an experience23, so that to construct a political 
theory is one and the same as to share with one's listener an event or set 
of circumstances, which will become a part of the individual in much the 
same way that an event or circumstance of sensory experience might become 
part of one. His political theory was nothing less than a purposeful in­
trusion into the affairs and considerations of politics of what he held to 
be the rational 'truth' of the human condition. Hobbes' political theory 
therefore implied the construction of limits on two different levels, the 
acceptance of one kind of limit leading to the motivation for the other. 
First, political theory is a limitation of the thoughts and opinions that 
are associated with political action. For Hobbes, a political theory must 
be more than mere persuasion, it must be an act of teaching. Insofar as 
theory limits the consideration, or knowledge of the terms of a subject, it 
is an experience of reason which shapes the thoughts of men prior to their
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actions. The right reasoning of the civil condition, in Hobbes' view, com­
pels men to limit their activities; and since human perception is shaped by 
experience, participation in the affairs of the commonwealth generates a 
continuous reconstitution of states of mind. The subsequent constitution 
of mind then further motivates men to limit their actions by imposing re­
straints upon themselves, firstly, with regard to respecting the establi­
shed commonwealth, and, secondly, with respect to embracing civil laws:
"But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conserva­
tion of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, 
which we call commonwealth; so also have they made artifi­
cial chains, called civil laws
The thrust of Hobbes' political theory was to take men, in the expe­
rience of reason, from their own parochial perspectives, to an awareness of 
the universal underpinnings of the civil condition, and thence to the rea­
sonable justification of the commonwealth; it was, in other words, a dis­
cursive journey from the existential perspective to the essential, and from 
there to a consideration of the right ordering of civil existence. Initial­
ly , postulates Hobbes, men were autonomous stimulus/response mechanisms, 
each unique in his experiences, which, in turn, gave individual meaning to 
ever-present appetites and aversions. The product of such basic drives 
filtered through the unique history of experiences that located each indi­
vidual in political time and space. Basically, men were viewed as aggre­
gates of politically relevant formal accidents or causes, the effect of 
which was a generalized, fundamentally apolitical individual, that is, a 
largely unintegratable, discrete cluster of experiences and interests. If 
men are not naturally political, argued Hobbes - taking the political to 
entail a sophisticated mutuality of interests - then political union must 
be achieved by some superstructural means. But men are also essentially 
rational beings, capable of perceiving the advantages of cooperative en­
deavour, or, at the very least, collective bargaining in accordance with 
coalitions of common interest. The problem, then, as Hobbes framed it, was 
how to import into the existential panorama an awareness of the politically- 
relevant basic causes in man, and from this develop the rational, if eclec­
tic synthesis of a "well-governed" civil condition. Man becomes, as it 
were, a self-created political organism: civilization, therefore, is a
product of civility, not its precursor.
174
Hobbes' commitment, on the one hand, to a certain uniformity and sys­
tematic working of the universe, and, on the other hand, to the absolute 
validity and veracity - not merely of the senses, but of the taxonomy of 
the human apprehension of existence - led him to split the phenomenaliza- 
tion of the universe in terms of the two dimensions of knowledge and expe­
rience: the function of reason and the experience of the senses. His sub­
ject had a manifest diffusion in terms of its actual existence, reported 
and known by the senses, and it had a fundamental wholeness and unity in 
the essential constituents of the universe, and in their interaction in the 
milieu of cause and effect. But while these defined the theoretical ten­
dencies leading to atomism, they did not provide the system with the neces­
sary structure for articulation and permanence in the philosophical sense. 
What was required was a certainty and clarity of the subject, not now as 
theoretical forces, but as a thing or things of existence and being.
Hobbes achieved this by ascertaining the epistemological terms of human 
awareness and preconception, and building a theoretical model of the uni­
verse strictly confined to these terms. Such terms provided the format for 
the existence of things in the world, no more, no less, rendering all that 
is the case comprehensible to human awareness; and each of these terms con­
veys a sense of the termination of the qualities and magnitudes that des­
cribe each thing of the universe, so that such things, each alone, are sub­
ject to a limit and articulation. Thus the tendencies of unity and sepa­
rateness have an objective station in the finite and limited terms of 
Hobbesian epistemology, whether as existence or as essence in reason: 
things are either bodies (as matter) and their motions, or they are names, 
subject to the strict delimitation of definitions.
With these factors Hobbes was prepared to fashion a model of political 
being. His task was to arrive at a limited unity, as it were - limited in 
the sense of the terms of the world (epistemology), and thus the world it­
self (mechanical determinism), and thereby limited in the sense of the civil 
condition (politics); leading to a unity resident in reason, culminating in 
covenantical relationships, and hence an existential unity. While, as 
Hobbes tells us in De Cive, he was interrupted in the progress of this 
ambition, he was not deterred from the logic it spelled: his doctrine was 
in three stages, and each stage flowed into its successor. Hobbes was one 
who preferred the synthetic side of the resolutive/composite method. For 
the most part, he was not the analyst that, for example, Galileo was, and
175
his words are a directed demonstration, motivated by the ends to which they 
were deductively paced, and not the more-or-less autobiographical report of 
a detached enquirer. The starting point for Hobbes is man himself, as a 
wilful individual. The fact that Hobbes' political atoms are themselves 
patently visible does not mean that Hobbes sidestepped the question of dis­
creteness. On the contrary, it merely becomes more apparent in the compo 
tive function, the putting together of already divided parts. In fact, 
Leviathan itself is the product of synthesis. Hobbes' political atom - 
wilful man - is an autonomous entity, contained by the material body that 
also incorporates the materiality of mind, so that psychological life is 
localized to the experience of the individual, autonomous person. Here, 
then, is the limit, substantiating the whole in the being of the particular. 
Thus the political for Hobbes, being divided and limited, began to take 
atomic shape.
If the individual is limited to the confines of his own experience, he 
is also limited in another direction: the 'corporate individual', and the
entire psychological process from sense to endeavour, as an individuated 
whole, is the only unit that can be meaningful to Hobbes' sense of 'poli­
tics'. To delve beneath this point in the analysis of the political is to 
disrupt the integrity of the only relevant particular of the political 
whole: the 'output', as it were, of the chain of dynamics that constitute 
the individual psychology, namely, individual wilt. The individual as a 
nexus is the precise composite of all the factors and forces that lend him 
individuality (or idiosyncracy). To the extent that the individual is a 
reflection of various public phenomena, such as language and conduct inter 
homines, his individuality is bounded, or limited, by its possible modes of 
expression. The individual is, in a way, bifurcated: he is the 'patient',
who receives the forces and motions of other bodies as agents; likewise, he 
is the agent who through his own body, affects other bodies in the universe. 
The factor of human psychology sits squarely between these two extremes 
such that it is difficult to determine the relative loci of the psychologi­
cal individual and the corporeal person. That is, in one sense, the corpo­
real person is the product, or effect, of psychology: all endeavour is in­
tended to serve ego-centric interests.
The whole dilemma of civil life was, for Hobbes, the interplay of 
unity and separateness. While possessing common mental attributes,(an
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essential psychological unity), men perceive the world in various and 
vastly different ways which, nevertheless, in the narrow confines of civil 
intercourse, paradoxically result in fairly uniform behaviour - competi­
tion: the common pursuit of limited resources to be differentially applied
to mutually exclusive ends. To the extent that the self is the basic in­
gredient of politics, so the object of the self - the individual person - 
is the indivisible limit of politics. In both the passions of man and his 
reasoning ability lies the heart of the theme of unity and separateness, 
typified by the phrase "all men are different, alike". All men manifest 
differences based on a common human nature, and bear an essential simila­
rity in the qualities by which these differences are determined; each man 
is a distinct and categorically separate entity, having a disposition of 
mind and an array of life experiences that are all his own. Yet, there is 
a unity of essence, derived from an undergirding commonality that lends 
each individual a sense of wholeness that transcends mere corporeal integ­
rity: a sense of autonomy founded in shared forms of life. Although
Hobbes' political individual is truly psychologically autonomous, the social 
setting in which an individual finds himself will greatly narrow the range 
of possible alternative solutions to any given problem. Mere sociability 
is itself a confining and complex situation, permitting only a narrow range 
of action. Indeed, when considered in terms of the scope of human action 
afforded by man's "natural setting", the only 'solution' is the maintenance 
of the commonwealth, and this is Hobbes' point. Men reach a common conclu­
sion with regard to their political situation through an appreciation of a 
common experiential and, as it were, environmental feature: society itself.
II
Leviathan and Obligation
Hobbes' version of the social contract, and particularly his argument 
for the institution of a commonwealth, begins by describing the world of 
men devoid of government. There would be no rules, since there would be 
nobody with the decisional power to make them. In this respect, at least, 
all men would be perfectly free. But, far from being an agreeable condi­
tion, it would be the worst imaginable. There has never been enough food 
or other resources to satisfy everyone's needs; there has always been com-
177
petition for what there is, though, in more 'civilized' circumstances, this 
competition has been limited by the power of government. The ideal typical 
state of nature, then, according to Hobbes, is characterized by unrestrain­
ed competition, not for the amenities of 'civilized' life, but for the very 
means of subsistence. Each man could rely only upon his own strength and 
cunning to secure the necessities of life; there would be nobody to whom he 
might appeal to protect his person or property or to punish those who in­
vade his personal territory. Yet, this is not the worst of it. Not only 
would un-civilized man have to be watchful and defensive, he would have to 
launch preemptive strikes against others as well, even when they pose no 
immediate threat to his welfare. Simply, the best way to provide for fu­
ture defense is to attack at the most propitious moment, irrespective of 
immediate justifications. The subjection of others, in other words, would 
be necessary to guarantee one's own security.
No reasonable person would want to live in this fearful and unstable 
condition and so, Hobbes argues, reasonable persons seek to establish or, 
properly speaking, enhance the institution of government. (It is easy to 
slip into the 'false chronology' of the 'state of nature' metaphor and take 
it literally as a piece of historical reconstruction. Hobbes' point is not 
so much that government arose out of a state of nature in response to the 
concerns of reasonable men, but that reasonable men in civilized circum­
stances - i.e. in a civil condition - must be aware of the fragile veneer 
of civility that separates them from the heart of darkness resident deep 
within us all. In many respects, Hobbes' uncompromising call for reflec­
tion upon human nature and its civil expression parallels Freud's recogni­
tion of the multi-tiered construction of human personality.) Each indivi­
dual, then, once aware of the precipitous and finely-balanced position of 
his civility, acknowledges the transfer of his 'right' to the use of force 
to one man or body of men, who has the sole authority to make laws or issue 
commands, and to punish disobedience. Each must, at least notionally, give 
up the use of force to secure his interests and to settle conflicts. Each 
must accept the principle of arbitration, the principle that conflicts are 
to be settled peacefully by appeal to a third party, and each must agree 
that he is under an obligation, bound by all of the decisions and decrees 
of the 'sovereign'. If each surrenders his 'natural right' to do as he 
sees fit and submits to the sovereign, then all will benefit. There will 
be peace, order, and security where otherwise there would be war, chaos,
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and continual fear. Cooperation for mutual benefit can replace the unre­
strained competition of the state of nature.
The benefits derived from civil organization are obviously of the 
greatest importance to Hobbes. Some governments may offer greater benefits 
than others, but vitually all of them provide the fundamental benefits of 
order and protection. Some writers have based an obligation to obey the 
law directly upon the gratitude due for the receipt of such benefits. A 
tacit consent to the laws of Athens is not the only basis of civil obliga­
tion mentioned in the Cvito. Socrates personifies the laws and imagines 
them holding him to account for the benefits they have bestowed upon him. 
"We have brought you into the world and reared you and educated you, and 
given you and your fellow-citizens a share in the good things at our dispo­
sal .... "25 Socrates obviously agrees and is grateful for all the bene­
fits of his Athenian citizenship. Other more recent thinkers have sugges­
ted similar theories of civil obligation. W. D. Ross follows Socrates in 
combining these two lines of argument:
" ... the duty of obeying the laws of one's country 
arises partly ... from the duty of gratitude for the 
benefits one has received from it; partly from the 
implicit promise to obey which seems to be involved 
in permanent residence in a country.... "26
While explicitly rejecting the Hobbesian social contract, J. S. Mill 
nevertheless accepts a version of the benefits argument:
"Though society is not founded on a contract, and 
though no good purpose is answered by inventing- a 
contract in order to deduce social obligations from 
it, everyone who receives the protection of society 
owes a return for the benefit .... "27
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument, it loses its plausi­
bility once we construe the obligation to obey the laws of some government 
as an obligation owed to that government for the benefits it has bestowed 
upon us. In the first place, obligations deriving from benefactions are 
typically uncertain and ill-defined. There is usually no specific act or 
line of action that is owed, and one is frequently unsure whether there is 
'some obligation' or no obligation at all. This basis of obligation seems 
on the face of it ill-suited to carry the burden of such a precise and im-
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portant obligation as an obligation to obey the law.
This defect appears more clearly when one reflects upon the varied 
reasons a government might have for conferring some of its benefits upon 
its subjects. It is sometimes out of a genuine regard for their welfare, 
but it is frequently the result of less benevolent motives. If a govern­
ment confers benefits upon its subjects in order, let us say, to secure 
its ill-gotten power, it is at least questionable whether such a benefac­
tion would call for repayment. A rather lengthy case-by-case examination 
would seem to be necessary to establish whether benefactions place the 
citizenry under an obligation, considering such things as the nature of 
the benefits, whether they are 'standard' or 'extraordinary', their under­
pinning motives, and so on. Moreover, in a modern democracy the govern­
ment of the day is to a large extent dependent on the 'good will' of its 
electorate and interest groups, resulting in the distribution of benefits 
in order to secure approval or votes. The argument for gratitude falls 
away in direct proportion to the efforts of politicians to ingratiate 
themselves with their public. But apart from such an examination, it is 
not obvious that obedience to all the laws of the state would in any event 
be the appropriate way to discharge such an obligation. M.B.E. Smith 
contends that, on the contrary,
"... it is clear that the mere fact that a person has 
conferred on me even the most momentous benefits does not 
establish his right to dictate all of my behaviour; nor 
does it establish that I always have an obligation to 
consider his wishes when I am deciding what I shall do.
If, then, we haVe a prima facie obligation to act grate­
fully towards government, ... (this) surely does not 
establish that we have a prima facie obligation to obey 
the law."28
The idea that one has an obligation to the government to obey its 
laws rests upon a mistaken conception of the nature and role of government. 
It is erroneous to regard a government as an entity in its own right which 
trades off tit-for-tat with its subjects, benefits for obedience. The para­
dox is that the gratitude argument presupposes a personification of the 
state, an altogether illicit anthropomorphism. We need not feel beholden 
to our government for the goods and services that it provides, for the 
government is not a separate party with legitimate interests of its own to 
sacrifice on our behalf. Rather, it is an organ of the larger society
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whose interests it exists to serve. The goods it bestows upon us are our 
goods. Indeed, this conception of the status of government was one of the 
great advances in political thought arising out of the social contractarian 
reaction to the medieval pact of government. The whole thrust of the con­
tract metaphor is towards individuals combining in order to enhance their 
mutual well-being - the material expression of which is government and 
regulated civil intercourse - not, as with the feudal metaphor of civility, 
an organic relationship between three distinct and coeval entities: sove­
reign, church, and citizenry.
It is true, of course, that the individuals who hold office in a govern­
ment have their own interests, and that they may use their positions of 
power to serve those interests. They may confer special benefits upon some 
citizens and thereby place them under an obligation to reciprocate. On the 
other hand, a citizen or group of citizens may place members of parliament 
under an obligation by conferring 'benefits' upon them. We are all too 
painfully aware of such favours and pay-offs in government, and we also 
know full well that it has nothing to do with an obligation to obey the 
law.
There is nothing in Leviathan which indicates that civil obligation is 
premised upon gratitude for the benefits of government. It is a matter of 
considerable debate, however, just what Hobbes' view is. He begins with 
the notion of a law of nature, which is "a precept or general rule, found 
out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive 
of his life or take away the means of preserving the same and to omit that 
by which he thinks it may best be preserved".33 The first and fundamental 
law of nature instructs men to seek peace as a means to their own preserva­
tion. From this first law of nature is derived the second: "that a man
be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defense 
of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all things, 
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow 
other men against himself."30 The mutual transference of this right of 
nature to a sovereign constitutes, for Hobbes, the social contract, and as 
a result of the agreement each becomes bound to obey the commands of the 
sovereign.
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One of the fundamental issues in interpreting Hobbes is whether the 
obligation to obey the sovereign derives directly from the mutual agree­
ment, or whether (to use the language of Part I) this is merely a conven­
tional obligation which needs in turn to be grounded in a further obliga­
tion to keep one's commitments. Stuart M. Brown, Jr. maintains that 
"Hobbes never doubts the general validity of covenants and thus never 
requires any guarantee of their obligatory character."3* J. R. Pennock 
claims to the contrary that the notion of a covenant "...must imply an 
obligation independent of, and prior to the covenants".32 This obligation 
would be supplied by the third law of nature, "that men perform their cove­
nants made".33 Hobbes speaks of the laws of nature obliging men even in a 
state of nature, and he adds that "...the true doctrine of the laws of 
nature is the true moral philosophy."3Lf
Now, this is an important issue only if there is such a thing as a 
social contract. Certainly, Hobbes does not believe that at some time in 
the remote past everybody came together and concluded such an agreement.
He does seem to think, though, that civil obligation derives from some 
kind of commitment. "The way by which a man ... transfers his right is a 
declaration or signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign...."35 
If one has not made an express commitment to obey, then one's obligation 
must be inferred from some other act, "...there being no obligation on any 
man which ariseth not from some act of his own."36
We have discussed, in part, the difficulties surrounding any theory of 
tacit commitment, and Hobbes does not escape them. He speaks in a diffi­
cult passage of obligation being derived from submission to the sovereign. 
An obligation may be 'inferred' either from express words "...or from the 
intention of him that submitteth himself to his power, which intention is 
to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth... namely the peace 
of the subjects within themselves and their defense against a common 
enemy."37 There is no doubt something interesting and important here, but 
it is not clear just how we are to construct a theory of obligation out of 
it. If it is to be understood as a voluntary commitment (which certainly 
seems to be the way Hobbes intended it to be understood), we have the same 
problem that we have with Locke's theory: obeying the law is just not what
the plain man would regard as voluntarily undertaking a commitment. And if 
'submission' means more than obeying the law, then it is not clear that
everybody has submitted to the sovereign. It may well be that anyone who 
considered the matter would realize that the point of obeying the law is 
to preserve the peace and secure their defense, and that this end is to be 
served in future cases just as surely as it is in the present case, and he 
might think of this as very much like a commitment to obey the law in the 
future; but true as this may be, we still cannot infer anybody's actual 
will or intention from such facts.
That civil obligation derives from the social contract is the most 
obvious, but by no means the only interpretation of Hobbes' views. He also 
speaks of the laws of nature obliging men to seek peace and to preserve it 
once it is achieved. Obeying the law is the way to fulfil this injunction; 
so, one has an obligation to obey the law. Civil obligation may thus be 
based directly upon the laws of nature rather than upon an uncertain agree­
ment. If we accept this interpretation we find ourselves faced with an­
other issue: are the laws of nature generative of obligations because they
are rules of reason or because they are divine commands? One may find sup­
port for both views - indeed, in the same paragraph:
"These dictates of reason men used to call by the name 
of laws, but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or
theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and 
defense of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word 
of him, that by right hath command over other. But yet if 
we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of 
God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they 
properly called laws."38
The correct view here would seem to be that the laws of nature are 
binding upon men in both these ways, but that it is as rules, precepts, or 
theorems of reason that they are of most significance in Hobbes' account of 
civil obligation.38 The contrast between the laws of nature and the laws 
of God is really the contrast between two sources of prescription.
This point, however, raises yet another question: in what respect are
these rules rationally binding - as moral rules or as rules for the advance­
ment of one's own good? Hobbes refers to the laws of nature, as we have 
seen, as "the true moral philosophy", and he thinks it would always be in 
one's own interest to follow them. This would be inconsistent if it were 
true that "nothing could be called a moral obligation which in principle
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never conflicted with self-interest".140 Howard Warrender argues that the 
laws of nature are moral rules (and so give rise to moral obligations) only 
if they are regarded as commands of God. Otherwise they "...cannot be 
taken to be more than prudential maxims for those who desire their own pre­
servation", in which case "political obligation would turn out like natural 
law to be no more than another prudential maxim. ...,,1+1
But how important is this issue? One may doubt that Hobbes would have 
much cared whether his laws of nature were to be taken as moral or as 
"merely prudential" rules. The important question is whether they provide 
a good reason for obedience. If the theory can be grounded in self- 
interest, if it can appeal to "that reason which dictateth to every man his 
own good"142, then so much the better, "seeing all the voluntary actions of 
men tend to the benefit of themselves, and those actions are most reason­
able, that conduce most to their ends."142 We need not accept a complete 
psychological egoism to agree that this sort of reason would be a good 
reason. Whether it would give rise to a moral obligation is of interest 
but of relative unimportance. Leaving the contract out of the picture, 
then, the argument can be reduced to this: if there is no government there
will be chaos and every man's survival will be in jeopardy. If there is a 
government and if its rules and commands are obeyed, then all will benefit 
by the consequent order and security. It is in every man's interest that 
the law be obeyed; so every man ought to obey the law. This radically con­
densed version of Hobbes' argument (to be amended in the next section) is 
simple and attractive, appealing as it does to the fundamental interest 
which all men presumably have in their own self-preservation. Questions 
could be raised whether this would be a moral obligation, but the more 
interesting question is whether the argument is convincing. Does it supply 
a person properly concerned with his own welfare with a solid reason for 
obeying the law?
There is still room for someone to reply that his survival does not 
really depend on his own obedience, and that he may be better off if he 
does not always obey the law. "It is to my advantage, as it is to every­
one else's advantage, that the law be obeyed in general", the Thrasymachean 
sceptic might reply, "but that does not mean that it must always be to my 
advantage to obey the law. If we were faced with only two possible worlds, 
one in which everybody obeyed the law and one in which nobody did, then
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clearly it would be to my advantage to belong to the first world. But 
there is a third possibility which must be considered: a world in which
everyone obeyed the law except me, and I always act in such a way as to 
maximize my own benefit regardless of whether I break the law or not."41*
Hobbes is aware that this question could be raised. In his discussion 
of the third law of nature, that men perform their covenants made, he 
defines injustice as "the not performance of covenant", so that it would be 
unjust to break the law since that would mean violating the social contract. 
But might it not be to my advantage to do this on occasion?
"The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such 
thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; 
seriously alleging, that every man's conservation, and 
contentment being committed to his own care, there could 
be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought 
conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make or not
make; keep or not keep covenants was not against reason, 
when it conduced to one's benefit."45
Hobbes' reply to the fool is that his "specious reasoning" is false for 
two reasons. The first is that, though breaking covenants might by some 
unforeseen happenstance "turn... to his own benefit", it would be unreason­
able to act on this possibility, since breach of trust "tends to his own 
destruction". The second is that nobody who gets a reputation for such 
things will be "received into any society that unite themselves for peace 
and defense, but by the error of them that receive him."46
Let us look at the first part of the answer. Hobbes may be saying 
either that it is never likely that disobedience will turn out to be to my 
disadvantage, or that even though the chance of success seems good, the 
consequence of failure would be so awful that it is never a reasonable risk 
to take. On either interpretation the argument is not fully convincing.
In the first place, the chance of punishment or other sanctions varies from 
time to time and from place to place, as well as with the nature of the 
illegal act. Nevertheless, if the result of disobedience is, or tends to 
be, one's own destruction, the chance of success would have to be very 
great to "make it reasonable or wisely done". But we must ask in what 
respect disobedience would tend to one's own destruction. There are 
several possible answers. Firstly, one's disobedience may be met with
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severe punishment. This would be a perfectly proper sense in which disobe­
dience would tend to one's destruction. But, as noted, the chance of puni­
shment and its probable severity may vary in a number of ways. It is not 
uncommon for the periodic punishment for a certain activity (such as 
selling untaxed alcoholic beverages) to be only a small drain on its large 
profits. Not all crimes, then, would tend to one's own destruction in this 
straightforward sense.
Secondly, one's disobedience may set an example for others and so tend 
to the destruction of the political order. Since one's preservation is 
dependent upon this order, one's disobedience would thereby tend to self- 
destruction. This argument is more difficult to evaluate, partly because 
we know so little about the effect which one person's disobedience has on 
others. But it seems obvious that a society will put up with some disobe­
dience before it falls apart, and adding one more lawbreaker will not make 
much difference. If it is in this way that disobedience tends to my own 
destruction, then it may seem reasonable to choose the direct and tangible 
benefits I expect from disobedience over the indirect and less obvious 
benefits which come from obedience.
Thirdly, we have already mentioned Hobbes' second reply to the fool, 
and it can be read as complementing his first reply by specifying the 
destruction he has in mind. If he breaks faith with other men he will be 
considered untrustworthy and so will be excluded from the society which 
protects him. Hobbes has a point here, though it seems to be somewhat 
overstated. An untrustworthy person may be watched more closely than 
others, and he may suffer penalties for his acts of bad faith, but only 
rarely would he be expelled from society altogether. Besides, it may be 
possible to avoid detection. Hobbes' argument supplies a good reason for 
keeping an acceptable reputation, but might not a clever enough fool be 
able to keep a public image of integrity, even preaching the virtues of law 
and order, while being prepared to ignore the law when it serves his ends? 
Not everyone could, for one must "have a mind disposed to adapt itself 
according to the wind"1*7, but some people are very good at this.
Fourthly, one must of course run the risk that one's duplicity would 
be discovered, and it might be very difficult to maintain the deception. 
This gives rise to a fourth way in which disobedience might tend toward the
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d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l :  t h e  c o n s t a n t  s w i tc h in g  b a c k - a n d - f o r t h  from
t h e  ' p u b l i c '  t o  th e  ' p r i v a t e '  p e r s o n  and th e  c o n s t a n t  v i g i l a n c e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  keep  e a c h  in  i t s  p r o p e r  p l a c e  c o u ld  be a v e ry  heavy  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
b u rd e n .  The m e n ta l  s t r a i n  c o u ld  be so  g r e a t  t h a t  i t  would t e n d  to w a rd s  
o n e ' s  e v e n t u a l  e m o t io n a l  r u i n . 49  Much d ep en d s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  upon th e  con­
s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  w h e th e r  he would  be c l e v e r  enough and a b l e  t o  
w i t h s t a n d  th e  s t r e s s ,  and i t  i s  t o  be d o u b te d  t h a t  a n y th in g  g e n e r a l  c o u ld  
be s a i d  one way o r  t h e  o t h e r .
L e t  us s t a n d  back  and t a k e  a b r o a d e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  on H obbes ' a rgum en t.  
He i s  n o t  r e a l l y  s a y in g  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  would in  e v e ry  i n s t a n c e  g a in  
from  o b e y in g  th e  law . He i s  a r g u i n g ,  r a t h e r ,  f o r  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  a c e r t a i n  
p r i n c i p l e  t o  govern  o n e ' s  c o n d u c t .  T h is  i s  one r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  lan g u a g e  o f  
commitment and  s u b m is s io n  i s  so  p r o m in e n t  i n  h i s  t h e o r y .  C a l c u l a t i o n  o f  
a d v a n ta g e  on e a c h  o c c a s io n  i s  j u s t  t h e  s o r t  o f  t h i n g  t h a t  i s  r u l e d  o u t  by 
a commitment t o  a c t  in  a c e r t a i n  way. G ra n te d  a l l  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  
t h i n k i n g  o f  c i v i l  o b l i g a t i o n  a s  d e r i v i n g  from  an a c t u a l  com m itm ent, may we 
n o t  t h i n k  o f  Hobbes a s  a r g u in g  t h i s  way: "Though i t  may seem t o  y o u r  s h o r t
te rm  a d v a n ta g e  t o  i g n o r e  th e  demands o f  t h e  c i v i l  o r d e r ,  and th o u g h  i t  
m ig h t  even  be t o  y o u r  s h o r t  t e rm  a d v a n ta g e  on o c c a s io n  to  do s o ,  you w i l l  
be b e t t e r  o f f  i n  th e  lo n g  run  (o r  a t  l e a s t  th e  odds a r e  t h a t  you w i l l )  i f  
you ig n o r e  such  s h o r t  te rm  g a in s  and make i t  a r u l e  a lw ays  t o  obey th e  
l a w ."  Why i s  t h i s  so? F o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  a l r e a d y  e n u m e ra te d ,  H obbes ' ' r u l e -  
p r u d e n t i a l i s m ' : one c a n n o t  be s u r e  o f  e s c a p in g  d e t e c t i o n ,  and  th e  c o n s e ­
q u e n c e s  s h o u ld  n o t  be d i s m is s e d  l i g h t l y :  an i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  no l o n g e r  be
c o n s id e r e d  t r u s t w o r t h y ,  he may be d e p r iv e d  o f  some o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  
c i t i z e n s h i p ,  and he may be c o n s id e r e d  a menace t o  p u b l i c  o r d e r .  F u r t h e r ­
m ore, he w i l l  p r o b a b ly  i n f l u e n c e  o t h e r s  t o  underm ine  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  
i n  w hich he h a s  a s  g r e a t  a s t a k e  a s  anybody e l s e .  One m ust a l s o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t r e s s  in v o lv e d  in  k e e p in g  o n e ' s  a c t u a l  d i s p o s i t i o n s  a 
s e c r e t ,  and  h e r e  so m e th in g  v e ry  much l i k e  a commitment i s  n e c e s s a r y :  a 
p e r s o n  m u s t ,  i n  a s e n s e ,  d e c id e  w ha t  k in d  o f  p e r s o n  he w i l l  b e .  E i t h e r  he 
a c c e p t s  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  a s  b i n d in g  o r  he i s  r e a d y  t o  d i s o b e y  when i t  w i l l  
g a in  him  some im p o r t a n t  a d v a n ta g e .  The man who i s  a  l a w - a b i d e r  i s  j u s t  n o t  
r e a d y  t o  do c e r t a i n  t h i n g s ,  and i f  he i s  t o o  e a s i l y  tem p te d  we s h a l l  say  
t h a t  he was r e a d y  a f t e r  a l l . 49  H obbes ' rem ark  a lo n g  t h i s  l i n e  i s  r a r e l y  
n o t i c e d  by h i s  co m m en ta to rs :  " T h a t  w hich  g i v e s  t o  human a c t i o n s  t h e  r e l i s h
o f  j u s t i c e ,  i s  a c e r t a i n  n o b le n e s s  o r  g a l l a n t n e s s  o f  c o u ra g e ,  r a r e l y  found ,
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by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life, to 
fraud, or breach of promise."50
Each of these lines of argument taken singly could be rejected by a 
tough sceptic, but they are quite powerful in their cumulative effect. It 
would take a high opinion of one's own powers and a low opinion of others 
to think that opportunism would be the best bet for the long run. And 
though disobedience on occasion could well be advantageous, one must con­
sider that it is not just a single act, but a way of life which one is 
choosing. Whether or not one could successfully conduct the kind of double 
life required of the opportunist, it would certainly involve some kind of 
inconsistency.
In what sense is one being inconsistent in granting the desirability 
of general obedience to the law yet being prepared to violate it himself? 
One's behaviour would be inconsistent with one's public professions, but 
this is nothing new, for as we have seen, this may consciously be adopted 
as part of one's strategy. One's policy or principle of action could not 
be made public, but one's behaviour could be consistent with one's policy: 
a person consistently professes obedience in public and consistently cal­
culates his advantage in private. But is there not something inconsistent 
in the policy itself? Is it not inconsistent to will that everybody except 
me should obey the law regardless of his own disadvantage? One would not 
be willing something logically inconsistent - it would be quite possible 
for everyone but me to follow a certain course of action. But I would be 
acting in a different way from the way in which I want and need others to 
act. I would be exempting myself from the general uncalculating obedience 
from which we all benefit. From the Kantian perspective, in the absence of 
some special justifying reason it is wrong of me to make an exception of 
myself. I would be taking unfair advantage of the willingness of others to
obey the law even when it might be to their advantage to break it. Here we
*
have an additional reason of a different sort for obeying the law. It is 
frequently said that Hobbes' line of argument has nothing to do with mora­
lity and that it establishes an obligation only in the broadest sense of 
the term. But if obedience to the law is also a matter of justice or fair­
ness to others, then the obligation to obey would resemble more closely a 
moral obligation in the narrower sense of the term.
188
We would n o t  be d i s t o r t i n g  th e  i d e a  o f  a s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  o u t  o f  a l l  
r e c o g n i t i o n  i f  we i n t e r p r e t e d  i t  m e t a p h o r i c a l l y  a s  making t h i s  k in d  o f  
p o i n t .  Each o f  us o u g h t  t o  behave  a s  i f  he had  a g re e d  w i th  a l l  t h e  r e s t  
t o  obey th e  law  even  when d o in g  so m ig h t  in v o lv e  some s a c r i f i c e .  I t  i s  a s  
i f  e a ch  had  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e s t  b a s e d  upon an e x p l i c i t  a g re e m e n t .
We s h o u ld  t h i n k  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a s  th o u g h  i t  were a j o i n t  v e n tu r e  b a s e d  upon 
a c o n t r a c t  c r e a t i n g  m u tu a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and o b l i g a t i o n s .  The model o f  a 
c o n t r a c t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f i t t i n g  s in c e  i t  a l s o  e x p r e s s e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
c i v i l  s o c i e t y  i s  b e n e f i c i a l  to  t h o s e  who p a r t i c i p a t e  in  i t  -  i t  i s  some­
t h i n g  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  p e r s o n s  who c o n s id e r e d  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  would  v o l u n t a ­
r i l y  a c c e p t  and s u p p o r t .  B u t  we need  n o t  t a k e  th e  m etapho r  l i t e r a l l y  and 
t h i n k  o f  t h e  f i c t i o n a l  c o n t r a c t  a s  t h e  a c t u a l  source o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  
ob ey . Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  h a s  been  s u b m i t te d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways 
and w i th  v a r y i n g  em phas is  by R ousseau , K ant and Rawls, a l l  o f  whom w i l l  be 
d i s c u s s e d  i n  l a t e r  s e c t i o n s .  The p o i n t  h e r e ,  how ever, i s  t h a t  w hat i r k s  
us  m ost in  Hobbes i s  th e  l a c k  o f  commitment t o  m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n  i n  t h e  
n a r r o w e r  s e n se  o f  t h e  t e r m ,  and t h a t  no m a t t e r  how p l e a s i n g  and s e n s i b l e  
h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  c i v i l i t y  may b e ,  o f  i t s e l f  i t  does  n o t  p r o ­
v id e  s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a  g e n u in e ly  m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  obey th e  
law .
I l l
H obbes ' C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m
Most s c h o l a r l y  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Hobbes ' t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  h a s  b een  in  
r e a c t i o n  t o  w ha t  S t u a r t  Brown h a s  c a l l e d  t h e  " t r a d i t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . 51 
A c c o rd in g  t o  t h i s  v iew  -  w hich  c o u n ts  a number o f  a d h e r e n t s 52 -  Hobbes 
a c t u a l l y  h a s  no t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n .  W hile  t h e r e  i s  a good d e a l  o f  d i s ­
a g re e m e n t  o v e r  th e  d e t a i l s ,  t h e s e  com m enta to rs  a g re e  t h a t  w hat Hobbes 
o f f e r s  i n  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  w orks i s  a p r u d e n t i a l  a c c o u n t  o f  why we ought t o  
obey t h e  l a w s ,  n o t  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  why we a r e  u n d e r  an obligation t o  obey 
them . The a rgum en t o f  t h e  e x p o n e n ts  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v iew  i s  s t r a i g h t ­
fo rw a rd .  They b e g in  by t a k i n g  H obbes ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l  ego ism  s e r i o u s l y :  man
i s  a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  c r e a t u r e  c o n c e rn e d  p r i m a r i l y  w i th  s a t i s f y i n g  h i s  own 
d e s i r e s .  They a l s o  t a k e  Hobbes a t  h i s  word when he d e f i n e s  a law o f  n a t u r e  
a s  "a p r e c e p t  o r  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  found  o u t  by r e a s o n ,  by w hich  a man i s  f o r -
189
bidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it 
may be best preserved."53 So regarded, the laws of nature are no more 
than prudential maxims - precepts which carry no moral force, although 
self-interest may 'require1 us to obey them.
As a consequence, the traditionalists claim, Hobbes' third law of 
nature, "that men perform their covenants made", is reduced to the precept, 
"keep your promises when it is in your interests to do so". Hobbes admits 
as much when he declares that "covenants without the sword, are but words, 
and of no strength to secure a man at all".54 We may be compelled to keep 
our promises, but we are never under an obligation to do so. This, of 
course, puts Hobbes in a difficult position. On the one hand, according 
to this reading of Hobbes, he argues that we are under an obligation to 
obey the sovereign because we have covenanted to do so; but on the other 
hand, he tells us that we only need to honour our covenants when we are 
compelled to do so - when, in fact, we are in the civil state. The prob­
lem confronting a literal reading is: how do we enter the civil state if
we cannot contract our way into it? The answer is that we enter the civil 
state when we are forced into it by someone who has the power to command 
our obedience. In the end, it is the sovereign's ability to command obe­
dience, his coercive power, which explains both why we usually do obey and 
why we ought to obey him: to do otherwise would be dangerous and foolish.
This, then, is the traditionalist interpretation. In summary, two 
points need to be emphasized. First, as discussed in the previous section, 
Hobbes tells us why it is prudent to obey the sovereign, not why we have 
an obligation to obey him. As J.W.N. Watkins puts it, Hobbes' "prescrip­
tions are not moral prescriptions - they are more like 'doctor's orders' 
of a peculiarly compelling kind."55 And, secondly, the social contract is 
completely unnecessary to Hobbes' prudential account of obedience.
Another interpretation is that presented by Michael Oakeshott in his 
introduction to Leviathan. 56 Oakeshott agrees with the traditional view 
that the state of nature is a moral vacuum, but he goes on to claim that 
Hobbes does account for one's having an obligation to obey the sovereign 
in the civil state. Oakeshott's exposition of Hobbes' theory of obligation 
centres on a distinction of four separate kinds of obligation. According
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t o  H obbes, O a k e s h o t t  s a y s ,  " to  be obliged i s  t o  be bound , i s  t o  be f o r ­
b id d e n ,  t o  s u f f e r  im p e d im e n t . " 57 From t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  
O a k e s h o t t  t r a c e s  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  w hich  we may be o b l i g e d :  p h y s i ­
c a l l y ,  r a t i o n a l l y ,  m o r a l ly ,  and p o l i t i c a l l y .  P h y s i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  may come 
a b o u t ,  f o r  e x am p le ,  when someone i s  o b l i g e d  to  hand o v e r  h i s  money to  a 
gunman; s i m i l a r l y ,  we a r e  p h y s i c a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  obey th e  law s o f  g r a v i t y .  
Hobbes a l s o  c o n s i d e r s  us  t o  b e ,  a t  t im e s ,  u n d e r  a r a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  a s  
when "a man may be p r e v e n t e d  from w i l l i n g  a c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  b e c a u s e  he p e r ­
c e i v e s  t h a t  i t s  p r o b a b ly  c o n se q u e n c e s  a r e  damaging to  h i m s e l f . " 58 Both  
k in d s  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  -  b u t  t h i s  i s  
a c t u a l l y  t o  s a y  no more t h a n  t h a t  c o e r c io n  and p ru d e n c e  may b o th  e x i s t  in  
a  m ora l  vacuum a s  w e l l  a s  i n  th e  c i v i l  s i t u a t i o n . 59
U n lik e  p h y s i c a l  and r a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  how ever, m ora l  and  p o l i t i c a l  
o b l i g a t i o n  a r e  found  o n ly  i n  th e  c i v i l  s t a t e .  There  i s  r e a s o n  t o  q u e s t i o n  
O a k e s h o t t ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  c o u n t  p o l i t i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  a s  a d i s t i n c t  k in d  o f  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  s im p ly  "a mixed o b l i g a t i o n  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  p h y s i c a l ,  
r a t i o n a l  and m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n " 8 8 , b u t  t h i s  i s  u n im p o r ta n t  h e r e .  Our co n ­
c e rn  i s  w i th  O a k e s h o t t ' s  c l a im  t h a t  Hobbes i n t r o d u c e s  a m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  obey th e  s o v e r e i g n .  Does O a k e s h o t t  e s t a b l i s h  a l i n k  be tw een  th e  s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t  and t h i s  m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n ?  The a n sw e r ,  f o r  two r e a s o n s ,  i s  no .
To b e g in  w i t h ,  we have  O a k e s h o t t ' s  t e s t im o n y  t h a t  " th e  c o v e n a n t  i t s e l f  does 
n o t  c r e a t e  a m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n :  i t  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  m o ra l ly  o b l i g a t o r y  and ,
n o t  b e in g  a law ( th e  w i l l  o f  t h e  S o v e r e i g n ) , i t  does  n o t  i t s e l f  make any 
c o n d u c t  m o r a l ly  o b l i g a t o r y . " 81 Moral o b l i g a t i o n  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by a v o lu n ­
t a r y  a c t  o f  authorization on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h o s e  who a r e  bound , n o t  by c o v e ­
n a n t .  And a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s ,  a s  O a k e s h o t t  s a y s ,  a  r a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  to  
make t h e  c o v e n a n t ,  t h i s  s im p ly  means t h a t  i t  i s  p r u d e n t  t o  do s o .
O a k e s h o t t ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i t  seem s, l e a d s  us to  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  Hobbes 
a c c o u n t s  f o r  o u r  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  obey th e  s o v e r e i g n ,  b u t  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  
i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  h i s  a c c o u n t .
The seco n d  r e a s o n  why O a k e s h o t t  does  n o t  fo rg e  a l i n k  be tw een  th e  
s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  and o b l i g a t i o n  i s  t h a t ,  i f  we a c c e p t  h i s  r e a d i n g  o f  Hobbes, 
H obbes ' t h e o r y  makes no s e n s e .  O a k e s h o t t  s t a t e s  t h a t  " th e  o n ly  s o r t  o f  
a c t i o n  t o  w hich  th e  te rm  m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  i s  o b e d ie n c e  t o  
th e  commands o f  an a u t h o r i t y  a u t h o r i z e d  by t h e  v o l u n t a r y  a c t  o f  him who i s  
b o u n d . " 82 B u t  he im m e d ia te ly  d e c l a r e s  t h a t :  (1) th e  c o v e n a n t  does  n o t
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create this moral obligation; (2) moral obligation is not based on self- 
interest;. (3) moral obligation does not derive from superior power; and 
(4) moral obligation is not rooted in the laws of nature, which are only 
rational precepts until the sovereign commands them. What, we may ask, 
is left? If all these possibilities are ruled out, how did the sovereign 
acquire his authority? How do we even identify the sovereign whose laws 
(or will) we have a moral obligation to obey? Oakeshott tells us that 
"The answer to the question, Why am I morally bound to obey the will of 
this Sovereign? is, Because I have authorized this Sovereign, 'avouched' 
his actions, and 'am bound by my own act'."53 But he fails to show how 
the sovereign is authorized because he has eliminated all the possible 
avenues for such a demonstration. This interpretation, as Warrender has 
pointed out, reduces Hobbes "either to a dogmatic assertion that the citi­
zen is obliged, or to a merely circular argument to the same end."5t+ In 
effect, if not intent, Oakeshott's analysis collapses into the traditional 
interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation.
Oakeshott - and perhaps Hobbes himself - goes astray because he tries 
to elicit moral obligation from a moral vacuum. His difficulty takes this 
form: if there are no moral obligations in the state of nature, then we
are under no obligation to keep promises; we may find it prudent to enter 
into a social contract, or covenant, and to observe its conditions, but 
this does not entail an obligation to do so. Even if a sovereign is 
appointed, and even if he is powerful enough to command obedience, we are 
still not under an obligation to obey him. Put simply, Oakeshott argues 
that Hobbes arrives at moral obligation by adding rational obligation (i.e. 
prudence) to physical obligation (i.e. coercion). It does not sum.
Those who follow the third path of Hobbes interpretation avoid this 
difficulty by refusing to accept the distinction Oakeshott and the tradi­
tionalists draw between the state of nature and the civil state. Thus 
Howard Warrender, who presents the fullest exposition of this third posi­
tion, maintains that Hobbes' theory does provide for moral obligation in 
the state of nature.55 Warrender denies, in other words, that there is a 
moral vacuum in Hobbes' theory.
Warrender's argument rests on his interpretation of Hobbes' use of 
the laws of nature. Contrary to the first two interpretations, Warrender
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b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e s e  law s a r e  more th a n  r a t i o n a l  p r e c e p t s  o r  p r u d e n t i a l  
maxims. As a p r o p o n e n t  o f  t h e  "command th e o r y  o f  la w " ,  W arre n d e r  p o i n t s  
o u t ,  Hobbes can  c a l l  t h e  law s o f  n a t u r e  laws o n ly  i f  t h e y  a r e  commanded 
by a s o v e r e ig n  who h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  command -  w hich in  th e  c a s e  o f  n a t u r e  
m ust be God. T h i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  seems t o  be j u s t  w hat Hobbes d o e s . 66 The 
law s o f  n a t u r e  a r e  t h e  commands o f  God a n d ,  a s  H is  s u b j e c t s ,  we a r e  u n d e r  
an o b l i g a t i o n  to  obey them . From th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  a s tu d y  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  m ost s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  W arren d er  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  th e  
c o n t r a c t  o r  c o v e n a n t  i s  n o t  t h e  ground  o f  o b l i g a t i o n :  r a t h e r  th a n  c r e a t e
an o b l i g a t i o n  to  a  s o v e r e i g n ,  c o v e n a n ts  th e m s e lv e s  a r e  o b l i g a t o r y  o n ly  
b e c a u s e  we a r e  commanded to  keep  them by God i n  th e  t h i r d  law  o f  n a t u r e .
I n  W a r r e n d e r 's  w o rd s ,  "The im m edia te  answ er th e n  to  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  why I  
s h o u ld  keep  v a l i d  c o v e n a n t s ,  i s  t h a t  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n a t u r a l  law and a 
commandment o f  God -  a p l a c e  t h a t  i t  m ust s h a r e  w i th  a number o f  o t h e r  
law s  o f  n a t u r e . " 67 W arren d er  goes  on to  c la im  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  
p l a y s  an i m p o r t a n t ,  i f  s u b o r d i n a t e ,  r o l e  i n  H obbes ' t h e o r y  by d e te r m i n in g  
o r  f i x i n g  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n ts  o f  t h e  law s o f  
n a t u r e .  The law s o f  n a t u r e  a r e  b o th  h i g h l y  fo rm a l  and r e m a rk a b ly  vague : 
t h e y  p l a c e  u s  u n d e r  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  s e ek  p e a c e ,  to  g iv e  up t h e  r i g h t s  o f  
n a t u r e  where o t h e r s  w i l l  do l i k e w i s e ,  t o  k eep  c o v e n a n t s ,  and so  on . But 
when, w h e re ,  and how a r e  we t o  obey t h e s e  law s?  A c c o rd in g  t o  W a rre n d e r ,  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a n a lo g o u s  t o  t h a t  o f  a u to m o b i le  d r i v e r s :  we a l l  know
t h a t ,  a s  a m a t t e r  o f  s a f e t y ,  we m ust d r i v e  on th e  same s i d e  o f  t h e  r o a d ,  
b u t  w hich s i d e  i s  t h i s ?  I t  i s  th e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t ,  on W a r r e n d e r 's  a c c o u n t ,  
w hich  s u p p l i e s  t h e  answ er to  q u e s t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  f o r  i t  f ix e s  o u r  o b l i ­
g a t i o n s  even though  i t  d o e s  n o t  create them . As W arrender  s a y s ,
"Even i f  t h e  law  o f  n a t u r e  e n j o i n i n g  us t o  seek  p e a c e  
t h e r e f o r e  i m p l i e s . . .  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  
r e a s o n  c a n n o t  i n d i c a t e  w hich  p e r s o n  o r  p e r s o n s  we s h o u ld  
ob ey , and th e  d e t e r m i n a t e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  obey a man o r  
g roup  o f  men a s  s o v e r e i g n  r e q u i r e s  an a g re e m e n t  t o  r e c o g ­
n i z e  a p a r t i c u l a r  man o r  g roup  f o r  t h i s  o f f i c e .  Thus i n  
v i r t u e  o f  t h e  e q u a l i t y  o f  men, an o b l i g a t i o n  from  one man 
t o  obey  t h e  commands o f  a n o t h e r ,  a lw ays  depends  upon h i s  
c o v e n a n t . " 66
B u t even  w i th  t h i s  s u b o r d i n a t e  r o l e  i t  r e m a in s  t r u e  f o r  W a r re n d e r ,  a s  f o r  
O a k e s h o t t  and th e  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s ,  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  do es  n o t  e s t a b ­
l i s h  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  obey t h e  s o v e r e i g n .
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W a r r e n d e r 's  v e r s i o n  o f  H obbes ' t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  r e s e m b le s  
O a k e s h o t t ' s  i n  t h a t  b o th  a c c e p t  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  H obbes ' a c c o u n t  o f  
o b l i g a t i o n  i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  b u t  t h e  d e v ic e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  does n o t  
s e r v e  as  t h e  g round  o f  o b l i g a t i o n .  Y e t  a g a in  we must r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  
i s  W a r r e n d e r 's  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  Hobbes a c c e p t a b l e ?  T h is  h a s  been  th e  s u b j e c t  
o f  a good d e a l  o f  c o n t e n t i o n ,  and i t  would t a k e  us to o  f a r  a f i e l d  to  a t t e m p t  
a f u l l  answ er  h e r e ;  b u t  t h e  e v id e n c e  w eighs  a g a i n s t  W a r r e n d e r . W hile 
t h e r e  a r e  some p a s s a g e s  i n  H obbes ' w r i t i n g s  w hich may s u p p o r t  W a r r e n d e r 's  
t h e s i s ,  i t  s t i l l  seems t h a t  W a r r e n d e r 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  law s o f  
n a t u r e  r u n s  c o u n te r  n o t  o n ly  t o  H obbes ' d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h o s e  l a w s ,  b u t  t o  
th e  whole sweep o f  H obbes ' a rg u m e n t . 70 W a r r e n d e r 's  a c c o u n t ,  i n  th e  en d ,  
i s  once a g a in  l i k e  O a k e s h o t t ' s .
We come, f i n a l l y ,  t o  B r ia n  B a r r y ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  B a r r y ' s  p o s i t i o n  
i s  t h e  m ost c h a l l e n g i n g  b e c a u s e  h i s  r e a d i n g  o f  Hobbes s t a n d s  somewhere b e ­
tween th e  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  and W a rre n d e r :  he p r o m is e s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  an e x p l i ­
c a t i o n  w hich  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  H obbes ' t h e o r y  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
and w hich a l s o  manages t o  a v o id  W a r r e n d e r 's  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I s  t h i s  p ro m ise  
f u l f i l l e d ?  We s h a l l  have  t o  lo o k  c l o s e l y  a t  h i s  a rgum en t t o  f i n d  o u t .
B a r ry  o u t l i n e s  f i v e  t h e s e s  w hich  a r e  p u t  fo rw ard  by W a rre n d er  and 
r e j e c t e d  by W a r r e n d e r 's  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  c r i t i c s .  These t h e s e s  a r e :
" (a )  t h e r e  can be o b l i g a t i o n  in  th e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ;
(b) no new k in d  o f  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  added  when th e  s t a t e  
i s  form ed;
(c) th e  law s o f  n a t u r e  do n o t  r e s t  on s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
e i t h e r  f o r  t h e i r  d e m o n s t r a t io n  o r  f o r  t h e i r  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ;
(d) t h e  law s o f  n a t u r e  a r e  o b l i g a t o r y  i n  th e  s t a t e  o f  
n a t u r e  and a fo r t io r i  u n d e r  a s o v e r e ig n ;  and;
(e) t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  keep  th e  c o v e n a n t  w hich  e s t a b ­
l i s h e s  a s o v e r e i g n  (o r  any o t h e r  co v en an t)  depends  
o n ,  and i s  m e re ly  a s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f ,  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  
to  obey t h e  law s o f  n a t u r e . " 71
B oth  W arren d er  and h i s  c r i t i c s ,  a s  B a r ry  p o i n t  o u t ,  r e g a r d  t h e s e  a s  l o g i ­
c a l l y  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  c l a i m s ,  t o  be a c c e p te d  o r  r e j e c t e d  in  to to . B u t  B a r ry  
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  (a) and (b) a r e  l o g i c a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  o t h e r s ,  w hich 
l e a v e s  him i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  a c c e p t  W a r r e n d e r 's  c la im s  a b o u t  o b l i g a t i o n  in  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  -  (a) and (b) -  and to  d i s m i s s ,  w i th  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a ­
l i s t s ,  W a r r e n d e r 's  c la im s  t h a t  t h e  law s o f  n a t u r e  a r e  o b l i g a t o r y  b e c a u s e
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they are the commands of God - (c), (d) , and (e).
According to Barry, then, Hobbes' laws of nature are precepts of 
reason, not divine commands, and the state of nature is not a moral vacuum. 
But if this is the case, how does Hobbes account for obligation in the 
state of nature? Barry's answer is surprisingly simple. He turns to 
Hobbes' definition of obligation in Leviathan:
"Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it; 
or by transferring it to another.... And when a man hath 
in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; 
then he is said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder 
those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from 
the benefit of it...."72
He then applies this to the state of nature. After all, the definition 
does not specify that the transfer of a right from one party to another in 
the state of nature does not generate obligations or bind the parties 
involved. But this is not enough, of course, to rebut the traditional 
objections to Hobbes' theory, for it is not how Hobbes defines obligation, 
but how he uses the concept, which presents problems. No matter what 
Hobbes says in his definition, we must still deal with such declarations 
as "the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a 
civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them...."73
Again, however, Barry is prepared to reconcile seemingly contradictory 
positions. This time he argues that, although many promises, contracts and 
covenants made in the state of nature may, according to Hobbes, be invalid, 
others are obligatory even when there is no threatening sovereign's sword. 
Specifically, Barry holds that when two parties have covenanted with each 
other - a covenant in Hobbes' theory is a contract to perform at some time 
in the future - and one party has already performed his part, the second 
party is obliged, even in the state of nature, to meet his end of the bar­
gain :
"Hobbes is quite explicit about this - in these cir­
cumstances the second party is obliged to do his part, 
too. Covenants are binding, he tells us, 'either where 
one of the parties has performed already; or where there 
is a power to make him perform'. The absence of a common 
power is, of course, a defining characteristic of the 
state of nature; thus Hobbes is saying here that even in
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the state of nature there is an obligation to perform 
your side of a covenant if the other party has already 
performed his."7t+
As an example, Barry cites the following passages from Leviathan:
"if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for life, to 
an enemy; I am bound to it: for it is a contract, wherein
one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive 
money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other 
law, as in the condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the 
performance, the covenant (i.e. the promise to pay) is 
valid."75
This means, Barry says, that "(o)nce the enemy has released me, I can 
obviously no longer plead mistrust of his good faith, and this would be 
the only acceptable excuse for not carrying out my part of the bargain.
I am therefore obliged to do so."76
Even on this reading it must be admitted that many, perhaps most, 
contracts are not obligatory in the state of nature. When two parties in 
"the condition of mere nature" enter into a contract which requires that 
both perform some action in the future - what Hobbes calls a "covenant of 
mutual trust"77 - neither party is obliged to perform, "for he that per- 
formeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after; because the 
bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and 
other passions, without the fear of some coercive power...."78 And this 
insecurity or ineffectiveness of contracts is one of the major reasons for 
abandoning the state of nature for civil society. But this also provokes 
one of the major objections to Hobbes' account of obligation: how is it
that coercive power provides for obligation where none existed before?
Does Hobbes confuse "being obliged" to fulfil a contract with "having an 
obligation" to do so? The traditional interpretation, as we have seen, 
says that he does: the sovereign's power may oblige us, either physically
or prudentially, to perform what we covenant to do, but this is all it 
does; and, as a result, Hobbes' theory of obligation is no theory of 
obligation at all. Barry (like Warrender) takes the opposite view. No 
new kinds of obligation are created by the establishment of a sovereign; 
all that happens is that the sovereign secures contracts and renders valid 
what would otherwise have been invalid. The sovereign does this not by
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coercing me, but by removing any reasonable suspicion I might have that 
performing my part of a covenant first will betray me to the other party's 
ambition and avarice. Barry puts it this way:
"the sovereign operates in such a way as to remove the 
excuses for not performing which can so easily be main­
tained in the absence of a coercive power. It is not so 
much that the sovereign makes it pay to keep your covenant 
by punishing you if you don't, but that it always pays 
anyway to keep covenants provided you can do so without 
exposing yourself, and the sovereign ensures that you will 
not be exposing yourself by keeping your covenant."79
Barry admits that Hobbes does not show in detail how this works out, 
but he does produce this passage from Leviathan as evidence:
"But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to 
constrain those who would otherwise violate their faith, 
that fear (of being double-crossed by the others) is no 
more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by covenant 
is to perform first, is obliged to do so."80
Barry’s explanation is that,
"Hobbes does not argue that the covenant obliges you because 
'there is a power set up to constrain' you; he says that the 
covenant obliges you because 'there is a power set up to 
constrain' the othev parties to it, thus taking away the 
'reasonable suspicion' of being double-crossed that would 
otherwise invalidate such a covenant."81
Once this "reasonable suspicion" is eliminated, we are obliged to follow 
through on our contractual agreements. If Barry is right, the sovereign's 
role is actually to remove the conditions which nullify our contracts and, 
by doing so, to make contracts - and obligation - possible.
Barry's next move is to apply this explanation to Hobbes' two kinds 
of civil states, "commonwealth by institution" and "commonwealth by 
acquisition". The application to a "commonwealth by institution", which 
is created by a covenant of mutual trust between individuals in a state of 
nature, is straightforward. Neither our persons nor our promises are 
secure in the state of nature, so we covenant to obey the commands of the 
sovereign we establish. We are under an obligation to keep this covenant -
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unless, of course, we are threatened with "death, wounds, or imprisonment"®2 
- because we are no longer endangered by double-crossers. The sovereign 
will see that each fulfils his contractual obligations. The explanation 
must be stretched a bit, however, to account for an obligation to obey the 
"sovereign by acquisition". This seems to be the purest case of Hobbes' 
attempt to derive obligation from coercion. In order for me to have an 
obligation to obey a conqueror two conditions must be met: first, the
conqueror must allow me my life and my physical liberty in exchange for my 
(tacit) promise to obey him; and, second, the conqueror must provide con­
ditions which make it safe for me to perform my part. This first condition 
is crucial, since the second applies also to "sovereignty by institution". 
Barry relates the first condition to the ransom example. When the victor 
spares my life and allows me physical liberty he "performs at once and for 
all"83. This is "precisely analogous", Barry says, to the situation of men 
released by a captor in return for a promise of a future ransom - only in 
this case the ransom is our obedience to the commands of the conqueror/ 
captor. And Barry reminds us that "even 'in the condition of mere nature' 
that promise was held to be obligatory, because the other party had already 
performed its part of the bargain."8  ^ So in the case of "sovereignty by 
acquisition" the obligation to obey the sovereign rests, first, on our 
obligation to fulfil a covenant when the other party has already performed, 
and, second, on the condition that the sovereign removes the excuses which 
prevent contracts from generating obligations.
In sum, Barry's reading of Hobbes is the only one of the four princi­
pal interpretations which concludes that the social contract is essential 
to Hobbes' theory of obligation, and the theory itself is adequate. This 
is why we must consider it to be the most challenging and a more plausible 
response to the traditional interpretation than those offered by Oakeshott 
and Warrender. But, however ingenious Barry's argument is, his position 
too is ultimately untenable.
This is because Barry's explanation fails in two key areas: he does
not actually show that there can be obligations in the state of nature or 
that "sovereignty by acquisition" is based on consent rather than coercion. 
With regard to the first problem, Barry, as has been noted, cites Hobbes' 
statement that covenants are binding "'either where one of the parties has
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performed already; or where there is a power to make him perform'."85 But, 
if we place this quotation in its context, we see that Barry uses it im­
properly. '(T)he question", Hobbes says,
"is not of promises mutual, where there is no security 
of performance on either side; as when there is no civil 
power erected over the parties promising; for such pro­
mises are no covenants: but either where one of the
parties has performed already; or where there is a power 
to make him perform; there is the question whether it he 
against reason3 that is3 against the benefit of the other 
to per form3 or not. And I say it is not against reason."88
What Hobbes says here is that it is unreasonable to keep a promise "where 
there is no security of performance on either side;" but it is reasonable 
to do so "either where one of the parties has performed already; or where 
there is a power to make him perform". Obligation is not mentioned here 
or in the rest of the long paragraph of which this is a part. In fact, 
the point of this particular paragraph seems to be that "he which declares 
he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no 
other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single power."87
Barry's position is similarly shaky with respect to the ransom 
example. This is what Hobbes says:
"Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere 
nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay 
a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound to 
it: for it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit
of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; 
and consequently, where no other law, as in the condition of 
mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is 
valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the pay­
ment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a
weaker prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, 
for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless, as hath been said 
before, there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to 
renew the war."88
Barry considers this to be an example of how we can have an obligation to 
perform covenants in the state of nature. And Hobbes clearly uses the 
language of obligation here: "obligatory", "bound", "obliged". Yet the
problem with Hobbes' theory of obligation is that he uses this language in 
a manner which reduces obligation to prudence. One of the reasons
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the Leviathan is so often startling is that Hobbes claims that we have an 
obligation in circumstances in which we normally say we have none. The 
ransom example is a good case: we have no obligation to a kidnapper to
meet his demands, even if we 'promise* to do so. Hobbes may say that 
"(c)ovenants entered into be fear... are obligatory," but his reasoning 
is prudential. If any captor releases me on my promise to pay him a ran­
som in the future it may be prudent for me to keep my promise - especially 
when there is no sovereign to protect me. The prudential basis of this 
passage is also brought out by the remark about the weaker prince who is 
'bound' to observe the conditions of a disadvantageous peace. In both 
cases the obligation is what Oakeshott designates "rational obligation"; 
which is to say that it is not obligation at all. It is not enough for 
Barry to point to passages where Hobbes speaks of obligations in the state 
of nature: he must also demonstrate that Hobbes has not stripped the con­
cept of its usual meaning.89
This difficulty carries over to the question of obedience to a "sove­
reign by acquisition". Are we under an obligation to obey the conqueror 
or are we compelled to obey him? Hobbes' answer, according to the tradi­
tional view, is that we are obliged because we are compelled. Barry, on 
the other hand, maintains that our obligation here is contractual, just as 
is our obligation to obey a "sovereign by institution". Again, there is 
testimony in Leviathan to support this contention:
"It is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right 
of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.
Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, 
beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh 
in; and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged 
by an enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, 
to spare him for this yielding to discretion; which obliges 
not the victor longer than in his discretion he shall think 
fit."90
But let us look closer at this argument. Hobbes does not, of course, 
require that the covenant with the conqueror be "in express words"; "other 
sufficient signs of the will" will do as well.9* These "other sufficient 
signs", or this tacit covenant, apparently boil down to submission to the 
conqueror, to obeying his commands. This, as John Plamenatz says, is 
surely "a curious argument". Hobbes tell us that we are obliged to obey 
the sovereign because we have covenanted to do so, but he also tells us
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that, in this case, we covenant when we obey. "In other words, whenever 
we obey, we promise to obey, and this promise makes obedience a duty.
Which is absurd."92 If we resist rather than submit to the conqueror, we 
do not covenant with him and, presumably, we therefore have no obligation 
to obey him. But this amounts to saying that those who obey are obliged 
to obey (no matter why they obey?) and those who disobey are not obliged 
to obey (no matter why they disobey?) the conqueror.
The only defense Barry can offer against this objection is to point 
to the obligation we have even "in the condition of mere nature" to keep 
our covenants when the other party has already performed. But this move, 
as we have seen, fails because Hobbes tells us that we (prudentially) 
ought to fulfil our part of the bargain when the other party has performed 
his and not that we are obliged to do so. Hobbes simply does not account 
for any obligations in the state of nature. We obey the victor, as it 
happens, either because we are forced to do so or because we recognize 
that it is prudent to do so - but not because we are obliged to obey him.
Finally, Barry's account of "sovereignty by institution" does not 
fare any better. For in order to accomplish the move from the state of 
nature to the civil state by way of the social contract, Barry must show 
that the natural state is not a moral vacuum. Since he does not bring this 
off, for reasons already mentioned, Barry is in no better position than 
Oakeshott, although his account of Hobbes' theory seems to be closer to 
Hobbes' intentions. This failure to rescue Hobbes is evidenced even by 
Barry's own synopsis of Hobbes' theory:
"If we have to reduce Hobbes to a slogan, it must be some­
thing like this: 'Obey even when there isn't a policeman,
because this contributes to peace: only provided that
there are enough policemen around to give you more security 
than you would get in a free-for-all.' And it may be added 
that since a free-for-all is very, very insecure, the criti­
cal level of police protection need not be very high to 
make it preferable for you to cast your vote for peace by 
obeying the government's commands."93
This is quite acceptable as a 'slogan'; but it is acceptable because it 
refers to obedience, security, and prudence rather than contracts and 
obligations. Barry's interpretation, like the other three, ultimately
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devolves to the conclusion that Hobbes' theory of obligation does not 
require the social contract and the theory itself is not successful.
The reason why Hobbes cannot be rescued is nowhere shown more clearly 
than in chapter 21 of Leviathan quoted in section II, where Hobbes argues 
that there is
"no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some 
act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free. 
And because such arguments, must either be drawn from 
the express words, I authorize all his actions, or from 
the intention of him that submitteth to his power, which 
intention is to be understood by the end for which he so 
submitteth, the obligation, and liberty of the subject, 
is to be derived, either from those words, or others 
equivalent; or else from the end of the institution of 
sovereignty, namely the peace of the subjects within 
themselves, and their defence against a common enemy."9I+
Hobbes begins by stating a voluntarist conception of obligation, but 
by the end of the paragraph it makes no difference what the subject does 
so long as the sovereign protects him. "The end of obedience," Hobbes 
says, "is protection".95 Perhaps it is this concern with security which, 
in the end, accounts for Hobbes' failure to distinguish between protection 
and extortion - a failure which leads him to conclude that we have an 
obligation to obey anyone who can command our obedience.
IV
Locke's Contractarianism
There are three important respects in which Locke differs from - and 
improves upon - the Hobbesian position. In each of these three respects 
Locke avoids one of the problems which beset Hobbes' theory. In the first 
place, Locke allows for the validity of promises in the state of nature:
"The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between two 
men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la 
Vega in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an 
Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, 
though they are perfectly in a state of nature in refer­
ence to one another. For truth and the keeping of faith
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belong to men as men3 and not as members of society.
Hobbes created a moral vacuum when he held that promises made in the state 
of nature are not binding, and he had no answer to the question, "How can 
society be established by a social contract when only those contracts and 
promises made in civil society are valid?" But there is no moral vacuum 
in Locke's state of nature, so it is at least possible, on his account, 
for a group of individuals to contract their way into civil society.
Secondly, Locke recognizes only one of Hobbes' two forms of common­
wealth, that which Hobbes calls "commonwealth by institution". There is 
no "commonwealth by acquisition", according to Locke, because conquest 
produces no right to command. This is stated plainly in chapter XVI, "Of 
Conquest". "That the aggressor," Locke says,
"who puts himself into the state of war with another, and 
unjustly invades another man's rights, can by such an un­
just war never come to have a right over the conquered, 
will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think that 
robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomsoever 
they have force enough to master, or that men are bound by 
promises which unlawful force extorts from them."97
By refusing to reduce right to might, Locke preserves the distinction be­
tween "being obliged" and "having an obligation" - a distinction which, as 
we have seen, Hobbes can not make. Locke does not rob 'promise' and 'con­
sent' of their meaning (at least, not at this point): for 'promises' 
which are coerced from us are not really promises and obedience to a con­
queror does not constitute consent to his rule.
The third respect in which Locke differs from Hobbes follows from the 
first two. Since there is neither a moral vacuum nor any rights or obliga­
tions deriving from coercion in his theory, Locke is able to claim that the 
kinds of government which may be founded by a social contract are limited. 
Specifically, Locke maintains, contrary to Hobbes, that we can never con­
sent to establish and obey an absolute monarch. Absolute monarchy "is in­
deed inconsistent with civil society," Locke asserts, "and so can be no 
form of civil government at all." Absolute rule is not only contrary to 
the ends of civil society, it is also no better than the state of nature:
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"For the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy 
those inconveniences of the state of nature which nece­
ssarily follow from every man's being judge in his own 
case, by setting up a known authority to which every one 
of that society may appeal upon any injury received or 
controversy that may arise, and which every one of the 
society ought to obey; wherever any persons are, who 
have not such an authority to appeal to and decide any 
difference between them, there those persons are still 
in the state of nature. And so is every absolute prince, 
in respect of those who are under his dominion."99
Thus, the only kind of government which can be established by contract is 
a limited government, one which respects the lives, liberties, and property 
of its subjects. No government which grants to one man "an absolute, arbi­
trary power... over another to take away his life whenever he pleases" is 
justifiable, for "this is a power which neither nature gives... nor com­
pact can convey...."^99
The notion that government is limited by the terms of the social con­
tract is, for Locke, a two-edged sword which he also uses to justify the 
right of revolution. Men enter into societies and create governments, he 
says, in order to achieve certain goals. When the government no longer 
contributes to the achievement of these goals, whether through negligence 
or tyranny, then the members of the society have the right to overthrow the 
government and to institute a new one. If they fail to do so, they will 
find that they have returned to the state of nature. Locke sets all this 
out in a lengthy synoptic passage:
"The reason why men enter into society is the preserva­
tion of their property; and the end why they choose and 
authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and 
rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the 
members of the society, to limit the power and moderate the 
dominion of every part and member of the society. For since 
it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that 
the legislative should have a power to destroy that which 
every one designs to secure by entering into society, and 
for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of 
their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take 
away and destroy the property of the people, or reduce them 
to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a 
state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved 
from any farther obedience, and are left to the common 
refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and 
violence. Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall 
transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by
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ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp 
themselves or put into the hands of any other an absolute 
power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, 
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people 
have put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it 
devolves to the people; who have a right to resume their 
original liberty, and by the establishment of the new legis­
lative... provide for their own safety and security, which 
is the end for which they are in society."101
In those cases where the government exceeds its authority, it is the 
governors who "do rebatlare - that is, bring back again the state of war - 
and are properly rebels...."102 They violate the terms of the contract, 
and their violence justifies the revolt of the citizenry.
To say, then, that Locke improves upon Hobbes in each of these re­
spects is to say that Locke's theory is a significant advance from Hobbes': 
it is both more coherent and morepalatable. However, this is not to say 
that Locke's theory is successful. The major problem for Locke is that, 
when push comes to shove, he too stretches the concept of consent beyond 
recognition. A brief explanation of his argument should make this clear.
Early in the Second Tveati-se Locke announces a rather unequivocal 
position on the relationship between civil authority and individual con­
sent. No one is under an obligation to obey the laws of a civil society
unless he has consented to do so. "Men being", as Locke says,
"...by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the
political power of another, without his own consent.
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his 
natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society 
is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a 
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable 
living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of 
their properties, and a greater security against any that 
are not of it."10 3
Locke then moves to preclude an extreme interpretation of his posi­
tion. Such an interpretation would hold that the individual is under an 
obligation to obey only those laws to which he consents, so that one might 
consent to some of the laws of a civil society and refuse to consent to 
others. This virtually requires, in effect, that all laws be approved un-
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animously. But Locke maintains that unanimous consent is necessary only 
to establish civil society and, further, that this social contract entails 
a promise to follow the will of the majority in future decisions. When 
one consents to enter into a civil society, in other words, one consents 
to be governed henceforth by the majority of one's fellow subjects, or by 
the majority of the members of the representative body.10l+
Next, Locke attempts to counter two objections to contract theory. 
These objections, in Locke's words, are:
"First: That there are no instances to be found in
history of a company of men, independent and equal one 
amongst another, that met together, and in this way began 
and set up a government.
"Secondly: 'Tis impossible of right that men should
do so, because all men being born under government, they 
are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a 
new one."105
Locke draws on his knowledge of the Bible, ancient history, and the anthro­
pology of his day to defend himself from the first objection. Little rests 
on this question, however, for even if it can be shown that somewhere, 
sometime a group of individuals created a civil society by mutual consent, 
the contract theorist must still show what bearing this has on all those 
individuals who have never explicitly consented to the institution of any 
state. The fact (if it is a fact) that one of my distant ancestors was a 
charter member, so to speak, of the civil society in which I now live can­
not place me under the same obligation he incurred unless his consent is 
construed to be the consent of all his progeny as well - and this clearly 
will not do. This seems to put Locke on the horns of a dilemma: either
he must acknowledge that only those who have actually consented to obey 
the laws of government (i.e. virtually no one) are under an obligation to 
do so, or he must hold that we all gave our consent in the long forgotten 
past when our ancestors spoke for us.
In his reply to the second objection Locke escapes the dilemma by 
loosening the notion of consent. Locke agrees that no one can consent for 
someone else; not, at least, when the second party is capable of reason. 
"'Tis true", he says, "that whatever engagements or promises any one has
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made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot by any 
compact whatsoever bind his children or posterity."105 Nevertheless, he 
goes on to argue that the child who inherits property from his parents 
thereby agrees to accept that property on the same terms as his parents 
did - that is, by joining the civil society. The child appends his signa­
ture, as it were, to the contract signed by his parents; and this procedure 
is so common that we are likely to fail to see it for what it really is: 
an act of consent. As Locke puts it,
"the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his 
father but under the same terms his father did, by be­
coming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself 
presently under the government he finds there established, 
as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. And 
thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which 
only makes them members of it, being given separately in 
their turns... people take no notice of it...."107
Locke thus joins Hobbes in basing his answer to the question, "what 
shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to 
make him subject to the laws of any government", on a distinction between 
express and tacit consent. But the introduction of tacit consent, as 
Locke recognizes, leads immediately to another, similar question: "what
ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, l-.e., 
how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted 
to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all." Locke's 
answer, which has gained some notoriety among students of political 
thought, is that
"every man that hath any possessions, or enjoyment of any 
part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give 
his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience 
to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as any 
one under it; whether this his possessions be of land to 
him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; 
or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; 
and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of any 
one within the territories of that government."108
This extension of 'consent', however, renders the concept meaningless and 
useless. It also contradicts Locke's own purposes, for it not only allows 
that one may consent to be ruled by an absolute monarch - it also implies
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that people have done so.109 John Plamenatz puts the point neatly:
"Locke, in attempting to found rightful government 
upon consent, imagined that he was attacking the founda­
tions of tyranny. His attack was made with the bluntest 
of weapons. If consent can be implied by some of the 
things that he maintains imply it, then there never 
existed any government but ruled with the unanimous and 
continuous assent of all its subjects."110
Certainly this is trouble enough for Locke; but there is also an 
important difficulty with his notion of express consent. Locke declares 
that anyone who expressly consents to obey the laws of a commonwealth 
thereby becomes a "member" of that commonwealth, and membership is a status 
that cannot be renounced:
"he that has once by actual agreement and any express 
declaration given his consent to be of any commonwealth 
is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain 
unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in 
the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any cala­
mity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved, 
or else by some public acts cuts him off from being any 
longer a member of it."111
Here again Locke undermines his own position: for if our consent
cannot be withdrawn, then we remain under an obligation to obey the govern­
ment no matter how the character of that government changes. This clearly 
is at odds with Locke's claims that we cannot consent to obey some kinds of 
governments and that the people have the right to revolt when the govern­
ment becomes despotical. Locke's notion of express consent, as well as his 
conception of tacit consent, fails to provide him with a means of escaping 
the Hobbesian conclusion that we are under an obligation to obey any ruler 
who can command our obedience.
What are we to make of this? Some commentators have argued that the 
Second Treatise is written in code and that Locke's use of the social con­
tract is merely a subterfuge to prevent the authorities from seeing his 
Hobbesian premises and conclusion.112 But this interpretation can only be 
sustained if one neglects those passages which, as has been shown, distin­
guish Locke's position from Hobbes'. Another alternative is to dismiss 
the Second Treatise as a carelessly written, incoherent work. This is
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sometimes a tempting view - especially when one is considering those parts 
of the book in which Locke advances his account of contractarianism - but 
it does not square with the clarity of Locke's reasoning and writing in 
most of the book. This points to a third possibility: since it is Locke's
use of contract theory which presents the problems, both in terms of its 
own intelligibility and its fit with the rest of the Second Treatise, per­
haps it is best to regard the work from some perspective other than that 
of the social contract. Perhaps the Second Treatise is not the classic of 
the contractarian tradition after all.
Hanna Pitkin has argued persuasively that Locke's political theory is 
best understood as a theory of 'hypothetical consent'. Locke obviously 
cannot hold both that we can consent to any form of government and that we 
are never under an obligation to absolute monarchies and other despotical 
governments. Pitkin concludes that Locke's notion of consent must be re­
interpreted, for the advocacy of limited government and the right to revolt 
are at the heart of Locke's political thought. In the end, she says, 
personal consent, whether express or tacit, is irrelevant to Locke's 
theory:
"not only is your personal consent irrelevant, but it 
actually no longer matters whether this government or 
any government was really founded by a group of men 
deciding to leave the state of nature by means of a 
contract. As long as a government's actions are with­
in the bounds of what such a contract hypothetically 
would have provided, would have had to provide, those 
living within its territory must obey.... The only 
'consent' that is relevant is the hypothetical consent 
imputed to hypothetical timeless, abstract, rational 
men."113
It is the character or nature of the government which is all-important to 
Locke's position, then, not whether or not anyone at any time ever actually 
entered into a contract to obey it. In fact, the legitimacy of the govern­
ment and the obligation to obey it both follow from the character of the 
government. How, then, do we determine if the government is or is not 
legitimate? Pitkin says that Locke tells us to look to the law of nature, 
for it is this which sets the standards which governments must meet; it is, 
to put it another way, the law of nature which establishes the terms of the 
original social contract. As Pitkin points out, "the original contract
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could not have read any otherwise than it did, and the powers it gave and 
limits it placed can be logically deduced from the laws of nature and 
conditions in the state of nature.1,11Lf
All this indicates that Locke's political thought relies more on a 
conception of the law of nature than on the idea of a social contract. As 
an examination of the Second Treatise reveals, Locke refers from beginning 
to end to the limits placed on the conduct of men and governments by the 
law of nature.115 The core of the entire theory is stated near the begin­
ning of the book. In an often cited passage Locke asserts that, "The state 
of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and 
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, 
that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his 
life, health, liberty or possessions." The sentence which follows it is 
not often referred to so frequently, but it is perhaps even more important:
"For men being all the workmanship of an omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker - all the servants of one sovereign 
Master, sent into the world by His order, and about his 
business - they are his property, whose workmanship they 
are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure; 
and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in 
one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any 
such subordination among us, that may authorize us to 
destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's
"* -I I ruses, as the inferior rank of creatures are for ours."iiD
In this paragraph Locke paradoxically (given his Calvanist leanings) 
evokes a hierarchical ontology reminiscent of the Great Chain of Being.
God is the creator, master of all He has created. Men, His creatures, are 
endowed with reason, which affords those who consult it the knowledge that 
they are equal and independent with respect to one another and that only 
He who has created them has the right to dispose of their lives. Subordi­
nate to men are the irrational creatures, the beasts who serve us. Any 
man who harms another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions commits 
a transgression against God and degrades himself to the status of a beast,
"and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild
1 1 7savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security."
Of greatest importance, however, as mentioned in Part TWO, is the idea 
that men are the property of God, "made to last during his, not one
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another's pleasure." From this premise Locke derives the conclusion that 
we have an obligation to God to preserve ourselves.118 And since we are 
at His disposal, as His property, we cannot place ourselves at the dispo­
sal of other men:
"For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by 
compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, 
nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of an­
other to take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can 
give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot 
take away his own life, cannot give another power over it."118
This line of reasoning extends through the Second Treatise.120 it 
explains why men cannot enter into a social contract to create and obey an 
absolute, arbitrary government: we cannot transfer to others a power over
our lives which we do not have. The reason men establish civil societies 
in the first place is that the state of nature is inconvenient, at best, 
and hazardous, at worst. Governments are formed and laws are passed to 
serve as "guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the 
society"121, to protect us from those degraded men who will not observe 
the laws of nature and to provide us with disinterested judges to settle 
our controversies. It cannot be supposed, therefore, that men will relin­
quish the liberty of the state of nature for a civil condition which is 
just as harsh and inconvenient. The only governments which men are under 
an obligation to obey' - the only governments to which they can consent - 
are those which rule in accordance with the laws of nature, those which 
further the goals of protecting life, liberty, and property. "Thus",
Locke says,
"the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, 
legislators as well as others. The rules that they (i.e., 
legislators) make for other men's actions must... be com- 
formable to the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God, 
of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law 
of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human 
sanction can be good or valid against it."122
A contractual element is present, however, in circumstances where the 
laws of nature are inadequately or incompetently applied; for when this is 
the case, the citizen may invoke the notion of a broken contract. Never­
theless, the contractual elements of Locke's theory are subordinate to his
211
natural law doctrine. Both the legitimacy of civil societies and the obli­
gatory nature of promises and contracts depend, as it turns out, on the law 
of nature. Locke makes this quite clear in this passage from the Essays on 
the Law of Nature:
"Certainly, positive civil laws are not binding by their own 
nature or force or in any other way than in virtue of the 
law of nature, which orders obedience to superiors and the 
keeping of public peace. Thus, without this law, the rulers 
can perhaps by force and with the aid of arms compel the 
multitude to obedience, but put them under an obligation 
they cannot. Without natural law the other basis also of 
human society is overthrown, i.e. the faithful fulfilment 
of contracts, for it is not to be expected that a man would 
abide by a compact because he has promised it, when better 
terms are offered elsewhere, unless the obligation to keep 
promises was derived from nature, and not from human will."123
If we will consult the law of nature, then we will know whether or not we 
are under an obligation to obey the government: for it is the law of
nature which sets out the terms of the social contract to which we hypo­
thetically consent.
A further question remains. If Locke's 'solution' to the problem of 
civil obligation is at bottom a natural law solution, why did Locke incor­
porate the idea of a social contract into his theory? It does seem, after 
all, that his discussion of express and tacit consent is at cross-purposes 
with the rest of the Second Treatise. There are several possible answers 
to this question - contract terminology might have best suited Locke's 
polemical purposes, for example - but one that Patrick Riley has recently 
suggested is particularly interesting. Riley argues that natural law and 
contract theory, "far from being simply antithetical in Locke, necessarily 
involve each other - at least given human imperfection and 'corruption'."124
Riley's argument, briefly, is that men could safely remain in the 
state of nature, with the law of nature as their standard, were they not 
imperfect and subject to corruption. The fact that they are flawed, how­
ever, compels them to enter civil society to protect their lives, liberties, 
and property. The law of nature tells those who consult it that they must 
establish and obey a government which will further this goal. But the law 
of nature is not specific enough in this respect: it tells us what kind
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of government we are under an obligation to obey, but it does not tell us 
whom we should obey. Locke uses contract theory, Riley claims, to provide 
this specific information. "It is not 'only' consent", he says, "...which 
Locke says creates a duty of obedience; the general duty arises from 
natural law, and consent only tells one which actual persons to obey."125 
The social contract, then, does not create the obligation to obey the 
government, but it does fix the obligation by specifying who is to be 
obeyed. And in this way the contractual elements of Locke's political 
theory supplement his basic natural law doctrine.
The textual evidence for Riley's reading of Locke is a bit thin, but 
it does seem to be a plausible account of the relationship between contract 
and natural law in Locke's theory.125 Such a reading, however, still 
leaves the social contract in a subordinate position: the law of nature is
the foundation on which Locke's political philosophy rests.
Locke's political theory, in conclusion, does not supply an adequate 
contractarian account of civil obligation because it is not a contract 
theory at all. But this does not mean that Locke's attempt at a solution 
to the problem of civil obligation, like Hobbes', must be dismissed alto­
gether; for the theory may be satisfactory even if it is not a contract 
theory. Those who accept Locke's theistic, natural law premises should in­
deed find it a satisfactory theory, although they may disagree with some of 
its details. There is at least the basis in Locke's theory, that is, for 
fulfilling the two conditions necessary and jointly sufficient to validate 
a civil obligation claim. There is, first, a conception (albeit a somewhat 
diffuse conception) of what it means to be a member of or a participant in 
a civil society.^' And there is, secondly, a conception of a moral order, 
one which deserves our obedience and, hypothetically, our consent.
Nevertheless, Locke's is not a contract theory, and its adequacy or 
inadequacy is not important here. It is not a contract theory because the 
legitimacy of the government - the conception of a moral order which Locke 
develops - is derived from natural law rather than from a social contract, 
real or imagined. Locke does improve upon Hobbes by tying his solution to 
the problem of civil obligation to a conception of a just state, but it re­
mains for Rousseau and Rawls to tie the conception of a moral order to the 
device of the social contract.
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PART FOUR
ROUSSEAU: "THE MORAL VIEW OF THE WORLD"
Boswell: But, Sir, does not Rousseau talk such nonsense?
Johnson: True, Sir, but Rousseau knows he is talking
nonsense, and laughs at the world for staring 
at him.
Boswell: How so, Sir?
Johnson: Why, Sir, a man who talks nonsense so well, must
know that he is talking nonsense.
Boswell, Life of Johnson
"It will not be neglected because it is chimerical; but 
because the world is absurd, and there is a kind of absurd­
ity in being wise amongst fools."
Rousseau, Project for' a Perpetual 
Peace
The precise nature of Rousseau's theoretical consistency is an endless 
source of argument. Peter Gay's introduction to Ernst Cassirer's The 
Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau presents an extensive survey of the many 
different positions1 which, for our purposes, roughly divide into three 
groups.
The traditional argument is that Rousseau's purported 'individualism' 
is inconsistent with his later 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian' solutions. 
Commentators such as Sabine, Barker, Vaughan, Talmon and Watkins conclude 
that Rousseau's theory is both confused and inconsistent. A variation of 
this contention is pursued by Crocker and Babbitt. They trace the 'confu­
sions' in his political theory to the contradictions of his 'distorted' or 
'paranoid' mind as Rousseau "projects his own illness" onto society and 
develops similarly "sick conclusions".2
221
A more sympathetic group of interpreters have contended that 
Rousseau's political theory is not meant to be psychologically or logically 
consistent. They suggest that his theory derives from different sets of 
contradictory principles and its conclusions reflect this tension and con­
tradiction. Judith Shklar argues that Rousseau depends upon the expansion 
of two dichotomous images, 'Sparta' and 'the Golden Age', and there is no 
need to expect a reconciliation. Grimsley, Cobban and Burgelin suggest 
that Rousseau's philosophy is a radically consistent attempt to synthesize 
different "principles of Existence", such as individual unity versus 
psychic division, or the requirements of order and the flux of social and 
natural existence. The contradictions and tensions found in Rousseau, it 
is argued, reflect the basic existential tensions between his major meta­
physical premises.3
The last group of interpreters have suggested that the unity of 
Rousseau's thought is more complex than simple theoretical canons allow. 
Hendel, Cassirer, Guehenno and Grimsley all contend that the consistency 
and coherence of Rousseau's philosophy is primarily personal: it can most
fruitfully be discussed as a theory which sets a basic problem for itself 
and then consistently examines the same problem from different perspectives 
and under varying conditions. This problem can either be a basic moral 
concern or Rousseau's continuous concern with his own moral identity and, 
by implication, moral agency in general.4 Our approach has been influenced 
most by the last group, especially Hendel. With the exception of Burgelin, 
the majority of commentators aim to excuse Rousseau's theorizing from 
classical canons of logical consistency or parsimony. Rousseau, however, 
argues for the veridicality of his 'system' and makes it quite clear that 
problems of logical and psychological coherence within his philosophy are 
legitimate questions for analysis. For the purposes of a study of contrac­
tarianism, however, there is no need to join the debate about whether 
Rousseau is a totalitarian, democrat or liberal; our concern lies princi­
pally with ascertaining whether or not the idea of a social contract is at 
the heart of his theory of politics. Rousseau's totalitarian or liberta­
rian credentials will be discussed as a consequence of his contractarianism 
and not as its possible motivation. It will become obvious, however, 
especially in Part Seven, that Rousseau's 'party-political' status is of 
importance to us insofar as it reflects certain tensions within contracta­
rianism, in particular, the search for Gemeinschaftliche unity and homo-
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geneity within Gesellsohaft society.
/
Not all of Rousseau's commentators accept the view that the idea of a 
social contract is central to his philosophy; Shklar, for example, asserts 
that, "in spite of the title of his most celebrated book, the social con­
tract itself plays an insignificant part in his political thought."5 But 
the judgement that the social contract is a major element of Rousseau's 
political philosophy is, as will be shown, quite defensible. For 
Rousseau's use of the contractarian metaphor is not only one of the most 
significant aspects of his political thought: it is also the major contri­
bution to social contract theory in general. Indeed, in the moderate 
nominalism of the Discourses and the Social Contract we find a nominalism 
(or rather, a 'conceptualism' according to which universals have esse 
intentionale but not esse naturale) reminiscent of Abelard's - at once a 
rejection of both thoroughgoing atomistic individualism and Thomistic 
realism: a civil philosophy premised upon the individual yet sustained by
that which is common to all persons. What was found wanting in Hobbes and 
Locke, namely, the centrality of the idea of the social contract, became a 
possibility in Rousseau precisely as a consequence of his abandonment of 
atomism.
The Enlightenment saw the spread of atomistic nominalism in a manner 
of the utmost significance for a study of political philosophy. The 
Encyclopaedists, among others, reduced nominalism to what may be described 
as its popular social implications. Much was made of human reason (which 
was identified with the reasoning powers of the individual), of the rights 
of the individual, and of the authority of common sense. If universals or 
ideas are created by the mind, as the nominalists supposed and as the 
common-sense philosophers of the Enlightenment were beginning to believe, 
then authority is transferred from some objective source, such as the royal 
prerogative or the revelations of divinity, to the individual mind. For if 
the mind creates ideas and none has general authority, then each individual 
is free to create his own, as it were, and all must be equally valid.
Here, somewhat paradoxically, we have the origins of both liberal democracy 
and philosophical anarchism.
Rousseau, of course, rejected atomistic nominalism; and, in adopting 
an Abelardian position, shifted the emphasis of Enlightenment debate from
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atomic man to the 'Idea' of men not just as rational beings but as beings 
who manifest their reason in mutual engagements.5
The point is that Rousseau, like Abelard, implied that while univer- 
sals may derive only from individuals, "once abstracted they (are) indepen­
dent of real things".7 The 'general will', for example, served neither as 
a mere theoretical fiction nor a metaphysical entity, but as a notion cate­
gorically distinct from psychological facts about individuals in space and 
time, at once derived from, resident within and transcending individual 
will. Rousseau combatted atomism, then, not by denying the ontological 
primacy of the individual, but by shifting discussion, as Kant would later 
do in a more complete way, from ontology to epistemology.
It has been argued by Patrick Riley that Kant must be considered as 
the most adequate of the social contract theorists, principally because in 
reformulating Rousseau's "social contract as an Idea of reason which shows 
what a people could reasonably agree to"8 Kant transformed Rousseau's 
literal conception into a hypothetical contractarianism. In the following 
sections, however, we will challenge this view as a typical misreading, or 
underrating, of Rousseau and contend that it was Rousseau, not Kant, who 
first developed hypothetical contractarianism. Naturally, we must be care­
ful not to underrate Kant in turn, but from the perspective of this thesis 
there is yet a further argument for placing Kant second to Rousseau: the
notion of the social contract is not essential to Kant's theory of obliga­
tion. That this point is obvious to those familiar with the literature 
need not be pressed. Kant's development of the contract metaphor may in­
deed be superior to Rousseau's, but Kant did not employ the notion in what 
could properly be termed a contractarian theory of obligation. Rather, 
Kant's theory of obligation is most profitably viewed as correlated with a 
theory of 'rational agency' and 'justified action'. The notions of obliga­
tion, of being under an obligation and of an action being obligatory (or 
one's 'duty'), in the Kantian system, rely on a complex metaphysical theory 
of the nature of a person - what it is for a person to act for reasons, 
what it is for a person to act rationally, and what it is for his actions 
to (fully) manifest this rationality i.e. to be justified. For our purpos­
es, the critical impact of Kant on subsequent contractarian discourse 
(Rawls in particular) is that his theory is unified through the notion of 
a community of persons, in the context of which reasons for acting are
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given more determinate content, i.e., what Kant calls the 'kingdom of ends', 
in which rational agents (as ends-in-themselves) act rationally in pursuit 
of personal and common ends. In other words, Kant envisaged people pursu­
ing legitimate personal interests subject to the limitations of the moral 
law.
Our examination of Kant's theory of civil obligation, then, is to be 
found in Appendix Pour, taking the following form: first, a consideration
of Kant's understanding of the notions of 'duty' and 'obligation', indica­
ting how these are tied to his conceptions of what it is to be a person and 
rational agency, and to his general characterization of the principles 
according to which actions are 'rationally necessary'. Second, the loca­
tion of these principles within Kant's fuller theory of rational agency and 
justification in which moral goodness and the moral law, respectively, are 
the 'supreme conditions'; and third, a discussion of Kant's formulation(s) 
of the supreme principle of morality, and his derivation of the notion of 
a kingdom of ends.
The discussion of Rousseau in the following sections will firstly 
trace what he termed "the Progress of Inequality", integrating the Dis­
courses and the Social Contract, stressing both the highly metaphorical and 
radical nature of Rousseau's theory as the first statement of hypothetical 
contractarianism. This point is then taken up with a detailed discussion 
of the 'general will' and its contractarian implications. The final 
section relates the analysis of Rousseau's political theory to the problem 
of civil obligation, and there it is suggested that Rousseau does indeed 
provide an adequate contractarian solution to this problem. Both analyses, 
of Rousseau and Kant, will then be integrated in Part Five, on Rawl's A 
Theory of Justice, and criticized in Part Six and Part Seven.
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On the Origin of Inequality
Perhaps the best way to gain an appreciation of the role of the social 
contract in Rousseau's thought is to see how it emerges from the concerns 
expressed in his earlier political writings. The relationship between the 
Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Second 
Discourse) is especially important, for one follows the other in the way 
that a builder follows a wrecker. That is, Rousseau's task in the Second 
Discourse is primarily critical: it is an attempt to dismantle the social
theories of Hobbes and Locke, among others. In the Social Contract, how­
ever, his purpose is to erect a new theory on the ruins - and the contract 
metaphor is the keystone of the project.
For both Hobbes and Locke civil society is an escape from and an 
improvement on the dangers and inconveniences of the state of nature. For 
Rousseau, on the other hand, the movement from the state of nature to civil 
society is a degeneration - a falling away from the virtues of man in his 
'original state'. 'Progress' is actually the corruption of self-regard 
(amour de soi) into petty envy and vanity (amour-propre) . The advantages 
of civil society, moreover, are purchased at the expense of the weak and 
the poor, who are forced to bear the burdens of social life while the rich 
and powerful enjoy its benefits. What has really happened, according to 
Rousseau, is that we have exchanged our natural independence for the chains 
of 'unjustified' inequality.
How and why has this happened? To answer these questions, Rousseau 
offers a hypothetical narrative - a description of how "the progress of 
inequality" must have occurred. He begins by arguing that others have mis­
conceived the state of nature and that this misconception casts doubts on 
their accounts of the development of civil society. How, Rousseau asks, 
could men in the state of nature have perceived the dangers of their situa­
tion? How could they possibly have entered into a contract to ameliorate 
their condition? In the state of nature as it truly must have been, argues 
Rousseau, men were but animals who lacked intelligence, the power of speech, 
and the ability to transform their existence:
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"But who does not see... that everything seems to remove 
from savage man both the temptation and the means of changing 
his condition? His imagination paints no pictures; his heart 
makes no demands on him. His few wants are so readily sup­
plied, and he is so far from having the knowledge which is 
needful to make him want more, that he can have neither fore­
sight nor curiosity."9
It would be impossible, according to Rousseau's analysis, for men in 
the state of nature to establish a civil society by means of a social con­
tract or any other design. The only possible explanation is that there is 
an intermediate step, or set of steps, between the state of nature and the 
formation of civil society. Thus Rousseau imagines a process of develop­
ment which moves from "mutual undertakings" (for example, the famous stag- 
hunt) to the "little societies" of the family, to neighbourhood and, 
finally, to the societies of villages and towns. Somewhere along the way, 
in some manner which Rousseau cannot explain, language came into use.*0 
This, together with the accidental discovery of metallurgy and agriculture, 
sets the stage for the introduction of civil society. The role of language, 
of course, was to make communication possible. Metallurgy and agriculture 
- "the two arts which produced this great revolution"^ - brought about the 
inequality of resources which, Rousseau argues, is a necessary condition 
for the foundation of civil society. The "two arts" enabled men to look 
beyond their daily needs and allowed them to provide for the future; at the 
same time, they also led to the division of labour and the introduction of 
private property. The immediate consequence of the new institution of 
property was a state of war. Since there was no convention governing the 
distribution of property, the 'right' of the first occupier and the 'right' 
of the strongest were constantly at odds. Only at this point, after 
society and property had given rise to the chaos of the state of war, was 
civil society finally established. However, before proceeding to a discus­
sion of the establishment and development of civil society we must consider 
in greater detail Rousseau's conception of the state of nature.
The state of nature, for Rousseau, is both a quasi-historical notion 
and a 'procedural device'. The confusion of the two categories readily 
leads to trivialization of the contractarian idea and a comprehensive (one 
might say, all too easy) dismissal reminiscent of Hume. The historical 
notion arises in answer to the first two questions posed in the preface to 
the Second Discourse: "... how shall we know the source of inequality
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between men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind? And how shall man 
hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which the 
succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitu­
tion?"12 Nature, on this view, is what is original. The 'procedural 
device', on the other hand, represents a partial solution to the third, 
fourth and fifth questions: "How can he distinguish what is fundamental 
in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and 
the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition? 
.... What experiments would have to he made3 to discover the natural man? 
And how are those experiments to be made in a state of society?"13 The 
second group of questions flow from the first, yet Rousseau's priority is 
clear: to fashion a hypothetical account of history from its distinctly
human (rather than animal) origins in order to better understand man's 
fundamental nature. The reconstruction is presented as nothing other than 
an assemblage of bits of information and inductions within a common-sense 
framework: in other words, it is a 'historiated', rather than historio­
graphical, model of human evolution. The key to the model's symbolism 
lies in Rousseau's fascination with the movement from simplicity to com­
plexity, growth to decay, that for him characterizes the course of human 
development. Since, for Rousseau, 'development' is meaningful only insofar 
as it connotes enhancement of freedom, 'progress' (as the chronology of 
increasing complexity in human affairs) is praiseworthy when it fosters 
development and blameworthy when it does not. Consequently, progress is 
of itself a negative thing in that it needlessly increases the complexity 
of life, serving only to destroy the intimacy of human relations. Progress 
is justified, or at least justifiable, when its end-orientation is the 
enhancement of freedom. Yet, one may ask, how can the complication of 
relations and environments foster 'freedom', as the term is commonly under­
stood? Surely, unnecessary elaborations upon reasonably convivial circum­
stances can only increase the chances of personal subjection to the control 
of others? The point, of course, is that this assumes, firstly, that free­
dom consists exclusively in one's not being subject to another's will, and, 
secondly, that we are talking about much the same kind of people throughout 
the so-called 'march of progress'.
Freedom proper (let us call it freedorr^ ) is not merely an external, 
negative condition or set of phenomena - physical freedom (freedom^) - 
rather, Rousseau implies, it is a combination of freedom^ and civil free-
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dom (freedom2); it is what we would regard as having an independent, 
rational will. That is to say, for Rousseau, a person is free 3^^  when he 
is independent of both external constraints and the bondage of his passions 
and susceptibilities to the will of others. Each aspect alone is necessary 
but insufficient to fully satisfy Rousseau's conception of liberty. More­
over, if it could be shown that the 'first' men were free in one respect 
(freedom^) and not free in the other (freedorr^ ) , it would be possible to 
analyze the course of human evolution as the emergence and growth of rela­
tions between the two aspects of freedom, and thereby be able to better 
identify the criteria, circumstances and prospects of social development. 
The sense of human evolution, whether it be an imputed teleology or actual 
purposiveness - the moral why of history - would thus unfold as the dialec­
tic of liberty. Hence the (logical) necessity of Rousseau's depiction of 
the state of nature as a static idyll populated by insufferable dullards.
If evolution is the movement from simplicity to complexity, the raw mater­
ial of the process must be elemental yet essentially in keeping with what 
is to follow i.e. there must be sufficient commonality to permit continuity 
without the introduction of 'genetically' extraneous material. The infant 
grows into a man, as it were. In other words, it is assumed that there is 
within natural and social 'organisms' an internal principle of maturation.
It requires only a small jump from the quasi-historical model to con­
jecture on what is "original and what is artificial in the actual nature 
of man"ll+ to lay the foundations for what we have termed a 'procedural de­
vice', that is, a mechanism or, in this case, an assumption by which we 
facilitate some procedure. The procedure with which we are concerned is, 
of course, the contractarian method• the hypothetical decisional process 
by which we may consider the moral dimensions of participation in the 
activities of the state.15 The state of nature in this context, is a 
logical construct which filters the fundamental features of human nature 
from the plethora of secondary traits acquired in successive stages of 
social life. The signal characteristic of the state of nature is its lack 
of what we would regard as social life, presenting us, in regard to 
Rousseau's contractarian method, with a kind of notional experimental 
'control'. On the most basic level, then, man's natural condition is, for 
Rousseau, an 'ideal type' which aids us in, firstly, determining man's 
condition before he entered society; secondly, locating the basic 'princip­
les' of human nature; thirdly, describing and assessing the human condition
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in modern civil society; and, fourthly, constructing an 'original position', 
or starting point, from which to pursue the contractarian method.
On a more sophisticated level, Rousseau's characterization of the 
psychology of natural man excludes all possibility of full freedom^), for 
although he is physically independent natural man's "soul, which nothing 
disturbs, is wholly wrapped up in the feeling of its present existence, 
without any idea of the future, however near at hand; while his projects, 
as limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day".16 The inno­
cent happiness of external independence is not complemented by 'internal' 
control and, while precious in itself, physical liberty is not enough:
"The heart only receives laws from itself", wrote Rousseau in Emile, "by 
wanting to enchain it one releases it; one only enchains it by leaving it 
free."17 Had man remained in his natural condition the problem of free­
dom^ ancj 3) would not have arisen for, indeed, nothing was problematical 
in the state of nature. The emergence of society, however, impinged upon 
physical liberty and, in so doing, generated the possibility of psychologi­
cal liberty: the seeds of autonomy. For although natural man was physi­
cally free, he was not autonomous: he was incapable of rational action 
other than in the mere satisfaction of his appetites. The growth of social 
affiliations and the gradual shedding of natural innocence thus presented 
mankind with the central paradox to which Rousseau addressed himself in all 
his works: that "man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains". 
Expressed in terms of the two aspects of liberty (freedon^), physical free­
dom (freedong) and civil freedom (freedort^ ) , it may be seen that the para­
dox readily expands into a crude syllogism. Firstly, man is free^, or at 
least once was freej and ought to be free3, but, secondly, no man under 
present circumstances can be free3 because freedom^ was lost and the free- 
doni2 made possible by society has not been properly developed, so, thirdly, 
in order to achieve freedon^, man must endure the loss of freedom^ while 
nurturing freedom to a point where freedom is once more possible. The 
attainment of physical freedom is thus dependent upon the realization of 
civil freedom, and when the two are merged we have autonomy. Presented in 
this way, the dialectic of libevty transforms into the dialectic of autono­
my. The revolutionary struggle to break the chains of bondage becomes, 
when all is said and done, a matter of enlightened, if despotic, education. 
"There can be no patriotism without liberty," writes Rousseau in A Dis-
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course on Political Economy, "no liberty without virtue, no virtue without 
citizens; create citizens, and you have everything you need; without them, 
you will have nothing but debased slaves, from the rulers of the State 
downwards. To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to have 
men it is necessary to educate them when they are children."18
The curriculum of this pedagogic revolution grows out of the search 
for happiness: "we must be happy, dear Emile: that is the aim of every
sensitive being: it is the first desire imprinted in us by nature and the
only one which never leaves us."18 And happiness, Rousseau never tires of 
telling us, is the fruit of being truly ourselves, identifying with what 
we are rather than the masks behind which we hide. Society has nurtured a 
yearning for more than it can provide, for it has created an awareness of 
morality unknown to primitive man. Yet this awareness remains stunted and 
frustrated because the conditions of moral agency are unfulfilled - natural 
freedom is beyond us, because we are no longer 'natural', and 'moral' free­
dom tantalizes us because we have not tasted autonomy. The idea of civil 
society, then, rather than society itself (as manifest at any one time) is 
fundamental to the understanding and attainment of autonomy. The moral 
order is essentially a social concept, for it invites participation in the 
practical affairs of communal life and establishes, in theory at least, a 
mode of existence conducive to virtuous, that is, civic-minded, behaviour. 
Natural man is lost forever. Moreover, the moral order is premised upon a 
civic freedom, the self-reflective application of reason to action - we 
would not want to resurrect an identity no longer applicable to our concep­
tions of what we ought to be. The conventions upon which moral order is 
founded thus simultaneously repudiate and embrace the state of nature. It 
is a parable that strikes close to home yet nevertheless remains a parable, 
the point of which lies not in the narrative but in the practical lesson 
we extract from it. "The ideal society", writes Ronald Grimsley, "is a 
kind of microcosm which in its essentials reflects the spiritual order 
governing the universe as a whole. Through his active participation in 
this higher order man will attain a happiness far superior to the merely 
instinctive 'goodness' of primitive man."20
"The philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, 
have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature," writes 
Rousseau in the Second Discourse,
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"but not one of them has got there. Some of them have not 
hesitated to ascribe to man, in such a state, the idea of 
just and unjust, without troubling themselves to show that 
he must be possessed of such an idea, or that it could be 
of any use to him. Others have spoken of the natural right 
of every man to keep what belongs to him, without explaining 
what they meant by 'belongs'. Others, again, beginning by 
giving the strong authority over the weak, proceeded directly 
to the birth of government without regard to the time that 
must have elapsed before the meaning of the words 'authority' 
and 'government' could have existed among men. Everyone of 
them, in short, constantly dwelling on wants, avidity, 
oppression, desires and pride, has transferred to the state 
of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in 
speaking of the savage, they described the social man. It 
has not even entered into the heads of most of our writers 
to doubt whether the state of nature ever existed...."21
The significance of this thinly-veiled attack on Hobbes derives from 
Rousseau's emphasis on the evolution of human behaviour, language, norms 
and institutions. Hobbes is criticized for foisting an image of seven­
teenth century man upon pre-history and retrospectively establishing the 
conditions of contemporary civility. In effect, Rousseau echoes Vico's 
criticism that men who could contractually delimit their freedom of action 
in favour of an omnicompetent sovereign must themselves be the product of 
a sophisticated social order. However, Rousseau's objection to Leviathan 
goes deeper than this. A contrived, tautological argument is easily dis­
missed. Were Hobbes merely indulging in amateurish anthropology his 
formidability would dissolve in a caustic footnote. The real threat to an 
evolutionary conception of humanity posed by Hobbes' state of nature is 
its very opposition to such a conception in the first place. The motion 
of substances in Hobbes' monistic metaphysics reduces to a ruthless circu­
larity that belies, by its very repetitiousness, the possibility of 
'development'. The state of nature, as Hobbes conceives it, is not a 
temporally-confined notion applicable only to the opening moments of an 
irreversible process. Rather, it represents the 'heart of darkness', as 
it were, within all men for all time. It is the core of man's political 
soul; remove the veneer of civility and hibernating natural man will 
awaken. The state of nature, by this account, is a world devoid of strong 
government. In complete contrast to Rousseau, it is an assertion that 
chaos is endemic to human nature, and 'goodness' transitory and contingent. 
Whereas Rousseau takes disunity and selfishness to be the bitter harvest 
of burgeoning, ill-considered social relations, Hobbes looks towards the
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'disorder within'. The fulcrum on which the debate hinges is the necessity 
of man's enslavement to selfish passions. One mythopoeic construction, 
Hobbes', dramatizes the point by elevating Hell to the human realm as 
bellum omnium contra omnes, and then homilizes on the dangers of lurking 
daemonic forces. The other mythopoeic construction, Rousseau's, does not 
counter by appropriating Heaven, but, cleverly, evokes a benign Purgatory 
in which good and evil are unknown. The strategy here is to avoid attribu­
ting anything to human nature other than the most simple intuitive catego­
ries of biological survival. Conflict is unknown because there is nothing 
over which one need quarrel: food, shelter, territory - all are bounteous
and held in common. Circumstances coupled with innate, survival-oriented 
drives and sympathies determine the subsequent course of events. Rationa­
lity and morality grew out of man's interaction with nature, then, not 
full-blown from the godhead. In this respect, Rousseau was more in keeping 
with Spinoza than Calvin, and, like Spinoza, Rousseau penned an outline of 
the rise of civilization in terms of man's response to changing circum­
stances. Each response to some environmental stimulus altered the consti­
tution of the organism, as it were, and each change amended subsequent 
responses. Taken to its logical conclusion, would it not then be possible 
to employ this relationship and direct the means and avenues of change?
Here we can see the emergence of Rousseau's political philosophy as, 
literally, a pedagogy of the oppressed. If inequality arises from differ­
ential responses to changing conditions and resultant contests over rela­
tively diminished resources, then, firstly, reorganize the distribution of 
resources and, secondly, educate men to respond more thoughtfully and 
creatively to new situations. Needless to say, this will initially involve 
a lengthy transitional period in which a planned environment can be estab­
lished and an entire generation educated to the ways of the new order. 
However, in theory at least, it follows from the initial premise of man's 
natural condition that the transition is possible and, if achieved, the 
resultant transformation inevitable. But we are getting ahead of our­
selves. What is important here is that the divergent mythopoems of the 
state of nature lead to radically different political philosophies, and 
vice versa. Priority does not matter: philosophy and mythopoetry lead
incestuous careers, each illuminating the other. Out of a portrait of the 
past grows a vision of the future and, more often than not, a romanticiza- 
tion of the present. What passes for political theory is, in this context,
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little more than catechism and exegesis.
The point at which Rousseau and Hobbes converge is outlined in the 
first two paragraphs of chapter vi, Book 1 of The Social Contract:
"I suppose men to have reached the point at which the 
obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of 
nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the 
resources at the disposal of each individual for his mainte­
nance in that state. That primitive condition can then sub­
sist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it 
changed its manner of existence.
"But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite 
and direct existing ones, they have no other means of pre­
serving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a 
sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These 
they have to bring into play by means of a single motive 
power, and cause to act in concert."22
Rousseau here assumes the reader's familiarity with the second part 
of the Second Discourse in which he traces the "slow succession of events 
and discoveries in the most natural order"23 that led to the emergence of 
fixed private property. Though Rousseau completely discounts Hobbes' con­
tention that man is innately acquisitive, he recognizes that competitive 
possessiveness has become the hallmark of 'civilized' human relations and, 
like Hobbes, identifies the rise of the State with the escape from (a now 
degenerate) natural freedom. Writes Rousseau, "The first man who, having 
enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying 'This is mine', 
and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of 
civil society."214 While the possession of goods in the natural state was 
limited to each person's capacity to defend and utilize what was needed 
for day-to-day self-preservation, the regular production of surplus food 
on an established piece of territory generated two hitherto unconsidered, 
if not unthinkable, notions, firstly, a claim to property rights and, 
secondly, a market for the exchange of commodities. Moreover, the indivi­
dual's conception of himself, his self-awareness of what he is and how he 
appears to others, underwent a concomitant transformation. Whereas once 
the points of reference between men focused on what men were (their natural 
endowments and talents) the rise of personal property shifted attention to 
what men possess: I am what I own. In other words, personal identity was
no longer exclusively a matter of reference to oneself and others as
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persons, but a calculation of the disposition of things in a world increas­
ingly characterized by an inequality of possessions.
The assertion of claims to property rights, then, fostered a radically 
different conception of human relations to the little-considered, roughly- 
hewn notion commonly held at the close of the state of nature. In particu­
lar, it promoted in the successful claimants ('the rich') a fear of the 
less-advantaged who, alone or in coalition, could themselves usurp the 
'false titles' of the former. This sense of insecurity nurtured in turn 
what Rousseau considered to be "the profoundest plan that ever entered the 
mind of man: this was to employ in his favour the forces of those who 
attacked him, to make allies of his adversaries, to inspire them with 
different maxims, and to give them other institutions as favourable to him­
self as the law of nature was unfavourable."2  ^ Rousseau's paradigmatic man 
of property dramaticizes for his neighbours in terms reminiscent of Hobbes 
the horrors of instability and internecine strife:
" 'Let us institute rules of justice and peace', he concludes, 
'to which all without exception may be obliged to conform; 
rules that may in some measure make amends for the caprices of 
fortune, by subjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the 
observance of reciprocal obligations. Let us, in a word, in­
stead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect them in 
a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, repulse their 
common enemies, and maintain eternal harmony among us.' "2^
"All ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty"27, 
comments Rousseau in a passage seemingly in contradiction with the conclu­
sion of Book 1 of the Social Contract-.
"I shall end this chapter and this book by remarking on a fact 
on which the whole social system should rest: i.e. that, in­
stead of destroying natural equality, the fundamental compact 
substitutes, for such physical inequality as nature may have 
set up between man, an equality that is moral and legitimate,
and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence,
• ?  Rbecome every one equal by convention and legal right."
However, Rousseau appends a footnote qualifying this statement to the 
effect that bad governments manufacture an illusory equality because their 
sole interest is to defend the rich. Almost as an afterthought he tacks on 
to the footnote a general comment that renders his annotation quite enigma-
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tic. "In fact," he writes, "laws are always of use to those who possess 
and harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows that the
social state is advantageous to men only when all have something and none 
too much. how is one to reconcile this categorical assertion with the 
remark it is meant to illuminate? All social systems ought to rest on con­
ventions and legal rights because only in this way can we guarantee sub­
stantive equality, yet all laws, we are told, protect only the propertied. 
Granted it is added that social states are "advantageous to men only when 
all have something and none too much", but the textual summation does not 
premise the fundamental compact on a prior re-distribution of resources or 
a commitment to distributive justice. We must consider whether we are 
presented with a genuine internal contradiction, or if Rousseau has improp­
erly presented his argument, in part taking for granted what was later made 
more explicit by Rawls with regard to distributive justice, and in part 
failing to elucidate upon the paedeutic underpinnings of his political 
philosophy.
In the short run, however, it is possible to reconcile the two state­
ments by emphasizing that in the post-natural/pre-civil fluxion men suffer 
from both proprietal and conventional inequalities i.e. inequalities 
arising from the irregular, selective application of norms. At the very 
least, the formation of civil society introduces an element of stability 
and uniformity in the regulation of public behaviour, even if such stabili­
zation consolidates the position of the 'rich' at the expense of the 'poor'. 
The formation of civil society is not questioned so much as the circum­
stances in which it is formed. Given that the presumed prevailing condi­
tions prior to the establishment of civil order demand some rationalization, 
Rousseau is not contesting the fact of rationalization but, rather, the 
inequitable relations between men that a priori, weaken the legitimacy of a 
newly-instituted order. The implication seems to be that should these 
circumstances be changed in favour of greater proprietal equality or should 
the system be so rigorously fair that the rich cannot abuse the law, civil 
society would gain the mantle of legitimacy. In other words, since civil 
society is properly founded on an "equality of right", the true test of 
legitimacy is, firstly, whether or not such an "equality of right" has been 
at least notionally established; secondly, whether or not it is being 
fairly and rigorously enforced; and, thirdly, whether or not the social
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matrix is actually conducive to the realization of egalitarian principles. 
(See Appendix Five.)
One of the aims of the Second Discourse, in sum, is to expose the gap 
between ideal and reality. In the state of nature men were no more than 
animals, but they enjoyed physical liberty; in civil society they are 
developed social beings with linguistic and technical skills, but they are 
either oppressors or, what is more likely, oppressed. What, Rousseau asks, 
has been gained? Unlike earlier writers who underscored the desirability 
of civil society by contrasting it with the horrors of the state of nature, 
Rousseau holds that there is little to choose between the two states of 
existence. He is not, to be sure, a primitivist. But he is anxious to 
show that civil society as it is (the de facto state) represents a missed 
opportunity: an opportunity to achieve a condition which is both social
and free. Such is the civil, or political, society (the de jure state) 
which Rousseau envisages in the Social Contract.
II
The Social Contract
Rousseau, in the Social Contract, implicitly distinguishes between 
three states of existence. The first is the state of nature - the condi­
tion of 'natural' liberty and innocence. Second is what we shall term de 
facto (corrupt) society, i.e. civil society as it is depicted in the Second 
Discourse. The third state, which is civil society as it would be if the 
principles of political right were observed, may be called the 'just 
society'. The just society is not to be understood as a synthesis of the 
state of nature and de facto society, however. The natural liberty and the 
innocent virtue of the state of nature are lost forever. And this loss
i
would be tolerable, Rousseau claims, were it not for the injustices of 
corrupted civil society; for even though man in a civil society is deprived 
of the advantages of the state of nature,
"he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so 
stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feel­
ings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did 
not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below 
that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually
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the happy moment which took him from it for ever, and, 
instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him 
an intelligent being and a man."30
The just society, as Rousseau conceives it, ends the abuses and ful­
fils the promise of corrupted civil society. It substitutes civil liberty 
- freedom2 under law - for natural liberty (the freedom^ of the beast in 
the wilderness). Property, "which can be founded only on a positive 
title", supplants possession, "which is merely the effect of force or the 
right of the first occupier".31 Above all, in a just society the laws are 
applied fairly and the interests of all receive equal attention. This con­
ception of the just society, as mentioned lies behind Rousseau's remark 
that "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains". According to the 
hypothetical anthropology of the Second. Discourse, man is indeed born free^; 
but his development into a social being requires that he exchange his 
natural independence for the bonds of society. These social "chains" - or 
this "yoke", another metaphor Rousseau uses frequently - are as much a 
feature of the just society as of de facto society. The question to be 
answered in the Social Contract is, under what conditions are these chains 
justified? This is what Rousseau means when he says, "One thinks himself 
the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did 
this change come about? I do not know.32 What can make it legitimate?
That question I think I can answer."33
The Social Contract, then, is an inquiry into the moral foundations 
of the state, or, as the subtitle proclaims, into the Principles of Politi­
cal Right. Rousseau begins this inquiry by dismissing the idea that poli­
tical right is, as Locke would have it, natural. It is, instead, a matter 
of convention:
"But the social order is a sacred right which serves as 
a foundation for all other rights. This right, however, 
since it comes not by nature, must have been built upon 
conventions. To discover what these conventions are is the 
matter of our inquiry."34
The defense of this claim comprises two brief chapters in which 
"natural" accounts of the origin of political authority are rejected. In 
the first Rousseau attacks the argument that the right of the state is 
natural because it is simply an outgrowth of the most ancient and natural
238
of all societies, the family. Rather than deny that civil society may have 
developed from (or on the model of) the family, Rousseau turns the tables 
on his opponents by asserting that the "natural bonds" which unite the 
family are dissolved when children reach maturity. Once children outgrow 
their dependence on their parents, parents and children alike return to a 
state of independence. "If they remain united," Rousseau says, "they con­
tinue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is 
then maintained only by convention."35 The analogy with the family, con­
sequently, fails to demonstrate that political right is natural rather than 
conventional.
In the second of these chapters Rousseau considers the argument that 
political authority derives from the right of the strongest. Since strength 
is a natural capacity, political right would, on this argument, also be 
natural. Rousseau's response is to point out that force creates no right. 
Those who maintain that it does, he says, simply confuse prudential and 
moral reasoning. "To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will - 
at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?"36
Once he has disposed of these arguments, Rousseau believes that he has 
made his point: there is no natural authority of man over man, and all
legitimate authority among men is, therefore, conventional. The next ques­
tion is, what is the nature and scope of this (these) convention(s)? 
Rousseau is especially concerned to delimit what men can reasonably be said 
to have agreed to, and he is particularly anxious to rebut the claim that 
slavery is or can be conventional - i.e. that one person can agree to en­
slave himself to another. The reason for this concern goes beyond opposi­
tion to slavery, for Rousseau is aware that justifications of slavery can 
also be used, mutatis mutandis, to justify despotism.
The ethical impotence of coercion is, for Rousseau, the starting point 
of political philosophy; for it allows one to move beyond descriptive 
analyses of de facto circumstances and formulate normative problems deman­
ding de jure solutions.
The master-slave relation, according to Rousseau, is a 'contractual' 
rather than a natural condition; moreover, insofar as it is founded in 
coercion and not in right, it is an illegitimate contract. One would never
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willingly submit to servitude, argues Rousseau, nor could one regard any 
convention flowing from coercion alone as morally binding. An absolutism 
derived from power alone, in other words, is a shallow, non-reflexive 
dominion, i.e. its legitimacy is self-referring, dependent upon the 
enforced quietude of its subjects. In keeping with Locke and Montesquieu, 
Rousseau rejected Grotius' and Pufendorf's arguments endorsing voluntary 
submission to absolutism: "If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate
his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why could not a whole 
people do the same and make itself subject to a king?"37 A person cannot 
rightfully dispossess himself of his liberty, nor a people of theirs, con­
tends Rousseau, because liberty is essentially inalienable. Yet how does 
this accord with Rousseau's solution of the fundamental problem of politi­
cal philosophy in Book I, chapter vi?
Rousseau states that "(to) alienate is to give or to sell".38 Clear­
ly, if man is "born free" he has at the very least, freedom^, which he can 
surrender or 'sell'. If we assume that people act rationally, we generally 
mean that they act in accordance with their perceived advantage. Rousseau 
contends that because one could never be advantaged by the gratuitous 
divestiture of freedom one would not voluntarily do so: "To say that a
man gives himself gratuitously, is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; 
such an act is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that he who does 
it is out of his mind."38 So, if liberty can be rationally alienated the 
only possible mode of divestment is exchange, that is, 'selling' one's 
liberty for some perceived advantage. But this advantage must be a con­
siderable one, else the 'sale' be so lop-sided in the purchaser's favour 
that the bargain be no genuine exchange at all. Yet, Rousseau regards 
liberty (even freedonq) as priceless (unless, of course, it is set aside 
in the process of realizing freedomg), an aspect of one's humanity so 
central that "(to) renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surren­
der the rights of humanity and even its duties."40 Since moral agency 
hinges on freedom of choice (and moral agency alone is that which properly 
defines humanity) the renunciation of liberty "is incompatible with man's 
nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from 
his acts."41 Because liberty is priceless it is equally irrational to 
gratuitously renounce it or to 'sell' it; consequently, the voluntary 
alienation of liberty is beyond rational man. This is one of the principal 
axes on which turns the argument of the Social Contract; or, properly
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speaking, it is one of Rousseau's principal axioms, for it does not flow 
from an argued case but rests entirely upon what he takes to be its intui­
tive good sense. Its centrality derives from the emphasis Rousseau places 
upon the sanctity of liberty as the critical concern of political philos­
ophy, and in terms of which he delineates the boundaries of the "fundamen­
tal problem".
Leaving aside, for the moment, the argument for the enhancement of 
one's liberty, the only seemingly rational case for the divestiture of 
freedom^, declares Rousseau, is that from survival. "Grotius and the 
rest", remarks Rousseau, "find in war another origin for the so-called 
right of slavery. The victor having, as they hold, the right of killing 
the vanquished, the latter can buy back his life at the price of his 
liberty; and this convention is the more legitimate because it is to the 
advantage of both parties."142 The assumption here, of course, is that the 
victor has a right granted by conquest, and that it is to the advantage of 
all to come to some sort of arrangement by which the conquered live and the 
conqueror rules. Since loss of life naturally entails loss of liberty, the 
vanquished is rationally bound to bargain for the maximum possible advan­
tage, i.e. his life. The 'conquest argument', then, attempts to fashion a 
mutually-advantageous equilibrium of interests between radically unequal 
participants in a competitive-anarchic environment. Interests are differ­
entially weighted in accordance with the relative dominance of one party; 
thus, the 'conqueror', by virtue of his dominance, sees his entire set of 
interests (ranging from mere survival to absolute sovereignty) at the heart 
of any notional calculation, while the conquered may rationally bargain 
only for his basic interests, of which the most fundamental is survival.
It is assumed, of course, that the conqueror has completely defeated his 
rivals, otherwise the bargaining situation is altered in favour of the 
partially-defeated who will rationally pursue additional interests.
As the second step of argumentation in Leviathan, the conquest argu­
ment assumes a dramatic alteration in the state of nature, which for Hobbes 
is composed of equal participants ('atoms') in a competitive-anarchic 
environment. The domination of one person or group of persons in this con­
dition inexorably leads to the dissolution of this natural state, since 
dominion entails the defeat of others, which further entails the imposition 
of order by the establishment of unequal but mutually-advantageous equilib-
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r i a .  S in c e  r i g h t s  a r e  n e g o t i a b l e  com m od it ies  i n  a ze ro -su m  game i n  which 
some m ust l o s e  a l l  t h e i r  r i g h t s  so  t h a t  o t h e r s  can  be s e c u r e  -  and v i r t u a l ­
l y  ev e ry o n e  (w i th  a t  l e a s t  one e x c e p t io n )  m ust l o s e  some r i g h t s  so  t h a t  
e v e ry o n e  may be s e c u r e  (each  s e v e r a l l y  s u b m its  t o  and t h e r e f o r e  c o n t r a c t s  
w i th  t h e  s o v e re ig n )  -  t h e  H obbes ian  a c c o u n t  o f  a m ora l  o r d e r  i s  t h a t  m ost 
i n c l u s i v e  s e t  o f  e f f i c i e n t l y - e n f o r c e d ,  m u tu a l ly - a d v a n ta g e o u s  e q u i l i b r i a  
be tw een  u n e q u a l  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  a g iv e n  t e r r i t o r y .  Such an o r d e r  i s  a 
m o ra l  one on th e  u n a b a s h e d ly  u t i l i t a r i a n  g rounds  t h a t ,  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  c o n c e r n e d ,  i t  i s  t h e  o n ly  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  g i v e s  e v e ry o n e  
so m e th in g  and (w i th  a t  l e a s t  one e x c e p t io n )  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  a l l  u n i f o r m ly .
I t  i s  'm o r a l ' ,  t h e n ,  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  t h e  ' b e s t '  f o r  a l l  c o n c e rn e d .  M oreover, 
a rg u e d  H obbes, i t  a lo n e  w orks ;  a  p r a g m a t ic  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  r e l e g a t e s  
o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  th e  r e a lm  o f  t h e  f a n c i f u l .
R ousseau  c h a l l e n g e d  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  r i s e  o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  on 
s i x  g ro u n d s :  (1) i t  p r e s e n t s  an i n a c c u r a t e  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ,
w hich  f o r  R ousseau  i s  composed o f  u n e q u a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  a n o n - c o m p e t i t i v e  
a n a r c h i c  e n v iro n m e n t ;  (2) i t  d oes  n o t  p l a c e  t h e  d e ve lopm en t o f  c i v i l  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  human e v o l u t i o n  a s  i t s  p ro d u c ts ; (3) in
r e g a r d i n g  r i g h t s  a s  n e g o t i a b l e  com m od it ies  Hobbes h a s  d e v a lu e d  th e  v e ry  
n o t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  t o  th e  p o i n t  o f  w o r t h l e s s n e s s ;  (4) t h e  a l l e g e d  ' r i g h t '  o f  
c o n q u e s t  i s  no ' r i g h t '  a t  a l l ;  (5) H obbes ' c o n c e p t io n  does  n o t  p r o v id e  an 
a c c o u n t  o f  c i t i z e n s h i p  i n  any m e a n in g fu l  s e n s e ,  b u t  o n ly  a form  o f  n e g o t i a ­
t e d  s l a v e r y  t h a t  m i n d l e s s l y  c h a in s  f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s  t o  th e  f e a r s ,  f o i b l e s  
and f a i l u r e s  o f  t h e i r  a n c e s t o r s ;  and , (6) a m ora l  o r d e r  i s  d e r i v e d  from 
n e i t h e r  p r a g m a t i c  n o r  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  from j u s t i c e .
R ousseau  do es  n o t  d i s p u t e  t h e  common a s su m p t io n  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  f o r  a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a ze ro -su m  game e n t a i l s  t h e  v e c t o r i n g  o f  p e r s o n a l  
i n t e r e s t s ;  w ha t  he d o e s ,  how ever ,  i s  t o  i n j e c t  a f u r t h e r  e le m e n t  i n t o  th e  
game -  th e  g e n e r a l  w i l l  -  i n  te rm s  o f  w hich  t h e  s a c r i f i c e  o f  p e r s o n a l  
i n t e r e s t s  makes p o s s i b l e  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  more im p o r t a n t  c iv ic  i n t e r e s t s .  
C iv i c  i n t e r e s t s ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  R ousseau , a r e  p a r t  and p a r c e l  o f  e a c h  c i t i ­
z e n ' s  o v e r a l l  s e t  o f  i n t e r e s t s  b u t ,  a s  we s h a l l  see  i n  S e c t i o n  I I I ,  a r e  
i n c a p a b le  o f  r e a l i z a t i o n  f o r  th e  w an t o f  a  s u i t a b l e  m a t r ix :  a m o ra l  o r d e r
o r  j u s t  s o c i e t y  in  w hich  p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  b a la n c e d  so  a s  t o  e l i c i t  
and enhance  c i v i c  i n t e r e s t s .
242
It is the fourth point outlined above that occupies Rousseau's atten­
tion in Book I, chapter iv of the Social Contract. In refuting Hobbes' war 
of each against all Rousseau introduces his conception of the rise of civil 
society. The attack on Grotius is secondary to Rousseau's task, as if the 
inclusion of this noted gentleman added weight to an otherwise uncompromi­
sing rejection of Hobbes. To recapitulate, then, the state of nature is a 
somewhat non-competitive anarchy, according to Rousseau, characterized 
neither by peace nor war but by transitory/ irregular relationships: men
are not natural1 enemies. Wars are generated by the institution of proper­
ty, "and, as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal relations, 
but only out of real relations, private war, or war of man with man, can 
exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no constant property, 
nor in the social state, where everything is under the authority of the 
l a w s . W a r s  are fought not between individuals but between states, and 
insofar as individuals are engaged in wars they confront each other not as 
citizens of their respective states, but as combatants 'defending the 
fatherland'. The Hobbesian formula for the manufacture of civil society is 
therefore by implication an inversion of what Rousseau takes to be the 
natural course of events. Order, merely factitious or otherwise, is not 
the product of war, rather, it is the preface to war.
According to Rousseau's logic (following Montesquieu), the purpose of 
war is the subjugation of hostile states, not citizens. Once the citizens 
of a hostile state lay down their arms they are no longer enemies and no 
one has any further 'right' over their lives. Paradoxically, the right 
over life thrown into question by war is rendered unproblematical once the 
conflict is resolved: conquest deprives the conqueror of his alleged right
over the conquered since his success has ended the war. Consequently, 
attempts to develop arguments for the legitimacy of alienated liberty dis­
solve into questions of power and prudence, but not right. Furthermore, 
whether prudential or not, "(by) taking an equivalent for his [victim's] 
life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing him without 
profit, he has killed him usefully. So far then is he from acquiring over 
him any authority in addition to that of force, the state of war contin­
ues...."14^ Forced consent cannot create an obligation because obligations 
pertain only to moral agents, persons possessed of volition and physical 
liberty; or, as Rousseau puts it, "(the) words slave and right contradict 
each other, and are mutually exclusive."145
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Underlying Rousseau's rebuttal of the fact of submission as the 
justification (and paradigm) of de facto civil associations is a deeper, 
unrelenting hostility to all inequitable civil relations. Physical in­
equalities will be overcome in the wake of moral equality, not vice versa. 
Since obligations and rights are properly formulated and undertaken by 
moral agents, and such agency is made possible before all else by freedom^ 
and freedom2 (the freedom to cogitate and choose) the only policy guaran­
teeing the uniform assumption and application of obligations and rights 
within a polity is one of equal citizenship for all. A just society, in 
other words, is an ecology of citizens, equally free persons united by 
common rights and obligations. Once more, if the telos of man is moral 
agency which, in turn, flows from liberty, then the voluntary renunciation 
of freedom for any reason other than its eventual enhancement entails the 
self-denial of one's humanity. A moral order is rational, then, only inso­
far as its attainment guarantees the conditions of moral agency. Author­
ity, as the right to compel compliance with an obligation, is thus made 
possible within this context by its enhancement of liberty. Rather than 
counterpoising each other, authority and liberty combine to achieve what 
Kant later termed autonomy. One is free3 i-n that one obeys only oneself, 
that is, expressions of one's own will. In undertaking and fulfilling an 
obligation, argued Rousseau, one is exercising one's autonomy. Given that, 
on the whole, an obligation as it were unites one person's will with 
another's (in that a contractual obligation expresses the will of at least 
two several contracting parties), the existence of obligations presumes 
stable relations between moral agents. Moreover, it is presumed that since 
an obligation places a restriction on one's freedom, the unwarranted breach 
of an obligation not only represents the frustration of others' expecta­
tions but, more importantly, the trivialization of the voluntary vectoring 
of one's freedom: one has devalued one's right to freedomg and partially
destabilized the relations between moral agents that, on the most basic 
level, constitute a moral order. Further, since (moral) authority is 
solely premised upon 'right' (what is morally obligatory) a moral order - 
as a matrix of social interaction within which, as Kant would put it, one's 
will can be united with another's under a universal law of freedom - is 
necessarily authoritative. In other words, authority is a necessary en- 
tailment of morality, which flows from autonomous agency, itself made 
possible by freedom.
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The clustering of these concepts (freedom, morality, autonomy and 
authority) provides the conditions in which obligations may be properly 
undertaken and fulfilled. Thus, for Rousseau (as for Kant), the philoso­
phical problem of 'legitimacy' reduces to the more basic consideration of 
what constitutes a moral order or just society. Needless to say, this 
lies in complete contrast to the pragmatic 'political' problem of legiti­
macy (expressed most forcefully by Hobbes) in terms of which a state is 
legitimate as a consequence of its monopoly of force over the most inclu­
sive set of decisional activities within some territory. The process is 
here reversed. Rousseau and Kant acknowledge such a monopoly and omni- 
competence as the practical result of a previously established authority. 
'Illegitimacy' is therefore a possibility for Rousseau and Kant even within 
a successful coercive apparatus, since the seeds of legitimacy were sown 
elsewhere, namely, in the moral foundations of the state and in its current 
manifestation and performance. Consequently, a legitimate government may 
become illegitimate through abrogation of the principles of its underpin­
ning moral order. Likewise, an illegitimate government may acquire a 
degree of legitimacy through its enhancement of moral order - Rousseau and 
Kant are far more cautious on this point. In its most sophisticated form, 
as presented by Max Weber, the political problem reduces to questions of 
social psychology: legitimacy as a belief held by the government and the
citizenry that the former has a right to rule. Rousseau and Kant, however, 
regard this as a secondary issue that arises in the wake of the philosophi­
cal problem: the just state as the fruit of a moral order. The belief in
a civil obligation to obey the laws of the state, that is, a belief in the 
basis of legitimacy, must be founded in an actual obligation, according to 
Rousseau and Kant. A moral order is the crucible of civil obligation on 
this view; in the final analysis, it is the only crucible.
The schematic argument of the Social Contract, as developed in Book I 
up to chapter iv, might be termed a 'formal paradox', with the conclusion 
drawn from the premises thus far given as a question demanding of a practi­
cal answer. The practical implication (which is thrown up by rather than 
deduced from the initial argument) is a further argument (embedded in the 
formal paradox) the unpacking of which constitutes the bulk of the text.
In other words, Rousseau in the Social Contract firstly endeavours to 
arrive at the fundamental problem of political philosophy; secondly, having 
formulated the problem defends this particular formulation; and, thirdly,
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solves the problem and defends his solution. With regard to Rousseau's 
first step, the formal paradox is itself the product of two logically prior 
strands of argument - A and B below. The conclusions of these two prelimi­
nary arguments constitute the premises of the reasoning by which Rousseau 
arrives at an initial formulation of the fundamental problem. The argument 
is as follows:
A 1. The telos of man is to be a moral agent. (This is the 
fundamental axiom upon which Rousseau builds his entire 
argument.)
2. Morality is premised entirely upon freedom.
3. Therefore, to renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's
humanity: a rational impossibility.
B 1. A moral order is a (cooperative) mode of association which 
facilitiates rational interaction between free persons,
i.e. it maximizes the effective conditions of reason in 
action.
2. Insofar as men consider the moral status of actual social 
conditions they reflect upon the (presumed) principles of 
moral order. Individuals make comparisons between what is 
and what ought to be the case.
3. Since the signal characteristic of moral order is rational 
(cooperative) interaction between free persons, a common 
conception of what ought to be the case (that is, the 
principles of moral order) will arise from agreement between 
equally free persons. This is the contractarian method.
The proper application of the contractarian method, harnessed with 
the assumption that one cannot renounce liberty3 leads to a single general 
conclusion: the only sort of association open to equally free rational
persons is one in which the freedom of each is guaranteed. The political 
problem flowing from this general conclusion is how to implement it in 
practical affairs, i.e. how to fashion (or refashion) actual associations 
so as to ensure equal individual liberty. In other words, how can the 
contractarian method aid us in achieving autonomy without sacrificing 
authority?
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Rousseau is now in a position to set out his own account of the con­
vention which establishes political authority. This convention is a unani­
mous agreement by a group of people to form a body politic. And this 
convention is what Rousseau calls the social compact or contract.
But if the social contract is to serve as the foundation of legitimate 
civil authority, Rousseau must show how it avoids the problems detailed in 
the Second Discourse. Can there be a system of political right which does 
not subordinate the interests of some to the interests of others? Does the 
social contract require the individual to relinquish his personal power and 
freedom - "the chief instruments of his self-preservation" - only to betray 
him? The problem, once more, is that
"Some form of association must be found as a result of 
which the whole strength of the community will be enlisted 
for the protection of the person and property of each con­
stituent member, in such a way that each, when united to 
his fellows, renders obedience to his own will, and remains 
as free as before. This is the basic problem of which the 
Social Contract provides the solution."1*6
This is the heart of Rousseau's conception of the just society. It is also 
an indication of the crucial role the social contract plays in his theory, 
and it will be necessary, therefore, to examine closely this passage and 
the rest of the brief chapter on "The Social Compact" (Book I, chapter vi).
To begin with, Rousseau clearly thinks of the social contract as a way 
of defining the terms under which rational individuals could agree to 
accept the authority of the state. There is no suggestion that there ever 
has been an actual social contract. That is, the content, or 'clauses', of 
all contracts among individuals to form a body politic is always and every­
where the same. This is because the content of the contract is "determined 
by the nature of the act", as Rousseau puts it, and "the slightest modifi­
cation would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have 
perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and 
everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized...."1*7 And if the clauses of 
this one and only possible contract are not adhered to, everyone regains 
his natural liberty - if not his natural innocence. This, indeed, is what 
distinguishes the just from the corrupt society: those in power in the
corrupt society fail to observe the terms of the social contract.
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But what are these terms or clauses? Rousseau never lists them, but 
he does say that "properly understood" they reduce to one clause:
"the total alienation of each associate, together with all 
his rights, to the whole community; for... as each gives 
himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; 
and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them 
burdensome to others.1,1+8
The emphasis here, although the word is not mentioned, is on equality. 
Rousseau's social contract stipulates that every individual surrender his 
original power and liberty and acknowledge the authority of a community in 
which he is an equal partner. This means that each member renounces his 
natural liberty in favour of civil or conventional liberty - equal freedom 
under lau - and exchanges his power to possess all that he can for the 
social recognition and protection of a property right - equal protection 
under taw. In Rousseau's words, this equality under law guarantees that
"each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to 
nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does 
not acquire the same right as he yields others over him­
self, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and 
an increase of force for the preservation of what he has."48
This is still rather vague, of course. What, after all, can Rousseau 
mean when he says that some form of association must be found in which 
each, "when united to his fellows, renders obedience to his own will, and 
remains as free as before"? This seems to contradict the very purpose of 
the political association, which is to establish an authority which in some 
respects supersedes the will of the individual. And how can one possibly 
be as free as before when he is subject to the commands of the state? 
Further, Rousseau's distillation of the "essence" of the social contract 
only raises more perplexing questions. What does it mean to say that,
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common 
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in 
our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indi­
visible part of the whole."50
Passages such as these have led some critics to denounce Rousseau as 
a metaphysical mystifier or obscurantist. While these charges are unfair,
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it is certainly true that Rousseau's terse and abstract exposition is often 
unclear and underdeveloped. If we are to make sense of these passages, in 
any case, we must first understand what Rousseau means by the general will.
Ill
The General Will
What is this 'general will' which, according to Rousseau, is the 
"essence" of the social contract? There is, unfortunately, no quick and 
easy answer to this question: Rousseau is notoriously unclear on the
matter - which is not to say that he is incomprehensible - and, as mention­
ed, the commentaries on the Social Contract present a bewildering variety 
of responses.51 What is offered here, then, is an unavoidably long and 
involved answer to this apparently straightforward question. Our answer 
has two parts. In the first is set out an interpretation of the general 
will; in the second this interpretation is defended by showing how it helps 
us to understand some of the more baffling aspects of Rousseau's argument 
in the Social Contract.
The idea of a general will rests on a fundamental distinction between 
what are taken to be two aspects of a person. Everyone, in Rousseau's 
view, is both a human being - a concrete person - and (at least potential­
ly) a citizen - an abstract person. Insofar as we are human beings, we are 
each unique; that is, each of us has his own particular identity and set of 
interests. Insofar as we are citizens, on the other hand, we are all alike 
in that we are all members of a 'public. And as members of a public we 
share a common interest in the welfare of the body politic. Everyone, 
consequently, according to Rousseau, has both a particular* interest as a 
human being and a general interest as a citizen.
From this distinction between one's interest qua human being and one's 
interest qua the citizen, Rousseau moves to a distinction between the 
particular will and the general will. The particular will aims at the ful­
filment of the particular interest of a person, an actual individual, while 
the general will seeks to further the interest of the citizen. Since, it 
is presumed, the interests of all citizens are the same, the general will
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may be said to reflect the common or public interest - the interest we all 
have as members of the public. Rousseau distinguishes the particular from 
the general will in this fashion: "the particular will tends, by its very
nature, to partiality, while the general will tends to equality."52 As 
men, that is, with particular wills, we naturally tend to grant precedence 
to our own idiosyncratic interests and desires. Thus, the particular will 
is partial both because it is the will of an identifiable individual and 
because it is, in a sense, biased - it places a higher value on the 
interests of the self than on the interests of others. The general will, 
by contrast, tends to equality because it can do nothing but grant conside­
ration to everyone's interests. By focusing on the common interest we all 
share as citizens, in other words, the general will is impartial: it con­
siders only the interests of the abstract person Rousseau calls 'the citi­
zen'. Since we are all the same qua citizens, the general will is devoted 
equally to all of us.
An example may help to clarify this distinction. Consider the case of 
an individual who possesses to a high degree the skills of a thief. Such a 
person may find it in his interest to put his skills to use and break the 
law. His particular will may then be to steal from others in order to 
satisfy his own desires. But it is also true that this same law prohibi­
ting robbery benefits him qua member of the public, for it protects his 
property as well as others'. The particular will points one way and the 
general will another. If only his interests are considered, of course, our 
potential thief will put his talents to work because, by hypothesis, he may 
gain more of what he wahts by breaking the law than by observing it. His 
interests qua man, it seems, may outweigh his interests qua citizen.
In Part Seven we will consider the pitfalls of this conception of 
human interests, in particular, the assumption of identical civil interests 
held in common by a (theoretically) homogeneous citizenry, each citizen 
severally situated within the civil matrix so as to gain equally from a 
common political-decisional viewpoint. It will be argued that while moving 
from premises similar to Vico's, Rousseau commits the Vichian error of 
apophrades by invoking a conception of order and civility alien to the 
'world of men'. That is to say, while adopting a social evolutionary per­
spective, Rousseau frustrates his ambition to analyse things 'as they are' 
by imposing on them an image not only of things as they 'might be' but
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but things as they 'morally must become'. However, in this Part and in 
Part Pive, when discussing Rawls' development of Rousseau, we will concen­
trate on what might be termed the 'most favourable' interpretation of 
Rousseau - an immensely fertile viewpoint that has much to offer, but only 
in (a strictly theoretical) context.
Rousseau does not invoke the general will, however, simply as a 
counterbalance to selfish interests. This would be a futile move, for, as 
Rousseau recognizes, the policy which is in one's net interest will often 
differ from one's interest qua member of the community. A farmer, to use 
another example, may find that it is in his interests, all things consider­
ed, for food prices to increase even though such an increase is not in his 
interests qua citizen. The point of the distinction between the general 
will and the particular will is to show that public policy decisions should 
not be based simply on considerations of self-interest; for this will re­
sult in the constant clash of particular interests and inequitable outcomes 
as everyone pursues the policy of greatest benefit to himself. What 
Rousseau suggests as an alternative is that decisions establishing laws and 
policies should be made solely on the basis of the common interest. This 
is no mere platitude. The common interest is, for Rousseau, the interest 
of each individual considered abstractly. No reference is made to the 
actual attributes of anyone - not to his possessions, his position in 
society, his abilities, or any of his characteristics. Instead, all indi­
viduals are considered only qua citizens, qua members of the public, and 
from this standpoint all have the same interests. Considered abstractly, 
as citizens, the thief and his victim share a common interest in the en­
forcement of a law against theft, and the farmer and the shopper share a 
common interest in a policy which prevents a rise in food prices.
Rousseau's claim is that only the general will of the citizen - and not the 
particular will of the man - is relevant to public policy decisions.
When Rousseau uses the notion of the general will, then, he means by 
it neither a psychological construct nor a metaphysical self which is in 
conflict with a base, appetitive self. The general will is, on the con­
trary, a moral imperative. The purpose of this imperative (as for Kant's 
categorical imperative) is to guarantee that the claims of no particular 
individual(s) are given preference. Everyone receives equal consideration 
because public policy decisions take into account only the viewpoint of the
251
citizen - and this viewpoint is shared by all. Any other viewpoint is 
morally irrelevant. Here again we see the emphasis on formal equality.
Thus Rousseau writes that
"the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of 
such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the 
same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights. 
Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every act of 
Sovereignty, every authentic act of the general will, binds or 
favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recog­
nizes only the body of the nation, and draws no distinctions 
between those of whom it is made up."53
A further implication is that laws established in accordance with the 
general will do more than simply grant equal (initial) consideration to 
everyone: they actually are in everyone's interest. This is because a law
sanctioned by the general will promotes everyone's interest qua citizen. 
Such a law is not likely to be the first choice of many individuals, but it 
is an acceptable choice for all because it makes some contribution to 
everyone's well-being. It is, as Brian Barry has said, "a sort of highest 
common factor of agreements".5^
There is also a close connection between the general will and 
Rousseau's conception of moral liberty. If the people are furnished with 
adequate information, Rousseau says, and are allowed no communication when 
they deliberate (to prevent 'logrolling' manoeuvres), the outcome of their 
vote will be in accordance with the general will. Everyone can readily 
vote for and obey laws which are in his interest qua citizen, and this 
satisfies Rousseau's definition of liberty as "obedience to a law which we 
prescribe to ourselves...."55.
Two important points remain to be discussed before we turn to a 
defense of this interpretation of the general will. First, Rousseau does 
not confine the notion of a particular will to individuals: groups may
also have particular wills. This is the case with what Rousseau calls 
"factions" or "partial associations", i.e. groups within the body politic 
which have distinct identities and interests. Rousseau disapproves of 
these associations because he fears that they will divert the loyalty of 
the people from the state; men will think of themselves as merchants, or 
farmers, or Catholics, rather than citizens. When this happens, Rousseau
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w a m s ,  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l s  o f  t h e s e  r i v a l  g ro u p s  w i l l  keep  t h e  g e n e r a l  
w i l l  from  p r e v a i l i n g  when th e  p e o p le  v o t e .  He a r g u e s ,  c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  t h a t  
" p a r t i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s "  s h o u ld  be p r e v e n t e d  from  fo rm in g ;  and  i f  p r o p h y la c ­
t i c  m ea su res  f a i l ,  th e n  " i t  i s  b e s t  to  have  a s  many a s  p o s s i b l e  and  t o  p r e ­
v e n t  them from  b e in g  u n e q u a l .  . . .  1,55.
The se co n d  p o i n t  h a s  t o  do w i th  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  w i l l ,  o r  
w ha t  may be c a l l e d  i t s  r a n g e  o f  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  A c c o rd in g  t o  R ou sseau ,  th e  
g e n e r a l  w i l l  a p p l i e s  t o  la w s ,  b u t  n o t  t o  d e c r e e s .  A law i s  a g e n e r a l  
p o l i c y ,  a  r u l e  w hich  g o v e rn s  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  e v e ry  member o f  t h e  body p o l i ­
t i c ,  w h i le  a d e c re e  i s  an a c t  w hich  r e f e r s  t o  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i d e n t i f i a b l e  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  The g e n e r a l  w i l l  " l o s e s  i t s  n a t u r a l  r e c t i t u d e  when i t  i s  
d i r e c t e d  t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  and  d e t e r m i n a n t  o b j e c t ,  b e c a u s e  i n  su c h  a c a se  
we a r e  j u d g in g  o f  s o m e th in g  f o r e i g n  to  u s ,  and  have  no t r u e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
e q u i t y  t o  g u id e  u s " . 57 T here  i s  no  " t r u e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u i t y "  i n  t h e s e  
c a s e s  b e c a u s e  men, n o t  c i t i z e n s ,  a r e  i n v o lv e d .  I n s t e a d  o f  a p p e a l i n g  t o  th e  
g e n e r a l  w i l l ,  we m ust d e c id e  on th e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  -  and 
d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  a r e  b e s t  l e f t  t o  e x e c u t i v e s  and ju d g e s ,  n o t  t o  th e  
p e o p le  a s  a w h o le .
The d e f e n s e  o f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  w i l l  d e v e lo p s  by 
show ing t h a t  i t  a l l o w s  us t o  make s e n se  o f  some o f  th e  o b s c u re  and  p u z z l i n g  
p a s s a g e s  i n  t h e  S o c ia l C ontract and t h a t  i t  r e s o l v e s  t h e  a p p a r e n t  c o n t r a ­
d i c t i o n s  i n  R o u s s e a u 's  a rg u m e n t.  We w i l l  c o n c e n t r a t e  on th e  f o l l o w i n g  f o u r  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  S o c ia l Contract'. (1) What does  R ousseau  mean when he sa y s  
t h a t  one may be " f o r c e d  to  be f r e e " ?  (2) What i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  
th e  g e n e r a l  w i l l  and t h e  w i l l  o f  a l l ?  (3) How i s  i t  t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  w i l l  
i s  a lw ay s  r i g h t ?  and (4) What i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  v o t i n g  -  e s p e c ­
i a l l y  m a j o r i t y  r u l e  -  and  th e  g e n e r a l  w i l l ?
(1) P e rh a p s  t h e  m ost famous -  o r  in fam ous  -  a rg u m en t o f  t h e  S o c ia l  
C ontract i s  t h a t  w hich  i n c l u d e s  t h e  p h r a s e ,  " f o r c e d  to  be f r e e "  (Book I ,  
c h a p t e r  v i i ) . The i d e a  t h a t  someone may be f o r c e d  t o  be f r e e  s t r i k e s  many 
r e a d e r s  a s  b o th  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  and r e p u l s i v e .  How can  one be f o r c e d  t o  
be f r e e ,  i t  i s  a s k e d ,  when freedom  i s  t h e  v e ry  a b sen c e  o f  c o e r c io n ?  B u t 
t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  o n ly  h o ld s  i f  ' f r e e d o m ' i s  u n d e r s to o d  i n  i t s  n a r ro w ,  'n e g a ­
t i v e '  o r  ' p r o b l e m a t i c a l '  s e n s e .  R ousseau  h i m s e l f ,  a s  we have  s e e n ,  c o n ­
c e i v e s  o f  t h r e e  o r d e r s  o f  freedom  -  n a t u r a l ,  c i v i l ,  and m o ra l  -  and he
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defines moral liberty ('autonomy', in Kant's sense of the term) as "obed­
ience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves....". When he says that one 
may be forced to be free, he means that one may be compelled to obey a law 
to which one has given one's consent.
This, of course, does not remove all objections. For why should one 
have to be forced to obey a law to which he has consented? Is not this 
also self-contradictory? Given Rousseau's distinction between particular 
and general wills, it clearly is not. The particular will of a man who 
cheats on his taxes, for example, is in conflict with his general will as 
a citizen. He may "look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratui­
tous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the 
payment of it is burdensome to himself" and therefore "wish to enjoy the 
rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a sub­
ject."58 These aims are contradictory because the cheater wants both to 
enjoy the benefits of the social order - "the rights of citizenship" - and 
to avoid contributing his fair share to the maintenance of this order - 
"the duties of a subject". If he follows his particular will, he acts 
against the general will. "The continuance of such an injustice," Rousseau 
observes,
"could not but prove the undoing of the body politic.
"In order then that the social compact may not be an 
empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking... 
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be 
compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing 
less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is 
the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, 
secures him against personal dependence."58
A persistent sceptic may still harbour a doubt - what has this to do 
with freedom? Why not simply say that members of the body politic will not 
be allowed to take unfair advantage of their fellows? Rousseau speaks of 
freedom here because he considers the state - or at least a just state - to 
be the realm of freedom. Civil society grants equal rights and liberties 
to all and secures everyone from personal dependence. Anyone who accepts 
and follows social rules whenever they favour him but breaks them whenever 
it suits his purposes contributes to the destruction of that realm. Such a 
person is a parasite whose actions threaten his own freedom as well as that 
of others. For this reason Rousseau says that the parasite must be "forced
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to be free" - to act in accordance with his will as a citizen.55
(2) Another source of confusion is Rousseau’s distinction between the 
general will and the will of all (Book II , chapter iii). Rousseau sets 
this out in the following paragraph:
"There is often a great deal of difference between the 
will of all and the general will; the latter considers only 
the common interest, while the former takes private interest 
into account, and is no more than the sum of particular wills; 
but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses 
that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the 
sum of the differences."51
Although the object of this paragraph ostensibly is to elucidate, many 
have found that it has the opposite effect. John Plamenatz, for example, 
has charged that this quasi-mathematical account of the general will is, if 
taken literally, "sheer nonsense". According to Plamenatz, the "pluses" 
and "minuses" of particular wills must be that which is peculiar to each of 
them, and the mathematical explanation is:
"Let John's will be x + a, Richard's x + b, and Thomas's 
x + c; x being what is common to them all, and a, b, and a, 
what is peculiar to each. If the general will is what remains 
after the "pluses" and "minuses" have cancelled each other out, 
it is x; but if it is the sum of the differences it is a + b + o. 
Whichever it is, it cannot be both; and the second alternative 
is too absurd to be considered. Beware of political philosophers 
who use mathematics, no matter how simple, to illustrate their 
meaning!"5 2
The problem here arises from Rousseau's equation of the general will 
with "the sum of the differences". If this phrase is taken literally, 
Plamenatz's complaint is justified. But there is evidence in the surround­
ing passages that indicates that what Rousseau means by "the sum of the 
differences" is Plamenatz's x, not his a + b + o. In a footnote to the 
passage in question, to begin with, Rousseau says that "the agreement of all 
interests is formed by opposition to that of each. If there were no 
different interests, the common interest would be barely felt, as it would 
encounter no obstacle...." In the succeeding paragraph of the text he 
claims that,"If, when the people, being furnished with adequate informa­
tion, held its deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with 
another, the grand total (great number) of the small differences would
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always give the general will...."63 Furthermore, part of Rousseau's 
quarrel with "partial associations" is that, "The differences become less 
numerous and give a less general result."
The point of these passages may be put this way: the general will is
"the sum of the differences" because Rousseau believes that the more small 
differences there are in society, the more likely people are to recognize 
and pursue the common interest. When there is a clash between the inter­
ests of a few large groups, the members of each group will tend to see only 
their particular interests qua members of the group of "faction". But when 
there are a "great number" of differences in the particular interests of 
individuals, the individuals are more likely to see their common interest 
qua citizens. Each sees that he can seldom, if ever, get all of what he 
wants, and he soon perceives the need for some sort of rule for allocating 
social benefits and burdens. The most reasonable rule, Rousseau suggests, 
is that which regards us all as abstractions - as citizens - for in this 
way we are all treated equally. The will of all - the "sum of particular 
wills" - will not produce an outcome acceptable to all because, when the 
"pluses" and "minuses" are tallied, it will favour the interests of some at 
the expense of others. The general will, however, "remains as the sum of 
the differences" because it represents the common ground which all can 
accept despite their differences.
(3) Rousseau has also baffled a good many readers with his assertion 
that the general will is always right. Here again there is the semblance 
of a contradiction, for Rousseau couples this assertion with the claim that 
the people, who supposedly express the general will, may well be wrong.
How can both statements be true?
Rousseau refers to the "rightness" of the general will in three 
places.64 He says, first, that "the general will is always upright and 
always tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the 
deliberations of the people always have the same rectitude".65 Next, he
asks, "Why is it that the general will is always upright... unless it is
because there is not a man who does not think of 'each* as meaning him, and
consider himself in voting for all?"66 Finally, he declares that, "The
general will is always upright, but the judgment which guides it is not 
always enlightened. 1,6^
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The first and third references are relevant to the present question.
If the general will is, as we have argued, a moral imperative which requir­
es that all public policy decisions consider only the interests of the 
citizen, then it follows that the general will is always (in the) right, or 
righteous, or morally correct. How can it not be? Rousseau's point is 
that the people must try to approve laws and policies which satisfy the 
general will, but they are not always able to do so. The people may wish 
to pursue a policy of decreasing food prices, for instance, but if they 
lack either the necessary factual or theoretical knowledge, they may bring 
about the opposite effect. "Of itself the people wills always the good, 
but of itself it by no means always sees it." It is the task of the legis­
lator to provide the guidance the people need to produce "the union of 
understanding and will in the social body...."58
Part of the difficulty here is that Rousseau uses'the general will' in 
two related but different ways. For the most part he uses it as a moral 
imperative, but he sometimes speaks of a particular decision as an expres­
sion of the general will. If the people reach a decision whose outcome 
does indeed have the effect of promoting the common interest, Rousseau 
tends to say that the people have expressed the general will. This is, of 
course, quite confusing. But if a distinction is drawn between the general 
will - the moral imperative - and a general will - a decision in accordance 
with this imperative - then it is easy to see how the general will is 
always (in the) right even though the people may sometimes be wrong. The 
general will is always (in the) right because it is the criterion for 
rightness in public decisions; and a general will is right because it is a 
decision whose outcome actually promotes the common interest of the citi­
zenry. But when the people enact a law or policy which does not have the 
intended effect of furthering the common interest, they they have not 
expressed a general will and they are, as a result, wrong: i.e., they are
mistaken about what the general will requires in this particular situation. 
To be sure, Rousseau does not explicitly draw this distinction, but there 
is ample basis for it in the Social Contract.
(4) The last problem concerns Rousseau's remarks on voting. There are 
two related puzzles here. The first is, what is the relationship between 
majority rule and the general will? Rousseau's comments on this point are 
rather mysterious, but they are not completely obscure. Rousseau's brief
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discussion of majority rule begins with the acknowledgement that the social 
contract requires unanimous consent, for "no one... can make any man sub­
ject without his consent"; but he soon goes on to say that, "Apart from 
this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds the rest."59 
This poses a problem, obviously - "how can a man be both free and forced to 
conform to wills that are not his own" - and Rousseau offers the following 
explanation:
"When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what 
the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or 
rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with 
the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving 
his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general 
will is found by counting votes."70
In these two sentences we have a good example of Rousseau's conflation of 
the general will and a general will. The proposal is to be approved, on 
the one hand, if it conforms to the general will (moral imperative); but a 
general will (specific policy which satisfies the moral imperative) is dis­
covered, on the other, only by counting votes. The important point, however, 
is brought out in the conclusion of the paragraph:
"When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own 
prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I 
was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general 
will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the 
day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my 
will; and it is in that case that I should not have been 
free."
This is complicated and paradoxical, to say the least, but it can be 
sorted out. We have already seen how a person (or even the whole people) 
can be mistaken in his (their) opinion of what is in conformity with the 
general will (§ III, supra) . The question here is, why is the majority 
opinion any less likely to be mistaken than that of the minority or a soli­
tary individual? It is certainly possible in principle for one person to 
be right while everyone else is wrong. But if we assume, as Rousseau seems 
to: (1) that there is a uniquely right answer, a specific policy in conform­
ity with the general will, to be found; (2) that everyone has an equal, 
better-than-even chance of discerning the right answer; and (3) that every­
one wants the right answer to prevail; then the majority vote or answer is 
more likely to be correct than the minority's. And this indicates how one
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might be glad that his own point of view was not victorious, for Rousseau's 
point is not that whatever the majority wants is the general will, but that 
the majority is more likely to have discovered the policy which satisfies 
the general will. While this looks like a statistical argument it is not, 
and what makes the conclusion so unappealing is that it assumes in practi­
cal matters (such as voting on some issue) that (1) there is a uniquely 
right answer, a specific policy in conformity with the general will, to be 
found; (2) everyone has an equal, better-than-even chance of discerning the 
right answer; and (3) everyone wants the right answer to prevail. As we 
shall see in Part Seven, it is precisely these assumptions about man's 
civil nature, as it were, that stumble under Vichian criticism and ultimate­
ly restrict the Rousseauan enterprise to the realm of the (albeit heuristi- 
cally fertile) theoretical.
But what has this to do with freedom? How could a person possibly be 
less free if his opinion had carried the day? The answer here, as in the 
case of the "forced to be free" passage, follows from Rousseau's conception 
of the just state as the realm of freedom. Rousseau assumes that all the
voters want the policy which best satisfies the general will to prevail.
If the majority is more likely to perceive that policy, then a person whose
opinion is in the minority may be said to have voted against his will qua
citizen; his will was to promote the common interest, but his opinion as to 
what policy would do so was mistaken. "The constant will of all the mem­
bers of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens 
and free."72 If one sees, consequently, that the policy he favoured actual­
ly is not in the common interest, he then recognizes that his particular 
opinion was divergent from his constant will. Since the realm of freedom 
is preserved only through observance of the general will, freedom is dimin­
ished whenever a policy contrary to the general will is pursued. And, from 
a thoroughly Platonic perspective, one who had supported such a policy - 
along with everyone else - would then be less free than if his opinion had 
not carried the day.
The second problem with Rousseau's remark on voting concerns the aims 
of the individual voter. In the chapter we have just examined, "Voting" 
(Book IV, ii), Rousseau clearly requires individuals to vote according to 
their perception of what the general will demands; particular interests are 
not to be considered. "(The) general will becomes mute", he says, when
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"all men, guided by secret motives, no more give their views as citizens 
than if the State had never been...."73 Earlier in the Social Contract, 
however, Rousseau seems to take the opposite position:
"Why is it that the general will is always upright, and 
that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless 
it is because there is not a man who does not think of 
'each' as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for 
all? This proves that equality of rights and the idea of 
justice which such equality creates originate in the prefer­
ence each man gives to himself, and accordingly in the very 
nature of man."7i+
Which of these statements reflects the "official" position? Or has 
Rousseau actually contradicted himself? With the aid of the distinction 
between the general will and a general will we can once again, for the 
moment, snatch Rousseau from the jaws of self-contradiction. In this 
second passage Rousseau's purpose is to justify the general will, the moral 
imperative that all public policy decisions are to take account of only the 
common interest of the citizen. His argument is that this particular 
imperative supplies a just basis for a civil society because it is accept­
able to everyone, for everyone can see that he is not placing himself under 
arbitrary rule when he agrees to the social contract. The interests of all 
individuals are treated equally by the general will, and "the preference 
each man gives to himself" leads to "equality of rights and the idea of 
justice" under the general will. In the other passage Rousseau's concern 
is with determining what specific policies or laws are in conformity with 
the general will. Thus when he says that the voters are to state their 
opinions on the question, "is policy x in conformity with the general 
will?", and not to follow their particular interests when they vote, he is 
specifying how a general will in accordance with the general will can be 
found. These remarks about the aims of the voter, then, treat of two dif­
ferent aspects of the general will and do not contradict one another.
At this point the defense rests - the critique will be taken up in 
Part Six and Part Seven. What remains, finally, is to show how Rousseau's 
theory of the social contract provides a solution to the problem of civil 
obligation.
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IV
Rousseau's Contractarianism
Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau devotes little attention in the 
Social Contract to the details usually associated with contract theory. He 
says almost nothing, for instance, about how the individual gives his con­
sent to the formation of the civil association, and he never mentions the 
distinction between express and tacit consent. Nor does Rousseau directly 
address the question, "what is the relationship between personal consent 
and civil obligation?" Given his neglect of these question, how can 
Rousseau's contract theory possibly provide a plausible solution to the 
problem of civil obligation?
The answer is that Rousseau neglects what may well be neglected. He 
is more concerned, in the first place, with the problem of 'hypothetical 
consent' - i.e. what kind of government deserves our consent? - than with 
the mechanics of the expression of consent. And he believes, secondly, 
that a citizen of a state which deserves his consent has a civil obligation 
to obey the laws of that state. Rousseau's solution to the problem of 
civil obligation looks to the character of the state rather than to any 
particular act of an individual.
How does the character of the state related to the theory of the 
social contract? For Rousseau, as has been pointed out, there is only one 
possible social contract, and its terms are "everywhere the same and every­
where tacitly admitted and recognized...." This contract is the only one 
to which men may reasonably be imagined to have consented. If a state 
violates the terms of this contract, it thereby frees the citizens of their 
obligation to it. The state which respects the contract, on the other 
hand, is a just state to which the citizens remain under an obligation.
The just state and the state which preserves the contract, then, are one 
and the same.
But what are the terms of this contract? These terms, as we have 
seen, assure each individual that the surrender of his natural independence 
and power to the civil association will not merely place him under the will 
of an arbitrary government. By acknowledging the public authority, instead,
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he is guaranteed both a voice in the passage of legislation and the state's 
protection of his life and property. He is, in Rousseau's words, both a 
"subject" and a member of the "Sovereign", for his duty of obedience to the 
law is balanced by his right to participate in the making of the law. 
Furthermore, the social contract includes the understanding that public 
policy decisions will be (as far as possible) in conformity with the 
general will, so that the individual knows that his interests will not be 
ignored.
These are the terms of the social contract. The emphasis throughout 
the Social Contract is on equality. Everyone is granted the same rights 
and liberties and all are subjected to the same duties and burdens. "From 
whatever side we approach our principle", Rousseau says, "we reach the same 
conclusion, that the social compact sets up an equality of such a kind, 
that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should 
therefore all enjoy the same rights."75 This equality of condition pro­
duces a mutuality of obligation: by accepting an equal place as a member
of the Sovereign, the individual also undertakes a civil obligation as a 
subject. And this mutuality of obligation is the core of civil society, 
for "the essence of the body politic lies in the reconciliation of obed­
ience and liberty, and the words subject and Sovereign are identical corre­
latives the idea of which meets in the single word 'citizen'."75
The notion of a social contract is therefore essential to Rousseau's 
theory of civil obligation, and, on a theoretical level, the theory itself 
is adequate. The theory is adequate because it provides a conception of a 
state which deserves our consent, and any citizen of such a state will have 
a civil obligation to obey its laws. More importantly, however, Rousseau's 
account is genuinely a contractarian theory because he derives his concep­
tion of the just state - the state which deserves to be obeyed - from the 
idea of a social contract. In this respect, at least, Rousseau's theory is 
superior to those of Hobbes and Locke.
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PART FIVE
RAWLS: THE SECULAR COVENANT
The last of the contract theorists to be discussed in this thesis is 
John Rawls, a philosopher whose work has contributed greatly to the revival 
of interest in the idea of the social contract. Unlike Hobbes, Locke and to 
a lesser extent Rousseau, Rawls does not focus his contractual theory on the 
problem of civil obligation. The problem is treated seriously in his theory, 
but it is only one of many secondary concerns. For Rawls, the primary pur­
pose of the contractarian metaphor is to serve as the source of a theory of 
distributive justice, and his work is much more a contractual theory of 
justice than of civil obligation. In a series of articles, beginning with 
"Justice as Fairness" in 1958, Rawls developed this theory and applied it to 
a number of problems in moral and political philosophy.* The definitive 
statement of Rawls' contractual position, however, is his A Theory of Jus­
tice, and we shall concentrate on Rawls' elaboration of his theory in that 
work.
Despite its length and scope, A Theory of Justice is a coherent work; 
and the philosophical scaffolding which holds it together is the idea of a 
social contract. Our aim here is to show how Rawls uses this scaffold to 
deal with one of the many problems he considers - the problem of civil 
obligation. In Appendix Six questions of obligation, obedience and stabil­
ity are discussed, in particular, the problems of "natural duty" and civil 
disobedience. However, insofar as we are concerned with the manner in which 
Rawls addresses the problem of civility, Part Five focuses on his contracta­
rianism. Section one, then, discusses the role of the social contract in 
Rawls' theory. Section two presents an account of the two principles of 
justice which, according to Rawls, would be chosen by the parties to a pro­
perly conceived social contract. Some of the criticisms of A Theory of 
Justice will be touched on in Section three, and we shall argue in Section 
four that on the whole Rawls provides a satisfactory contractual basis for 
solving the problem of civility. In Section five, H.L.A. Hart's development 
of the "principle of fairness" is discussed as a less complex and in many 
ways more direct approach to the problem of civil obligation than is to be 
found in A Theory of Justice.
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The importance of the Kantian conception of 'moral personality* for 
Rawls' system of moral philosophy can be easily explained. His thought is 
founded on one central Kantian assumption, namely, that human beings should 
be thought of as the authors of the moral principles that guide their lives:
"Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social 
cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the princi­
ples which are to assign basic rights and duties and to 
determine the division of social benefits.... Just as each 
person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes 
his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational 
for him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once 
and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust."2
In other words, Rawls wants to view moral principles as the products of 
human choices. Therefore, moral principles are not to be regarded as the 
mandates of a Supreme Being or the distillation of the laws of nature, but 
as the result of intelligent deliberation. Rawls has several reasons for 
favouring this approach, each designed to appeal to certain plausible 
assumptions concerning the nature of moral theory. First, it seems proper 
that persons should play some role in determining the moral principles em­
bracing their lives. People should not be governed by principles to which 
they have not in some way consented. This sentiment is responsible for the 
recurring popularity of varieties of social contract theories, and Rawls 
acknowledges that he sees himself working within this tradition. Second, 
it seems only reasonable that moral principles should take into account the 
interests and desires of social beings; and one way of doing this is to 
grant each citizen a role in the formation of these principles. Third, if 
Rawls' approach is accepted as the basis of moral theory, strong arguments 
are available for convincing moral offenders to mend their ways, namely, 
that they are contradicting moral judgements which they have made or would 
make were they to give the matter their attention.
However, there are obvious difficulties with this approach. First, 
although people commonly make moral judgements and often attempt to abide 
by what they take to be moral principles, few have given much thought as to 
why they accept such principles or whether some alternative set of princi­
ples might be preferable. People normally abide by, or react against (but 
remain within the categories of) the moral codes into which they are socia­
lized and pay little attention to why they do so. There is no obvious way
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of making plausible the assertion that individuals have in fact chosen their 
moral codes, or, indeed, that they ought to question the 'received wisdom' 
of generations. Second, if Rawls' approach is to be successful he must be 
able to vouch for the unanimity of choice underpinning the selection of 
moral principles. Unanimity is necessary here because, as with Rousseau's 
general will, the authority of a contrived code can issue only from its 
acceptance by all those within its domain. A third difficulty is that 
people differ greatly in intelligence, ambition, status and knowledge as 
well as temperament.
Because of these difficulties it is clear that Rawls cannot rely on 
the actual choices of actual human beings to provide a set of moral princi­
ples which meet the condition of universal acceptance. His solution is to 
develop a conception of moral being or moral personality which he variously 
calls 'moral nature' or 'autonomous nature'. It is in terms of the choices 
made by human beings as moral persons that Rawls talks of choosing princi­
ples of morality. Much like Rousseau's general will and Kant's rational 
will, moral personality is conceived as a compendium of those characteris­
tics of human nature which Rawls deems to govern moral activity and moral 
thought, namely, freedom, equality and rationality; the set of these three 
features is referred to by Rawls as 'autonomy'.3
Rawls' conception of autonomy is quite conspicuously inspired by Kant. 
However, he believes that much of the interpretative literature on Kant's 
moral thought is fundamentally misguided, and in illuminating this misplaced 
emphasis Rawls indicates his particular vector.
"It is a mistake, I believe, to emphasize the place of 
generality and universality in Kant's ethics. That moral 
principles are general and universal is hardly new with 
him; and as we have seen these conditions do not in any 
case take us very far. It is impossible to construct a 
moral theory on so slender a basis, and therefore to limit 
the discussion of Kant's doctrine to these notions is to 
reduce it to triviality. The real force of his view lies 
elsewhere."^
Rawls is confident that the real force of Kant's view is located in the 
notion of moral nature. Thus he says:
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"Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously 
when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the 
most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free 
and equal rational being. The principles he acts upon are 
not adopted because of his social position or natural endow­
ments, or in view of the particular kind of society in which 
he lives or the specific things that he happens to want."
According to Rawls, the strength of Kant's position resides in the attempt 
to found moral principles on the decisions of free, equal and rational 
beings; and it is this aspect of Kant's theory which Rawls adopts for his 
own.
Rawls, in his acceptance of the general Kantian position nevertheless 
qualifies it. He believes that it is essential to carefully detail the con­
ditions under which moral beings ideally make their choices, and that these 
conditions should be designed so as to give optimal expression to the fea­
tures of moral nature.5 Rawls calls this set of conditions the 'original 
position'.
Rawls emphasises that his original position differs from the circum­
stances of Kant's noumenal realm in two central aspects. First, the choice 
of moral principles is conceived as being a collective one; that is, the 
parties to the original position are assumed to be a group of individuals 
equal in stature, each of whom is concerned only to advance his own 
interests.6 Rawls' intention here is to provide a moral basis for social 
relations; consequently, he does not want to presuppose social ties of any 
sort, but to base whatever social organisation that men construct on moral 
principles adopted by beings in the paradoxically unnatural 'state of 
nature'. It is assumed that the individual is morally prior to society.
The second way in which Rawls' moral persons differ in circumstance 
from those of Kant is in their awareness that they are subject to the con­
ditions of human life.7 First, the parties to the original position know 
that in whatever actual circumstances they find themselves they will be sub­
ject to the 'circumstances of justice', i.e. that there exists a moderate 
scarcity of means in the world for which men must compete. Second, the 
parties are allowed to possess general information concerning 'human nature' 
and the human condition. Rawls assumes that some such general information 
is necessary to enable persons to make rational choices in the original
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position. The most important item of general information is the knowledge 
that there exist certain means which are necessary for the successful carry­
ing out of any projects which concrete individuals might have in mind.
Rawls calls these means 'primary goods', and the principal interest of the 
parties to the original position is to accumulate as large a supply of 
primary goods as is possible.
The introduction of the notion of the original position as the realm 
of moral personality adds quite considerably to the complexity of A Theory 
of Justice. Thus, in attempting to grasp any particular passage or chapter 
the reader must determine whether Rawls is speaking from the perspective of 
concrete individuals in the conditions of ordinary life; from the viewpoint 
of autonomous beings in the original position; or from the 'meta-position' 
of the moral philosopher speaking to his philosophically-enlightened 
readers. For example, the parties to the original position are characteri­
sed as being 'disinterested' in the welfare of their fellows in the sense 
that they are not concerned whether their fellows fare well or ill in the 
world. Concrete individuals, as acknowledged by Rawls, are not disinteres­
ted. ^ But only from the meta-position of Rawls and the reader is it known 
why the parties ought to be characterised as disinterested. Furthermore, 
various of Rawls' most basic notions have one meaning under the circumstan­
ces of the original position and another, though closely related, meaning 
under the conditions of ordinary life; this is true of 'autonomy', 'justice', 
the 'right', 'freedom' and 'equality'. Autonomy, for example, is the ex 
officio condition of the parties to the original position; they are situated 
equally, they are free since they live behind the 'veil of ignorance' (see 
Section one), and they are rational. Concrete individuals in ordinary life 
may also be autonomous, according to Rawls, but they may achieve this condi­
tion only by acting in accordance with the principles chosen by the parties 
in the original position. Being autonomous is something very different for 
concrete individuals than it is for abstract persons.
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I
Rawls' Contractarianism
Rawls begins A Theory of Justice by setting out his notion of society 
and his idea of the role that justice plays in our social arrangements. 
Society, he says, is "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage", but it 
"is typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests".9 
Society is too valuable to be abandoned because it "makes possible a better 
life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own 
efforts"; but it also leads to conflicts because "persons are not indiffe­
rent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are dis­
tributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a 
lesser share".10 The role of justice in this situation is to "provide a way 
of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and... 
define the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens of social coope­
ration. nl 1
For Rawls, as for Rousseau, the principal task of the social contract 
is to provide a conception of the just or, in Rawls' terms, "well-ordered" 
society. A society is well-ordered, Rawls says,
"when it is not only designed to advance the good of its 
members but when it is also effectively regulated by a 
public conception of justice. That is, it is a society 
in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others 
accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic 
social institutions generally satisfy these principles."12
The problem Rawls confronts is this: although we all have a conception of
justice, we do not all share the same conception. Because principles of 
justice are so closely tied to self-interest, "what is just and unjust is 
usually in dispute".13 And although we agree that there is a need for a set 
of principles which specify rights and duties and which determine the proper 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, we are not 
likely to agree on the contents of these principles.
The diversity of our conceptions of justice, however, is a hurdle 
which Rawls is prepared to leap. Drawing upon a distinction between 'con­
ceptions' and 'concepts', Rawls argues that there is a unity which underlies
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this diversity. This unity is supplied by the concept of justice, which is 
something of a common denominator for the various conceptions of justice: 
it is "specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these 
different conceptions, have in common."11* This common denominator holds 
that a conception of justice - because it is a conception of justice - must 
make no arbitrary distinctions between persons in assigning basic rights and 
duties and must strike a proper balance between competing claims to the ad­
vantages of social life. Thus someone who proposes that only left-handed, 
red-headed persons over six feet tall be allowed to vote in public elections 
may be suspected of advancing something other than a conception of justice.
But this distinction between concepts and conceptions does not boost 
Rawls over all the hurdles. The concept of justice, as Rawls formulates it, 
is entirely formal, and the contents of the notions "arbitrary distinctions" 
and "proper balance" are, as Rawls acknowledges, "left open for each to 
interpret according to the principles that he accepts."15 The concept of 
justice may set limits beyond which conceptions of justice cannot go, but it 
does not single out a public conception of justice - a set of principles 
which all can accept. Is there a conception of justice which is acceptable 
to all? Rawls believes that there is, and he thinks it can be discovered 
with the aid of the contractarian metaphor. In this respect, A Theory of 
Justice resembles the Social Contract; but Rawls is much more explicit and 
specific in his treatment of the derivation and substance of the principles 
of justice.
If the purpose of the social contract is to elicit a public conception 
of justice, then the contractual situation must be reinterpreted. We must 
not think of the original contract as a means of entering a particular 
society or establishing a particular form of government. Instead, "the 
guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of 
society are the object of the original agreement."16 Rawls asks us to 
imagine a situation in which a group of free and rational persons chooses a 
set of principles of justice for their society. This choice is made with 
the knowledge that the principles selected will govern all further agree­
ments and specify the kinds of social cooperation - including the forms of 
government - which will be allowed. We are to assume, moreover, that the 
parties to this social contract are self-interested but not selfish, which 
means that each will favour the set of principles that promises him the
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I ngreatest personal advantage regardless of what it promises others.' And as 
in other contract theories, the choice in this "initial situation" must be 
unanimous.
Rawls' initial situation is meant to correspond to the state of nature 
in traditional contract theory; i.e. it is an illustration of the conditions 
under which the contract is proposed, considered, and 'signed'. In Rawls' 
theory, as in Rousseau's, the initial situation is strictly hypothetical.
Its only purpose is to provide a proving ground, so to speak, for various 
conceptions of justice. Rawls' idea is that any set of principles of jus­
tice that could win the unanimous consent of the parties in the initial 
situation could also provide the basis of a well-ordered society: a public
conception of justice. The difficulty, as he recognizes, is that the ini­
tial situation can be defined in various ways, and the conception of justice 
it yields will vary with its definition. It is necessary, consequently, to 
discover "the most philosophically favoured interpretation of this initial 
choice situation...."18
How do we decide whether an interpretation of the initial situation is 
or is not most philosophically favoured? Rawls' answer is that, since all 
interpretations of this situation will be restricted in some way, we must 
consider which restrictions it seems most reasonable to impose on a situa­
tion in which principles of justice are chosen. The most philosophically 
favoured interpretation is that which embodies these reasonable restric­
tions. As Rawls explains the procedure,
"I assume... that there is a broad measure of agreement 
that principles of justice should be chosen under certain 
conditions. To justify a particular description of the 
initial situation one shows that it incorporates these 
commonly shared presumptions. One argues from widely ac­
cepted but weak premises to more specific conclusions.
Each of the presumptions should by itself be natural and 
plausible; some of them may seem innocuous or even trivial.
The aim of the contract approach is to establish that taken 
together they impose significant bonds on acceptable princi­
ples of justice."18
What are these reasonable restrictions on arguments for principles of jus­
tice - on the initial situation? Rawls lists the following four:
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1. "no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural 
fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles";
2. "it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circum­
stances of one's own case";
3. "particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' con­
ceptions of their good (should) not affect the principles 
adopted"; and
4. "all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing 
principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their 
acceptance, and so on."20
The interpretation of the initial situation formed by these four conditions 
is designated "the original position". Because the principles of justice 
chosen in the original position satisfy the constraints which are deemed 
reasonable to impose on the initial situation, the principles themselves are 
sure to be acceptable to all. The original position is, therefore, the most 
"philosophically favoured" interpretation of the situation in which a con­
ception of justice is to be selected.
The original position is, of course, a vital part of Rawls' theory.
Its most important feature is the so-called "veil of ignorance", which is 
Rawls' metaphor for the cumulative effect of the first three restrictions.21 
The point of these restrictions is to proscribe considerations which, in 
Rawls' view, are irrelevant from the perspective of social justice. Thus 
Rawls holds that one's natural or social circumstances are 'contingencies' 
which do not bear on questions of justice. He also argues that it is 
reasonable to design the initial situation so that no one can advance prin­
ciples which will simply further his own interests. To use Rawls' example, 
we cannot have the wealthy proposing the principle that taxation for welfare 
purposes is unjust while the poor support some sort of confiscatory measure: 
in this situation no agreement will be reached. The veil of ignorance is a 
metaphor which is used to illustrate how these three restrictions will ex­
clude such self-serving suggestions.
This is how it works. We are to imagine that the persons in the ori­
ginal position are, as previously noted, rational and self-interested; but 
we are also to assume that these persons are deprived of most information 
about their personal identities. More precisely, they do not know what 
their socio-economic positions are, what abilities or disabilities they
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have, or even what their aspirations are. They do know that they have goals 
to pursue - what Rawls calls a "rational plan of life" - but they do not 
know what these goals are. Similar constraints are placed upon the social 
knowledge of the participants. While they are allowed to know "the general 
facts about society" - i.e. they may be acquainted with economic, social, 
and psychological theory - they are ignorant of the particular circumstances 
of their society.22 Thus the principles of justice chosen in the original 
position will be selected from behind a veil of ignorance - a veil which 
"excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and 
allows them to be guided by their prejudices."23
One may wonder whether the veil of ignorance hides too much. When so 
little is known how could any principles be chosen? Rawls' response is that 
the persons behind the veil will concern themselves with the distribution of 
"primary goods; that is, things that every rational man is presumed to 
want."2*4 These primary goods - rights and liberties, powers and opportuni­
ties, income and wealth - are desired by rational men, even those behind the 
viel of ignorance, because they are normally useful no matter what a per­
son's goals are. A scholar, a playboy and a philanthropist will all find 
that the more of these primary goods he can command, the better will be his 
chances of fulfilling his rational plan of life. Everyone in the original 
position, then, will support principles of justice which seem to assure him 
of the highest possible level of primary goods.
The problem for these persons, of course, is that they are behind the 
veil of ignorance and they do not know whether to support principles that 
favour the most advantaged, the least advantaged, or the average member of 
society. As Rawls puts it, "no one is in a position to tailor principles to 
his own advantage."25 By blinding everyone to the contingencies of his 
natural and social circumstances, Rawls produces a moral equality among 
those choosing a conception of justice for their society. No one knows 
whether he is at the top or bottom of society, and he must cast his vote 
accordingly. 'Deprived of the knowledge of their circumstances, the parties 
to the social contract are, like Rousseau's citizens, abstract individuals. 
When they choose principles of justice, therefore, they must choose princi­
ples which will benefit abstract individuals; and in this situation, "each 
is forced to choose for everyone."25 In this way the veil of ignorance 
makes the unanimous choice of a conception of justice possible. And the
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original position, which incorporates this veil, is the most philosophically 
favoured interpretation of the initial situation because it defines "the 
principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance 
their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advan­
taged or disadvantaged by social or natural contingencies."27 (Needless to 
say, this model presupposes the general 'liberal' assumption that 'primary 
goods' are fundamentally economic, i.e. negotiable and tangible scarce 
resources. There is little room in Rawls' model for the Nietzchian 'over­
man' who wishes to dominate others and scorns mere 'commodities'; after all, 
how can one 'distribute' dominance? Nevertheless, Rawls' Lockean and 
Smithian groundwork is sufficiently broad to cater for those who work within 
his milieu and accept much the same set of ethical and cultural axioms. In 
this sense, Rawls addresses his theory to philosophically literate Anglo­
phones .)
The function of the social contract in Rawls' theory is to provide a 
method for eliciting a public conception of justice. The original position 
limits the kinds of principles which may be suggested and leads to a unani­
mous acceptance of a particular set of principles of justice. These princi­
ples form a public conception of justice and this conception, in turn, is 
the foundation of a well-ordered society.
In Section two we shall examine the substance of the principles that, 
according to Rawls, follow from the original position. Before doing so, 
however, some further remarks about the definition of the original position 
are necessary. In a sense the original position is no more than a metaphor 
for the restrictions which it seems reasonable to impose on principles of 
justice. Because it is only a metaphor, anyone can gain entrance to the 
original position at any time "simply by following a certain procedure, 
namely by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with these res­
trictions."28 But how do we determine whether these restrictions are the 
proper ones? Rawls suggests two methods. The first, which consists of 
arguing from "widely held but weak premises to more specific conclusions", 
has already been discussed. The second method is a complicated bit of balan­
cing which is supposed to produce a "reflective equilibrium" reminiscent of 
the standpoint of the intuitionist ethicist's 'ideal observer'.
278
Finding a "reflective equilibrium" requires us to weigh the principles 
of justice which follow from a definition of the initial situation against 
our considered judgements of justice. We do this by imagining cases in 
which a question of justice is raised, beginning with cases where we have a 
firm conviction about how the question should be answered. We then examine 
the relevant principle from the set of principles under consideration to see 
how it would have us answer the question. If the principle requires an an­
swer in this case which differs from our considered judgement, then we may 
reject the definition of the initial situation which leads to this set of 
principles. If, on the other hand, the principle requires an answer which 
matches our considered judgement, we must continue to check the set of prin­
ciples against our considered judgements. The proper definition of the 
initial situation is reached by altering the features of the situation so 
that its principles of justice accommodate our considered judgements of jus­
tice. In this sense, the method entailed by the pursuit of a 'reflective 
equilibrium' is an 'asymptotic' approach to principles of conduct; that is 
to say, we engage in a dialectic between ideal principles, actual principles 
currently employed, and proposed principles under discussion. The outcome, 
while not necessarily being a compromise, at least takes note of the various 
perspectives and modulations under consideration.
This is a rather one-sided account of the process, however, for find­
ing a reflective equilibrium involves a mutual adjustment of conceptions of 
the initial situation and considered judgements. In some cases - Rawls 
cites religious and racial intolerance - we are firmly convinced of what is 
just and unjust; in other cases - the distribution of wealth and authority - 
we are much less certain. In these latter cases a conception of justice may 
actually extend or modify our judgements. It is even possible that a set of 
principles may be so powerful and attractive that we reject a considered 
judgement in favour of the judgement prescribed by the relevant principle. 
When we consider interpretations of the initial situation, then, we "check 
an interpretation... by the capacity of its principles to accommodate our 
firmest convictions and to provide guidance where guidance is needed."29
When we arrive at a definition of the contractual situation which 
meets these criteria, we reach a state of reflective equilibrium. Rawls 
describes the process this way:
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"By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions 
of the contracual circumstances, at others withdrawing our 
judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that 
eventually we shall find a description of the initial situa­
tion that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields 
principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned 
and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflec­
tive equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our 
principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since 
we know to what principles our judgments conform and the pre­
mises of their derivation."3^
The definition of the initial situation which meets our considered 
judgements in reflective equilibrium, according to Rawls, is the original 
position - the most favoured interpretation of the contractual situation. 
Now that we have seen how Rawls derives his principles, let us see what 
those principles are.
II
Principles of Justice
What is the conception of justice which will be chosen by the persons 
in the original position? Since Rawls provides both a general statement of 
this conception and a more specific formulation of its constituent princi­
ples, we shall follow his lead and discuss the general conception before 
setting out the principles themselves. This general conception - the choice 
of those in the original position -holds that,
"All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of 
these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured."31
Two aspects of this conception are especially noteworthy: its relationship 
to other conceptions of justice and its incorporation of the "maximin" rule. 
This general conception, in the first place, stipulates that primary goods 
are to be distributed to all equally except in those cases where an unequal 
distribution will benefit the least favoured members of society. This 
divergence from strict equality follows from Rawls' assumption that the 
parties to the 'social contract' are self-interested but not selfish. The
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significance of this difference is illustrated in the following table. Sup­
pose there is a society composed of three persons, A, B, and C. In the 
status quo, (SQ) each receives an income of $5. A, B and C are to choose 
among three alternative distribution schemes ( S , S2, S3), each of which im­
proves upon the status quo.
SQ S 1 s 2 S 3
A $5 $7 $9 $15
B 5 7 8 10
C 5 7 7 8
If A, B and C are following the general conception of justice, they 
will select S3 as the most just alternative to the status quo. S3 is pre­
ferable to Si and S2 because everyone enjoys a higher income in S3; and 
since the parties are not envious (Rawls' assumption), the discrepancy in 
incomes makes no difference. By the same token, if S2 were the only alter­
native to SQ, then S2 would be the preferred distribution. But if both Si 
and S2 were alternatives to SQ, then men acting on Rawls' conception of jus­
tice would select S ^ . Compared to Si, S2 is an unjustified inequality. S2 
offers no more benefit to C than Si, and Rawls' conception allows inequali­
ties only when they work to the advantage of the worst-off. Thus, while it 
does allow for inequalities, the general conception has a definite bias to­
ward equality.
The general conception also differs in an important way from the 
utilitarian conception of justice. In its classical form utilitarianism 
aims at producing the greatest good for the greatest number or, in a more 
contemporary idiom, at maximizing aggregate welfare. The conception Rawls 
claims to derive from the original position, on the other hand, places dis­
tributive over aggregative considerations. Utilitarianism can in principle 
require that some members of society be deprived of social goods in order to 
improve the aggregate welfare of the remainder; Rawls' conception rules this 
out as an arbitrary inequality.
Imagine that our society of three is confronted with the following 
distributive possibilities:
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SQ Si S2
A $5 $9 $50
B 5 8 25
C 5 7 4
According to the utilitarian conception of justice S2 is the preferred 
alternative, for it promises the highest level of aggregate welfare. Rawls' 
general conception, however, selects Sj, for it is an improvement on SQ and 
it does not sacrifice the interests of part of the community to those of the 
rest.
This general conception of justice, then, is meant to differ from - 
and provide an alternative to - both strict egalitarianism and utilitarian­
ism. But this brings us to the second notable aspect of this conception of 
justice: why would this conception be chosen over all others in the origi­
nal position? The reason for its selection, says Rawls, is that it is a 
"maximin" solution to the problem of social justice. The maximin decisions 
rule states that, when confronted with a number of ways of distributing some 
good(s) , we should maximize the minimum. We should rank the alternatives by 
their worst possible "outcomes", in other words, and choose that alternative 
whose worst outcome is better than the worst outcomes of the others. Since 
its worst possible outcome is better than that of utilitarianism and as good 
as that of equalitarianism, the general conception is the maximin solution 
to the problem of social justice: it will be chosen by those in the origi­
nal position if they follow the maximin rule. (Of course, there are many 
difficulties associated with Rawls' use of the term "outcome". Not only are 
there problems arising from probability theory, but as well there is the 
dilemma of possible outcomes being evidence-relative. The open-endedness of 
the term also leads one to ask "how remote an outcome?" However, for our 
purposes it is sufficient to adopt Rawls' somewhat colloquial approach and 
regard outcomes as the tangible short-term results of particular sets of 
circumstances.)
But this poses another question: why would (or should) those in the
original position adopt a maximin strategy? This is a question raised by 
many of Rawls' critics, and we shall return to it in Section three. For now 
we shall simply set out Rawls' answer. Maximin is a timid, risk-averse
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strategy, and there seems to be no plausible reason for adopting it, al­
though there may be psychological motives for doing so. As Rawls' acknow­
ledges, "the maximin rule is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices 
under uncertainty." But he also maintains that maximin is an attractive 
rule in "situations marked by certain special features" and that "the origi­
nal position manifests these features to the fullest possible degree....".32
There are three of these special features. The first is that "since 
the rule takes no account of the likelihoods of the possible circumstances, 
there must be some reason for sharply discounting estimates of these possi­
bilities." If there is a high probability that one shall be among the most 
advantaged members of society, then it is irrational (i.e. contrary to one's 
own interest) to adopt the maximin rule. But Rawls claims that in the ori­
ginal position, behind the veil of ignorance, knowledge of probabilities is 
"impossible, or at least extremely insecure". The second feature that sug­
gests the maximin rule is, "the person choosing has a conception of the good 
such that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above
IIthe minimum stipend that he can... be sure of by following the maximin rule. 
This feature, which discourages gambling, is supposedly met by the persons 
in the original position with their contentless "rational plans of life". 
Finally, the maximin rule is attractive if "the rejected alternatives have 
outcomes that one can hardly accept."33 Thus Rawls argues that the original 
position exhibits all these features to a high degree; that this makes maxi­
min the appropriate strategy to adopt in the original position; and that his 
general conception of justice will be chosen in the original position be­
cause it is the maximin solution to the problem of social justice.
In its more precise formulation the general conception of justice con­
sists of two principles and two priority rules for their application. These 
are:
"First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liber­
ties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all
Second Principle: social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged... and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity."3^
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(We have deleted from principle 11(a) the phrase, "consistent with the just 
savings principle". While Rawls' account of the problem of saving between 
generations is provocative, it is a subject which need not be considered 
here.)
The first principle is far from novel - everyone is to be as free as 
possible so long as his freedom does not interfere with the rights and 
liberties of others. A few words need to be said about the second princi­
ple, however. Principle 11(a) is what Rawls calls the "difference princi­
ple". The idea behind the difference principle is that inequalities are 
just "if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expec­
tations of the least advantaged members of society".35 Rawls promotes the 
difference principle as an attractive alternative to the principle of effi­
ciency (Pareto-optimality), which holds that a distribution of goods is 
efficient (optimal) when no changes can be made without making someone worse 
off. The problem with the principle of efficiency is that it sanctions a 
variety of distributions that seem intuitively unjust, including the situa­
tion in which one person has all the goods. Since the others have nothing 
unless they take something from him, thereby making him worse off, the dis­
tribution is inefficient. Rawls' difference principle, on the other hand, 
specifies that such a distribution is unjust because it is an inequality 
which does not benefit the least favoured. The principle of efficiency also 
approves of changes whenever the changes benefit someone and harm none. But 
the difference principle prohibits these changes too, except in the case 
where those who benefit are the least advantaged members of society. Other­
wise, the better off are not allowed to improve their own positions unless 
they also improve those of the worst-off.
The difference principle also has a positive side, for it requires 
some changes that violate the principle of efficiency. According to the 
difference principle the position of the least advantaged must be improved 
whenever possible, even ' if this involves a redistribution which takes goods 
away from the most advantaged. Hence the difference principle represents 
the claims, as Rawls puts it, of "democratic equality". "If the basic 
structure (of society) is unjust," he says, the difference principle
"will authorize changes that may lower the expectations of 
some of those better-off; and therefore the democratic con­
ception is not consistent with the principle of efficiency
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if this principle is taken to mean that only changes which 
improve everyone's prospects are allowed. Justice is prior 
to efficiency and requires some changes that are not effi­
cient in this sense."35
The function of principle 11(b) is to set limits on 11(a). 11(b)
stipulates that all social and economic inequalities are to be attached to 
positions open to everyone: equality of opportunity. This is to prevent a
rigidly hierarchical society from being justified by the conception of jus­
tice which flows from the original position. Without 11(b), in fact, it 
would be possible to argue that the difference principle required the estab­
lishment of something like a hereditary aristocracy. This could only be 
done, of course, on the grounds that the lot of the least advantaged would 
be better in such a society. But 11(b) rules this out as beyond considera­
tion.
In addition to the principles themselves, Rawls' specific formulation 
of the conception of justice includes two priority rules. The first grants 
principle I precedence over principle II, so that considerations of liberty 
are prior to considerations of welfare. Only when the first principle is 
satisfied is one allowed to go on to the second. This priority is establi­
shed to prevent trades of liberty for higher levels of welfare. Rawls only 
allows this priority rule to be broken when the following conditions are 
met:
"(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total 
system of liberty shared by all;
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those 
with the lesser liberty."37
The second priority rule gives 11(b) - equality of opportunity - pre­
cedence over 11(a) - the difference principle - for the reasons mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph.
This, then, is the set of principles which would be chosen in the 
original position, or so Rawls claims. These principles have been called 
into question by critics of Rawls' theory of justice, and we shall briefly 
examine some of these criticisms before turning to Rawls' treatment of the 
problem of civil obligation.
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III
Criticisms Considered
As might be expected of a book of its scope, A Theory of Justice has 
been the target of criticism for scholars in a variety of disciplines and 
with a variety of predilections. In this section we shall consider some 
objections to the manner in which Rawls derives his principles - the con­
tractual aspect of his theory - and to the substance of the principles. 
Although the derivation is more crucial to a study of the social contract, 
most critics seem concerned with the content of the principles. We shall 
begin with a rehearsal of some of these objections.
Objections to Rawls' principles of justice generally fall into two 
categories: those which attack the priority of liberty (first priority
rule) and those which attach the difference principle (principle 11(a) ).
The first offensive has been skilfully directed by Brian Barry.3® Barry 
argues that liberty can only be granted such absolute priority when wealth 
or welfare is radically devalued. Is it never worthwhile, he asks, to trade 
liberty for economic gain? Not even when we exchange a minute portion of 
our liberty for an immense increase in our welfare? The argument is simple 
but effective. Indeed, Rawls himself relaxes the priority rule so that 
societies at low levels of material well-being are allowed to trade liberty 
for welfare. This is, in effect, a retreat to a new position, where Rawls 
holds that the priority rule does not apply until a certain threshold has 
been reached: "Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irrational 
from the standpoint of the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty 
for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office."39 And this 
retreat has important ramifications: for if those in the original position
do not know whether their society has crossed this material threshold, they 
may not grant priority to liberty. It seems safer, in fact, to reserve the 
possibility of exchanging liberty for welfare when one is ignorant of the 
material well-being of one's society. Thus the first priority rule seems to 
lack justification - at least in the absolute form Rawls first assigns to 
it. Of course, both Rawls and Barry here take for granted what is perhaps 
the most odious entailment of social atomism, namely, the negotiability of 
values. Moreover, there is a complete failure to express any intelligible 
relationship between 'objective benefits' and subjective advantage, e.g.,
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income versus happiness, status versus quietude. The diminishing return of 
satisfactions associated with the ever-increasing accumulation of wealth 
seems to pass by both Rawls and Barry. To the extent that both operate 
within the same conceptual matrix and hold the same values, Barry merely 
adjusts rdther than cidticizes Rawls' theory.
The difference principle, and the maximin criterion which underlies 
it, has drawn more critical fire than any other feature of Rawls' theory.40 
Here, as with the first priority rule, critics have argued that Rawls fails 
to demonstrate that the difference principle would be chosen in the original 
position. Rawls' claim that the original position displays "to the fullest 
possible degree" the three features that make the maximin rule plausible is, 
in their view, patently wrong. These features are: (1) it is unreasonable
to estimate probabilities of one's position in society when one is behind 
the veil of ignorance; (2) the person in the original position cares little, 
if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum that following the 
maximin rule guarantees; and (3) the rejected alternatives have unacceptable 
outcomes. But are these actually characteristics of the original position, 
or does Rawls attribute them to the original position without justification?
In the case of the first feature, it is argued, there is no reason to 
accept this as a description of the original position. No matter how opague 
the veil, the pessimism of the maximin rule is no more warranted as a gene­
ral strategy than the optimism of the maximax rule. Harsanyi points out 
that
"using the maximin principle in the original position is 
equivalent to assigning unity or near-unity probability 
to the possibility that one may end up as the worst-off 
individual in society; and... there cannot be any rational 
justification whatever for assigning such an extremely 
high probability to this possibility."41
Critics have also declared the second feature to be an arbitrary 
assumption. Why will the person in the original position have a conception 
of the good which leads him to care little about what he can gain beyond the 
minimum he is assured by the maximin rule? Why should this be accepted as a 
feature of the original position - the most favoured interpretation of the 
initial situation? Rawls says that his conception of justice "guarantees a 
satisfactory minimum. There may be, on reflection, little reason for trying
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to do better.42 This is a supposition, not an argument. Rawls also ties 
the second feature to the priority of liberty when he asserts that, "The 
minimum assured by the two principles in lexical order (i.e. with liberty 
granted priority) is not one that the parties wish to jeopardize for the 
sake of greater economic and social advantage.43 But this merely rests one 
weak reed on another. It is not clear, in short, that the priority of 
liberty and the difference principle follow necessarily from the original 
position. Rawls' continued defence of the difference principle indicates 
that he is not willing to abandon it; but he also suggests that the most 
important aspect of his theory is not the particular conception of justice 
he sets out, but the contractual procedure he follows to arrive at this con­
ception.44 He believes, in other words, that the contractual procedure is 
capable of producing a public conception of justice even if he is (somewhat) 
mistaken about the content of that conception. With this in mind, let us 
see if anyone has undermined this most fundamental part of A Theory of Jus­
tice.
We shall examine here the criticisms of Douglas Rae and Ronald 
Dworkin. Rae1s criticism is less sweeping, for he criticizes 'from within’; 
i.e. he accepts most of Rawls' contractual method, but he charges that Rawls 
has misinterpreted the contractual situation. "Rawls's use of ignorance," 
Rae says, "turns the contract metaphor outside in."45 This is because no 
one in the original position is allowed to know his natural or social cir­
cumstances, each, as Rawls says, is forced to choose for everyone. A simple 
contract theory, in Rae's view, allows this sort of knowledge so that "the 
general interest would emerge as a bargain between agents for particular 
interests."45 With every interest represented equally, the bargain struck 
must be fair and in the general interest. The problem with Rawls' approach, 
according to Rae, is that it "disenfranchises all the interests except those 
of the social minimum,"47 - which is to say that principles are chosen by 
representatives of the least advantaged members of society. This may be 
true given the "special features" which Rawls attributes to the original 
position, especially the assertion that everyone "cares very little, if any­
thing, for what might be gained above the minimum stipend that he can... be 
sure of by following the maximin mile." But if these assumptions are drop­
ped - and they can be - then Rawls' version of the contractual situation is 
more promising than Rae's. For a contractual situation in which everyone 
knows who he is and whom he represents is likely to end in stalemate. Self-
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interested men who know their status are not likely to reach an agreement on 
fundamental rules of justice, for the attempts of each to tailor the princi­
ples to his own advantage will lead to the frustration of all: or all ex­
cept those who enjoy the benefits of the status q u o By stripping his 
contracters of their individual identities, on the one hand, Rawls is able 
not only to show how agreement on a conception of justice can be reached, 
but also why those who agree to the rules will be inclined to respect them: 
it is a conception arrived at impartially in a situation where morally 
irrelevant considerations are excluded. For Rawls' argument to stand we do 
not need actual differences of interest but only the 'possibility of such.
Dworkin's criticisms are more fundamental. His charge, basically, is 
that Rawls' hypothetical contract is empty because it, and all hypothetical 
agreements, have nothing to recommend them other than the inherent fairness 
(if they are fair) of their terms. The fact that I would .have agreed that x 
is a fair rule does not supply an independent argument for the fairness of 
x ; I would have agreed that r is a fair rule because it simply is fair. Nor 
does the fact that I would have agreed to this proposition bind me to 
observe cc; at least, it does not bind me any further than the fairness of x 
itself. Dworkin provides this helpful example of his reasoning:
"Suppose that you and I are playing poker and we find, in 
the middle of the hand, that the deck is one card short.
You suggest that we throw the hand in, but I refuse because 
I know I am going to win and I want the money.... Your 
might say that I would certainly have agreed to that pro­
cedure had the possibility of the deck being short been 
raised in advance. But your point is not that I am somehow 
committed to throwing the hand in by an agreement I never 
made. Rather, you use the device of an hypothetical agree­
ment to make a point that might have been made without that 
device, which is that the solution recommended is so obvious­
ly fair and sensible that only someone with an immediate con­
trary interest could disagree. Your main argument is that 
your solution is fair and sensible, and the fact that I would 
have chosen it myself adds nothing of substance to the argu­
ment .,,I+ 9
There are two distinct arguments here. The first holds that a hypo­
thetical agreement adds no obligatory force to a rule; this is not immedia­
tely relevant. The other holds that the fairness of rules is in no way 
related to hypothetical agreements, and the upshot is that Rawls' hypotheti­
cal contract is meaningless. Perhaps I would have agreed in advance to
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throw the hand in when the deck was found to be short; but this is only to 
say that I would have recognized the fairness of the solution, not that my 
hypothetical agreement makes it fair.
But this argument misses the point. Dworkin seems to have in mind a 
'performative' view of agreeing: one does something in agreeing. Yet, 
there is a sense of the notion of agreement - not so much a tacit as an im­
plicit dimension - that does not require performative execution. How do we 
know whether or not a rule or solution is fair? One way is to imagine how 
persons not swayed by "immediate contrary" interests would solve the problem 
at hand, and this, of course, is what Rawls suggests we do. The simplicity 
of Dworkin's example is misleading. The device of a hypothetical agreement 
may appear to be redundant in the poker game, but this is only because the 
fair solution is obvious. In cases where the fair solution is not apparent 
- when questions of social justice arise, for instance - we need a hypothe­
tical agreement, or something quite like it, to show us the proper solution. 
Rawls has merely put a highly sophisticated version of this device to work 
on an exceptionally difficult problem.
The criticisms of Rawls' theory, in sum, bring into question the set 
of principles which Rawls claims to derive from the original position, but 
they do not undercut the contractual method of his theory. Contract theory 
does provide a way of discovering a conception of justice which can serve as 
the basis of a well-ordered society, even if it is not the conception Rawls 
expounds in A Theory of Justice.
IV
Civil Obligation
Rawls' solution of the problem of civil obligation is developed as a 
corollary of his theory of justice. After the persons in the original posi­
tion have chosen principles to govern their institutions - principles of 
justice - they must next choose principles to govern their conduct as indi­
viduals. This choice is simplified by the fact that the conception of jus­
tice is already arrived at and the parties have only to find a set of prin­
ciples for individuals which is in harmony with the conception of justice.
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Among this set of principles for individuals are the two which Rawls calls 
on to deal with the problem of civil obligation.
The first of these is the principle of fairness. This principle 
applies to conduct within institutional contexts, including such institut­
ions as games and promising. It is also the source of a l l  obligations, 
according to Rawls, for all obligations arise within the context of rule- 
governed social practices. Rawls offers this account of the principle of 
fairness:
"This principle holds that a person is required to do his 
part as defined by the rules of an institution when two 
conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or
fair) , that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; 
and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of 
the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it 
offers to further one's interests. The main idea is that 
when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous 
cooperative venture according to rules... those who have 
submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar 
acquiescence on the part of those who have benefitted from 
their submission. We are not to gain from the cooperative 
labours of others without doing our fair share."50
The second part of the principle of fairness is most important here.
If the notions of "voluntarily accepted benefits" and "taken advantage of 
the opportunities" are broadly interpreted, then, following Locke, all the 
citizens of a just society may be said to be under an obligation to obey the 
law. If they are interpreted narrowly, on the other hand, then few citi­
zens, if any, will have a general civil obligation. Rawls takes the latter 
path. That is, he says "there is no political obligation, strictly speaking, 
for citizens generally" because it is not clear what "the requisite binding 
action"51 is. Thus, while those who have taken an oath of office may have a 
general obligation to obey the law, the average citizen does not.
The second principle for individuals enters the theoretical picture at 
this point. This principle, "the natural duty to justice", is one of 
several 'natural' duties. Others are the duty to help others in need when 
doing so poses no excessive risk or loss to oneself; the duty not to harm 
others; and the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering. Unlike obliga­
tions, natural duties apply to us regardless of our voluntary acts and need 
not be connected to institutions or social practices - hence their 'natural'
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quality. In terms of the commitment-content distinction noted in Part One, 
natural duties can be traced to the content of the situation rather than to 
a commitment: "Thus we have a natural duty not to be cruel, and a duty to
52
help another, whether or not we have committed ourselves to those actions."
The role of the natural duty of justice is to supplement the principle 
of fairness. It does so by requiring
"us to support and comply with just institutions that exist 
and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just 
arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be 
done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic 
structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable 
to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty 
to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to 
these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, per­
formative or otherwise."53
In a just society, therefore, the average citizen has a general (Kant­
ian) duty to obey the law even though he has no obligation to do so. And if 
we were to put into his mouth the question, "Am I morally required to obey 
the law?", rather than "Am I under an obligation to obey the law?", the 
answer would be "yes".
$
Strictly speaking, then, Rawls does not provide a solution to the prob­
lem of civil obligation, for he argues that only a few have civil obliga­
tions, even in the just society. He provides, instead, an answer to the 
more general question of political obedience: "Why should I obey the law?".
To this Rawls answers, "Because you have a natural duty to do so." Within a 
Kantian framework, this answer is entirely satisfactory, and it is a cont­
ractual - if not consensual -^response. At the same time, however, it can 
be seen that Rawls has sold the principle of fairness short. There are dif­
ficulties, no doubt, in describing what counts as a voluntary act which 
obliges us to obey tie laws of a just society, but this does not mean that we 
only commit ourselves to obey the law by taking an oath to do so. It does 
not seem altogether unreasonable to say that we "voluntarily accept the 
benefits" of a just political system when, over time, we "take advantage of 
the opportunities it offers to further our interests". And to do this is, 
in a sense, to incur an obligation. Rawls, like Rousseau, provides a tenta­
tive contractual basis for solving the problem of civil obligation; and, 
although he shies away from this solution, he also goes on to point out a
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way of handling the problem of civil disobedience.
For Rawls, as for Rousseau, the fundamental idea of the social con­
tract is not to show when and how men have consented to the establishment of 
a civil society, but to show what kind of principles rational men not bent 
on the pursuit of de facto advantages would choose to govern their society 
if they were able to do so. The purpose of the 'contract* is to elicit 
those principles. Underlying the contractarian theories of both Rawls and 
Rousseau is a respect for the equality of men. This respect takes the form 
of the citizen in Rousseau's theory, the abstract sense in which we are all 
alike and allegedly share the same interests. In A Theory of Justice this 
sense of equality is displayed in Rawls' notion of the original position, 
the situation in which, deprived of their identities, men are required to 
choose principles of justice. Without knowledge of morally irrelevant con­
tingencies, the persons in the original position become equals, and they 
regard the decision they must make from the same vantage point - from that 
of citizens. "The original position", as one commentator has said, "is 
well designed to enforce the abstract right to equal concern and respect, 
which must be understood to be the fundamental concept of Rawls's deep 
theory. "
V
Hart on Fairness and Obligation
In Part Three, Section two, we remarked that the model of a social 
contract helps express the fact that, in Rousseau's and Rawls' view, civil 
society is beneficial to those who participate in it - it is something that 
rational men who considered the alternative would voluntarily accept and 
support. But we need not take the metaphor literally and think of the fic­
tional contract as the actual source of the obligation to obey the law.
Then, if not from a 'contract', from what circumstance does the obligation 
arise? Rawls, as has been mentioned, shies away from a contractual solution 
to the problem of civil obligation almost by way of ignoring the implica­
tions of the principle of fairness. H.L.A. Hart, on the other hand, both 
provides a simpler formulation of the principle of fairness and makes an 
interesting attempt to preserve the spirit of contractarianism while elimi-
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nating a 'contract' as the actual basis of civil obligation.
Hart considers civil society to be a cooperative enterprise regulated 
by common rules and argues that obligations arise in such cases from a 
"mutuality of restrictions":
"...when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those 
who have submitted to these restrictions when required have 
a right to a similar submission from those who have benefit- 
ted by their submission. The rules may provide that offi­
cials should have authority to enforce obedience and make 
further rules, and this will create a structure of legal 
rights and duties, but the moral obligation to obey the 
rules in such circumstances is due to the cooperating mem­
bers of the society, and they have the correlative moral 
right to obedience."55
Civil society may be considered as the one cooperative enterprise in which 
we all participate. By working together and making sacrifices according to 
the rules we are able to provide by our concerted endeavours far more for 
each individual than one could provide by his own solitary labour. The com­
mon enterprise requires rules according to which the members restrict their 
liberty and make certain sacrifices. By accepting the benefits of the co­
operative scheme I incur an obligation to submit to the same restrictions 
and to make similar sacrifices. Although the obligation results from the 
acceptance of benefits, it differs significantly from a simple obligation to 
reciprocate for a favour or gift; it has nothing to do with showing grati­
tude (though this may be an additional motive in fulfilling the obligation). 
It is a matter of acting justly or fairly toward those who have already sub­
mitted to the "mutuality of restrictions". Unlike the vague obligations to 
which benefactions give rise, the obligation to 'do one's part' is specific 
and strict: the other members of the common enterprise, those to whom the
obligation is owed, have a right that the obligatory actions be performed. 
Disobeying the law is refusing to restrict my freedom or to make contribu­
tions as others have done; it is unfair of me to accept the fruits of their 
sacrifices while refusing to make my own.
Convenient examples of obligations arising from a fair distribution of 
necessary burdens would be taxes and military service. Few persons care to 
contribute either, but both are necessary, many would argue, to the success
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of our common social enterprise. Of course, society could get along if some 
people did not do their part, but to benefit from the taxes and service of 
others while evading them oneself would be to treat others unfairly. Accor­
ding to Hart, one owes a similar (or at least an equivalent) sacrifice to 
them, and they have reason to rebuke one as a shirker if one attempts to 
evade the burden. Naturally, there may be reasons which would justify mak­
ing an exception of oneself, but in the absence of such reasons one is 
simply taking advantage of those who have done their part.
However, there are three problems with Hart's argument as it stands:
(1) it leaves out the justification of the institution or enterprise from 
which the obligations arise, (2) it may not apply to disobedience which is 
principled or conscientious rather than self-seeking, and, (3) it may not 
take into account that society itself requires from some of its members that 
their contribution relative to their share of the benefits may be dispro­
portionately large.
Hart claims, or at least he does not (disclaim, that one ought to obey 
the rules of any joint enterprise which involves a mutuality of restric­
tions. This needs to be qualified, for as it stands it sounds like a purely 
conventionalist view. If the enterprise is a pernicious one, if it is con- 
demnable on moral grounds, and if it were better that it did not exist, then 
no obligation to obey its rules can be based upon considerations of fair 
play. The slave trade or an extortion racket would be examples of joint 
enterprises of this sort. Even those who are beneficiaries of such enter­
prises have no moral obligation to obey its rules. One may treat his fellow 
extortionists unfairly by dealing with the police, let us say, but this does 
not mean that one ought not to have done it. The undertaking must be moral­
ly justifiable before the fairness appeal will be appropriate.
The value of civil society has already been discussed. Without rules 
of certain sorts men could not live together and cooperate to mutual advan­
tage. These rules must provide at the minimum for peace and security of 
person and property. Besides these standing males there must be recognized 
procedures for making and executing policies and for adjudicating disputes. 
Without this framework of order and stability, and without this decision- 
procedure, there could be no common economic endeavour, and so no material 
prosperity. Nor would there be any but the most primitive culture: no
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scientific, "no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, 
continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short."56 Civil society is not simply one valu­
able thing among others; it is the necessary condition of almost everything 
else that we value. And it would be impossible unless the law was generally 
obeyed. The whole point of having laws and judicial procedures is lost if 
they are not generally followed; it is simply inconsistent to grant the 
desirability of government and to say that it is a matter of indifference 
whether its laws and decisions are obeyed. General disobedience would bring 
about the dissolution of civil society itself.
Hobbes makes the point forcefully when he discusses "the diseases of a 
commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof 
one is, that every private man is judge of good and evil actions.
"From this false doctrine men are disposed to debate with 
themselves, and dispute the commands of the commonwealth; 
and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their pri­
vate judgments they shall think fit; whereby the common­
wealth is distracted and weakened."
Locke makes the same point when discussing the social contract, which puts 
all those who are party to it under an obligation to the others "to submit 
to a determination of the majority and to be concluded by it." If it did 
not, then the contract would be meaningless:
"For what appearance would there be of any compact? What 
new engagement if he were no further tied by any decree 
of the society than he himself thought fit and did actual­
ly consent to? This would still be as great a liberty as 
he himself had before his compact...."58
It cannot be necessary for all to agree before each is bound to obey. "Such
a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration59
than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in."
Now it would be quite possible for any one individual to disregard the 
laws without damaging the social enterprise. Obeying the law often means 
bearing some burden or restricting one's liberty in some unpleasant way. It 
could well be to one's advantage to disregard the law, as long as others 
continued to heed it. But it would be unjust or unfair to those who do
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restrict their freedom and do bear the burdens, not to do likewise. In the 
absence of some special circumstance which excuses one from obedience, one 
would be taking advantage of the sacrifices of others to further one's own 
ends. This would be similar at least to violating a moral obligation in the 
narrow sense: one's conformity to the law is owed to others by virtue of
their cooperation in the scheme from which all benefit.
This argument, as we have developed it, appeals to considerations both 
of utility and of fairness and, it seems clear, is stronger than an argument 
appealing only to one criterion. An argument appealing exclusively to fair­
ness, as we have just seen, would generate unwanted obligations in cases of 
morally objectionable institutions. But what about an argument appealing 
only to the utility of one's acts? After making a case for having govern­
ment one might simply argue that one ought to support desirable institutions 
and ought not by his actions contribute to their demise. Socrates speaks in 
places as though his escape would single-handedly overturn the Athenian 
legal system, though in others he speaks only of the tendency of such an act 
to undermine the system. In either case the consequences of such an act 
would be bad. One ought not by an act of disobedience to contribute to a 
breakdown of the political order.
The modified fairness argument is stronger than this consequentialist 
argument for more than one reason. In the first place, it does not rely 
upon the actual or hypothetical consequences of any given act of disobed­
ience. It is quite possible that many acts of disobedience which would be 
unfair in the way described would bring about a balance of 'good' conse­
quences and would have no effect upon the obedience of others. The second 
virtue of the argument is that it more accurately portrays what might be 
referred to as the 'horizontal' nature of our moral-political relations. 
Obedience to the law is not owed to the government, as the simpler benefits 
argument has it; rather, it is something we owe our fellow citizens and they 
owe us. The debt arises from our past actions and reflects a situation of 
mutual dependence, trust and cooperation. And we owe our part to the co­
operating members of society because of their cooperation, not simply be­
cause they are creatures upon whom one ought not inflict suffering.
This brings us to the second problem with Hart's argument: the law is
sometimes openly disobeyed, not for personal benefit, but because it is con-
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sidered morally objectionable. We must distinguish between covert criminal 
disobedience for personal gain and public civil disobedience for some larger 
purpose. There is a difference between disobeying a law because obedience 
is irksome, and disobeying it because one judges it to be bad. The fairness 
appeal as developed so far is sufficient to show the wrongness of the for­
mer, but it does not seem properly directed to the latter. If it is an un­
just law or unjust executive act under recovering law which is at issue it 
seems odd to accuse the disobedient of unfairness, for it is in the name of 
fair play that he takes his stand. If he is seeking no private advantage 
from his action and is even inviting legal punishment for it, he cannot be 
considered a shirker or 'free rider'.
Nevertheless, one ought to obey even those laws which one takes to be 
'bad' (leaving out for now the possibility that the whole system of laws is 
bad). It is not necessary to appeal to the notion of fairness to make this 
point. We must have some procedure for deciding which rules are best and 
for settling any other controversies which might threaten the peace. If 
each person obeys only those decisions which he thinks are correct the 
'system', to put it crudely, will not work. Persons of different exper­
ience, outlook and temperament cannot be counted on to agree in their indi­
vidual judgements. Even men of good will, as Kant would have it, will dis­
agree about what decision would be best. Each must be prepared, then, to 
accept the decision reached through a decision-procedure of which one 
approves as binding, even though one may think it is wrong. We shall 
examine this argument more carefully in Part Six when discussing the scope 
of obligations.
If one grants the necessity of general unconditional acceptance yet 
refuses to take this stance oneself, then we should ask what makes one an 
exception to the rule. This is not so much a matter of fairness as consis­
tency. If one expects others (white supremacists, for example) to obey laws 
which they think are immoral, then one must be prepared in consistency to do 
the same. At least one must be prepared to justify making an exception of 
oneself by appealing to some sort of relevant difference.
The natural temptation in many cases is to reply that there is a rele­
vant difference: white supremacists, for example, are morally backward
individuals whose sense of justice is obviously deficient. They are 'wrong'
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in their judgement of race laws whereas we are 'right' in ours. If we dis­
obey such laws it is because we 'correctly' perceive their shortcomings.
One could even claim consistency: the principle one is consistently advoca­
ting is that a law be obeyed if it is not an immoral law. One may consis­
tently act on this principle, but it is not a principle on which everyone 
could act and the political system still survive. As has been mentioned, 
one reason for having a social decision-procedure is that persons cannot be 
counted on to agree about what ought to be done in many situations. In the 
absence of some sure sign of moral infallibility, everyone should be willing 
to submit his conduct to determination by a fair decision procedure. Thus, 
one ought prima facie to obey a law even when one thinks it is a bad law.
Civil obligation is a complex obligation, supported as it is by dif­
ferent sorts of considerations. In the broadest sense of 'obligation', one 
has an obligation to obey the law because reason dictates the adoption of a 
certain principle of conduct. It is in one's own interest, as well as in 
the interest of others, that one obey the law regardless of the advantage to 
be obtained by disobedience, and regardless of one's judgement of the worth 
of a particular law. It is necessary that people generally act in this way, 
and one must be prepared in consistency to do the same. Finally, one will 
be acting unfairly towards others if one refuses to do his part in maintain­
ing the system from which all benefit. In this respect, civil obligation 
resembles more closely an obligation in the narrow sense of the term.
As it is based upon the preservation of something of great importance, 
it is accordingly an obligation of great weight. This does not mean that it 
may never justifiably be set aside, but it does mean that the decision to do 
so should never be made without careful and sober reflection.
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PART SIX
THE CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF CIVIL OBLIGATION
In the preceding Parts of this thesis we have argued that Rousseau and 
Rawls, in particular, point the way toward a contractarian solution to the 
problem of civil obligation, and that the theories of Hobbes and Locke - 
whether they succeed or fail as accounts of civil obligation - are not 
adequate contractual theories. Contractual terms abound in both Leviathan 
and the Second Treatise, to be sure, but this simply obscures the fact that 
the social contract plays a vital role in neither theory. For Hobbes, the 
ultimate appeal is to prudence; for Locke, it is to the law of nature.
Thus the contractual field is left to Rousseau, Rawls and, in part, Kant. 
But this distinction between the theories of Rousseau and Rawls, on the 
one hand, and Hobbes and Locke, on the other, could only be drawn after a 
study of the details of their arguments; and this scrutiny of the theore­
tical trees may have led us to lose sight of the philosophical forest. At 
this point in the exposition, therefore, we return to more general conside­
rations. With the explications of the theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau 
and Rawls lending the necessary background, it is now possible to address 
the question, What is the contractarian theory of civil obligation? What, 
in other words, are its elements and how is it structured? As a prelude to 
these matters, we shall first reconsider and extend our earlier remarks on 
the problem of civil obligation.
The aim of Part One was to show that the problem of civil obligation 
can be solved. To accomplish this task we had first to set out a concep­
tion of civil obligation free from the ambiguities which usually surround 
that concept. It also had to be demonstrated that those who dismiss civil 
obligation as a pseudo-problem which does not admit of a general theoreti­
cal solution were mistaken. According to the formal solution advanced in 
Part One, a citizen of a moral order or just state has a civil obligation 
to obey the laws of that state. And a satisfactory theory of civil obliga­
tion, on this reasoning, must supply both a conception of the (or a) just 
state and a conception of citizenship or membership. But other questions 
remain. What, for example, is a general solution to the problem of civil
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obligation? Must a solution to this problem be general? And why, finally, 
must the state be just? These matters we touched on in Part One, but they 
must now be examined more closely.
The principal aim of social contract theory, as it is usually under­
stood, is to demonstrate that we ought to obey the laws of the country in 
which we live because we have somehow agreed or consented to do so. But 
this puts too great an emphasis on consent. Contracts are agreements, 
certainly, and they are binding because they rest on the consent of the 
parties involved; but contracts are agreements to do or not do something. 
They include terms, that is, the explicit and implicit conditions under 
which the parties consent to the contract. The problem with the tradition­
al view of the social contract is that its preoccupation with the notion of 
consent has caused it to pay too little attention to the 'terms' or 
'clauses' of the contract.
In the first four sections of Part Six we shall try to correct this 
oversight. The logic of the social contract shows us not when and how we 
have consented to obey the laws of a state, but what kind of state warrants 
our obedience. With the aid of the idea of a social contract, in other 
words, we can develop a conception of a state - a just state - to whose 
authority we could reasonably assent. If we find that the state in which 
we are living meets this conception, then, following the principle of fair­
ness, we know that we have an obligation to obey its laws.
In sections five to seven we wish to do two things. First, we shall 
consider some of the objections commonly brought against contract theory. 
These are telling objections when contract theory is understood in the 
usual sense, but we hope to show that the interpretation of the social con­
tract advanced here overcomes or avoids them. When these criticisms are 
disposed of, secondly, we shall attempt to define contract theory further 
by pointing out its limitations. Throughout this thesis it has been main­
tained that the social contract can guide us to a satisfactory account of 
civil obligation; but if we are to understand the logic of the social con­
tract, we must be aware of what it cannot do as well as.what it can.
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I
The Question of Generality
One of the ironies of the literature on civil obligation is that 
attempts to clarify the issues and problems involved have often had the 
opposite effect. In the name of linguistic precision, for instance, 
Macdonald, McPherson, and Weldon have all argued that attempts to find a 
general theory of civil obligation are futile because the problem of civil 
obligation, stated generally, is senseless. But none of these writers 
bothers to explain what 'generality' means in this context, and this over­
sight makes it rather difficult to evaluate their claims. Let us take a 
closer look and see if a notion of generality can be discovered.
Macdonald's essay, "The Language of Political Theory", affords the 
best opportunity, for it is the most straightforward and concise statement 
of the anti-general-theory position. The purpose of this article is to 
criticize philosophers who seek a general solution to the "fundamental 
puzzle of political philosophy", which is "to find a valid reason for 
political obligation".1 Macdonald formulates the fundamental puzzle in 
this way: "Why should I obey any law or acknowledge the authority of any
State or Government?"2 She then claims that the question, when it is 
stated in this vague manner, cannot be answered because we simply do not 
have enough information to know how to answer it. As Macdonald says,
"No general criterion of all right actions can be supplied. 
Similarly, the answer to 'Why should I obey any law, acknow­
ledge the authority of any State or support any Government?' 
is that this is a senseless question. Therefore, any attempted 
reply to it is bound to be senseless...."3
Since time spent on general questions of obligation is time wasted, 
Macdonald suggests that we concentrate instead on particular questions.
"It makes sense," she says,
"to ask 'Why should I obey the Conscription Act?' or 'Why 
should I oppose the present German Government?' because by 
considering the particular circumstances and the characteris­
tics of all concerned, it is possible to decide for or against 
obedience and support."^
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There are two problems with Macdonald's argument. Her formulation of 
the general question of civil obligation, in the first place, is actually 
a question of obedience, not obligation. It asks, in other words, "Why 
should I obey any law?" rather than "Do I have an obligation to obey any 
law?". These are different questions, and an answer to one is not neces­
sarily an answer to the other. By the same token, good reasons for dismis­
sing one of these questions are not necessarily good reasons for dismissing 
the other. Macdonald is probably right to discard so vague a question as 
"Why should I obey any law?", but "Do I have an obligation, or a prima 
facie obligation to obey the law?" is another matter. To answer this 
second question we must show how persons incur obligations to obey laws and 
determine whether or not the questioner has done so. This may be difficult 
to do, for it may require an explanation of the concepts of obligation and 
law; but the task is surely not impossible and the question is clearly not 
senseless. Macdonald's formulation of the general question, in brief is 
an example of the unhappy consequences of conflating 'obligation' with 
'ought'.
The second problem with Macdonald's argument is that she presents a 
misleading account of the levels involved. She leaps, that is, from ques­
tions about obedience to laws in general to questions about obedience to 
a particular law as if there were no intermediate level. This kind of 
analytical gymnastics leads her to reject the general question as senseless 
and accept the particular question as sensible.  ^ But this is much too 
facile a move; for Macdonald neglects a third question at an intermediate 
level: "Why should I obey the laws of this state or government?". In one
sense, of course, this is a particular question: it refers to a specific
state or government. But in another sense it is a general question, for it 
does not refer to a single law or instance, but to an entire system of 
laws. Furthermore, this intermediate or systemic level often evokes the 
general question. This is because we sometimes must determine what are the 
general features of states which deserve our obedience before we can decide 
whether a particular state has these features and, hence, ought to be 
obeyed. There is, moreover, a way of formulating this systemic level 
question which clearly invokes general concerns: "What kind of state (or 
civil society, or rule-enforcing body) ought I obey?". This is a general 
question, certainly, but it is by no means senseless. And it seems, final­
ly, that this, and not Macdonald's "Why should I obey any law?" is the
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general question which has engaged political philosophers for so long.^
Thus Macdonald's attempt to clarify civil obligation is doubly con­
fused: she begins by conflating 'obligation' and 'ought', then compounds
the problem by over-simplifying the number of levels at which questions of 
obligation and obedience can arise. With these confusions removed, how­
ever, it is clear that a general solution to the problem of civil obliga­
tion is not an impossibility. Such a solution must answer the question, 
"When am I under an obligation to obey the laws of a state or government?". 
The answer, as we suggested in Part One, is, "You are under an obligation 
to obey the laws of a state if and only if you are a citizen of a just 
state". The notion of citizenship must be filled out so that it accounts 
for a commitment to the state, of course, and a conception of the just 
state must also be elaborated. But any theory which accomplishes these 
tasks is a general theory of civil obligation, for it delineates the crite­
ria which must be met if one is under an obligation to obey the laws of a 
state.
It is possible, then, to develop a general theory of civil obligation. 
But this leads to a further question about generality: must a theory of
civil obligation be general? The answer is yes. A civil obligation, as 
was argued in Part One, is a systemic obligation: one does not have a
civil obligation to obey this law or that law, but to obey a law just 
because it is part of a system promulgated by the law-making authorities of 
the state. One may have an obligation to obey some laws of the state and 
not others, but in this case the obligation is legal rather than civil. A 
person in Nazi Germany, for example, might have had a legal obligation to 
obey the traffic laws, but he had no civil obligation to obey the laws of 
the regime.
This systemic nature of civil obligation means that practical ques­
tions about civil obligation must be raised at what we have termed the 
intermediate level - "Am I under an obligation to obey the laws of this 
state?". True, particular questions of obligation can be raised sensibly, 
but we usually cannot answer them without referring to the intermediate or 
systemic level. When we can ask "Am I under an obligation to obey this 
law?" without also asking "Am I under an obligation to obey the laws of 
this state?" it is because we appeal to a legal, not a civil obligation.
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When we question our civil obligation, consequently, we question our 
obligation to, in a Kantian sense, 'respect' the system of laws of a 
specific state and, consequently, to accept a prima facie obligation to 
obey laws just because they are part of the system.
But questions of this sort cannot be answered unless we turn to the 
general level. We cannot determine whether a person is or is not under an 
obligation to obey the laws of a state unless we can determine how anyone, 
anywhere, incurs a civil obligation. If pledging allegiance to the flag is 
sufficient to place Jones under an obligation to obey the laws of the 
jurisdiction to which he is subject, then, ceteris paribus, it is also 
sufficient for his neighbours. This does not cover all circumstances, 
obviously: what binds one person to obedience to the laws of one state may
not bind another person to the laws of another state. This is to say that 
the character of the state in question is an absolutely vital considera­
tion; but this consideration too cannot be confined to the intermediate 
level. If pledging allegiance (or whatever) suffices to place one under a 
civil obligation to one (kind of) state but not to others, then we must 
once again resort to a general question: to what kind of state does one
incur a civil obligation? A theory of civil obligation, therefore, must 
have a general application - it must be a general theory.
Since a theory of civil obligation serves as a measuring rod of sorts 
it enables us to decide whether or not a particular person has an obliga­
tion to obey the laws of a particular state. According to the notion of 
civil obligation we have set out, for example, a theory of civil obligation 
must include a conception of a just state and a conception of citizenship. 
When a case arises, we must determine whether the state and person involved 
fit these conceptions. In this way questions of civil obligation at the 
particular and systemic levels require and presuppose a general theory of 
the state as deserving of the obedience of its citizens, such that the 
state will exercise legitimate authority and not serve merely as a focus of 
power. This consideration, needless to say, is the central problem of 
liberal political philosophy.
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The Just State
II
In addition to these questions about generality we must also attend 
briefly to another question: why must the state be just? Why is it, in
other words, that a civil obligation is an obligation to obey the laws of 
a just state and not those of an unjust state?
There are two reasons for denying that one can have a civil obligation 
to an unjust state. The first is related to the tendency to derive obliga­
tion from coercion. Those who claim that all members of a civil society 
have a civil obligation to that society run the risk of reducing obligation 
to obedience and founding obedience in coercion. For if membership and 
civil society are defined broadly, this position leads to the conclusion 
that everyone has an obligation to obey those who rule over him - even if 
this rule rests only on naked terror. There are, as noted in Part One, 
only two ways to avoid this conclusion: either redefine 'civil society' so
that arbitrarily coercive regimes are excluded, or distinguish those kinds 
of civil society which have a legitimate claim to civil obligation from 
those which do not. In either case, we must draw a distinction between 
regimes which may be owed obedience from those which may not. This distinc­
tion is conveniently marked by the adjectives 'just' and 'unjust'.
An objection may arise here: it is possible, and even likely, that a
state will treat some citizens justly and others unjustly. What are we to 
say when this happens - that those in the former category are under a civil 
obligation while those in the latter are not? If this is the case, then 
all that concerns the individual is how the state treats him, not its 
justice or injustice toward all. And this means, in turn, that a state 
need not be just in order to claim the civil obligation of some of its 
citizens.
The problem with this objection is that the individual cannot simply 
be concerned with how the state treats him. He incurs a civil obligation 
not as a person, but as a citizen; and this, as Rousseau argued, is an 
abstract status which he shares with others. So long as those in power 
treat some citizens unjustly, no citizen is secure. It is only when the
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state accords the same rights and liberties to all citizens that any 
citizen can have an obligation to obey the system of laws of the state. In 
this respect civil obligation is an all-or-nothing matter: either every
citizen has it or none has it. Peculiar personal characteristics or deeds 
have no bearing here: all that counts is one's status as a citizen. Given 
this all-or-nothing condition, any state that can justifiably claim the 
civil obligation of its citizens must be just. The content given to the 
concept of justice may vary, but it must include at least the notion that 
all citizens are 'equal' under the law.
This connection between citizenship and civil obligation is the second 
reason for denying that one can have a civil obligation to an unjust state. 
One may have prudential or even moral reasons for obeying the laws of an 
unjust state; or one may have undertaken a legal obligation to obey some of 
its laws. But a person cannot have a civil obligation unless he is a 
citizen of a just state.
Ill
The Contractual Theory of Civil Obligation
We must now consider how the contractual theory meets with the 
requirements of a general theory of civil obligation; to see, that is, what 
content it gives to the concepts of 'citizen' and 'just state'. There are 
some things that we cannot properly call 'citizens' or 'just states' with­
out entering the realm of fantasy. But the boundaries which separate what 
may from what may not be called a 'citizen' and a 'just state' are both 
flexible and vague, and within these vague boundaries there is room for a 
good deal of contest. 'Citizen' may describe members of a small, politi­
cally active minority, as in Periclean Athens, or it may be extended to the 
relatively passive masses. Simlarly, a 'just state' may be applied to a 
small, hierarchically organized polity, as in Plato's Republic, or to a 
large, decentralized nation. The looseness of these concepts seems to 
indicate a discomfiting relativism as though what anyone takes to be a just 
state is no more than a matter of taste. There is more involved than 
taste, surely, but there is a serious problem here: how are we to justify
our conceptions of 'citizen' and 'just state'?
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Contract theory, as Rawls has demonstrated, affords not only a concep­
tion of the just state: it also provides a procedure which leads us to
that conception. The contractual procedure is, in a sense, the justifica­
tion of the contractual conception of the just state. For if the procedure 
is appropriate, then the outcome of the procedure must also be acceptable. 
What the contractarian says, in effect, is this: "Here is a procedure.
Follow it and you will discover a non-arbitrary conception of the just 
state." Thus the burden of justification rests on the procedure rather 
than on the conception itself.
The core of the contractarian theory is the notion of hypothetical 
consent. Instead of asking whether or not one has at any time expressly or 
tacitly consented to obey the laws of a state, the contractarian asks, "To 
what kind of state should I give my consent?". This calls for the imagina­
tive construction of a just or deserving state, and, although they approach 
this task in different ways, Rousseau and Rawls both suggest that in this 
enterprise each must choose for all.7 That is to say, when he is choosing 
principles to govern the just state, each person is making choices which 
must be agreeable not only to himself, but to everyone in the state. When 
he is thus forced to take others into account the individual is prevented 
from 'stacking the deck' in his own favour. The resulting conception of a 
just state, consequently, is justifiable, not arbitrary, because it is 
acceptable to all.
The matter is far more complicated than this, however. The contrac­
tual procedure is justifiable basically because it satisfies both moral and 
prudential considerations. Taking prudential considerations first, it 
seems that anyone charged with 'constructing' a state will be concerned to 
erect safeguards to protect his person and possessions. Without such safe­
guards there would be no reason to consent to the authority of the state, 
for one would be as well off in a Lockean or Hobbesian state of nature. As 
Rousseau puts it, "the force and liberty of each man are the chief instru­
ments of his self-preservation", and one cannot reasonably surrender these 
instruments to anything other than "a form of association which will defend 
and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each 
associate...."8. The individual, then, will incorporate at least minimal 
safeguards into his imagined state. A rational egoist, of course, may wish 
to limit or define these safeguards so that he is protected while others
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remain vulnerable - especially vulnerable to him. But this option is 
denied, for the contractual procedure requires him to choose for all, and 
so the egoist must extend the protection he desires for himself to others. 
The contractual procedure leads in this way to a conception of the just 
state in which everyone has a right to equal protection. Since everyone's 
interests will be protected equally, the contractual procedure yields a 
result acceptable on prudential grounds to everyone. This works, however, 
only if some problems in moral theory are overcome - problems which attend 
to the idea that each must 'choose for all', i.e. choose for each as each 
would choose for himself. This requirement is itself the expression of a 
political axiological principle - the notion that an individual may not 
have one set of standards for others and another for himself. A well-worn 
example may help to illustrate this point: if Jones believes it is proper
for him to walk across a well-kept lawn rather than on the pavement, he has 
no right to condemn others who do the same thing in similar circumstances. 
This is sometimes called the principle of universality, and its variants - 
which is not to say equivalents - include the Golden Rule and Kant's 
Categorical Imperative.
But this principle is not free from difficulties. That we must do 
what we would have others do in a similar situation is, first, easily ren­
dered trivial. This is due largely to the vagueness of "in a similar 
situation". Jones may hold that, generally speaking, one should not walk 
across lawns when pavement is at hand. But he may also introduce a series 
of qualifications and exceptions which serve to excuse him in a particular 
situation: e.g. "One may walk across lawns when in a hurry and when no one
will see you so that one doesn't set a bad example". Jones could even go 
so far as to build a description of himself into the excusing characteris­
tics of the situation: e.g. "all 32 year old males may walk across lawns..
.." This is likely to be rejected by others as a resort to irrelevant 
considerations, but it does show how a universal rule can be trivialized so 
that it applies to a single instance, or little more.5 The upshot, 
obviously, is that an individual may formulate a rule in universal terms 
and still favour himself. And this means that in the contractual procedure 
one could choose for all a rule which required everyone to pay an income 
tax, for instance, except those who are public servants earning less than 
$20,000, etc. The loopholes that trivialization opens, in short, present 
the contractarian with a serious problem.
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There is also another problem with the principle of universality, 
involving the acceptability of the rules some people may be willing to 
universalize. A sincere Nazi, for example, would hardly hesitate to uni­
versalize the judgement "Jews should be exterminated". Not only does he 
believe that he should exterminate Jews, but he believes that others should 
do so as well.10 This has serious implications for contract theory because 
it demonstrates that requiring each to choose for all will not always lead 
to completely acceptable conceptions of the just state. Fanatics and 
bigots of all persuasions will be eager to establish a state based on 
intolerance, while those they would persecute and subjugate will not hesi­
tate to reject it. Thus the stipulation that each must choose for all 
fails once again to guarantee a conception of the just state which is 
acceptable to all.
For both these reasons the principle of universality - at least in its 
"each must choose for all" form - is not adequate to the contract theor­
ist's task. The aim of contract theory is to achieve a set of principles 
of justice, a conception of the just state, which is satisfactory from 
everyone's point of view even if it is the first choice of none. So long 
as the individuals who enter into the hypothetical contractual situation 
are able to slant the principles in their favour, or colour the conception 
with 'unacceptable' attitudes, however, there is no chance that unanimity 
will be attained. The solution, therefore, lies in finding a way to pre­
vent those who choose for all from granting preference to their own 
interests and desires.
This solution is precisely the one sought by Rousseau and Rawls. As 
we have seen, Rousseau insists not only that each must choose for all, but 
that each must choose as a eitizen. As men our wills are partial; but as 
citizens we share a general will. The thief and his victims share an 
interest as citizens in laws protecting property even though such laws may 
be contrary to the thief's interest as a man. If, then, the principles 
which are to govern the just state are chosen from the vantage of the citi­
zen rather than the man, they will be acceptable to all: they will repre­
sent the common ground which all can accept despite their differences.
Rawls offers essentially the same solution, but he presents in in a 
much more concrete and fully developed form. Like Rousseau, Rawls asks the
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individual to shed his priväte interests and assume an abstract identity so 
that the principles he chooses for all will be acceptable to all. He 
accomplishes this by placing the parties to the contract behind the "veil 
of ignorance". In this position, as Rawls points out, "No one knows his 
situation in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a 
position to tailor principles to his advantage."11 Given this restriction, 
the rational move for someone behind the veil is to propose principles of 
justice which will protect his interests - whatever they may happen to be. 
In this way the veil forces the parties to the hypothetical contract to 
adopt a common viewpoint; or, in Rousseau's terms, the veil leads them to 
promote their common interest as citizens instead of their private inter­
ests as men. Rawls uses the veil of ignorance in order to show us what it 
means to choose as a citizen. In this sense Rawls' version of contract 
theory develops and clarifies Rousseau's insight. Since it is more com­
plete and suggestive than Rousseau's account, though, it must be regarded 
as the exemplar of contract theory.
When Rousseau and Rawls deprive the parties to the hypothetical con­
tract the right and ability to maximize their personal interests, they 
achieve two aims. They ensure, in the first place,equality of considera­
tion. If the individuals in the contractual situation (or "original posi­
tion") cannot rig principles to their own advantage, they must choose 
principles which will be to some extent in everyone's interest. Consequen­
tly, no one's interests are favoured and none overlooked - everyone 
receives equal consideration. From the moral point of view, then, no one 
has reason to complain. In the second place, this guarantee of equal con­
sideration also closes the loopholes in the notion that "each must choose 
for all". Deadlocks caused by a clash of interests are avoided, and the 
outcome of the contractual procedure is at least acceptable to everyone for 
prudential reasons. The constraints which Rousseau and Rawls place upon 
the parties to the contract, in sum, allow them to derive a conception of 
the just state from the contractual procedure. 'Abstraction', then, is the 
essence of the contractarian method; the technique by which the good citi­
zen prescinds from what does not concern him as a citizen. And with the 
difficulties of the principle of universality overcome, the contractual 
procedure justifies the conception of the just state which emerges.
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What, then, does the just state look like? What is the contractarian 
conception of the just state? It is not possible to provide a detailed 
portrait here, and not simply because of the press of space and time. The 
contractarian conception of the just state is necessarily abstract, for it 
makes no reference to social and material conditions or political and legal 
institutions. There are two reasons for this. First, the parties to the 
contract are deprived of information about social and material conditions, 
and it would be foolish to try to design the institutions of government 
without such knowledge. This is why Rawls suggests a four-state sequence - 
during which the veil of ignorance is gradually lifted - for (1) choosing 
the principles of justice, (2) designing the constitution, (3) considering 
legislation, and (4) implementing and administering laws and policies.12 
It is also possible, secondly, that there may be a number of just states 
which vary widely in the kinds of conditions they face and institutions 
they have. Just states would no doubt share 'family resemblances', but no 
two would be identical. Hence no single portrait of the just state could 
possibly suffice; we shall have to be content, as a result, with a sketch.
The first requirement of a just state is that it must maintain the 
rule of law.13 There must be regular and recognized procedures for enact­
ing, enforcing and interpreting the rules which govern the society. The 
rules cannot simply be the arbitrary dictates of those in power, dictates 
issued with little regard for consistency or fairness. There are also 
other important aspects of the rule of law. If laws are to serve as rules 
- as guides to conduct - then the laws must be made public so that the 
citizens have a chance to follow them. There is no legal offence without 
a law, and a person cannot be held liable if he has no opportunity to learn 
what the law requires. Further, laws must take account of the notion 
"ought implies can". It is unreasonable to require or forbid men to do 
what they cannot be expected to do or avoid. Finally, the rule of law also 
demands that similar cases be treated similarly. What this means in prac­
tice depends upon the context, of course, but it does prohibit judges from 
ruling in favour of one claimant and against another when the only differ­
ences in their cases are patently irrelevant.
The ideal typical just state described in purely abstract and uninter­
preted terms must also guarantee certain fundamental rights and liberties. 
The basic rule here, as stated in Rawls' first principle, is that everyone
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is entitled to the greatest possible freedom compatible with a similar 
freedom for others. Legal and political rights will continue to emphasize 
equality: everyone is equal in the eyes of the law; everyone is entitled 
to due process of law; everyone has a right to an equal voice in the poli­
tical process. Beyond this, we find that the ideal typical just state also 
guarantees familiar substantive rights and liberties: freedom of expres­
sion, assembly and worship.14 This is, of course, only an indication of 
the rights and liberties protected by the just state, not a catalogue of 
them.
In both these respects - the rule of law and the recognition of 
certain fundamental rights and liberties - the contractarian conception of 
the just state embodies the principles of liberal democracy. In the area 
of distributive consideration, however, the contractarian conception 
significantly modifies the traditional liberal view. Citizens may be free 
and equal under law even though they are unable to enjoy this freedom or 
equality in practice. If the formal guarantees of the law are to have any 
meaning in actual life, then steps must be taken to ensure that the rich 
and powerful are not able to control the lives of others. Personal depen­
dence, to use Rousseau's terms, must not undermine legal independence. For 
this reason both Rousseau and Rawls advocate distributive schemes which try 
to prevent great economic disparities. Rawls' claim that the difference 
principle will be chosen by those in the original position may be wrong, 
but it does seem that contract theory rules out some alternatives, at the 
least. From behind the veil of ignorance, the difference principle appears 
more attractive than complete egalitarianism. Laissez-faire capitalism, by 
the same token, seems incompatible with contractual reasoning, for those 
behind the veil of ignorance are not likely to look favourably upon the 
prospect of some entrepreneur cornering the market on some vital commodity 
or of a plutocrat passing all his wealth, untaxed, on to his heirs.
Whether they will choose the difference principle or the average utility 
principle is not clear - perhaps both, and others, are acceptable. But it 
does appear that those in the contractual situation will opt for a distri­
butive principle which includes both incentives and levelling devices.
This sketch of the just state lacks colour as much as it lacks detail. 
It is not likely to inspire heroic deeds or lofty visions; but this is not 
to be expected. The just state is not the ideal state. We may say that a
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state is just without thereby implying that there is complete harmony 
between all its constituents or that the citizens are realizing one and all 
their full human potential. Even within the just state there will be 
crime, conflict and frustration. But the contractual conception of the 
just state is not meant to be a utopian ideal, valuable as such ideals may 
be; it is, instead, a 'benchmark', or Kantian schema, a measuring rod which 
we use to see whether the state we inhabit is just. If this actual state 
measures up, as it were, then the citizen knows that he has an obligation 
to obey its laws, for it is governed by principles to which he would con­
sent in the contractual situation. He has, in this case, a civil obliga­
tion .
IV
Citizenship, Fairness and Obligation
The justice of the state is a necessary condition for civil obliga­
tion, which is to say that we cannot have a civil obligation to an unjust 
state. But the justness of a state is not by itself sufficient to estab­
lish a civil obligation to that state. To show that someone is under an 
obligation to obey the laws of a state, we must demonstrate that the state 
is just and that he is a citizen of this state. The reason why both condi­
tions must be satisfied is related to the distinction between 'ought' and 
'obligation'. There are some things we ought to do even though we have no 
obligation to do them, and it may be that, ceteris paribus, I ought to obey 
the laws of a just state. But the fact that a state is just cannot place 
me under an obligation to obey. Obligations must be undertaken, and I can 
only be under an obligation to obey the laws when I have in some way 
committed myself to do so. The thesis we shall advance here is that all 
citizens of a just state have committed themselves to obey the lams of that 
state. Two requirements must be satisfied to substantiate this assertion. 
First, a conception of what it means to be a citizen must be developed.
Once this is done, we must show how the assumption and exercise of citizen­
ship in a just state commits one to obey the laws.
The meanings of 'citizen' and 'citizenship' are not absolutely fixed, 
of course. However, there is a common core: a citizen is entitled to
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exercise the civil and political rights recognized by a civil society. But 
this does not tell us much, and problems arise when we ask, "to whom is the 
status of citizenship to be accorded?". Throughout history the prevalent 
conceptions of citizenship have restricted this status to a privileged few. 
Vast numbers of people have been denied citizenship because they failed to 
meet racial, sexual, religious or economic criteria. In view of the wide 
variety of positions that have been taken on this question, consequently, 
we must also ask here: to whom does contract theory grant citizenship?
This question can be answered by returning to the contractual situa­
tion. Here, behind the veil of ignorance, the question may be put this 
way: who is to be allowed to take part in deciding matters of policy for 
the community? Since those in the contractual position are ignorant of 
their natural and social characteristics, citizenship will be granted to a 
broad spectrum of people. Racial, sexual and economic standards for 
citizenship will be rejected. At the same time, contract theory allows for 
the exclusion of those who are mentally incompetent or immature. If some­
one behind the veil does not know his age, for example, he may reason that 
he should not have a say in important community matters until he is mature 
enough to know what is in his interest. Settling the matter of citizen­
ship, however, is not quite this easy. For once we admit that some people 
ought to be denied full citizenship for lack of mental maturity or compe­
tence, we face the problem of drawing the line which separates those who 
are accorded full citizenship from those who are not. This does not seem to 
constitute a serious problem where age is concerned, for the line will not 
constitute a permanent barrier. But in the case of mental competence we 
seem to be opening the door to some form of aristocracy or elitism.
Consider the following situation. Brown finds himself in the contractual 
situation, and he faces the question: who shall be a citizen? Brown does
not know his own circumstances but he is allowed an acquaintance with 
social theory. He has, let us say, read J. S. Mill's Const derations on 
Representative Government. Struck by the notion that some people are 
better able to make decisions than others, Brown invokes a principle of 
plural voting which allots one vote to those of average intelligence (as 
determined by standard 'IQ' test), two votes to those above the 75th 
percentile and three votes to those in the top ten percent. What, in this 
case, has become of the contractual conception of citizenship?
319
The problem here is more apparent than real. If Brown continues his 
research he is not likely to find a conclusive (even a good) reason for 
restricting citizenship to or increasing the power of an intellectual 
elite. But even if his studies do incline him to believe that such restric­
tions are desirable, Brown still has no reason for denying the less intel­
ligent an equal vote. For if it happens that he is correct in his belief 
then he has ample opportunity to act on it in the real world. If he finds, 
that is, that he is not capable of participating in decision-making, then 
he simply may forego his political rights and allow his intellectual 
betters to govern for him. There is no reason for one behind the veil to 
surrender the right to participate when he may decide whether to exercise 
his right once the veil is lifted.
Contract theory thus provides a conception of citizenship which is 
consistent with a broadly demoncratic notion. Basically, the contractual 
conception stipulates that everyone capable of knowing and acting on his 
interests is to be a citizen - to have all the civil and political rights 
recognized by the community. Racial, sexual, religious and economic stan­
dards are ruled out. And although it will be difficult to draw the line 
between the competent and incompetent, this is a difficulty which can only 
be avoided by according citizenship to all from birth to death.
Now that the contractarian conception of citizenship has been set out, 
it remains to be seen how being a citizen commits one to obey the laws of a 
just state. As we suggested in Part live, this commitment follows from.the 
principle of fairness, as stated most succinctly by Hart: "when a number
of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus res­
trict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when 
required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited 
by their submission."15
Anyone who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a collective enterprise 
thereby undertakes an obligation to those who restrict their liberty in 
order to make a success of the enterprise. Fairness, in other words, 
requires us to do our part in a collective enterprise when the burdens of 
the enterprise fall on our shoulders. As long as the rules are fair and 
applied fairly, we owe obedience to these rules to our fellow participants. 
Mutual benefit enterprises are designed to benefit alt members, and coopera-
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tion is necessary if this benefit is to be realized. One who participates 
in such an enterprise, according to the principle of fairness, undertakes 
an obligation to his fellow participants to do his share of the work or 
bear his part of the burden when the time comes. Hart and others have held 
that civil obligation can be understood in this way. Civil society is a 
joint enterprise, and if we are to receive its benefits we must also accept 
its burdens - by paying taxes, serving in the military, obeying traffic 
laws, and so on. By accepting the benefits of the civil enterprise, 
furthermore, we undertake an obligation to submit to the restrictions of 
our liberty necessary to the continued existence of the enterprise. And 
this is to say that we incur an obligation to obey the laws. Fairness 
requires that the citizen of a just state obey the laws of that state.
This version of civil obligation is in many respects similar to the 
'game' or 'institutional' model discussed in Part One. Indeed, the obliga­
tions that one incurs when playing a game clearly fit Hart's statement of 
the principle of fairness. The problem with the game model is that it has 
been carelessly extended to account for civil obligation. McPherson and 
Weldon make participation or membership in political communities completely 
analogous to participation in a game. The problem with this is that some 
political societies - in the broadest sense of the term - are more like 
games than others. We are not, generally, coerced into playing games; 
moreover, games are governed by rules which are more or less well known to 
the players and which apply to all players equally. Now while some politi­
cal societies share these characteristics with games, others do not. The 
point is that politics is far from a game when the 'rules' are really no 
more than the dictates, enforced by coercion, of those in power.
The principle of fairness improves on the game or institutional model 
by pointing out that we only incur institutional obligations when we parti­
cipate in institutions of a certain kind. They must be "joint enterprises 
according to rules", as Hart says. David Lyons tightens the restrictions 
even further when he specifies that the enterprise must be "a useful, co­
operative, de facto practice."15 These features are present in a just 
state, or at least in the contractual conception of the just state, and 
they account for the citizen's obligation to obey the laws of such a state. 
As he benefits from his fellow citizens' obedience to the laws, the citizen 
also places himself under an obligation to observe the rules himself; and
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this is a civil obligation. So long as a state is just, then, every 
citizen - everyone who is entitled to exercise the civil and political 
rights recognized by the community - is under an obligation to obey the 
laws of the state.
Before going on to consider some objections to this account of civil 
obligation, we must reiterate an important point. We do not hold that the 
citizen of even a just state must always obey all its laws. There are 
certainly occasions when other considerations justify breaking the law, as 
in the familiar example of exceeding the speed limit while rushing someone 
to the hospital. It is also possible that a just state may sometimes act 
unjustly - by abusing other states, for instance, or even by enacting an 
unjust law. In these cases there may be excellent reasons for disobeying 
one or more of the laws. To say when, where and how one is entitled to 
disobey the laws of a just state is a complicated undertaking and far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is important to remember that even 
if one has an obZ'igat'lon to do x, it is not necessarily true, all things 
considered, that one ought to do x.
The principle of fairness seems to offer the best hope of forging a 
link between citizenship and civil obligation. To this point, however, it 
is no more than a hope. Serious objections to the principle of fairness 
have been raised in recent years, and it is not clear that these objections 
can be met. In what follows, therefore, we shall examine and respond to 
these criticisms, then evaluate rather tentatively the prospects of the 
principle of fairness.
These objections fall into two categories.17 The first is similar to 
that brought against traditional consent theory: just as the notion of
tacit consent stretches 'consent' beyond recognition, so the principle of 
fairness distorts the voluntary nature of obligations. Obligations must be 
undertaken freely, voluntarily; they cannot be imposed on us. The princip­
le of fairness, though, holds that those who live in a society and take 
advantage of its benefits thereby incur an obligation to obey the laws of 
that society. To say that this amounts to a voluntary acceptance of an 
obligation is going too far, for, like Locke's tacit consent, it implies 
that "the very being of any one within the territories" of a state entails 
a civil obligation to it. It is this difficulty which has led Rawls to
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abandon the principle of fairness as a foundation for civil obligation.
The best response to this objection is to admit that there is indeed
a problem with the voluntariness of obligations, but to point out that this
is not only a problem for the principle of fairness. The voluntariness of
obligations is in general problematical. J. L. Austin has reminded us of
how slippery 'voluntary' is, and this must always be kept in mind when
18dealing with questions of obligation. What does it mean to say that obli­
gations must be undertaken voluntarily? That the person who undertakes the 
obligation must say aloud or to himself at some point, "By doing this I am 
undertaking an obligation"? Or does it simply mean that one cannot be 
forced or coerced into undertaking an obligation? The person who says to 
himself as he promises to do something, "By making this promise I am under­
taking an obligation" is certainly placing himself under an obligation 
voluntarily. But so do members of any cooperative endeavour, even though 
none of them may inwardly or outwardly acknowledge this at the time. If we 
take 'voluntarily' to mean 'deliberately' or 'on purpose', we fail to take 
account of many cases in which we attribute obligations to individuals who 
have not deliberately - with deliberation - incurred those obligations. It 
follows from this use of 'voluntarily', for example, that the members of a 
bridge group are not under an obligation to observe the rules of bridge 
unless they expressly promise to do so. If, on the other hand, we take 
'voluntarily' to mean 'not under constraint or duress', we may recognize 
that the bridge players have an obligation to follow the rules despite 
their failure to proclaim their acceptance of this obligation.
This brings out a strength of the principle of fairness. A person who 
voluntarily participates in a mutually advantageous collective enterprise 
places himself under an obligation to his fellow participants even if he 
never deliberately incurs the obligation. When his participation is 
coerced, however, and against his will, then he is not under an obligation. 
In as much as the citizen of a just state is not forced to accept the bene­
fits of that state, then we may say that he voluntarily undertakes a civil 
obligation to it. In this way the principle of fairness steers between the 
narrow construction which unduly shrinks the scope of obligation and the 
broad, Hobbesian construction which derives obligation from coercion. It 
is also in line with the ordinary use of 'voluntarily'.
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But this response does not counter all the arguments against the 
voluntariness of the principle of fairness. Robert Nozick has also 
objected that the principle of fairness allows for obligations to be 
imposed on us.19 If we say that we incur an obligation whenever we accept 
the benefits of a just, mutually advantageous, cooperative enterprise, 
Nozick argues, we are saying that others can foist obligations on us. For 
this implies that others can place us under an obligation simply by confer­
ring benefits on us without our consent - by throwing books in our yards, 
for example. But we do not ordinarily have an obligation to one who, with­
out asking us to reciprocate in some way, confers a benefit upon us. "You 
may not decide to give me something... and then grab money from me to pay 
for it, even if I have nothing better to spend the money on."20
Nozick's point here is surely correct, but his example is beside the 
point. The principle of fairness does not require us to reciprocate when­
ever someone does something which is to our benefit; it refers only to the 
benefits of just, mutually advantageous, cooperative practices. But Nozick 
sees the same problem arising within such practices. In some cases one may 
avoid the obligation to reciprocate by refusing to accept the benefits of 
the cooperative enterprise in question. Those who never listen to a radio 
station which is supported by contributions for example, normally have no 
obligation to help underwrite its costs. But in other cases it may be 
practically impossible to avoid the benefits of a cooperative enterprise. 
Nozick offers this example: "If each day a different person on your street
sweeps the street, must you do so when your time comes?"2  ^ If you have 
agreed at some point to wield the broom, the answer is easy. But what if 
those who organized the street-sweeping enterprise never consulted you, but 
merely appeared one day to say, "We've been taking turns cleaning the 
street, and next Thursday is your turn."? This certainly is a difficult 
case for the principle of fairness. One may say, "I don't care that much 
for clean streets. If the rest of you want to spend your time sweeping, 
fine, but don't expect me to help." But if we agree that a clean street is 
to some extent beneficial to everyone who lives in it, then it looks as if 
there is no way to decline the benefits. It seems, consequently, that in 
this case, at least, some can foist obligations on others.
Nozick considers one possible escape from this bind: to stipulate
that the benefits one receives from the actions of others must outweigh the
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costs of doing one's share. Thus if the costs of taking a turn as sweeper 
are greater than the benefits of a clean street, then the practice is not 
mutually advantageous and one is not under an obligation to take a turn.
This seems to relieve us of the problem of having obligations thrust upon 
us against our wills. But this condition is very strong, and it raises 
another difficulty: it narrows considerably the range of application of
the principle of fairness. For if I have an obligation to do my part in a 
cooperative practice only when the benefits of that practice outweigh the 
costs of participation, then I must value these benefits more than anything 
else I could achieve with the time and resources I expend in doing my 
share. I would only be under an obligation to take my turn with the broom, 
for example, if the benefits of a clean street were greater than any other 
benefits I could gain by using the same time and energy otherwise.
Nozick argues that even if this strong condition is met by some prac­
tices, the principle of fairness is still not satisfactory. What if you 
are a cooperative member of an enterprise whose benefits to you are greater 
than your costs, but the enterprise does not benefit you as much as it 
would if some changes were made? One way of drawing attention to this 
alternative if the others ignore it is to withhold your cooperation. But 
the principle of fairness requires you to do your part so long as the 
enterprise is just and mutually advantageous. Thus one must support an 
enterprise even when he wishes to change it and his support makes it harder 
to change. This also holds true, according to the principle of fairness, 
if the benefits of the enterprise are uneven - if, i.e., some may benefit 
greatly while others only benefit enough to make their contributions 
worthwhile. In such a case do we want to say that everyone is obliged to 
do an equal amount to sustain the enterprise?
These are powerful arguments and cannot be refuted, but the principle 
of fairness can accommodate some of them - at least when applied to ques­
tions of civil obligation. First, it is likely, if not necessarily true, 
that the benefits of living in a just state outweigh the costs of obeying 
its laws, even in the strong sense stipulated by Nozick. The benefits a 
just state provides its citizens will be greater than any benefits they 
could obtain by disobeying the laws and refusing to pay their taxes. 
Secondly, the principle of fairness does not absolutely prohibit an indivi­
dual from withholding his cooperation in an attempt to convince others that
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a cooperative practice can be improved. The principle of fairness states 
that an individual has an obligation to do his part when others have done 
and are doing theirs; but this is not to say that this obligation cannot be 
overridden. It is possible, for instance, that a particular law in a just 
state may be disadvantageous to some citizens. The state as a whole meets 
the conditions of the principle of fairness, but in one aspect it is un­
just. In this case we may say that the disadvantaged citizens may or ought 
to disobey this law even though they have a civil obligation to obey the 
system of laws of the state.
Even if the principle of fairness can be spelled out and applied in a 
way which accommodates Nozick's objections it will still come under fire 
from another direction: the utilitarians. If the principle is strictly
adhered to, they contend, it will lead to cases where individuals are 
required to obey the rules even though better consequences can be secured 
by breaking them. To appreciate the force of this objection we must re­
examine the examples used to illustrate the principle of fairness. The 
bridge club is small, and the failure of one member to accept his share of 
responsibility poses a direct, perceptible threat to the success of the 
venture. But this is only because the group is small and each member's 
contribution is significant. In larger groups, where each member is likely 
to know only a minute fraction of the total membership, the contribution of 
most members is by itself insignificant. Since civil societies typically 
resemble large groups more than small, we must beware of drawing conclus­
ions about civil obligation from examples such as the bridge club.22
Consider, then, a different example. Adams is a citizen of a large, 
just state, and he earns an average income. In this state the amount of 
money the average person pays in taxes, while highly significant to him, is 
insignificant when compared to total government revenues. Adam's contribu­
tion has no visible effect on any government policy or programme. Suppose 
also that Adams loves to drink fine wine and would much rather buy wine 
than pay taxes. Given these considerations, should Adams pay his taxes?
If he does no one will be appreciably better off than if he does not, and 
if he buys wine instead then at least he will be markedly happier. If 
better consequences are achieved by buying wine, why should Adams pay his
taxes?
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One answer often given is that individuals cannot be allowed to calcu­
late utility when collective enterprises are at stake. For if everybody 
did as Adams does, no taxes would be paid and the state would collapse.
But this argument will not sway an act-utilitarian. It may be good enough 
when the group is small, but the situation changes remarkably when the 
group is large. If no one discovers that Adams has decided to spend his 
tax money on wine, he will not be setting a bad example. And Adams will 
not broadcast his decision because he does not want others to emulate him - 
at least not too many others - for then he would no longer receive the 
benefits of the collective enterprise. So Adams surreptitiously buys wine, 
secure in the knowledge that most people will continue to pay their taxes 
and the government will remain stable. Should Adams be condemned for 
failing to fulfil his obligation?
The example can be put in terms even more favourable to the utilitar­
ian position: suppose that Adams is altruistic; he will not buy wine but 
give money to a desperately needy person. Say that Adams' tax assessment 
is $1500. There is no doubt that in most cases a needy person would bene­
fit more from $1500 if Adams gives it to him rather than to the government. 
In this case do we want to say - as the principle of fairness requires - 
that Adams has an obligation to pay taxes? Or is it not better to abandon 
the principle of fairness?
A proponent of the principle of fairness can respond to the utilitar­
ian's objection in either of two ways, depending upon whether the objection 
is interpreted in a weak or strong sense. A weak sense is one which holds 
that we do have an obligation to do our part in a collective enterprise 
when others are doing their share, but which also holds that this obliga­
tion can be overridden by utilitarian considerations. When it is stated in 
this way, however, the objection is not an objection at all. This is due 
to the distinction between 'obligation' and 'ought'. One who takes part in 
and accepts the benefits of a cooperative venture undertakes a prima facie 
obligation to obey the rules and shoulder his share of the burden. But it 
would be foolish to pretend that an obligation can never be overridden. We 
do not condemn one for breaking speed limits rushing an injured person to 
hospital. It ought also to be noted that 'overriding' considerations are 
sometimes incorporated into the law as exemptions. The right of taxpayers 
to deduct donations to charities is a good example of this provision for
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exceptions within the law.
The problem is more difficult , though, if the utilitarian objection 
is taken in the strong sense. On this interpretation there is not even a 
prima facie obligation to obey the laws or observe rules. When we must 
decide whether to do our part in a collective enterprise, our sole guide­
line should be the principle of utility: take that action which will pro­
duce the best consequences. If Adams has reason to believe that he can 
produce better consequences by buying wine than by paying his taxes, then 
he ought to buy wine. If, conversely, he has reason to believe that his 
failure to pay taxes will actually play a significant part in the downfall 
of the government - an outcome he does not desire - then he ought to pay 
his taxes. Whatever the decision may be, the reasoning is the same.
What can be said in response to this strong sense of the utilitarian 
objection? The simplest answer is to say, "But that is not fair". It is 
not fair for Adams, that is, to expect others to abide by rules when he 
does not. But why is it not fair? Adams' action does not endanger the 
collective enterprise - this is part of his calculation. The reason why 
it is unfair is that there is nothing special about Adams' case. All 
members of a just state can undoubtedly find something which, qua indivi­
duals, they would prefer spending their money on to paying their taxes.
But unless extenuating circumstances arise, none of them has the right to 
disobey the law simply to increase his personal pleasure. Adams expects 
his fellow citizens to continue to pay their taxes: he wants them to - or
at least enough of them to keep the government in working order. But he 
also wants to make an exception in his own case. Since he had no justifi­
cation for doing so which does not also apply to everyone else, he has no 
right to do so. He has no right to make an exception in his own case 
because as a citizen of a just state he has undertaken an obligation to do 
his part. If Adams shrugs off this obligation, he takes unfair advantage 
of those upon whom he depends. This is not to imply that consequences 
should not be taken into account. Rawls has said that a moral theory 
which shuts out the consideration of consequences is crazy, and we would 
add that it is d a n g e r o u s . B u t  the point we wish to make here is that the 
principle of fairness helps us to see what we are under an obligation to do 
and, hence, what we ought to do ceteris paribus. All things are not always 
equal, however, and it may be that our altruistic Adams ought, all things
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considered, to give his money to the needy person rather than to the tax 
collector. But this is not to say that Adams does not have an obligation 
to pay his taxes, or that he is not under an obligation to obey the laws of 
the state: it is only to say that in this case these obligations may be
overridden (by other reasonable claims on conduct which are not themselves 
obligations).
What can be said, in summary, about the adequacy of the principle of 
fairness? We must recognize, first, that the principle is open to serious 
objections. Whether these objections are crippling is an open question, 
but the burden of proof is clearly on the advocates of the principle. Even 
if these objections do not undermine the principle of fairness, secondly, 
they do restrict its scope to practices where the benefits provided out­
weigh the costs of participating. As Nozick has shown, this is a very 
strong condition. Finally, we have seen that the principle does not answer 
all our questions about what we ought to do even in those cases where it 
may apply. In other words, claims based on the principle of fairness must 
be advanced cautiously and conditionally,on one hand, and with an awareness 
of the need for further investigation of this principle, on the other. The 
'social contract' cannot establish by itself a civil obligation. It may 
furnish the basis for doing so - a conception of the just state - but some­
thing like the principle of fairness is needed to forge the link between 
citizenship and civil obligation.
In Part One it was argued that a civil obligation can be attributed to 
a person only when two conditions are met: when he is (1) a citizen of (2) 
a just state. But these conditions are purely formal and they have little 
practical value until they are given content. What is a citizen? What is 
a just state? In the last four sections we have tried to show how the 
theory of the social contract helps us to answer these questions. Contract 
theory provides us with acceptable conceptions of citizenship and the just 
state, we have claimed, and this means that it affords the basis of a 
satisfactory theory of civil obligation.
However, we have not claimed that contract theory offers the only or 
even the best answer to questions of civil obligation. Such a claim could 
only be sustained after a detailed examination of the merits of rival 
approaches. However, the one virtue of contract theory which indicates
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its superiority is that contract theory not only provides conceptions of 
citizenship and the just state, it also supplies a procedure for developing 
and defending them. It is this procedure, we have argued, which satisfies 
both moral and prudential considerations and demonstrates the acceptibility 
of the contractarian conceptions of citizenship and the just state.
V
Criticism and Defense
Criticisms of contract theory have typically concentrated on its use 
(or abuse) of the concept of consent. Many of these criticisms were first 
voiced in David Hume's essay, "Of the Original Contract".24 Others are of 
more recent vintage.25 But the point of the criticisms is basically the 
same: the social contract is a misleading metaphor insofar as it portrays
consent as the only possible foundation for political authority.
One fundamental criticism of contract theory focuses on its historical 
nature. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that sometime, somewhere 
some group of people did expressly enter into a social contract, the 
critics say, what has this to do with our situation here and now? The 
composition and character of governments and states change so often that 
current institutions probably bear little resemblance to those founded by 
the original contract. Moreover, what difference does it make to us 
whether our distant ancestors agreed to establish and obey a political 
authority? They may have given their consent, but they had neither the 
power nor the right to give ours. We may incur obligations through con­
sent, but only through our own.
A related criticism points out that if obligation is derived from con­
sent, them most people have no obligation to obey the laws. For so long as 
'consent' is taken to mean express consent, then it is clear that only 
those who somehow directly pledge their allegiance are under an obligation 
to obey the laws. This is an undesirable result, of course, for the pur­
pose of 'contract' theorists - at least Hobbes and Locke - was to show that 
the general populace was under a civil obligation.
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The contractarians were not ignorant of these difficulties; but so 
long as they pinned their hopes on consent their only recourse was to 
loosen the concept.26 Thus, express gave way to tacit consent. This 
promised a solution to both of the criticisms already stated because it 
allowed for each new generation to renew the original contract - append 
their signatures, so to speak - by tacitly consenting, on the one hand, and 
for the obligation to obey the law to be extended to the general populace, 
on the other.
But stretching the notion of consent only left contract theory vulner­
able to other objections. The idea of tacit consent is not far-fetched, 
and it has its uses in certain contexts. But what is to be taken as a sign 
of tacit consent to obey the laws of a state? For Hobbes, such consent was 
given by anyone who was protected - and the degree of protection required 
seems minimal - by a sovereign authority. For Locke, tacit consent 
"reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of (a) 
government". In both cases the notion of consent is robbed of its meaning. 
For if mere presence in a country is an acceptable sign of consent, then no 
one ever lived who was not under an obligation to obey the laws of the 
state in which he found himself.
Locke hit upon a theoretical solution to this problem. While one's 
presence in a country was a sign of tacit consent to its laws, he said, one 
could withdraw this tacit consent by leaving the country. This emigration- 
in-protest solution, however, is utterly unsatisfactory, since emigration 
may be made both legally and physically impossible. And even where one is 
free to leave whenever he chooses, practical considerations render Locke's 
solution meaningless.
Another solution that has been suggested attempts to restrict the 
range of tacit consent more carefully than Hobbes and Locke did.27 Accord­
ing to this view an overt act of participation in the political process, 
such as voting, can be construed as tacit consent to obey the laws. By 
taking a part in this process, the argument goes, the citizen indicates 
that it meets with his approval. This revision of the notion of tacit con­
sent has its merits, but it too is open to serious objections. What are we 
to make of the person who votes for losing candidates? If no one he sup­
ports wins office, can we still say that he has consented to obey the
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government? What, furthermore, is the status of the non-voter? Is he 
under no obligation to obey the laws? This seems to be the only possible 
conclusion, yet it is hardly satisfactory. In the United States, for 
instance, it would mean that forty per cent or so of eligible voters who do 
not even vote in presidential elections would have no obligation to obey 
the laws. This clearly is not the outcome the contract theorist desires.
We find, then, that the contract qua consent theorist is on the horns 
of a dilemma. If he relies on express consent, his theory shows that only 
a few people have undertaken an obligation to obey the laws. And if he 
invokes tacit consent, his theory either imposes consent on everyone or 
encounters other crippling difficulties. The only way to escape the 
dilemma is to abandon the idea that we incur an obligation to obey the laws 
only when we somehow consent to do so. This is precisely what Rousseau and 
Rawls do. Consent still plays an important role in their theories, to be 
sure, but it is not consent to obey the laws. As they use it, consent is 
hypothetical, and its purpose is to elicit the terms of the social con­
tract: to draw out a conception of the kind of state to which we would ,
rationally give our consent if we had the chance. Whether we have a civil 
obligation depends upon the closeness of the fit between the actual state 
and the conception of the just state. Whatever the result may be, Rousseau 
and Rawls have avoided the dilemma. The logic of the social contract does 
not require that civil obligation be founded directly on consent.
There is a different kind of attack on contract theory which also must 
be considered, and it is not so easily avoided. This position has been set 
out by J.F.M. Hunter in an essay on "The Logic of Social Contracts".28 
Hunter recognizes that some contractarians do not invest all their philoso­
phical capital in the equation of consent with the tie that binds. In some 
cases, he says,
"the idea of a social contract may be used as a kind of 
political calculus, by asking such questions as what it 
would anyway be reasonable to suppose that people might 
agree to in making a social contract, or what it is 
logically possible or impossible to do in such contract 
situations."28
Hunter is primarily concerned in this regard with some of Locke's 
arguments. Nonetheless, his sketch does resemble the position we have
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attributed to Rousseau and Rawls, and his attack is consequently a stiffer 
challenge than the more common criticisms of consensual contract theory.
Hunter lodges two related objections against the idea of a social 
contract as "a kind of political calculus". He claims, to begin with, that 
the reasons one has for entering into a contract are largely irrelevant to 
the contract itself: "It is not what one wanted to secure for oneself in a
deal which one can be held to, but what one has agreed to."30 Now this 
objection has itself two aspects. Hunter is contending, it seems, that 
(1) hypothetical agreements are not actually binding: no one is bound by
an agreement into which he might have entered if he did not actually enter 
it, and (2) the reasons one has for entering into a contract do not deter­
mine the terms of the contract. We are bound by the contract we actually 
'sign', not by any hypothetical agreement we would have concluded had we 
the chance. The reasons we had for signing the contract, moreover, do not 
specify its terms, for there are often concessions to be made and comprom­
ises to be reached before the contract is finally signed. The idea of a 
social contract cannot provide a binding political calculus, consequently, 
because it leads only to a hypothetical agreement which has no bearing on 
our actual circumstances.
Hunter is right on both counts; but he also misses the point. The 
purpose of the social contract is to help us discover a conception of the 
just state, a state to whose authority we would or could consent. As such 
the social contract is an analytical device - "a kind of political calcu­
lus" - and it is not meant to have any obligatory force in itself.
This is not to say that the contractarian method is committed to the 
analogy found in intuitionist moral theory of the ideal observer: the
notional arbitrator in matters of ethical judgement whose notional opinion 
is valued because it is assumed to be informed, impartial and dispassion­
ate. The contractarian does not so much contrast 'ideal observers', or 
citizens, with real observers but, rather, uses the ideal conception to 
understand the conditions under which an ordinary person's judgements about 
moral matters are authoritative. Properly (employing the jurisprudential 
inflexion of the contract metaphor) contractarianism utilizes the analogy 
of judicial reasoning, where the paradigmatic arbitrator is not an ideal 
observer but a good judge - one who relies upon standards of rational
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justification. A standard of rational justification, as defined by Thomas 
Perry, is an
"objective standard directing us to use reasons and argu­
ments of a kind which are in fact well calculated to secure 
the reasonable agreement of others to our own reasonable 
moral judgment, or at least to secure their respect for us 
in reasonably making that judgment.... To give reasons and 
arguments of that kind for that purpose is to justify one's 
moral judgment... even though the truth or probably truth 
or moral statements cannot be established in this way, or 
perhaps in any way."31
The judicial analogy illustrates most forcefully the Kantian modulation of 
the contractarian method - the rational will addressed to matters of judge­
ment. While nascent in Rousseau (perhaps even adolescent) and richly 
developed in Kant's (non-contractarian) deontology, the judicial analogy is 
present as a mature synecdoche in Rawls - a stylized microcosmic represen­
tation of the liberal theory of moral reasoning. It can readily be seen 
"that many familiar requirements of the good judge and good judicial work 
are closely similar if not identical to the requirements of moral reason­
ableness"32 outlined in A Theory of Justice as the groundwork of the 
original position. The reflective citizen, then, in forming and critici­
zing public decisions assumes the role of the 'good judge' which, as out­
lined by Perry, exhibits the following features:
"First of all, a judge must carefully study the case 
before him, taking note of the precedents and statutes and 
legal principles which have been cited to him, and any 
other relevant standards which his study may disclose; and 
of course he must be attentive to all the facts of the case 
which may have legal significance. This is obviously simi­
lar to the requirement that we be reasonably well informed 
of relevant facts and plausible moral principles when 
making moral judgments. Second, a judge must be impartial; 
his decision must be one that he would be willing to render 
no matter who the parties to the case were, as long as the 
legally relevant facts remained the same. Third, a judge 
is supposed to disqualify himself from sitting in a case 
where his personal interests are involved. And in deciding 
other cases, he must not give special weight to the inter­
ests of his own socio-economic or professional class, or to 
his own racial or religious group, and so on. Now it is 
true that in morals we cannot avoid judging matters in which 
our own interests are involved, but if our judgment is to be 
universalizable we must give no greater weight or importance 
to them than if they were someone else's interests. A fourth 
requirement of the legal judge is that he be sincerely ratio-
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nal. That is, he is not free to reach any result he 
pleases as long as he can give plausible reasons; he must 
give the judgment which he honestly thinks is best, and 
the reasons which he honestly thinks are strongest. This 
is obviously similar to the requirement that we defend 
only those moral judgments which we have reached in reason­
able reflection, and that we use only those arguments from 
facts and relevant moral principles which we have ourselves
found convincing."^
The exercise of autonomous moral reflection, then, is neither a total­
ly fanciful nor impractical approach to matters of judgment; indeed, it is 
in many respects the basic notion underpinning our conception of rational 
judgement, how we actually come to determine what is fair and just. The 
autonomous moral judge who remains in doubt on some issue even after care­
ful reflection may ask 'where is there a correct answer to be found?' Yet, 
as Perry reminds us, "Clearly, there is nowhere he can turn; there is no 
external authority, even in theory. He must make up his own mind as best 
he can.
Hunter's distinction between the reasons for entering into a contract 
and its terms is also irrelevant. The social contract is not a hypotheti­
cal agreement which any one person would like to reach with others; it is a 
hypothetical agreement between all the members of a society. Because each 
is to choose for all, it is to be an agreement which everyone could confi­
dently sign. And this means that concessions and compromises are incorpor­
ated into the contractual model. Neither aspect of Hunter's first objec­
tion, then, strikes a fatal blow to contract theory.
What of the second objection? It too is concerned with the problem of 
deriving the terms of the social contract from the reasons and motives of 
the parties to it. Even if we grant that the reasons for entering a con­
tract do determine its content, Hunter argues, we still have no way of 
knowing ahead of time what these reasons are. "It is not easy to see how 
we could say a priori what the motives of the parties to a social contract 
must be."^5 Different persons have different motives and goals, and what 
one will agree to may be completely unacceptable to another. Where one man 
may hold out for a state which offers absolute protection, to use Hunter's 
example, another may be ready to run certain risks of death as long as 
other risks are minimized. Given this diversity, we must conclude that we 
cannot specify a priori the terms that any group will agree to - or whether
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they will arrive at an agreement at all.
How powerful is this objection? As Hunter points out, we cannot use 
the idea of a social contract to predict or define the clauses of any 
actual social contract. If the people of Newcastle, England and Newcastle, 
New South Wales, say, were each required to draw up social contracts, the 
finished products would be similar in some respects and quite different in 
others. In any case, the idea of a social contract could not tell us what 
terms (if any) either group of Novacastrians would agree upon unless we 
knew their motives and goals and ascribed them to the parties of the hypo­
thetical contract - and if we had this information, we would have no need 
for the hypothetical contract. But here again Hunter's objection is beside 
the point; or at least the point of contract theory as we understand it.
The proper question is not, "Can the idea of a social contract delineate 
the terms of association that people will actually consent to?". It is, 
instead, "Can the idea of a social contract help us to delineate the terms 
of association to which we ought to consent?". Rousseau and Rawls are well 
aware of the difficulties involved in bringing actual persons together in a 
social contract, and they require us to assume an abstract identity - as a 
citizen, behind the veil of ignorance - precisely for this reason. From 
this perspective we can develop a conception of the just state: a state to
whose authority all can consent even though, in the real world, some would 
not. And insofar as the point of contract theory is to develop a concep­
tion of a state to which we ought to consent, Hunter again is wide of the 
mark. The problem with so many authors is that they adhere to a purely 
performative view of consent, such that consent does not involve for them 
anything in the nature of judgement (other than, say, the decision to con­
sent) . They cannot make sense of the idea that one ought to consent to X 
even if one in fact has not consented to X and will not do so; and, if 
consenting is seen as just a bare human act, then the idea that some situa­
tions call for it and others do not can't be understood. So, actual con­
sent is demanded not so much because it generates obligations, but because 
it is assumed that reasonable and actual consent run together. According 
to the tenets of legal positivism, then, the law demands actual consent 
before it will acknowledge a contract because the law will not speculate 
about hypothetical agreements. But this is precisely where legal and moral 
judgements differ. Moral demands are ones to which we morally ought con­
sent, whether or not we have actually done so.
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Contract theory, in sum, is more defensible than usually thought; at 
least when it is interpreted along the lines suggested in this thesis. But 
contract theory also has its limitations, and when these go unnoticed the 
contractarian may open himself to some of the criticisms we have just 
rejected. Let us see what is beyond the reach of the contract theorist, 
and perhaps we will better understand what is within his grasp.
VI
The Limits of the Social Contract
The criticisms considered above were dismissed mainly because they do 
not apply to contract theory as we, following Rousseau and Rawls, have 
interpreted it. Since these criticisms have plagued contractarians for 
centuries, in some cases, one may suspect that the version of contract 
theory presented here is in some ways narrower than other, more common 
versions. This suspicion is well founded. For in appealing to the logic 
of the social contract we are suggesting that contract theory is adequate 
for some purposes and inadequate for others. Despite the views of Hobbes 
and Locke, for example, contract theory alone cannot determine for us 
whether we ought to obey or disobey the laws. Contract theory can certain­
ly help us here, but it is not itself sufficient. In this section, how­
ever, it will be shown how contract theory is limited in another respect - 
namely, it cannot solve Hobbes' problem.
Hobbes' problem, briefly, is this: how and why would free, rational,
and self-interested agents form any organized society at all? Unlike 
Rawls, who presupposes the existence of civil society, Hobbes uses the 
social contract to generate the political association. The social contract 
is what brings men out of the state of nature, subjects them to political 
authority and ends the war of all against all. Once men recognize that 
they stand to gain from the surrender of the natural liberty, Hobbes 
reasons, they will simultaneously agree to the social contract and author­
ize a sovereign to enforce it. The reason why free, rational, and self- 
interested men form an organized society, in short, is that it is prefer­
able to the state of nature, where the life of man is "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short".
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Unfortunately for Hobbes, his explanation does not withstand critical 
examination; hence the term, Hobbes' problem. For if men in the state of 
nature are free, rational, and self-interested, as Hobbes says they are, 
then it is unreasonable to suppose that they all would sign the social 
contract. Life in Hobbes' state of nature is precarious at best; everyone 
feels free to pursue his own advantage at the expense of others. Some may 
be better off than others, of course, but no one is secure: "the weakest
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or 
by confederacy with others...."35 Everyone, consequently, would prefer to 
live securely in civil society. Nonetheless, they cannot create civil 
society by means of a social contract. The reason for this is that the 
ideal situation for any one person is to be, as Thrasymachus would have it, 
the only agent who does not abide by the terms of the social contract.37 
This situation benefits the "false contractor" in two ways: he is no long­
er threatened by the others, on the one hand, and he finds them easier 
prey, on the other. The social contract promises the most desirable out­
come, as it happens, for the person who violates its terms, while it is 
even worse than the state of nature for those who do not. For, while they 
abide by the contract, they renounce opportunities to take advantage of 
other agents and lay aside (perhaps out of reach) the means of self-defense 
which they had in the state of nature.
In the terms of game theory, Hobbes' problem is known as an n-person 
prisoners' dilemma.38 The original prisoners' dilemma, which involves only 
two parties, takes the following form. Jones and Smith are charged with 
robbing a bank, although the evidence against them is not strong enough to 
warrant a conviction. The Crown prosecutor tells both prisoners that he 
will come to each separately and ask him to confess. If both confess, both 
will be prosecuted, but the prosecutor will recommend six year sentences 
rather than the usual ten. If neither confesses, they will be tried for 
illegal possession of weapons - an open and shut case - and be imprisoned 
for two years. But if one confesses and the other does not, the confessor 
will be let off with a one year sentence and the non-confessor will receive 
the full punishment of ten years. The prisoners' alternatives are summar­
ized in the following choice matrix, with the first number in each square 
representing the consequences for Jones, the second for Smith.
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Smith
not confess confess
not confess
Jones
confess
Quite obviously, Jones and Smith are in a bind. If they are rational, 
self-interested agents, the sensible strategy is to confess. For although 
they will be better off if neither confesses than if both confess, neither 
can trust the other not to confess. Whatever Jones assumes about Smith's 
behaviour, and vice versa, it is always in his interests to confess. The 
theoretical upshot of this is that in cases like the prisoners' dilemma, 
acting rationally from an individualistic viewpoint produces a relatively 
worse overall result. In this particular case, Jones and Smith get six 
years instead of two - clearly a relatively worse overall result.
In the case of Hobbes' problem each individual in the state of nature 
considers himself to be one agent set against all others, and he must 
decide whether he is to cooperate by signing and respecting the terms of 
the social contract. This calculus is set out in the following matrix, 
with preference orderings taking the place of years in prison.
Others
cooperate
Self
cooperate
2
1
a__b 
d c
not cooperate 
4
3not cooperate
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Here cell c - non-cooperation by everyone - is the state of nature and 
cell a is total cooperation in civil society. While a is preferable to c, 
however, everyone clearly prefers cell d over all. In the situation repre­
sented by d all but one person cooperate, and the lone non-cooperator is in 
the best position to take advantage of the others. The least desirable 
outcome, conversely, is cell b, where only one person cooperates. Here the 
cooperator is even worse off than in the state of nature: not only are his 
efforts to establish civil society wasted, but he also relinquishes the 
means of self-defense he had in the state of nature.
Hobbes' problem is a prisoners' dilemma because free, rational and 
self-interested men will not obtain through their choices the best overall 
result, which is cell a - where everyone signs and respects the social con­
tract. The rational course for any individual is non-cooperation. This 
will either bring about the most desirable result for the agent (cell d) or 
it will leave him where he already is - the state of nature (cell c) . So 
long as the individual cannot trust the others to cooperate, it is not 
rational for him to cooperate. And while this lack of trust persists, the 
men in the state of nature cannot possibly remove themselves from it by 
means of a social contract. Hobbes' problem cannot be solved by the social 
contract.
This may seem to be too quick an assessment of the situation. Hobbes' 
problem may seem especially intractable because of Hobbes' harsh view of 
human nature and the state of nature. What happens if these views are 
altered, so that the state of nature is a peaceful state of non-cooperation 
rather than a war of all against all? Such a move may reduce the stakes 
somewhat, but it does not change the outcome. Even with these more charit­
able conditions, the choice matrix remains the same. Everyone still most 
prefers a situation in which he is the only non-cooperator. For though no 
one endangers his life or possessions by signing and abiding by the social 
contract, everyone who cooperates bears a burden that can be shirked at 
little or no cost. A self-interested rational actor will not accept this 
burden when he has an opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the enterprise at 
no cost.
This is because the social contract is a public or collective good. 
Public goods are characterized by jointness of supply and non-excludabil-
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ity, which is to say that if they are provided for any members of a speci­
fic group, they are provided for the whole group. Common examples of pub­
lic goods include.clean air, public parks, national defense. How is it 
that the social contract is a public good? It is a good, in the first 
place, because everyone acknowledges that it is better than the Hobbesian 
state of nature. It is a public good, secondly, because the benefits of 
cooperation are indivisible and non-excludable. If the social contract 
goes into force, for example, a system of rules is promulgated and defense 
against invasion is provided. But every member of the group is able to 
take advantage of these benefits whether he cooperates or not. Even the 
person who breaks the rules upon occasion is benefitted by a system of 
rules, just as a thief wants his property protected from theft. Thus the 
social contract is a public good.
The problem is that in a large group, as most societies are, the con­
tribution of any individual to the provision of the public good is insigni­
ficant. Indeed, the public good will normally be provided for all even 
when some members of the group make no contribution at all. Here again our 
lover of fine wines, Adams, offers a helpful illustration. Adams realizes 
that his cooperation - paying taxes - is an insignificant contribution to 
the maintenance of the state in which he lives. If enough others cooperate 
the public good will be provided no matter what he does and he may continue 
to enjoy it even if he buys wine with his tax money. The sensible strategy 
for Adams to pursue, consequently, is non-cooperation. This remains true, 
furthermore, even when Adams believes that the public good will not be 
available due to insufficient cooperation. Should this circumstance arise, 
Adams would still find noncooperation to be the rational strategy because 
his contribution is not large enough to make a difference by itself.
Rather than waste his own resources by cooperating when cooperation serves 
no purpose, Adams will withhold his contribution. No matter what others do 
or are likely to do, in sum, Adams will reason that he should not cooperate. 
This reasoning once more dooms the social contract. For when each ration­
al, self-interested agent realizes that he has most to gain through non­
cooperation and most to lose through cooperation, the preference matrix 
again assumes the form of the prisoners' dilemma.
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Others
cooperate not cooperate
cooperate 2 4
Self a bd c
not cooperate 1 3
Cell c remains dominant. Thus Hobbes' problem continues to be a prob­
lem for those like Locke, who (sometimes, at least) conceives of the state 
of nature as considerably more benign than Hobbes allows. In the end, it 
is clear that the social contract cannot solve Hobbes' problem unless cer­
tain crucial assumptions are dropped - that the agents are self-interested 
- or added - that they are untrustworthy. To take either of these courses, 
however, is to beg the question, for if we assume that men are not self- 
interested or that they are trustworthy, we are fundamentally altering
Hobbes' problem.
It should also be noted that in this regard the principle of fairness 
is of no assistance. Considerations of fairness only arise within ongoing 
institutions or practices; they are of no use when we are trying to gener­
ate new ones.^O we may be able to persuade Don to obey the rules of 
cricket, for example, by showing him that he is not playing fairly. But we 
cannot normally accuse him of unfairness if he simply refuses to join in 
the game. This accusation can only be made when there are special circum­
stances. Perhaps Norm, Doug and I have played cricket with Don when we 
would have preferred to do other things. Now that we want to play and Don 
has something he would rather do, we may say to him, "Turnabout is fair 
play". But in this situation there is an ongoing system of cooperation, 
albeit ill-defined, which warrants the appeal to fairness. In the case of 
Hobbes' problem, though, there is no such system - there has been no co­
operation at all - and fairness has no role to play.
The logic of the social contract presupposes the existence of organ­
ized society. If this society does exist, then contract theory can help us 
to distinguish between its various forms so that we may discover whether
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our society is just or unjust. Knowing this, we may go on to determine 
with the aid of the principle of fairness, whether we are under an obliga­
tion to obey its laws. But contract theory can explain neither how the 
state came into being nor how we could create a new one ex nihtto. In this 
sense, at least, the social contract is more limited than some contracta- 
rians have thought.
VII
Obligation, Obedience and the Social Contract
We have already alluded to another limitation of the social contract: 
it cannot give us clear and absolute answers to all our questions about 
obedience to the law. Some 'contract' theorists, Hobbes and Locke among 
them, have written as if the social contract answered once and for all 
every one of the multifarious questions about civil obligation and obed­
ience. If you have (tacitly) consented to the social contract, they argue, 
then you are morally bound to obey the laws of the civil society in which 
you live; if you have not, you need not do so. The utter simplicity of 
this view has been largely responsible for the criticism which contract 
theory has suffered. What is to be taken as a sign of consent? Does con­
sent to the social contract place us under an obligation to obey the 
authorities no matter what they do? Or does it imply certain limits on
authority? What might these limits be? To whom does our consent bind us?
Can the sovereign violate the contract? These and other questions indicate 
the perplexities that result from taking contract qua consent theory to be
the answer to all the problems involving obedience to the law.
We must recognize that the theory of the social contract cannot tell 
us what we ought to do in each and every case. But in this respect it is 
like other theories. What has been traditionally identified as the problem 
of civil obligation - Why should I obey the law? - is, as Hanna Pitkin 
shows, a cluster of related questions. Despite their relatedness, however, 
they are different questions, and it is too much to expect one theory to 
provide a straightforward and satisfactory answer to all of them.
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The kernel of truth in the writings of those who question the very 
possibility of a general theory of civil obligation is that most questions 
of obedience to the law cannot be answered without undertaking a thorough 
examination of the circumstances involved. Should I refuse conscription? 
Should I perform an illegal abortion? Should I drive faster than the legal 
limit? Only the most ardent law-worshippers would even attempt to answer 
these questions without investigating the contexts in which they arise.
For in any serious problem of this sort a number of factors must be con­
sidered. Any theory of civil obligation or obedience which tries to supply 
a formula for anwering all these questions in abstraction is simply not 
doing justice to the complexities of life.
We have argued that a theory of civil obligation can be developed and 
that the social contract provides the basis for such a theory. But we have 
also tried to show that a theory of civil obligation is much more modest 
than has usually been thought. Such a theory can help us to see when we 
are under an obligation to obey the laws of a state; but this is not to say 
that when we know this we know all we need to know. If we know that the 
state is just and that we therefore have an obligation to obey its laws, we 
may still conscientiously decide that we ought not obey a specific law or 
laws in certain special circumstances. And if we know that the state is 
unjust and that we therefore have no obligation to obey its laws, we are 
likely to conclude in many cases that some of its laws ought still to be 
obeyed. Like all theories of civil obligation, the social contract helps 
us to learn whether we have an obligation to obey the laws. If we do, then 
we know that, ceteris paribus, we ought to obey them. This does not tell 
us everything, but it does tell us a great deal.
Problems of political ethics, like other moral problems, cannot be re­
solved by a priori theories. The man faced with a moral problem may look 
to a theory for guidance, but the theory cannot tell him, for example, if 
in his particular case all things are equal. The ceteris paribus clause 
means that theories are abstract and formal; if their strictures are to be 
put into effect, they must be filled out. This can only be done on a case 
by case basis. We have tried to show how the social contract can lend us 
guidance when we face what may be the foremost problem of political ethics. 
Contract theory may not answer every particular question for us, but it
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does show us how to begin to answer them. This is not everything we can 
ask for, but it is all we can reasonably expect.
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PART SEVEN
CIVILITY AND ORDER
Essential to the classical idea of justice is a purportedly radical 
distinction between one general interest and a multiplicity of particular 
interests. Indeed, a similar dichotomy seems indispensable to both egali­
tarian and non-egalitarian versions of the idea. Such a distinction, how­
ever, stands and falls with two interrelated assumptions: (1) that society
can be adequately grasped through the concept pair 'whole and part', and 
(2) that all fundamental human values are mutually compatible, can be woven 
together into a single political web. Reinterpreting the ancient concept 
of justice in order to make it plausible for modern societies, so it was 
argued in Part Two, we are compelled to abandon both of these assumptions.
Aristotle made to hoing sympheron the ultimate touchstone of a justly 
organised polis; the despotic city, in contrast, is ruled pros to idion 
sympheron.1 Elaborating on what he took to be much the same dichotomy, 
Aquinas distinguished between the bonum commune fostered by a legitimate 
monarch and the bonum proprium pursued by tyrants and usurpers.2 
Machiavelli followed the same lead by opposing the benefizio commune to the 
selfish aims of rival fazioni.3 Hobbes too (though in a quite anti- 
Aristotelian way) contrasted the "one Will" of the sovereign to the 'plura­
lity of voices" which the sovereign thoroughly unites into one.14 Rousseau, 
as we have discussed at great length, constructed his entire theory of 
legitimacy on a fundamental dichotomy between une volonte particuliere and 
la volonte generale. Finally, Hegel was likewise unswerving in his con­
trast between Privatwohl and allgemeine Wohl des Staates.5 The decisive 
question of post-Hellenic political philosophy, so it would appear, is 
whether power and authority are exercised (well) for the sake of the 
harmonious political whole or (badly) for the sake of an uncoordinated 
individual part. Because of the constraints inherent in a whole/part 
schematization of society (affirmed, though in quite different ways, by all 
of the above) there seems to be no third alternative.
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Closely allied to this idea of justice is the classical notion of 
freedom. Again following what they take to be Aristotle's lead, many 
modern philosophers have made freedom dependent on the 'integration' of the 
individual (part) into the political community (whole). In this case, too, 
there appears to be no third alternative between atomistic isolation and 
engulfment in the'brotherhood ' of the state.
The most disquieting aspect of this traditional discussion is the (not 
quite Aristotelian) suggestion that political arguments can only be ration­
al so long as they appeal to an underlying unanimity. Only a consensus 
omnium, it is implied, can rationally 'ground' the social whole. If all 
values are harmonious, of course, there can be (in the final analysis) no 
justification for dissent or disagreement. Rousseau, in many ways bent on 
retrieving the seamless unity of Spartan life for modernity, claimed that 
society is unthinkable unless there exists a 'point' in which all particu­
lar interests are superseded: the general will. When considered in ab­
straction as a sophisticated rendering of the notion of 'citizenship', the 
general will functions as a powerful heuristic device; when conceived 
literally as the 'public interest' - a reification of the 'common good' - 
it serves as an instrument of tyranny. Arguments such as Rousseau's, we 
want to argue, when taken literally rather than metaphorically, aim at 
renewing the pre-modern nexus of unanimity, ontology and political justifi­
cation discussed in Part Two and Appendix Three. Unfortunately, as socie­
ties become more and more differentiated, both the old idea of justice as 
an expression of 'the common good' and the old idea of freedom as the inte­
gration of an individual into a political brotherhood lose their original 
clarity. This seems inevitable, however, since modern homonoia (that which 
is 'shared' in a Gesellschaft) has become highly abstract. Whatever 'under­
standing' still underpins our public perceptions has lost most of its 
previous content. It offers little or no moral inspiration or human depth.
To be sure, all theories can be misused. Perhaps 'good' theories are 
even more vulnerable than 'bad' theories. Nonetheless, totalitarian misuse 
of the theory of the general will has been so persistent and widespread 
that it cannot altogether be dismissed as mere misfortune. Consider, as a 
telling example, Lukäcs' well-known essay on "Reification and the Conscious­
ness of the Proletariat".6 Society is a congeries of diverse perspectives, 
Lukdcs argues. Each individual perceives the total society from a particu-
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lar vantage point due to his location in the cycle of production, distribu­
tion and consumption. But only the proletariat has an undistorted vision 
of the 'totality1 of society, of what society is really like. This is 
because, given the perspective of historical materialism, the particular 
interests of the industrial working class are 'identical' with the general 
interests of the whole society. Moreover, and here comes an additional 
totalitarian plummet, Lukäcs does not attribute such redoubtable percept­
iveness to, the "empirical proletariat". These latter, he solemnly notes, 
may well be ensnared by bourgeois (particularistic) ideology. As a conse­
quence, he ends up appealing to the "vanguard of the proletariat", that is 
to say, to Lenin's self-appointed and self-perpetuating party.
Lukdcs himself is only marginally important. The structure of his 
argument for "democratic centralism", on the other hand, appears paradig­
matic for totalitarian misuses of the concept of the general will. Ultima­
tely, his claims depend on the ancient beliefs that all human values are 
mutually compatible, and that it is possible to reach an exhaustive under­
standing of die gesellschaftliche Totalität from one point of view. Lukdcs 
emphatically believes that society is a closed totality or 'whole' which 
can be comprehended (like Aristotle's "easily surveyable" Gemeinschaft) 
from a single perspective. As a result, he also believes that the Party 
can produce a perfect society (one where all values are realised simultan­
eously) simply by 'universalizing' this one correct perspective. Faced 
with de facto differences of opinion, as a matter of fact, the apologist 
for totalitarianism knows exactly what to think; he resorts to what might 
be called a 'temporal serialization of homonoia'. We all agree, says he; 
it simply takes some of us longer than others to realize the fact. The 
Party has forged its way into the future; anyone disagreeing with the Party 
is surely lagging behind in the past. Ever since the Republic, a conven­
ient way to justify the coercive manipulation of citizens has been the 
Platonic appeal to 'pedagogic sovereignty'. A principal target of Locke's 
Second Treatise, one recalls, is that "conceit of authority" which (elabo­
rating on Plato's bad analogy) construes rulers as fathers and citizens as 
sons.7 To disgruntled children, of course, a father or teacher can always 
say: "You will only understand tomorrow the reasons for what I am making
you do today." Fathers and teachers, so it seems, are 'ahead' of children 
in time. There may be 'equality' in teaching, but there is no 'simultane­
ity'. Lukdcs, it appears, simply translates this pedagogic model (not
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utterly implausible for a Gemeinschaft) into a justification for the total­
itarian coordination of Gesellschaft. Such a model, as we said, allows him 
to 'immunize' his conviction that there is only one truth against the fact­
ual incongruities of a highly differentiated society. The 'true self' of a 
dissident always agrees with the Party; only his "empirical self", trapped 
in the past, has diverged. In a situation like this, in fact, it is almost 
the duty of a virtuous regime (as "midwife of the future") to grate away 
empirical incrustations and allow a man finally to express what he - and 
everyone else - truly believes.
The tyrannical implications of these arguments are quite unconcealed. 
But we might briefly explain the sense in which they are apophradic (or 
anachronistic). The Greek word for 'obey' (peithesthai) literally means 
"to be persuaded". Political obedience in a city-state was restricted to 
fully adult citizens, to men who could understand arguments and reasons at 
the same time as they are put forward. Political authority, as a conse­
quence, was quite unlike the 'diachronic' authority of a father over his 
sons or a teacher over his students.
Implicit here is the idea, already encountered in Aristotle, that the 
polity can be structured and steered like a 'conversation'. The complexity 
of modern society makes this now unimaginable. Nonetheless, a tricky ana­
chronism at the core of totalitarian thought can be spied in the idea that 
whenever a citizen 'obeys' (no matter what 'empirical' explanation there 
might be), he has eo ipso 'been persuaded'. Because the Party occupies the 
future while the dissident occupies the past, language is not an appropri­
ate medium for such 'persuasion'. The only recourse is 'rational coercion^ 
the corruption of what Rousseau calls forcing a man to be free. At the 
nadir of his entanglement in Fascism, Giovanni Gentile said that the black­
jack is a spiritual force, and he too implied that by coercing a man it is 
possible to produce genuine conviction.® It is sometimes argued that 
etatist violence and coercion only acquired public legitimation when the 
explicit goal of politics became 'efficiency'. And, in fact, since one 
cannot coerce a man to be rational, noble or virtuous, coercion has no 
significant place in the'persuading' and 'being persuaded' of Aristotelian 
praxis. But one of the main characteristics of totalitarianism (and the 
one which concerns us most) is that it commits acts of violence and coer­
cion on the basis of alleged 'moral legitimacy', not merely on the basis of
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a (presumed) 'technical legitimacy'. What is doubly terrifying about the 
apophradic subordination of all spheres of life to politics is that a 
totalitarian regime (our paradigmatic unjust society) can now employ the 
efficient techniques of an advanced society to produce the ideological 
illusion of national unanimity and a homogeneity of moral perspectives. 
Equally frightening, the residual allurement of lost Gemeinschaft has made 
(and continues to make) many Western intellectuals perceive totalitarian 
integration as a morally attractive alternative to individualist-capital­
ist-bourgeois society.
As we explained in Part Two, the idea that a society is a political 
whole made out of individual parts has often been associated with the 
notion that some exceptionally worthy ('higher') part may be taken as 'rep­
resentative' of the whole. Only a single religious, economic and political 
focus, it seems, was able to give early societies enough 'centralization' 
to make them 'hang together'. The unity of a religious world view, more­
over, lent a background homogeneity and coherence to the cosmos which con­
tributed substantially to group coordination and solidarity. With these 
characteristics of Gemeinschaft in mind, we have tried to argue, we can 
understand the sense in which totalitarianism exploits a widespread modern 
desire to 'turn back the clock'.
Our suggestion against totalitarians like Lukdcs, in other words, is 
that political rationality now depends on the recognition that no single 
perspective can be safely universalized. Society, we want to argue, is no 
longer eusunoptos. It has become something like a loose nexus of numerous 
subsystems and life-spaces; and a rational conceptualization of social jus­
tice and legitimacy depends on an explicit acknowledgement that no single 
point of view has a definitive primacy or any special relation to the old 
'ontological' foundations. An adequate approach to modern society, it can 
be seen, demands the simultaneous appeal to a variety of non-harmonious 
values and uncoordinated system references. The historical obsolescence of 
the Aristotelian whole/part (or universal/particular) schematization of 
society can therefore shed light on why arguments originally employed for 
praising the 'moral polis' could be surreptitiously co-opted for the 
defense of, in J.S. Mill's phrase, the "moral police".9 A party bureau­
cracy can claim a monopoly on truth only if ti*uth is conceived as monopoli- 
zable, that is to say, as univocal and 'of a piece'. If a regime can
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manage to 'identify society and polity' it need not recognize social inter­
ests with which it might have to compromise. In sum, if there is only one 
common good, one overarching and all-encompassing principle of right, then 
it is at least plausible for a single political group to corner and centra­
lize the instruments of social control. In the intimacy of a pre-technolo- 
gical city-state, as Vico suggests,10 a relative monopoly on truth and jus­
tice might have been a pragmatic justification (e.g., it might have been 
indispensable for the production of an economic surplus). In industrial 
and post-industrial societies, however, a good case can be made for the 
thesis that efficiency depends upon a large degree of decentralization; 
and, if this is so, then a centralized monopoly on truth can only be 'legi­
timated through some sort of moral appeal.
With regard to the limitations of the social contract, it is our con­
tention that the contractarian metaphor can provide us with adequate crite­
ria for ascertaining whether or not we live in a (near) just society and, 
consequently, aid us in determining whether or not, as citizens, we are 
under an obligation to obey the laws of the state. However, it is equally 
clear that the contract of itself cannot provide the blueprint for a 'moral 
polis', that is, a society to which we automatically have a civil obliga­
tion. Where the Rousseauan enterprise collapses is in its dream of reform 3 
of regenerating homonoia and all that such a revival/revolution entails, in 
particular, the reification of a univocal perspective on a small homoge­
neous society of like-minded citizens. Where it stands is precisely on the 
ground of analytical abstraction, of modelling the disjunction between the 
just society and the totalitarian state. Paradoxically, it is left to the 
quasi-contractarian Locke to exploit the Gesellschaftliche implications of 
the contract metaphor, and to the 'hybrid' contractarian Rawls to bring 
together the strands of the notion as the foundation for a liberal (i.e. 
Gesellschaftliche) theory of justice. Insofar as even this most sophisti­
cated rendering of contractarianism implies a theory of the 'moral develop­
ment' of mankind, it too falls down. Ultimately, the contractarian meta­
phor can provide a solution to the problem of civil obligation only by 
elucidating the features of de jure civility and order; but it cannot fash­
ion for us the de facto circumstances in which the problems of civility and 
order will evaporate. In other words, it cannot make us 'better' citizens 
of the 'best' state, but only more aware persons in more sensitive milieux.
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In short, our aim in this Part is to explore the arguments for and 
against a kind of political rationality independent of the apophradic fic­
tion of a univocal general will. Adapting a phrase from Kenneth Burke,11 
we will term this new sort of rationality 'perspective by incongruity'. A 
successful readjustment of the old ideas of justice and legitimacy, we have 
already suggested, depends on a theory of society complex enough to incor­
porate a plurality of uncoordinated system-references, none of which should 
be granted uncontested primacy. We want, in other words, to construct a 
theory of social morality without the aid of either (a) the idea of value- 
consensus of (b) the whole/part schematization of society. Fortunately, 
there is a 'second tradition' in Western political philosophy, beside the 
one which was mentioned at the beginning of this Part. This 'second tradi­
tion', in a vague and sporadic way, always repudiated the old dependence 
legitimacy on social holism and on an easy compatibility of all human 
values. In the next section, we will indicate what we take to be the 
peculiar origin of a systematic association of political rationality with 
value incongruity. In the following sections, we will then turn briefly to 
a few of the ways in which Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau each set out to 
combat incongruity for the sake of an 'integrated state'.
In section seven we will first say something about the relevance of de 
Tocqueville to our argument and will then go on to explain how the idea of 
life-space differentiation can be used to clarify the basic difference be­
tween Epictetus and Mill. Only the political thematization of complex 
social incongruity, we will argue, can make Gleichschaltung improbable and 
ensure the pursuit of numerous unharmonious and equally urgent values.
Using Habermas as a point of reference for both Rousseau and Rawls, section 
eight will relate the problem of civil obligation - the contractarian 
strand of the thesis - to the problem of order - the Vichian strand - and 
discuss the decline of consensus omnium as, paradoxically, the concomitant 
of the rise of civility.
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I
The Collapse of Antiquity
The collapse of pagan antiquity was accompanied by a portentous inno­
vation: the institutional split between imperium and sacerdotium. Behind
this dualism, of course, lay the double heritage of Israel and Greece. 
Judaic culture, indeed, was characterised by a 'totalization' of religion 
analogous to the Hellenic 'totalization' of politics. Perhaps the most 
striking achievement of Christianity was its successful integration of 
these two heterogeneous strands of ancient civilization. In fact, this 
amalgamation produced what may be regarded as one of the 'secrets' of poli­
tical rationality in the West: the historical unlikelihood of a double
totalization. Throughout the Middle Ages, in any case, men were presented 
with two distinct and quite incommensurable realities: sovereignty on one
hand, salvation on the other. The fact that both religion and politics 
implicitly claimed a kind of universality led, by the end of the fifth 
century, to the Gelasian doctrine of the 'two swords'. This doctrine 
eventually became entrenched as the Western alternative to Byzantine 
caesaropapism or the Eastern tendency to transform the church into a civil 
institution. It eventually became common in the West to regard any reuni­
fication of sacred and secular authority as a backsliding into paganism and 
perhaps as a ruse of the devil. Such perspective by incongruity, as the 
investiture controversy shows, was no comfortable solution.12 Yet it was 
one of the first and most crucial steps in the differentiation of society 
and polity, in the proliferation of quasi-autonomous life-spaces which 
eventually made it quite impossible to regard advanced European society as 
a political whole made out of subordinated parts. In response to such 
institutionalized incongruity, political philosophy should (and at times 
did) feel compelled to loosen the bonds between rationality and unanimity 
which had been taken for granted in Judaic and Hellenic antiquity.
Western ideas of individual freedom and spiritual autonomy, in any 
case, are difficult to imagine without this original 'split' between impe­
rial and clerical 'domains'. Against the power of a centralized state the 
Stoics had offered men the leverage of natural right and universal reason. 
Unfortunately, since armed authorities could always claim a superior 'in­
sight' into what is naturally right, such an offering was more uplifting
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than helpful. The emergence of the Christian church as the organized (and 
'grounded') guardian of man's spiritual life, however, gave the Stoic idea 
of universal rights a powerful institutional embodiment, an embodiment 
legitimated through a 'dualistic' world view. Whatever freedom an indivi­
dual gained was due less to rights which inhered in his natural person than 
to the fact that he was now considered a locus of intersection between two 
semi-autonomous realms: sacred and secular, faith and citizenship, the soul 
and the body. The 'autonomy' of each domain, as was explained in Appendix 
Three, was guaranteed by a 'temporal disjunction', by the incommensurabili­
ty of finitude and infinity. As a result of his irrepressibly twin nature 
man's 'right to freedom from systematic interference' gained a new concep­
tual and institutional content. The 'other worldly' church, on the one 
hand, could defend men against encroachments by the state; while secular 
authority could protect men from the growing power of ecclesiastics.
The idea of rationality through incongruity (inchoate in this dualism 
of imperium and sacerdotium) extends in a philosophical tradition from 
Seneca. The essential (and largely implicit) message of this tradition is 
that justice and right are not merely independent of unanimity and a homo­
geneity of moral perspectives; they are actually impossible without the 
maintenance of clashing principles. One might call this a theory of Con­
cordia disc ors, with the proviso that 'harmony' here connotes no higher 
synthesis or unifying overview, but merely the intrinsic reasonableness of 
unresolved incongruity.
(We might interpolate a word here about Adam Smith. His idea of an 
"invisible hand", even though it suggests a complete coincidence of parti­
cular interests with an encompassing common interest, does not conflict 
with this argument. The hidden 'congruity' which Smith and Mandeville 
announced was restricted to the economic system alone. As a result, it 
does not guarantee a coordination of goals between economy, family, scien­
ce, military, politics, education, religion, and so on.)
Modern ideas about individual freedom, to repeat our claim, could 
hardly have been generated without early clerical guarantees of spiritual 
autonomy, guarantees based on the 'temporal incongruity' of finitude and 
infinity. The same sharp differentiation between religion and politics 
underlies what we believe to be a modernized theory of legitimacy. This
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bifurcation went so deep, in fact, that it already made it implausible to 
conceptualize society in Aristotelian (i.e. pagan) terms as a whole made 
out of parts. In other words, as soon as religion ceased to be civic reli­
gion, as soon as it acquired an unambiguous autonomy from secular author­
ity, individuals gained an extra-political (in some sense, 'otherworldly') 
foothold from which to resist the power of rulers. Since an individual now 
belonged to two 'autonomous' systems, he was no longer just a helpless 
particle encapsulated within a coordinated political whole. As a result of 
the irreversible differentiation between imperiwn and sacerdotium there was 
no longer one overview adequate to the total nexus of society. Polity and 
society could no longer be thought to coincide. Historically, of course, 
constitutional limitations on politically centralized authority have always 
been conceded in acts of compromise between one source of power (say, the 
king) and another (say, the church or the nobility). The individual has 
been a tertium gaudens. Modern democracy, too, is the product of an analo­
gous process of compromise between quasi-autonomous life-spaces, interac­
tion contexts each of which thematizes the rest of society from its own 
non-encompassing yet unassimilable perspective. Once Western society had 
become highly differentiated on the basis of such institutional horizons, 
widespread socialization into the Protestant ethos of individual privacy 
and industriousness seemed to absorb some of the rights-defending tasks 
formerly assigned to a powerful church. This was especially attractive 
since an individual's (non-worldly and non-social) conscience provides a 
convenient juncture for infinity to erupt into the finite world. As a con­
sequence, the self-understanding of modernity (lacking a theory of functio­
nal life-space differentiation in society) contained the erroneous - 
Lockean - conviction that an industrious individual can be a reliable bul­
wark against political tyranny. To counteract this belief, it is important 
to keep in mind the social 'contextualization' of modern individualism 
within the highly differentiated nexus of life-spaces that were outlined at 
the end of 'Part Two. This will help us replace the simplistic opposition 
of individual and polity with a concept of society complex enough to allow 
for intra-societal incongruity.
Now, it could be argued that Plato and Aristotle had no idea of modern 
'political rights' precisely because religion in the Hellenic polis had not 
yet been differentiated in contrast to the polity. Indeed, to follow 
Aristotle at his least 'contemplative', we might say that the idea of a
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human but non-political life was quite absurd. Because of what we are cal­
ling its 'totalization' of politics, the city-state could (without too much 
distortion) interpret itself as a whole made out of parts. When Goffman, 
for example, says that a modern insane asylum is a whole made out of parts, 
he is in some respects alluding to an underlying analogy with the Greek 
city-state. Normally, if asked whether Mr. Jones' liver is a part of the 
social system, we tend to reply: no, it is an element in the immediate
environment of the social system. In a lunatic asylum, however, inmates 
are more or less exhaustively 'contained' within the system. As a result, 
they have a hard time applying any extra-institutional leverage to secure 
what they see as their rights. In a very important sense, then, Burck- 
hardt's Griechische Kultur makes the polis seem like an ergastolo, like a 
penitentiary for lifers.
Cute analogies aside, totalitarianism is always accompanied by 'neo­
pagan' attempts at de-differentiation or Gleichschaltung. In this sense, 
totalitarianism has gone to school with Hellas. Its typical goal is the 
reabsorption of religious motivations into a 'pre-Christian' cult of the 
state; duties of service and devotion should come to replace rights of 
freedom and self-determination.
Christianity, as mentioned, was particularly well-suited for stabili­
zing a differentiation between the civitas divina and the civitas terrena. 
Unlike the civic religions of Greece, it was based on politically unassimi- 
lable concepts like infinity and human universality. Neither infinity nor 
universality can be comfortably fitted into the temporal and particular 
strictures of a worldly state. Thus, since the Emperor could not be the 
Pope (and celibacy ensured the irreversibility of this differentiation)13, 
each had to compromise with the other.
The totalitarian reemergence of a theologia civilis made it possible 
to evade this post-Christian need for the state to gain legitimacy through 
compromise with an incongruous (i.e. non-political) dimension of reality. 
Even more distressing, modern 'state religions' have been able to exploit 
the Christian concept of infinity which was unavailable to the Greeks. 
Neither Hitler nor Stalin represented 'neo-paganism' in a direct way 
because both held the goal of politics to be perfection, that is to say, a 
monotheistic re-divinization of the secular world. This is what Voegelin
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decries as "the radical immanentization of the Christian eschaton".14 
Notoriously, terrestrial paradise is an end which seems to justify every 
thinkable means. Since Hellenic politics did not aim at infinity (a goal 
heterogeneous with all known human life, i.e. with life which has had a 
chance to disappoint us) the polis cannot reasonably be called totalitarian 
in the modern sense. A polytheistic world view, moreover, allowed for a 
certain amount of non-schismatic disagreement and incongruity both among 
poleis and within every single polity. Nonetheless, by interpreting itself 
as a political whole made out of individual parts, the Hellenic city-state 
left a major legacy to modem tyranny.
II
The Two Cities
Doubtlessly, the theoretical abyss which opens up between Augustine 
and the Greeks originates in the Christian idea that man has fallen from 
grace through Adam's sin. Most important for our purposes is the fact that 
the idea of man's fallen state was articulated in a germinal but quite 
explicit distinction between society and polity. Man is by nature a social 
animal, claims Augustine. He was social in his primal innocence, he is 
social in this world and he will be social in heaven. Even the life of the 
saints is social.^ But man is not by nature a political animal. When the 
Visigoths sacked Rome in 410, it became clear to all those whose world had 
been shattered that worldly politics is simply a necessary evil: it 
results from culpa, not from natura.16 It is both a punishment for Adam's 
sin and compensation for the loss of order attendant to the Fall.
As it has been argued throughout this thesis, it is very difficult in 
light of the theory that man is a political animal3 to restrict the legiti­
mate functions of the state. By appealing to the goal of eternal salva­
tion, in contrast, Augustine has no trouble in viewing the state as an 
adjustable means for a fixed end outside itself, as merely a precondition 
for an essentially non-political goal. For Aristotle, as was explained in 
Appendix Three, the state is both an ordinance of nature (physis) and the 
culmination and fulfilment of man's destiny. For Augustine, in contrast, 
the state expresses man's fall from 'nature', and therefore receives a
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q u i t e  r e s t r i c t e d  r o l e  w i t h i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  economy o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s a l v a t i o n .  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  i d e a  t h a t  " l e g i s l a t o r s  make c i t i z e n s  good by fo rm in g  good 
h a b i t s  i n  th e m " 17 d e f i e s  r e a d y  t r a n s l a t i o n  i n t o  C h r i s t i a n  ' r e d e m p t io n  h i s ­
t o r y ' ,  s i n c e  s a l v a t i o n  c a n n o t  be l e g i s l a t e d .  The p o s t - C h r i s t i a n  s t a t e ,  as 
a  c o n se q u e n c e ,  i s  g r a n t e d  t h e  n a r ro w ly  d e l i m i t e d  f u n c t i o n  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
t h e  o r d e r  and s e c u r i t y  n e c e s s a r y  a s  a  p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  m a n 's  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u g g l e  f o r  s a l v a t i o n :  t h e  g o a l  o f  p o l i t i c s  becomes pax and sa lu s  p u b lica
r a t h e r  th a n  g l o r y .  B oth  p e a c e  and ' s o c i a l  w e l f a r e '  a r e  c l e a r l y  means t o  
f u r t h e r  e n d s .  In  l i n e  w i th  t h i s  ' t e m p o r a l  d i s j u n c t i o n '  o f  f i n i t u d e  and 
i n f i n i t y ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  inw ard  ( t h a t  i s ,  n o n - s o c i a l )  ' c o n s c i e n c e '  
becomes th e  l o c u s  o f  r e d e m p tio n  and g r a c e .  C r u c i a l  f o r  t h e  c o m p le x i ty  o f  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  be tw een  H e l l e n i c  p o l i t i c s  and t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  o l d  i d e a  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s a l v a t i o n  th ro u g h  communal p a r t i c i p a t i o n  became 
i m p o s s ib l e  on t h e  A u g u s t in ia n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  'tw o  c i t i e s ' .
As a f o o t n o t e  t o  t h e  new i d e a  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  th ro u g h  s o c i a l  
i n c o n g r u i t y  ( r a t i o n a l i t y  w hich  c a n  d i s p e n s e  w i th  t h e  o ld  s c h e m a t i z a t i o n  o f  
s o c i e t y  as  a c o o r d i n a t i n g  whole made o u t  o f  c o o r d i n a t e d  p a r t s ) , one m ig h t  
m e n t io n  t h e  w id e ly  i n f l u e n t i a l  t r e a t i s e  De P o te s ta te  Regia e t  Papati w r i t ­
t e n  by th e  D om inican John o f  P a r i s  c irc a  1302 . T h is  p a m p h le t  was p r o b a b ly  
t h e  f i r s t  s y s t e m a t i c  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  A q u in a s '  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  th e  
two p o w e rs .  R a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  we may r e a d  i t  a s  a r g u i n g ,  demands t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  tQ O  n o t  q u i t e  c o n g ru o u s  'g e n e r a l  w i l l s ' .  Some 
tw e n ty  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  i n  M a r s i l i u s  o f  P a d u a 's  Defensor P a d s ,  t h e  A r i s t o t e l ­
i a n  t r a d i t i o n  p ro d u ced  an argum ent f o r  a  c o m p le te ly  s e c u l a r  s t a t e .  J o h n ,  
how ever ,  p r e s e n t e d  t h e  more m o d era te  c a s e ,  w hich  i s  why he i s  more r e l e v a n t  
t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n .  In d e e d ,  he f o l l o w s  A r i s t o t l e  c h i e f l y  i n  t h e  
i d e a  t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  e n t a i l s  t h e  s t r i k i n g  o f  a m idd le  c o u r s e  be tw een  two 
e x t r e m e s .  The two e x tre m e s  he w an ts  t o  a v o id  a r e  (a) th e  E r a s t i a n  c la im  
t h a t  t h e  p ap a cy  i s  u t t e r l y  o t h e r w o r l d l y ,  and hence  h a s  no r i g h t  t o  e a r t h l y  
p r o p e r t y  o r  d o m in io n ,  and (b) t h e  p a p i s t  c l a im  t h a t  t h e  E m p e ro r 's  s o v e r e i g ­
n t y  i s  d e p e n d e n t  on p a p a l  s a n c t i o n .  What John  a rg u e s  i s  t h a t  b o th  powers 
a r e  'a u to n o m o u s ' :  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  b o th  d i r e c t l y  d e r i v e d  from  God n e i t h e r
c an  be v i o l a t e d  by t h e  o t h e r .  The o n ly  r e a l  o v e rv ie w  i s  l i t e r a l l y  ' o u t  o f  
t h i s  w o r l d ' .  To be r a t i o n a l ,  i n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  we m ust  avo id  g r a n t i n g  a b s o ­
l u t e  p r im a cy  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  imperium  o r  t o  t h e  sa cerd o tiw n . John  a d m its  
t h a t  t h e  p r i e s t h o o d  i s  'h ig h e r *  and 'more n o b l e '  t h a n  t h e  m onarchy , b u t  he 
d e n i e s  t h a t  t h i s  a b s t r a c t  r a n k in g  r e q u i r e s  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a u t h o r -
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ity of the latter to the authority of the former:
"For who would say that, because the teacher of letters or 
the instructor in morals orders all the members of the house­
hold to a more noble end, namely, knowledge of the truth, the 
physician too, who pursues a lower end - namely, the health 
of bodies - is subject to him in the preparation of his mede- 
cines?"18
This, in its most germinal form, is the logic of uncoordinated social dif­
ferentiation. What distinguishes it fron Plato's regimented "division of 
labour" is the absence of any ultimate guardian of conformist homonoia and 
the one true perspective. Such an affirmation of incongruity is crucial to 
any idea of justice and legitimacy which does not depend on an appeal to 
unanimity. De-differentiation (or Gleichschaltung) means going to the in­
structor in morals when we are sick. Totalitarian centralization is irra­
tional not because it violates an eternal law of nature, but because it 
flouts an achievement of social history. It appeals to the 'true centre' 
of society when society has already developed an irreducible plurality of 
centres.19
III
A Single and Indivisible Sovereign
The consolidation of modern national states in the fifteenth and six­
teenth centuries shattered the myth of the universal imperium (which always 
understood itself as unsynchronized with the sacerdotium) and therefore 
concealed temporarily the importance of systems- and life-space-differenti­
ation for political philosophy. The Inquisition had already begun to re­
evoke the painfully exorcized ghost of 'civic religion'. Finally, with the 
rise of national states, 'mediating institutions', i.e., institutions which 
mediate between sovereign and citizen, (clergy, nobility, free cities and 
parliaments) which previously had been able to resist the authority of mon- 
archs, fell victim to a new centralization of royal power. In this context, 
writers as different from one another as Machiavelli and Hobbes both found 
that they perceived virtue in the idea of the 'pagan state' where polity 
and society were not yet differentiated. In spite of the deep dissimilar­
ity between their positions, Machiavelli and Hobbes were on common ground
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as anti-clerics. Both thought that the church was the major divisive force 
in their societies, the power most responsible for fostering the discom­
forts of perspective by social incongruity. As a consequence, both recom­
mended what (with many provisos in Hobbes' case) we might call a 'neo- 
pagan' subordination of religion to politics. Machiavelli still wrote in 
the spirit of classical notions such as 'freedom' and 'immortalization'; 
his entire thought centred on the concept of virtü. In Hobbes, on the 
other hand, all such echoes of Aristotle have vanished. Nominalist and 
materialist as he was, he allowed 'freedom' to dwindle to a dim flicker of 
tolerated inwardness, and identified glory with vanity, with just another 
force inappropriately disarranging social orderliness and legalistic tran­
quility.
In the next section, we want to suggest why Machiavelli's passionate 
defense of ancient liberty subtly changed (in the modern context) into what 
seems like a clinical defense of 'princely' tyranny. This is the inevit­
able consequence, it will be argued, of trying to de-differentiate a com­
plex society on the model of the ancient city-state. In the following sec­
tion, we will go on to explore briefly how Hobbes' 'scientific' defense of 
absolutism, though fiercely anti-Aristotelian, made a daemonic contribution 
to the totalitarian elimination of all social (that is, non political) con­
straints upon the force which a sovereign might employ against his subjects
We should make one more remark before turning to Machiavelli. Unlike 
ancient eleutheria, the kind of freedom which is possible in modern 
Gesellschaften (what we have termed 'freedom in the traffic') depends on 
that same series of social cleavages which militates against Gleichschal­
tung . Obviously enough, when monasteries were expropriated (providing 
wealth for the rising middle class), the extra-political leverage of the 
sacerdotium was severely impaired. This seeming loss of differentiation, 
however, concealed a new principle of differentiation between polity and 
society which, not surprisingly, eventually became the foundation for 
modern liberal theories of political rights and freedoms. The old distinc­
tion between sacerdotium and imperium, indeed, was replaced by a new dis­
tinction between economy and polity. The disruptive effect of this new 
development on the old theory of politics, however, was difficult to dis­
cern at first. The rising merchant and industrial class itself understood 
absolute monarchy (with dynastic legitimacy) as the most effective type of
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government for suppressing factional rivalry among 'mediating institut­
ions'. An all powerful king, as Vico says, can "equalize the strong with 
the weak",20 and thereby preserve the peace necessary for the flourishing 
of free trade. In fact, one might argue that the initial trend toward 
centralizing government under a single and 'indivisible' sovereign (which 
may have seemed like a 'neo-pagan' reintegration of society) was actually 
a function of the emergent differentiation of the economic sphere. At the 
beginning, in any case, the nascent bourgeoisie was still not powerful 
encxigh to extract large-scale constitutional guarantees fron the monarch.
IV
Apophradism and Incongruity
This exceptional set of circumstances allowed modern political philo­
sophy to begin by reintroducing both the ancient whole/part schematization 
of society (without too much implausibility) and the attendant idea that 
all values are congruent with one another. Although the philosophers we 
have considered and will now discuss are all rich in subtlety (and even 
internal incongruity), the economy of our argument requires that we largely 
restrict the following to a somewhat stylised account of what is apophradic 
in their thought. What interests us most is the structural concealment of 
life-space (or functional subsystem) differentiation, which also explains 
the genesis of totalitarianism in the matrix of Hellenic philosophy.
There is nothing half-hearted about the plea, with which Machiavelli 
prefaces his Disoorsi, for political leaders to imitate antiquity. Both 
princes and republican rulers, he admits, 'admire' le virtuoissime 
operazioni of the ancients. Nonetheless, they stubbornly refuse to imitate 
what they admire. The cause of this moral inconsistency, Machiavelli con­
jectures, lies in an erroneous belief that between ancient and modern times 
things have changed - "as if the heaven, the sun, the elements and men had 
in their motion, their order and their potency, become different from what 
they used to be."21 Although Machiavelli rejected 'classical utopianism' 
for realistic goals, he always insisted on the immediate relevance of 
ancient examples for orientation in modern politics.
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The paradox of Machiavelli has always been that a man who fervently 
believed in liberty gave a ruthless boost to tyranny. The Prince, it is 
well known, does not help us overmuch in our attempts to distinguish legi­
timate from illegitimate regimes. The explanation of this fact lies partly 
in the distressing state of the Italian pentarchy during Machiavelli's 
lifetime: hattuta, spogliaga, lacera, corsa.22 Aristotelian aret&, as we
argued in Part Two and Appendix Three, flourished in a medium of 'combative 
collaboration'. Through language and mores and on the basis of a poly­
theistic world view, a citizen could achieve glory in a unique yet communal 
way. Machiavelli too locates the goal and culmination of politics in 
virtü. Thus, when Habermas, for example, claims that Machiavelli is 
already and exclusively concerned with the technical (Hobbesian) problem of 
survival and no longer with the practical (Aristotelian) problem of moral 
perfection, it seems at first that he is mouthing nonsense.23 What he 
means to say, however, is something like this: given the chaotic and dis-
unified character of early sixteenth-century Italian society, the only 
'agora' or public arena in which human affairs might be 'hammered out' was 
one of intense competition or war between 'sovereign' states. What makes 
war so essential for Machiavelli's theory of virtü is not any technical 
calculation about survival, but rather his perception that the only remain­
ing field for distinction and honour is the battlefield. The 'virtuous' 
self-assertiveness of the prince in external affairs, of course, demands in 
turn the cohesion and obedience of citizens in internal affairs. Princely 
virtü, in other words, presupposes a 'coherent' society, which the 'artis­
tic' prince might secure by imposing the appropriate form on the matter of 
his subjects. According to Machiavelli, there are three factors respons­
ible for the lack of unity in Italian states: the decadent nobility, the
unassimilable church and the wandering mercenary droves.
One of the largest impediments to the establishment of republics, 
Machiavelli argues, is the recalcitrant factionalism of gentiluomini. These 
landed-gentry have utterly lost the ancient gift of it vivere politico. 
Their deepest yearning is plush survival, not virtü. Thus, their indepen­
dence must be broken by a strong, centralized monarchy:
"The reason for this is that, where the material is so 
corrupt, laws do not suffice to keep it in hand; it is 
necessary to have, besides laws, a superior force, such 
as appertains to a monarch, who has such absolute and
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overwhelming power that he can restrain excesses due to 
ambition and the corrupt practices of the powerful. "2L+
Perhaps the best commentary on this passage from the Discourses is 
Machiavelli's famous contrast, in The Prince, of the French and the Turkish 
kingdoms:
"The Turkish empire is ruled by one man; all the others 
are his servants. The one ruler divides the empire into 
sandjaks, in charge of which he places various administra­
tors, whom he changes and varies as it suits him. But the 
king of France is surrounded by a long established order 
of nobles, who are acknowledged in France by their own 
subjects and are loved by them. They have their preroga­
tives; the king cannot take these away from them except at 
his own peril."25
From the standpoint of our argument, at least, what is at stake here is the 
relation between politics and incongruity. According to Machiavelli, there 
are only two types of principality. In the first, sovereignty is undivid­
ed; provincial authorities are utterly dependent on the prince for their 
power. In the second, there is a profound splintering of authority; the 
rank of each noble is established independently of centralized power, per 
antiquitä di sccngue. Countries of the first type (like Turkey) will be 
fiercely resistant to foreign conquest, since there are no rowdy barons who 
could bear the seeds of faction into the heart of the country. A principa­
lity like France, by contrast, is always resistant to centralized control; 
hence it is relatively easy to invade, though the invader will find it just 
as difficult to control as did the former prince. Differentiation, and 
this is our main point, always militates against a united front in war.
And war, as we noted, being the last surviving locus of glory and honour, 
is Machiavelli's focal concern. As a consequence, he believes that the un­
coordinated status of nobles makes them the enemies of both princes and 
republicans.
A parallel (and equally apophradic or 'anachronistic') hostility to­
ward differentiation in centres of authority can be found in Machiavelli's 
remarks on the church. Consider this "Nietzschean' contrast between Chris­
tian 'slave' morality and the sinew-tightening ethos of pagan religions:
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"Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative men, 
rather than men of action. It has assigned as man's high­
est good humility, abnegation, and contempt for mundane 
things, whereas the other identified it with magnanimity, 
bodily strength, and everything else that conduces to make 
men very bold. And if our religion demands that in you 
there be strength, what it asks for is strength to suffer 
rather than strength to do bold things. This pattern of 
life, therefore, appears to have made the world weak, and 
to have handed it over as a prey to the wicked, who run it 
successfully and securely since they are well aware that 
the generality of man, with paradise for their goal, con­
sider how best to bear, rather than how best to avenge, 
their injuries."26
One consequence of Christian otherworldliness and loss of pride is that 
politicians no longer dare 'use' religion the way the ancients did. Unable 
to bridge the 'temporal disjunction' between finitude and infinity, and 
hence unable to dominate the clergy, secular authority suffers the most 
woeful chastening Machiavelli can imagine: the factional dissolution of
the state and its easy susceptibility to alien invasion. Notice how the 
disunifying role of the church is neatly linked to the factionalism of the 
landed-gentry mentioned above:
"The church has neither been able to occupy the whole of 
Italy nor has it allowed anyone else to occupy it. Con­
sequently, it has been the cause why Italy has never come 
under one head, but has been under many princes and signori,, 
by whom such disunion and such weakness has been brought 
about, that it has now become the prey, not only of barbar­
ian potentates, but of anyone who attacks it. For whichO 7our Italians have to thank the Church and nobody else."
Only the Swiss, Machiavelli goes on to say, preserve today the ancient 
'integrated' way of life. For Italy, in contrast, factionalism runs so 
deep that only a heroic nuovo principe (above and beyond homiletic examina­
tion and reproof) might, through military prowess, make politics once and 
again a world of glorious virtü.
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V
The "Mortall God"
Hobbes (unlike Machiavelli and Rousseau) does not go out of his way to 
praise the ancients. His railing against "Aristotelity" may be seen as 
part of an attempt to foster a 'quasi-pagan' fusion of religion and poli­
tics, an attempt which is based on Hobbes' (paradoxically Aristotelian) re­
fusal to differentiate between polity and society. Despite (and in part as 
a consequence of) our remarks in Part Three, Hobbes' very concern with 
Christian eschatology led him to reassess the relation between man and 
deity, citizen and church. Because he wants to make the very validity of 
Scripture dependent on governmental sanction and thus eliminate a major re­
striction upon the force of the state, Hobbes occupies a peculiarly pivotal 
position in the history of etatist coercion and the 'party line'. The 
Leviathan makes such a violent break with the classical tradition of poli­
tical philosophy, however, that it can hardly be considered apophradic in a 
direct sense. Still, both Hobbes' deamonic conflation of persuasion with 
force, which we discussed at the beginning of this Part, and his socially 
unmediated opposition of the individual to the civil state, make it impera­
tive that we add to the analysis presented in Part Three.
What makes Hobbes quite unlike classicizing philosophers (and what 
makes him, as sane say, "the father of modern liberalism"),28 is (1) his 
mechanistic-Galilean or non-teleological concept of natural law, and (2) 
his nominalist lack of interest in 'the whole', in the Gemeinschaft as a 
religious fraternity. Vico repudiated Hobbes' work, one might recall, be­
cause he thought it impossible to deduce the "covenants" of civil society 
from the natural passions of individuals. Hobbes wanted to construct a 
rigorous science of politics on the basis of man's innate fear of violent 
death: "For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what
is evil, but chiefly the chief of natural evils, which is death; and this 
he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone 
moves downward."28 In response to such statements, Vico acutely claimed 
that "an excessive amount of attention to the natural sciences" had resul­
ted in a situation where the science of politics lies almost abandoned and 
untended.30 In this sense, Vico wanted to defend Aristotle's distinction 
between phronZsis and episteme, between prudence and rigorous science,
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against a reductive attempt to apply Galileo's methods to the realm of 
ethical self-realization: "it is an error to transfer the method of natu­
ral science into the prudential conduct of life."31 By transforming poli­
tical philosophy into a rigorous science, Hobbes eliminated Aristotle's 
teleological idea (retrieved and modified by Machiavelli) that the goal of 
the state is to foster virtue and 'character formation' in communal praxis. 
He replaced this idea with the mechanistic and legalistic notion that the 
aim of the state is to guarantee order, security and survival.
The content of the state is a 'set' of atomistic individuals, respon­
ding like automata and related to each other through mutual distrust and 
covenants. For this reason, Hobbes does not even entertain the possibility 
that political consensus might be achieved through conversation or persua­
sion. The only method suitable for etatist coordination is force or the 
legally institutionalized threat of force. As a consequence, the "unity" 
which Hobbes wants his Leviathan to achieve is both more coercive and ab­
stract than anything in the mainstream history of political thought. The 
cool irony of the pragmatist is audible in a phrase which Hobbes repeats 
throughout his writings: Non habebis Deos alienos. Vengeance is mine,
saith the state, for I am a "mortall God".
All Hobbes' political works, as he says, were occasioned by "disorders 
of the present time".32 These disorders, he agreed with Machiavelli, were 
in large part due to the pervasive Gelasian distinction between the 'two 
swords', to the old temporal disjunction of imperium and sacerdotium. In­
deed, anyone who makes "the distinction between Temporall, and Spirituall 
Domination"33 implies that there may be "two Sovereigns over the same 
people."314 For Hobbes such a doctrine is tantamount to sedition.
Thus, even though Tönnies and others are right to contrast Hobbes' 
theory of Gesellschaft with Aristotle's theory of Gemeinschaft,35 the basic 
assumption of Leviathan allows it too to be understood as promulgating a 
nominalistically modified whole/part schematization of society. Strictly 
speaking, Hobbes' nominalism made it impossible for him to regard the state 
as an organic 'whole' but, on the other hand, his political theory required 
him to see the state as a 'whole', therefore, by way of compromise, the 
state was pictured as a factitious or artificial whole. This does not 
affect our argument, however, since what is here being claimed is simply
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that, like Aristotle, Hobbes could not coherently distinguish polity and 
society. According to Hobbes, in fact, it is still a question of either/ 
or: either sovereignty is absolute and undivided or society becomes a
"dissolved multitude".35 If middle-level institutions (and again it is 
mainly a matter of church and nobility) claim any source of authority inde­
pendent of the civil sovereign, they must be regarded as enemies of the 
state, fomenters of faction and civil war:
"And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Govern­
ment of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of 
State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, 
and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in 
Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and 
safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the 
hand of the Soveraign."37
Indeed, to understand why Hobbes spent nearly two-thirds of Leviathan goug­
ing and filliping ecclesiastics about their claim that the church is prior 
to the state, one need only recall this sort of comment about the ’temporal 
disjunction' of Imperium and sacerdotium: "The most frequent pretext of
Sedition and Civill Warre, in Christian Commonwealths hath a long time pro­
ceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at 
once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandments are one contrary to 
the other."38 Behind Hobbes' notorious criticism-quashing claim that "no 
Law can be Unjust",38 lie lengthy arguments to the effect that, on a priori 
grounds, "there can be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the 
Laws of a Christian Commonwealth."80 Following Romans XIII, he supplements 
this claim with the assertion that resistance to an infidel or heretical 
sovereign is likewise contrary to God's express will.
The illiberal and coercive temper of Hobbes' thought, in other words, 
follows from his conflation of all semi-autonomous mediating institutions 
with the granular helium omnium contra omnes. The sovereign must be legis­
lator, judge, administrator and champion bundled up in one. Legitimacy is 
unthinkable, according to Hobbes, without a radical centralization of 
force. There is no summum bonum which might unify men into a moral commun­
ity; but there is a summum malum from which the terror-stricken 'atoms' 
flee into the protective and coordinating arms of the mighty Leviathan.
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This unswerving defense of absolutism, as discussed in Part Three, 
stems in part from Hobbes' 'modernized' (Galilean) concept of rationality. 
Indeed, consider what remains of the despised Aristotelity:
"When a man Reasoneth, he does nothing but conceive a sum 
total, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, 
from Subtraction of one sum from another; which (if it be 
done by Words) is conceiving of the consequence of the names 
of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the 
names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other 
part. "41
The legitimacy of an absolute monarch, Hobbes argues, is 'analytically im­
plicit' in the physical make-up and passions of each particular citizen. 
Likewise, individual loyalty 'follows' from the bare existence of the 
'society integrating' sovereign. Putting aside our perplexity at why 
states are not already and automatically the way Hobbes says they 'mechani­
cally' must be,42 we may say something more about the crucial non-Hellenic 
distinction between state and society. What makes such a distinction un­
fathomable from Hobbes' point of view is that it prevents the whole being 
presented as an artificial structure composed of covenanting parts.
His deep-seated commitment to this scheme, in fact, helps explain how 
Hobbes can paradoxically assert both (1) that it is never justifiable to 
resist the civil sovereign, and (2) that, if such resistance succeeds, it 
thereby becomes just.4  ^ Now, the first thing to understand about this 
paradox is that the civil sovereign is considered the principle of unity 
without which society could not be a 'fictive' whole or an "Artificial 
Man" .
"A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by 
one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with 
the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular.
For it is the unity of the Represented, that maketh the Per­
son One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, 
and but one Person: And unity, cannot otherwise be under-
tood in Multitude."44
First of all, one should again note the nominalist thesis that there is no 
communal 'wholeness' without political 'subsumption'. In the light of this 
idea, as we said, it becomes quite impossible to distinguish society from 
polity in such as way as to ensure constitutional powers on the limitations
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of the sovereign. Although Hobbes clearly says that the state has no right 
to ask an individual to contribute to his own destruction, such claims do 
nothing to temper his commitment to absolutism and political coordination. 
The only 'domain' which, following Leviathan, cannot be subsumed under pol­
itical control is the de-socialized inwardness of the silent and survival- 
oriented individual. This is just another way of saying that Hobbes cannot 
distinguish between society and polity but only between the all-mighty state 
and the solitary individual. Hobbes' reference to popular consent is like­
wise revealing. Since the absolute (unquestionable) authority of the sove­
reign is the condition sine qua non of civil society, it is also the condi­
tion sine qua non for the meaningful use of words such as 'right' and 
'wrong', 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'. Popular consent can only mean 
that the people agree that the sovereign is legitimate. But, on Hobbes' 
account, there is no standard in relation to which men might agree, unless 
the sovereign has uncontested power. Thus, Hobbes can claim both (1) that 
the sovereign is always 'right', and (2) that sovereignty exists in a di­
mension of brute force where concepts like 'right' and 'wrong' do not 
apply- In essence, the sovereign has the same kind of 'legitimacy' as the 
rude individual in the state of nature; he has a right to whatever he can 
get. He is only delegitimated when he is overpowered.
By trying to 'ground' politics rationally, Hobbes evoked anger and 
distrust among the royalist defenders of Stuart legitimacy. It is not dif­
ficult to see why; in the final analysis, he made the inviolability of the 
crown compatible with the automatic rightness of its ruin.
In spite of their shared anti-clericalism, Machiavelli and Hobbes are 
separated by a philosophical abyss. The principal difference between them 
can be spied in Hobbes' thorough repudiation of teleology and his interpre­
tation of (what Machiavelli would have called) virtü as an enticement to 
vanity and (hence) to civil war. The state marshalled for honour and power 
is replaced by the state organized according to order and law. But putting 
social and political philosophy on a mechanical-causal 'foundation', of 
course, Hobbes dismissed the possibility of evaluation of the sovereign's 
commands in the light of superior standards from the start. This too is 
unlike Machiavelli. The abyss is bridged on one point, however. Both de­
fended the centralized state as the only 'solution' to a faction-wracked 
society. Nevertheless, finally, what distinguishes Hobbes' absolute monar-
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chy with no constitutional limitations from totalitarian regimes in the 
twentieth century is the absence of a claim to either 'moral integration' 
or the emotionally satisfying self-realization of individuals in 'citizen­
ship'. This nominalist deficiency, however, was amended by Rousseau and 
his apophradic glorification of Sparta and the Spartan way of life.
VI
Corps Moral et Colleotif
In spite of Hobbes' failure to distinguish between society and polity, 
his state is so legalistic and abstract that it offers none of the moral 
comforts normally associated with life in Gemeinschaft. Indeed, where 
Rousseau differs most from Hobbes is in his double Aristotelian conviction 
that (1) the state can be 'subjectified' as a family or 'colloquy', and 
(2) the individual can 'realize himself' in political participation. 
Rousseau's admiration for Hobbes, on the other hand, stems from their 
shared commitment to the conflation of society and polity, and to the rela­
ted idea that the 'state' has absolute supremacy over its members. This 
idea, in turn, at least so we want to claim, stems from the either/or 
situation which is thrust upon us if we schematize society as a political 
whole made out of individual parts, un tout dont on fait partie Quite
unlike Hobbes, as discussed in Part Four, Rousseau puts supreme emphasis on.46
the ('religious') fraternity and solidarity of the corps moral et coltectif 
- which is the way he depicts the just society (or, as some would have it, 
his ideal of a renewed pagan state). This moral collectivism, said 
Benjamin Constant, makes the Social Contract "which is often invoked on 
behalf of liberty, the most terrible weapon of all types of despotism".^ 7 
Considering Rousseau's repeated claims that no individual freedoms are lost 
or transgressed in the de jure state, this denunciation of Constant's may 
be too strong; yet, it contains a grain of truth. At the very least it 
illuminates the disparity between ideal and reality forever present in 
Rousseau.
The Greeks, in any case, and especially the Spartans, always gave 
Rousseau hope for outwitting modern bourgeois corruption. In a passage 
which we have quoted before, he says: "Ancient politicians incessantly
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t a l k e d  a b o u t  m o ra l s  and v i r t u e ,  t h o s e  o f  o u r  t im e  t a l k  o n ly  o f  b u s i n e s s  and 
m oney . " 48 One o f  R o u s s e a u 's  main g o a l s ,  i n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  was t o  undo th e  
damage o f  modern t im e s  and " r e v i v e  lo v e  o f  v i r t u e  i n  t h e  h e a r t s  o f  c i t i ­
z e n s " . 49 B u t ,  what i s  wrong w i th  m o d e rn i ty ?  The main p ro b le m , as  Rousseau 
s e e s  i t ,  i s  t h e  d i s - i n t e g r a t e d  q u a l i t y  o f  ev e ry d a y  l i f e .  "We have  p h y s i ­
c i s t s ,  g e o m e te r s ,  c h e m i s t s ,  a s t r o n o m e r s ,  p o e t s ,  m u s i c ia n s ,  p a i n t e r s ;  we no 
lo n g e r  have  c i t i z e n s . " 50 The p o i n t  o f  R o u s s e a u 's  e a r l y  b l a s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
a r t s  and s c i e n c e s  i s  t h a t  b o th  modes o f  e x p r e s s io n  underm ine  t h e  s e a m le s s  
u n i t y  o f  c i t y - s t a t e  l i f e .  T h e re  i s  no a r t  o r  s c ie n c e  i n  Geneva!
Now, s i n c e  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  s o c i e t y  i s  i t s  u n i f i e d  w h o le n e s s ,  a s o c i e t y  
can  s u f f e r  no more o n e ro u s  m i s f o r t u n e  t h a n  h a v in g  "two s t a t e s  i n  o n e " . 51 
Not s u r p r i s i n g  t o  r e a d e r s  o f  M a c h i a v e l l i  and Hobbes (and t h e  a b sen c e  o f  
s u r p r i s e  i s  t h e  c o s t  o f  o u r  'h i g h  a l t i t u d e '  d e s c r i p t i o n s ) ,  Rousseau  s e e s  
one o f  t h e  m ost  d i s r u p t i v e  f o r c e s  i n  m odem  s o c i e t y  i n  th e  d u a l i s m  betw een  
t h e  " e a g le "  and th e  " c r o s s " . 52 Pagan r e l i g i o n ,  Rousseau o b s e r v e s ,  was a 
l i f e -  and s o c i e t y - i n t e g r a t i n g  f o r c e ;  C h r i s t i a n i t y  i s  n o t .  I n d e e d ,  a c c o r d ­
in g  t o  R o u s s e a u 's  h e r m e n e u t i c ,  C h r i s t i a n i t y  d i s r u p t e d  w hat was t h e n  a p r e ­
v a i l i n g  h om ogene ity  o f  s o c i e t y :
" . . . T h u s  m a t t e r s  s to o d  when J e s u s  made h i s  a p p e a r a n c e ,  b e n t  
on e s t a b l i s h i n g  a s p i r i t u a l  kingdom on e a r t h  -  an e n t e r p r i s e  
w hich  f o rc e d  a wedge be tw een  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sy s te m  and th e  
t h e o l o g i c a l  s y s te m , and so  underm ined  th e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e .
Hence t h e  i n t e r n a l  d i v i s i o n s  t h a t . . .  have  n e v e r  c e a s e d  t o  
p l a g u e  th e  C h r i s t i a n  p e o p l e s . " 52
What c u re  f o r  t h i s  g r i e v o u s  d i s u n i t y  i f  n o t  an a b s o l u t e  and i n d i v i s i b l e  
s o v e r e ig n ?  I t  was i n  h i s  r e p u d i a t i o n  o f  t h e  ' s p l i t '  b e tw een  sacerdotium  
and imperium  t h a t  Rousseau  f e l t  m ost a k in  t o  Hobbes:
"Only one C h r i s t i a n  w r i t e r ,  t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r  H obbes, had 
c l e a r l y  p e r c e iv e d  b o th  t h e  d i s e a s e  and th e  rem edy. He a lo n e  
has  d a r e d  t o  p ro p o se  t h a t  t h e  e a g l e ' s  two h e a d s  be r e u n i t e d ,  
i . e . ,  t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  be s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t y  
-  i n  t h e  a b sen c e  o f  w hich  t h e r e  w i l l  n e v e r  be a w e l l - c o n s t i t u ­
t e d  s t a t e  o r  g o v e rn m e n t . " 54
E ls e w h e re ,  and w i t h o u t  l i n g e r i n g  o v e r  t h e  ' c o i n c i d e n c e ' ,  Rousseau  m en t io n s  
t h a t  u n i t y  and u n a n im i ty  a r e  fo u n d in g  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  o n ly  two k in d s  o f  
s o c i e t y :  s o c i e t i e s  w hich  a r e  t o t a l l y  f r e e  and s o c i e t i e s  w hich  a r e  u t t e r l y
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enslaved.5 5
Most of what is disturbing in the Social Contract, in fact, is connec­
ted with Rousseau's naive conviction that "the total alienation to the 
whole community of each associate, together with every last one of his 
rights"55 is a guaranteed path to freedom and 'virtue'. The disjunction of 
the general will and the will of all is discomforting for similar reasons. 
Although there is solace in Rousseau's admission that citizens have rights 
utterly inviolable by their 'sovereign', it is hardly encouraging to read 
that only the 'sovereign' can decide what these rights are.57 The fact 
that Rousseau lodges 'sovereignty' in 'the people' and thereby distinguish­
es sharply between the sovereign (the general will) and the government (a 
mere tool of the general will), does nothing to mitigate the totalitarian 
implications which Constant (among a host of others) rightly observed in 
the Social Contract. Rousseau's outrage at the Gelasian dualism of impe- 
rium and sacerdotium reveals his deep commitment to a whole/part schemati- 
zation of society. Such a schematization, it can be seen, forced Rousseau 
(as it had previously forced Hobbes) into an either/or situation: "It is
of the essence of sovereign power to be illimitable; it is either omnipo­
tent or it is nothing."58 Furthermore, as was argued in Part Two, the con­
stitutional limitations which Montesquieu and Locke placed on sovereignty 
ultimately depend on their tacit rejection of this same whole/part scheme. 
Rousseau's liberty is an illusion since it depends on an apophradic appeal 
to homonoia, on the demand that, as an 'integrated' citoyen of Geneva, I 
agree, on all matters of public concern, with everybody in town (see Appen­
dix Seven) .
VII
Mill and Epictetus
Since, (if our thesis is correct) renewals of the ancient whole/part 
schematization of society leads inevitably to defenses of 'princely' tyran­
ny, absolutist coordination and the "ethical state", it is not surprising 
that arguments for democracy often appeal to incongruities and cleavages 
within society, rifts which might provide a bulwark against despotic 
Gleichschaltung. One subtle theoretician of the role of differentiation 
and incongruity in politics is Alexis de Tocqueville. Although his self-
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declared "corporativist" position is ultimately quite unlike our idea of 
functional life-space differentiation, it is well worth mentioning. Basic­
ally, de Tocqueville thought that local self-government, a free press, an 
independent judiciary, a separation of church and state, indirect elections 
and a general proliferation of middle-level associations would make it im­
possible (or at least improbable) to coordinate an entire society "from 
above". The very style of Democracy in America, with its sudden twists and 
turns and surprising shifts of perspective, helps us understand the insti­
tutionalized incongruity which makes it unlikely that America - at least as 
de Tocqueville knew it - could be turned into a tyranny over night.
In The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution de Tocqueville elabo­
rates upon the background of this theory. One of the well-springs of the 
Revolution, so he argues, was the systematic undermining of the aristocracy 
accomplished by Louis XIV. Cancelling the autonomy of the gentiluomini, 
one recalls, was one of Machiavelli's chief 'holistic' desires. louis XIV, 
at any rate, wanted ministers utterly dependent on him, not on semi-inde­
pendent nobles who (with their own feudatories and their own local respons­
ibilities) could resist centralization. By sweeping the aristocracy off 
the land and into the playhouse of Versailles, the crown managed to demo­
lish the only reliable defense against despotic coordination. When the 
people finally tired of privilege without responsibility they brought down 
the monarchy. By then, unfortunately, there were no more local or media­
ting institutions which could resist the despotism of centralized terror.
In Democracy in America de Tocqueville obviously wants to suggest that 
free associations can, in the modern 'democratic' world, perform a tyranny- 
resisting function analogous to that of the defunct nobility. What he 
sketches, with some provisos, is a society whose very lack of "wholeness" 
(i.e. lack of potential for centralization) is its greatest political 
asset, its sturdiest defense of freedom.
Moreover, de Tocqueville's subtle and largely implicit juxtaposition 
of the ancient regime and modern democracy has a lot in common with Vico's 
"logic of historical incommensurables". For the same reason it can be 
fruitfully contrasted with Hegel's 'synthesis' of the ancient polis and 
modern civil society. Hegel's method assumes an identity of 'thought' with 
holistic integration: to think x and y , I must weld them together in an
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encompassing whole. To truly 'think' Aristotle and Locke I must fuse them 
into a "capitalist agora". Both Vico and de Tocqueville proceed quite dif­
ferently. In his conclusion to Democracy in America, de Tocqueville says 
that democracy and aristocracy are like two utterly different individuals: 
they are incomparables. Instead of 'integrating' the old and the new, he 
allows each to illuminate the other from a distance. This method, it seems 
clear, involves a Vichian recognition that some old values are inevitably 
lost, that history is not a purely cumulative Gang but, rather, a simulta­
neous gain and loss. There is little use in trying, as Hegel did, to re­
trieve long-vanished eleutheria - an insistence on resurrecting the past 
only leads to a mortification of the present. More distressed than Hegel 
at the losses of the past, de Tocqueville was also more lucid about the 
burden of the future. This alone suffices to make him one of the great 
Vichian thinkers of modernity.
Equally relevant to the theory of perspective by incongruity is de 
Tocqueville's friend and contemporary, John Stuart Mill. In the following 
pages we will rephrase one of the central arguments of this thesis in terms 
of a contrast between Mill's On Liberty and that masterpiece of the later 
Stoa, Epictetus' On Freedom. The main aim here is to show how Mill's con­
cept of 'negative freedom’ (unlike Epictetus') can be given positive con­
tent by appealing to the complex structure of modern Gesellschaft society 
and specifically to the distinction between polity and society, or the 
underlying reality of functional life-space differentiation.
The idea of freedom from politics (apparently shared by Epictetus and 
Mill) originated in the Hellenistic repudiation of Plato's and Aristotle's 
ideal of "sharing in the common life". The philosophies of withdrawal, 
protest, indifference and escape which flourished throughout the Greek 
world during the fourth and third centuries B.C. can best be understood as 
strategic reactions to the startling rise of Macedonia and the attendant 
obsolescence of the city-state as a significant unit in military and poli­
tical affairs. Alexander's decision to integrate his Greek and barbarian 
subjects certified the eclipse of Aristotelian politics. The Epicurean 
movement (to which Aristippus belonged) finally came into its own, promul­
gating successfully the doctrine that the only 'good life' is the life out­
side the city-state. Indeed, 'the good' began to be seen as ultimately pri­
vate, as finally resolvable into the avoidance of pain.
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The extent to which Epictetus continues this old anti-Aristotelian 
tradition can be gathered from the opening words of On Freedom: "He is
free who lives as he wills."59 In the Politics, one should recall, 
Aristotle was quite harsh about a similar ideal of a society where "each 
man lives as he likes". About this ideal, he said: "This is a mean and
false conception of liberty. To live by the rule of the politeia ought not 
to be regarded as slavery but as salvation."50 Against Hellenic "salva­
tion" through political participation Epictetus asserts: ho akdlutos
anthropos eleutheros, "the unhindered man is free".5* Echoing Aristippus, 
he claims that political office is a needless burden and anxiety. The only 
way to guarantee freedom is to keep a distance between oneself and other 
men, to keep aparapodistos or "unentangled".52 From Epictetus' point of 
view, Aristotle's 'language-mediabed intersubjectivity' seems like just 
another senseless encumbrance on eleutheria. "For what is it that every 
man is seeking? To live securely, to be happy, to do everythng as he 
wishes to do, not to be hindered, not to be subject to compulsion."52 The 
question is how to avoid coercive restraint. Epictetus' answer lies in 
ataraxic withdrawal into an untouchable inner space or interior domus 
where no other man can enter.
"Diogenes was free. How did that come about? It was not 
because he was born of free parents, for he was not, but 
because he himself was free, because he had cast off all 
handles of slavery, and there was no way a person could 
get close and lay hold of him to enslave him. Everything 
he had was easily loosed, everything was merely tied on.
If you had laid hold of his property, he would have let 
it go rather than followed you for its sake; if you had 
laid hold of his leg, he would have let his leg go; if of 
his whole paltry body, his whole paltry body; and so also 
his family, friends and country."54
Freedom, in other words, is not self-realization in communicative praxis 
but rather self-abnegation in solitary retreat: "For freedom is not acqui­
red by satisfying yourself with what you desire, but by destroying your 
desire."55 In sum, since self-mastery requires a man to be "alone in the 
world",55 Epictetus must be said to have rejected the old equation of 'to 
live' with inter homines esse.
Verbally, at least, Mill's idea of negative freedom shares much with 
Epictetus' depiction of eleutheria. Mill too locates the core of liberty 
in the "inward domain of consciousness",57 and speaks of it as "the part of
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a person's life which only concerns himself".68 He even says, provoking 
many an Aristotelian censure, that "the only freedom which deserves the 
name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way."68 Lumping together 
Epictetus and Mill, in fact, Hannah Arendt claims that "our philosophical 
tradition is almost unanimous in holding that freedom begins where men have 
left the realm of political life inhabited by the many and that it is not
70experienced in association with others but in intercourse with one's self." 
Behind this anachronistic conflation of Epictetus and Mill, however, lies 
Arendt's refusal to comprehend the social evolutionary differentiation be­
tween polity and society. She too always presents her readers with an 
'either/or' situation: either you are for Aristotle or you are against
him; either you lead a political life or you are alone. The only non-poli­
tical "association", she claims elsewhere, is group labour.71 This, how­
ever, is precisely where Mill differs from Epictetus. The positive content 
of liberty, we may read him as arguing, is not withdrawal into inner sil­
ence but3 rather3 variegated participation in the multiple interaction con­
texts of a pluralistic society. Man can only realize himself and unfold 
his potentialities as a unique individual (which is what Mill advocates) 
only inter homines: in contexts of inter-subjectivity and combative colla­
boration. But in a Gesellschaft this realm is multiplex and not unique; it 
is incongruously distributed throughout various life-spaces and not exclu­
sively limited to the 'political sphere'. The point of Mill's negative 
freedom, as a result, is not so much to keep the manipulative fingers of 
the state locked-out of my interior domus as to prevent 'ignorant' politi­
cians (and conformist public opinion) from trying to regiment the various 
interaction contexts of my life. Mill does not quite say this, of course; 
but the fact that he does not praise the solitude of the later Stoa should 
be clear from his construal of 'freedom of thought' on the model of mutual 
falsification, correction and public debate. Man is not free in pure in­
ward contemplation, but, rather, in the 'combative' space of public criti­
cism and reciprocal refutation. This explains Mill's belief that freedom 
of the inward domain of consciousness is "practically inseparable"72 from 
the right to publish what we think. The contrast with Hobbes (who wanted 
"outward conformity" unimpugned by "inward conviction")72 is telling. As 
Vico knew, we have now replaced the old homonoia with a new corrigibility. 
But this merely makes intersubjectivity less predictable; it does not 
eliminate it altogether.
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What is missing in Mill is an adequate concept of functional life- 
space differentiation. If he had conceived 'science' as a system, he might 
have found it easier to translate his ideas about freedom of discussion 
into a non-political concept of positive freedom, of freedom to realize 
oneself in contexts of combative collaboration. It would also have allowed 
him to understand the structural relevance of 'freedom in the traffic' to 
our highly differentiated society. Our "inward domain of consciousness" is 
not a walled Epicurean garden but an active voyaging in the interstices of 
uncoordinated life-spaces. Important here is the idea that life-spaces in 
a complex Gesellschaft, unlike de Tocqueville's corporativist 'mediating 
institutions', make totalizing claims. Each life-space thematizes total 
society from its own perspective. In science one can see this easily, for 
the physicist, for example, will claim to be talking about 'everything', 
including the most refined (academic) constellations of energy and mass, 
while the sociologist, for example, will likewise claim to be talking about 
'everything', including the social phenomenon of scientific research in 
physics. In a sense, both are right: neither is complete, nor can either
claim an exhaustive overview. But even more emphatically than in the 
middle ages, the plurality of totalizations prevents the complete integra­
tion of individuals into an engulfing institution. The Graeco-totalitarian 
attempt to subordinate all spheres of life to politics is not so much a 
violation of the 'eternal rights' of individuals, as a flouting of an 
achievement of social evolution, an anachronistic denial of the functional 
differentiation of modern society into a plurality of incongruous perspec­
tives and divergent values with no unifying overview, or 'true centre'.
Perhaps what prevented Mill from formulating an argument such as this 
was his residually positivist conviction that there really is only one 
'truth', entailing eventual unanimity in matters of public policy. Often, 
his commitment to 'tolerance' seems to depend on the fact that no man yet 
knows the truth. To move beyond tolerance, in any case, and toward comba­
tive incongruity, we must appeal to a theory of functional life-space dif­
ferentiation. This, in fact, is our answer to Strawson, to his request for 
an integration of "incongruous ideals" and a common morality based on 
"social structures".74
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The Speculative and the Existential
VIII
"Now a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public 
conception of justice. This fact implies that its members 
have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the 
principles of justice require. Since a well-ordered society 
exists over time, its conception of justice is presumably 
stable; that is, when institutions are just (as defined by 
this conception), those taking part in these arrangements 
acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do 
their part in maintaining them."75
To assert that all rational persons in particular circumstances would 
choose certain principles by which to govern their conduct is not to say 
that once having been exposed to these principles rational persons would 
embrace them and develop a sense of attachment. The first assertion refers 
only to the 'deduction' of principles, their origin in the wills of ration­
al persons - their Kantian groundwork, as it were - while the second is a 
statement about the genealogy of moral precepts and the foundations of 
moral psychology. The distinction is significant insofar as Rawls is con­
cerned because it illuminates a dichotomy at the heart of his contractar­
ianism, indeed, a dilemma confronting all contractarians, namely, how to 
bridge the gap between the ideal typical circumstances and characters of 
the 'original position' (however envisioned) and actual circumstances and 
personalities. On the one hand, one may adopt a Kantian posture and talk 
in terms of the underpinnings of our 'sense of justice', i.e. those ideas 
to which we appeal when considering what is right and fair. Rawls acknow­
ledges that this is in fact what all persons do when speculating upon such 
matters and, as we have seen in Part Six, this speculative and supposition­
al aspect of contractarianism is what lends it its philosophic appeal. 
However, to the extent that one wishes to discuss actual persons and extant 
principles one must qualify the purely conjectural with reference to the 
predilections, habits and methods of non-speculative persons who simply 
live their lives, as it were, without reference to the philosopher's 
'original position'. In other words, in order to achieve his ambition of 
formulating a universal theory of justice Rawls must discuss, and account 
for, the development of moral precepts; and in order to establish the con­
tinuity of his principles of justice through generations or across the 
hiatus separating the original position and actual circumstances, Rawls
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must enlighten us as to the moral psychology of those beyond the original 
position. The task, then, is to blend the Kantian and the empirical in 
such a way as to justify the leap from the speculative to the existential.
Without launching into a discussion of Rawls' elaborate moral psycho­
logy or his revision of Piaget and Kohlberg,75 it is possible to subject 
his Gesellschaftliche contractarianism (and even moreso, Rousseau's 
Gemeinschaftliche version) to a Vichian critique. Indeed, by now the poli­
tical, if not the philosophical, deficiences of 'true' contractarianism (as 
opposed to Locke's 'quasi-contractarianism') are apparent. While serving 
as a genuine and fruitful conceptual solution to the problem of civil obli­
gation, contractarianism collapses as a model of civil society. Rather, it 
is a sophisticated heuristic device by means of which we may fashion 'pro- 
tomorphs' of civility and order and thence full-blown models of civitas; 
but as a blueprint, the image is a mirage. Why? Because the 'genuine' 
contractarianism of Rousseau and Rawls presupposes a 'totalisation' of 
politics (a failure to distinguish between polity and society) reminiscent 
of the Hellenic city-state which cannot be reproduced within highly diffe­
rentiated Gesellschaften. The very basis of the contractarian metaphor as 
a model of civil society (rather than as a synecdoche of rational reflec­
tion on civil society) is the double Aristotelian claim that, firstly, the 
state can be 'subjectified' as a family or 'colloquy', and, secondly, the 
individual can 'realize' himself in political participation. Plausible for 
the polis and Swiss cantons, both of these ideas warp under the pressure of 
complex societies and in turn lead to personal and governmental deformat­
ions .
With the collapse of kerygmatic guarantees, so we have argued, politi­
cal philosophy must attempt to reconstruct the old distinction between 
rationality and irrationality within the framework of social evolution.
Our focal concern, therefore, has been with the irrationality of political 
anachronism (apophradism, as we have termed it), particularly with the 
widespread apophradic desire to recreate the domestic holism of an early 
Gemeinschaft within a highly differentiated Gesellschaft. The Hellenic 
ideal of subordinating all spheres of life to politics, when transferred 
into a complex and uncoordinated non-totalitarian - or 'nearly just' - 
society can only issue in coercive totalitarian integration. (The bitter 
paradox of a means - the contractarian method as a way of determining
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whether or not a society is just - distorting itself when projected as an 
end - the contractarian method as a putative reification of the just 
society.) Totalitarianism, we have tried to demonstrate, is not irrational 
because it violates man's eternal nature but because it distorts the flow 
of history by endeavouring to regenerate the past in the future: it ap­
peals to the 'true centre' of society when, as we have said, society has 
already developed an irreducible plurality of centres. The strength of 
contractarianism lies in its recognition of this pluralism and its charac­
terization of the just society as one tolerant of 'difference'. Its weak­
ness, however, lies in its insatiable desire to minimize differences and 
achieve homogeneity. One may draw the analogy of a society of persons each 
of whom applies judicial reasoning to matters of public policy transformed 
into a society of robed judges.
The problem, of course, does not lie exclusively with contractarian­
ism. Indeed, if anything, the opposite is the case. However, the danger 
of misconstrual is everpresent (as Rousseau bears ample witness). The 
difficulty is that in drawing up parameters of civility and order the temp­
tation to articulate and defend a rational, univocal and universally bind­
ing criterion for the critique of social systems becomes well nigh over­
whelming.
Take, for example, the work of Jürgen Habermas,77 an avowed non-con­
tractarian who, in many ways, provides us with a striking parallel to 
Rousseau and Rawls. Like Rousseau and Rawls, Habermas recognizes that 
purely stipulative accounts of justice lack cogency. He realizes that man 
has both contingently arisen in evolution and developed in unforeseeable 
ways through history. As a consequence, he despairs of obtaining a 'uni­
versal principle' from heaven. Nevertheless, as a Marxist, he regards the 
alternative of an 'irrationalist' relativism or an ad hoe conventionalism 
to be more than merely philosophically unacceptable. Ethical scepticism, 
so he believes, even when it does not foster the glorification of instinct, 
blood and dark shirts, cannot help enervating the struggle for political 
reason. Consequently, it is said to smooth the path for a wideningly ille­
gitimate employment of elitist coercion. In fact, throughout his work, 
Habermas has set himself the paradoxical task of formulating a leftist 
standard of social criticism which though contingent in its origins has 
become constitutive of critical rationality itself, which is both a product
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and a presupposition of human action. In sum, we may say that Habermas' 
basic project is to work out a post-Darwinian reformulation of the egali­
tarian doctrine of unimpugnable natural rights.
For purposes of brief exposition it is possible to divide Habermas' 
main argumentation strategy into a 'critical moment' and a 'constructive 
moment'. When he is being predominantly critical, Habermas aims at the 
refutation of all positions which maintain that 'reason' (i.e., the ability 
to justify oneself in discussion) is only theoretical or contemplative and, 
as a consequence, that practice must ultimately be a matter of unjustifi­
able habit or irrational choice. In such cases, Habermas' bete noire.is 
'decisionism', or an assumption of the subjective indeterminateness of 
ends. This involves him in an extensive attack on positivism, which, as he 
interprets it, makes 'reason' coextensive with deductive operations plus 
the technical selection of optimally efficient means for preestablished 
ends. On its terms, the evaluative discrimination among ends has no cogni­
tive status. The answer to practical questions (like "What should our 
goals be?") cannot be true or false. The continuum between ethical neutra­
lity and 'decisionism', so Habermas suggests, should be transparent.
The constructive moment of his work has to do with renewing the claim 
of egalitarian natural right in the context of a curious 'linguistic turn'. 
Arguing against Weber's reduction of legitimacy to a plurality of factually 
accepted legalities, Habermas, like Rousseau, in particular, wants to form­
ulate a 'transperspectival' and univocal criterion of the good life, a 
standard reflecting the ideal of a classless society, of universal self- 
government through unrestricted and coercion-free public discussion. He 
claims to have arrived at this standard by reconstructing the fundamental 
norms of rational communication (as Rawls 'reconstructs' the fundamental 
norms of human nature) though he does not conceal the fact that this 're­
construction' implies the combined retrieval of two crucial concepts of 
German idealism: autonomy and universality. Thus the key to neo-Marxist
'communicative ethics' is the normative idea of an uncoerced reciprocal 
recognition of all men as autonomous and distinct individuals. This ideal 
value is, aptly enough, as with Rousseau and Rawls, both contingent and 
necessary. According to Habermas, its normative force presupposes the 
absence of mechanical predictability, but now has become inextricably and 
necessarily embedded in the 'deep structure' of sociocultural life. This
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necessity (what makes the idea 'constitutive' of critical reason) is 
thought to have both an evolutionary and a historical aspect.
On the one hand, Habermas sees the 'cultural break with nature' (c.f. 
Part Two, Section one) as marked by the institutionalization of ordinary 
language as the dominant medium in which intersubjective relationships both 
develop and are maintained. Furthermore, the theory of ordinary language 
communication purportedly furnishes us with a germinal ethics. The 'deep 
structure' of colloquial intersubjectivity, so he tentatively asserts, al­
ready 'anticipates' an idea of egalitarian social justice which entails 
the achievement of universal human autonomy - that is to say, equal rights 
for all men to satisfy their socially-interpreted needs and to participate 
in all relevant processes of political decision-making. For example, the 
competent speaker of a natural language (to reproduce one of Habermas' more 
striking arguments) must already have mastered the transformational genera­
tive rules, in something like Chomsky's sense, which allows him to correct­
ly employ pronominal shifters.7  ^ Now, to use the words "I", "you" and "we" 
properly, a speaker must recognize the correlative legitimacy of every 
other speaker’s using the same words in more or less the same sense. To be 
communicatively competent, Habermas claims, an interlocutor must recognize, 
at least tacitly, the right of every other man to be an autonomous subject, 
equal in all important respects to himself. This purportedly anthropologi- 
cally-invariant structure of ordinary language communication leads Habermas 
toward a 'naturalized ethics' which, in turn, forms the basis for his post- 
Darwinian (indeed, post-Vichian) doctrine of natural right. Ego, Habermas 
argues, can only maintain its identity through some kind of equal recipro­
city with an alter ego. Becoming a subject (and Habermas here refers to 
Mead) cannot be separated from learning to see ourselves through the eyes 
of another (a refinement of what we earlier temed 'beneficent verstehen' -  
see Appendix Five). Reciprocal recognition can thus be universalized into 
the elemental principle of a rational or post-conventional moral life. 
Moreover, exclusively monological (strategic and instrumental) action pro­
vokes an automatic sanction: loss of personal identity. If a speaker were
steadily to violate the underlying logic of speech acts, of acts of speak­
ing/hearing, the coherence of his self-definition would be called radically 
into question. If he were consistently to flout what Habermas calls the 
"universal pragmatic maxim" of truthfulness, for example, if he were always 
to lie, then after a while he would no longer know what he was saying.
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According to Habermas, this practical mechanism, whereby ego-identity (con­
stituted in the medium of colloquial intersubjectivity) can be threatened 
with abysmal collapse, exhibits how a transcendental argument - one which 
reconstructs the fundamental regulative conditions for rational communica­
tion - can bear a normative burden. It provides the functional underpin­
nings for a theory of man's second (linguistic) nature, of a boundary which 
none of us can transgress with impunity, at least not continuously and not 
for long.
On the other hand, there is a historical aspect to this issue which 
the appeal to anthropological constants might appear to slight, if not to 
ignore. Habermas is certainly aware that a full-blown 'Enlightenment mora­
lity' was not coeval with linguistic communication. He knows further that 
Western egalitarianism, for instance, is to some degree a 'secularized' 
version of the Pauline doctrine that all men are equal before the one God. 
Likewise, he knows that the abstract interchangeability or anonymity of 
experimenters in modern science, and especially the universality of equal 
exchange on the capitalist market both nurtured the liberal idea of justice 
and hence contributed to making civil rights, including suffrage, univer­
sal. All he requires for his 'quasi-transcendental' foundation of a uni- 
versalistic and egalitarian ethics is acceptance of the idea that these 
developments, though originally improbable, have now become in a certain 
sense irreversible. Furthermore, Habermas believes that he can deal with 
the historical genesis (and thus, variability) of ostensibly universalistic 
moral principles by tracing-out in a Rousseauan fashion, a hypothetical 
logic of social evolution, by constructing, as he said in his less tenta­
tive days, an empirically-flasifiable philosophy of history. The evolution 
of worldviews, moral systems and cult practices, he postulates, follows a 
set of empirically describable regularities: from sacred to secular, hete-
ronomy to autonomy, tribal particularism to human universalism and so 
forth. These 'observable' tendencies, Habermas argues, all point indirect­
ly to the underlying anthropological or linguistic invariants (especially 
to the ideal of a classless society or of a universal reciprocal recogni­
tion among individually autonomous men) which were originally kept 'inac­
tive' by external factors such as scarcity. In general, one can view this 
proposed 'logic of social evolution' as a phylogenetic analogue to the 
theories of Kohlberg and Piaget as to the ontogenetic genesis of 'universa­
listic' moral principles. To be formulaic and with a proviso about increa-
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sed subtlety, Habermas responds nicely to the description which Troeltsch 
gave of Marx: he is both a sociological relativist and an ethical absolu­
tist.79 Indeed, one might say the same about Rousseau, if not Rawls.
What makes this final position untenable is Habermas' (and Rousseau's 
and Rawls') commitment to an association of human rationality with an even­
tual consensus omnium. Communicative ethics is doubly naive since it tries 
to combine Marx's belief in the possibility of a society utterly free of 
all inner cleavages with Kant's notion that 'transcendental reflection' can 
unearth principles upon which all men will necessarily agree. Since every 
course of action on which men embark is going to produce contingencies and 
problems which they did not (and could not) foresee, the idea of a guaran­
tee or certified ground for choice seems additionally irrelevant. Of 
course, we have principles, but they are cultural achievements and are not 
rooted in evolutionary bedrock. There is an unavoidable moment of risk in 
every consequential step we take. How are pronominal shifters and pragma­
tic universals going to help us when we come to real moral dilemmas - say, 
the termination of a seventh-month pregnancy or the production of pluton­
ium? We would expect Habermas and his colleagues to say: why, all we have 
to do is to institute a practical discourse in which everyone affected has 
a right to his say and where the best argument is accepted unanimously: 
the literal application of the contractarian method as a model of civil 
behaviour rather than as a notional heuristic device. But what world is 
Habermas talking about? He seems to be spinning out words instead of 
thoughts. Who precisely is "everyone affected"? Unborn children and 
future generations seem not unlikely candidates - yet, there might be org­
anizational difficulties in getting them to exert their prerogatives of 
role-exchangeability in present discussions. Democratic rationality, so 
Habermas suggests, requires the "ideal simultaneity" of all men (not to 
mention 'ideal communication' - an absolute conceptual scheme ä la Kant in 
which we all know what we and others are saying and do not want to say: an 
idealized dialectical situation). But how can a simultaneity which is un­
thinkable be ideal? And in any case, who among the real (more than ideal) 
participants decides which argument is 'best'? Only a consensus omnium 
decides, responds Habermas (with a Rousseauan and Rawlsian echo), clearly 
unimpressed by the idea that modem society is too complex to be steered 
on the basis of unanimity. This is truly a remarkable construction. An 
unthinkable community (as opposed to the conceivable but highly unlikely
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community i n  R aw ls ' o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n )  comes t o  an u n t h in k a b le  c o n s e n s u s  
a b o u t  i s s u e s  w hich i n  r e a l  l i f e  a r e  a lw ays  am biguous, m an y -s id e d  and  r e c a l ­
c i t r a n t  t o  'g r o u n d e d '  o r  r i s k - f r e e  d e c i s i o n .  W ith o u t  t h i s  f a n t a s y ,  
Habermas c l a i m s ,  we would s in k  t o  t h e  d e p th s  o f  i r r a t i o n a l i s m  and d e s p a i r .  
T here  i s  n o t h in g  Habermas f e a r s  more th a n  awakening one m orn ing  and d i s c o v ­
e r i n g  t h a t  he  h a s  been  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  C a r l  S c h m i t t . 80 T h is  f e a r  i s  so 
overw he lm ing  t h a t  i t  h a s  caused  him t o  abandon t h e  a r g u m e n ta t iv e  k e r n e l  o f  
h i s  e a r l i e r  w o rk s ,  o f  t h o s e  e s s a y s  i n  w hich he was s t i l l  u n d e r  th e  i n ­
f lu e n c e  o f  A d o rn o 's  r a d i c a l  c r i t i q u e  o f  o n t o lo g y .  The b a s i s  o f  t h i s  e a r l y  
p o s i t i o n  was a r e p u d i a t i o n  o f  t h e  G r a e c o - p o s i t i v i s t  i d e a  o f  'p u r e  t h e o r y ' . 
I n d e e d ,  i t  t a k e s  l i t t l e  i n s i g h t  t o  see  t h a t  Habermas has  r e v i v e d  'p u r e  
t h e o r y ' .  H is  n a t u r a l i z e d  e t h i c s  i s  p a r t  o f  a p r o j e c t  w hich  i n v o l v e s  more 
t h a n  t h e  mere d e d u c t i o n  o f  an 'o u g h t '  from an ' i s ' .  We do n o t  have  t o  deny 
t h e  i n t r i c a t e  c o n n e c t io n  be tw een  t h e  way t h i n g s  a r e  and t h e  way t h e y  sh o u ld  
be  t o  s e e  H aberm as ' m i s s t e p  h e r e .  He h as  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  s a y in g ,  even 
i f  a l l  h i s  'know ledge  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  l i f e '  a rgum en ts  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  o n ly  one way i n  w hich  t h i n g s  o u g h t  t o  b e .  M oreover, Habermas has  
no r i g h t  t o  sup p o se  t h a t  t h e  a r r a y  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  ' f a c t s '  he  m a r s h a l s  f o r  
h i s  c a s e  a r e  open t o  one  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o n ly .  He makes t h e  c r i t i c a l  m is ­
t a k e  o f  p r e s u p p o s in g  t h a t  n a t u r a l  la n g u a g e  form s a c o n s i s t e n t  t o t a l i t y ;  and 
w h i l e  we s u s p e c t  t h a t  la n g u a g e  p e r fo rm s  a v a r i e t y  o f  f u n c t i o n s  and i s  b u i l t  
up  i n  a p ie c e m e a l  f a s h i o n ,  we a r e  a l lo w e d  t o  h o l d ,  even by h i s  a rg u m e n t,  
t h a t  l a n g u a g e  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  and t h e r e f o r e  i n c a p a b le  o f  g e n e r a t i n g  c o n s i s ­
t e n t  u n i v e r s a l s .  As w i th  R aw ls ' a n a l y s i s  o f  " n a t u r a l  d u t i e s " ,  w hat 
Habermas p r e s u p p o s e s  m ig h t  be t r u e  o f  a r t i f i c i a l ,  b u t  n o t  n a tu ra l , l a n g u a g e .
I t  i s  no a c c i d e n t  i f  Haberm as ' i d e a  t h a t  a r c h a i c  m an 's  " f i r s t  s e n te n c e  
e x p r e s s e s  u n e q u i v o c a l l y  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  u n i v e r s a l  and u n c o n s t r a i n e d  con­
s e n s u s " 81 and Rawls c o n c e p t io n  o f  n a t u r a l  d u t i e s  rem ind  u s  o f  V i c o ' s  r a i l ­
in g  a g a i n s t  t h e  " c o n c e i t "  o f  t h o s e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  "who w i l l  have  i t  t h a t  what 
t h e y  know m ust  have  b een  e m in e n t ly  u n d e r s to o d  from t h e  b e g in n i n g  o f  th e  
w o r l d . "  I n d e e d ,  b o th  Habermas and Rawls -  much more so  th a n  Rousseau  -  
want t o  renew p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  k in d  o f  f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  p o l i t i c s  
w hich  Vico w ished  t o  d e m o l is h  i n  t h e  New S c ie n c e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  V ico  d id  
n o t  a c c e p t  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m  v e r s u s  i r r a t i o n a l ­
i t y .  What we have  c a l l e d  t h e  's e c o n d  s t r a n d '  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  
a t t e m p te d  t o  s k e t c h  i n  o u t l i n e  a V ic h ia n  c o n c e p t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  
w hich  h a s  n e i t h e r  u l t i m a t e  g u a r a n t e e s  n o r  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  f o u n d a t i o n s .  In
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Part Two it was argued that Vico was able to sustain a commitment to reason 
without appealing to transhistorical canons of justice or unchanging natur­
al rights. Following the New Science, of course, we can never say that a 
political regime violates the eternal law of nature or that a citizen, sim­
ply by virtue of his citizenship, is under an obligation to obey the laws 
of his patria. But this does not, as Habermas might suppose, plunge us in­
to the grim depths of 'decisionistic ' unreason. We can consider the 'char­
acter' of a state and determine whether or not we are under an obligation 
to obey its laws, not by grounding civil obligations in immutable princi­
ples, or by fixing when and how we have consented to obey the laws of a 
state; but, firstly, by carefully considering what kind of a state warrants 
our obedience, and, secondly, with the aid of the contractarian metaphor, 
we can develop a conception of a state - a 'just state' - to whose author­
ity we could reasonably assent. If we find that the state in which we live 
meets this conception or approximates it, then, following the principle of 
fairness, we know that we have an obligation to obey its laws. Of course, 
this is not to say that when we know this we know all we need to know.
Like all theories of civil obligation, the social contract assists us in 
learning whether we have a civil obligation. If we do, then we know that, 
ceteris paribus, we ought to obey them. As remarked in the conclusion to 
Part Six, this does not tell us everything, but it does tell us a great 
deal.
If we believe, with Vico, that social evolution introduces non-trivial 
transformations into human society, then it is possible, among other 
things, to consider normative arguments in terms of historical anachronism 
(or what we have termed 'apophradism'). In Appendix Three and Part Seven, 
in fact, it was argued that the Hellenic identification of polity and soc­
iety, when naively transferred to highly differentiated societies, invaria­
bly generates illusory expectations and unrealizable values. The paradig­
matic unjust state - the totalitarian state - is irrational because it nec­
essarily fails to recognise the problem of civility: it sees only the prob­
lem of order. Yet, if nothing else, the rise of the modem state has been 
characterised (and haunted) by the many and various dilemmas surrounding 
the problem of civility. What was secondary for Hobbes, in other words, 
had acquired immense importance for Locke, not simply as a matter of per­
sonal taste but as a reflection of the times, as a recognition of the 
events and ideas that separated the two philosophers. That is to say, the 
'texture' of time as the stuff of history, not the mere passing of days.
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APPENDIX ONE
I
Traversing different paths toward divergent ends, the Machiavellian 
and the Calvinist shared a similar awareness of the human condition and 
espoused in common a pragmatic policy outlook, so to speak, in terms of 
which, it was argued, man could make the best of an unavoidably unfortunate 
situation. Equally committed to an ethic of action, Machiavelli and Calvin 
saw man's struggle for survival as a contest between growth and decay. 
Growth entails men working in harmony, forever striving for more complete 
control over mind and body: self-reliance and discipline. Decay is the
result of disunity, self-indulgence and, most importantly, half-hearted or 
insincere efforts at achieving self-reliance and discipline: inefficiency.
Consequently, the life-policy of the sensible man (of him who prefers 
growth to decay) is the efficient pursuit of self-reliance and discipline 
through action rather than contemplation. "How can a man know himself", 
asks Goethe, "Never by observation, but through action. Try to do your 
duty and you will know what is in you. And what is your duty? Your daily 
task."1
Arising from a crypto-evolutionary conception of History writ large 
as the chronology of human survival in general, and individual histories 
as particular records of 'natural selection' within the species, as it 
were, the Machiavellian perspective on man stripped the struggle for sur­
vival of any cosmic meaning and all spiritual dignity. As Hegel was later 
to reiterate, "the course of world history stands outside of virtue, blame 
and justice." Consequently, as individuals and as members of collectivi­
ties we seek to exist as best we can in the light of past experience and 
what we know at first hand. Most people have no pretensions to power out­
side the immediate sphere of their survival or any desire to frame legis­
lation for their fellows. Most wish to subject themselves to the authority 
of another rather than assume authority themselves; and so, it follows, 
according to Machiavelli's reasoning, that it is the limited ambitions of 
the many that grant the few power and authority, providing, of course, that 
the latter substantially satisfy the circumscript demands of the former. 
Similarly, the Calvinist perspective on the human condition emphasised the
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tentativeness of survival, urging the individual to play his part in the 
building of disciplined order out of uncertainty. While having regard to 
a spiritual end the Calvinist knew neither what that end was, other than 
God's glorification, nor the nature of Him who determined it. All the 
Calvinist did know was that his duty was to survive as best he could in 
accordance with the scriptures until he assumed his destiny under the 
divine will. Since divinity is beyond human comprehension it is sinful to 
speculate on the divine and unwise, indeed, immoral to ignore the temporal. 
The 'great chain of being' with its fecund and benevolent God ordering the 
natural hierarchy of things, so beloved of the neo-Platonists, Christian 
Aristotelians and Anglicans had no place in Calvin's theology. The drama 
of Satan's rebellion evaporates in a universe founded not on God's arbit­
rary domination but on his cheerful productivity and incessant fiddling. 
Where is the sense of wicked, bloody human history in a feudal 'body 
celestial'? Rather than some Renaissance mathematician presiding over a 
geometric universe, the Calvinist God is a levelling Master smashing all 
contrived symmetry and intermediate power. His boundless mastery so 
dominates the universe that nature, as it were, loses its generative capa­
city, because all potentiality emanates from an 'arbitary' Will. That is 
to say, tele which had been immanent are relocated in a transcendent God 
(a view forshadowed by the medieval nominalists).2 Gone is medieval plura­
lism and the balancing act of angels, popes and kings; swept away by the 
trembling wrath of a betrayed God permanently estranged from mankind. The 
Fall alienated man from God, from nature, from his fellows, and no blessed, 
other-worldly reunion will relieve this current misery. Only the discip­
lined activity of self-controlled men in this less than perfect world can 
reconstruct some semblance of order and thereby alleviate the estrangement 
between men, if not between man and God. There is no succour in this 
world, runs the argument, God didn't ordain a welfare-universe; and since 
there is no one to turn to - there being no intermediary between man and 
God - all help is self-help only.
Paradoxically, one could argue that, in a sense, Calvin removed God 
from temporal affairs precisely by making Him ubiquitous and 'omnicausa­
tive'3: the rationale for everything, yet a rationale devoid of a calcul­
able reasoning accessible to mankind. Unable to 'hide in everything', as 
it were (in the manner of Spinoza's pantheistic deity), but refusing the 
passive role of Platonic demiurge, Calvin's God is at one immanent, tran-
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scendent and sovereign. As 'transcendent reality', "God is the principle 
of all being (ratio essendi) and as transcendent idea, God is the formal 
principle of all knowing {ratio cognoscendi) . "4 The critical ontological 
distinction of creator and creature (not as artificer and artefact, but as 
the wellspring of existence and creation ex nihilo) defines God's transcen­
dence as existential priority and independence. Ontologically, the world 
is utterly dependent upon God, its finitude nestling within the limitless 
expanse of His purpose. God's immanence is manifest, for Calvin, not as 
Spinozaic pantheism but, rather, as 'revealed handiwork' i.e. nature as 
His 'good works'. "We are in the process of forming a living conception 
of God when we work on the perfection of the specific scientific discip­
lines," contended Schleiermacher5, reinforcing the Calvinist wonderment 
with nature as God's glory. Immanence as action in the world, then, as 
active participation rather than passive inherence. Thus,divine sovereign­
ty must appear not merely as a pietist epithet, but, in a manner remini­
scent of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus5, as an ethical category and meta­
physical axiom. Immanence and transcendence culminate, as it were, in 
God's sovereignty. Insofar as His singular presence is experienced by His 
creatures it is, for Calvin, uniquely understood as divine will. Only 
through vigorous assertion of universal divine sovereignty can it be con­
fidently proclaimed that God "rules unconditionally and irresistably in 
all occurrence."7 "The operation of this God," writes Karl Barth, "is as 
sovereign as Calvinist teaching describes it. In the strictest sense it 
is predestinating."5 Writing on man as subject to history (interestingly 
enough without once mentioning Calvin) the Lutheran Rudolph Bultmann neatly 
captures the Calvinist perspective on God as that of Hebraic man: 'Job's
brother'.
"The man of the Old Testament knows nothing of an order of 
nature, governed by law, comprehensible in terms of rational 
thought. But he believes in a God who has created the world 
and given it into the charge of man as the place for his 
dwelling and working. Man conceives God as the ruler of 
history, who directs the historical process to a goal, in 
accordance with His plan. Therefore he is sure that there 
is an order in all occurrences, although not one which is 
intelligible to reason. Certainly human life is weak, fragile, 
and ephemeral, but the word of God stands unshaken, and man 
can rely on it. God is indubitable authority, and man has to 
be obedient, but in this very obedience he is quite safe and 
secure and gains his 'true existence'."5
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Politics, as "the art of making possible that which is necessary"10, 
emerged as the practical expression of Calvinist ideology, the individual 
Calvinist no longer racked by dreams of salvation but earnestly striving 
to make this life less anxious at his departure than it was at his ent­
rance. In the manner of Marlowe's Tamburlaine, Calvin's new man was sub­
ject to control rather than humility, and was obliged to serve not a moral 
sovereign but a powerful man.11
The policy outlook embedded in both the Machiavellian and Calvinist 
conceptions of the human condition flowed from their mutual sensitivity to 
the uncertainty of life, a pathological fear of anarchy and an abiding 
concern with method, both as mode of investigation and procedure for 
attaining ends. It seems paradoxical that each thinker in his own way so 
devoted to enhancing social order felt compelled to spell out the essential 
instability of this world. But, clearly, the paradox was necessary to 
illuminate the dangers confronting order? not that it was contrived in 
either case as a simple heuristic or dramaticism - both related what they 
saw and reasoned, more often than not with a disarming honesty that worked 
against their calculable interests. Yet each heightened the tension in­
herent in the antithesis of order and chaos so as to more pronouncedly veer 
from the general drift of European thought that confronted the state's and 
man's temporal finitude in terms of the 'great chain', or some similar 
Platonistic theological metaphor, rather than in terms of moral and politi­
cal stability in an interminable flux of irrationality. Stability, argued 
Machiavelli and Calvin, is the basis upon which a functioning society is 
built: an order of reasonable expectations springing from discipline and
efficiency. The state serves primarily as an instrument of repression by 
which stability is forced upon men otherwise predisposed to the wanton pur­
suit of personal interests: in the italiano votgare of Machiavelli, men
dominated more by fortuna than virtu. However, the state arose neither 
from a calculated pursuit of stability, as argued by some contractarians, 
nor from an extension of 'the family', with its organic stability and 
natural affections. Rather, it may be taken from Calvinist and Machiavel­
lian thought, what was later to emerge as 'the state' lay nascent in the 
first instance of one 'savage' chieftain or family head forcing his will 
upon another. The cumulative tribalization of savages sprang from repres­
sion rather than reasoned reflection and mutual consultation. Though hard­
ly in itself a legitimating device, repression created the conditions under
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which men could later rationalize their collective existence in terms of 
legitimating fictions, such as the contract, and thereby retrospectively 
establish a groundwork for obligation as superior to mere obedience.
Luther had a similar view. "Let no one think that the world can be ruled 
without blood," wrote Luther, "the sword of the ruler must be red and 
bloody; for the world will and must be evil, and the sword is God's rod 
and vengeance upon it."12
Despite the considerable differences between Luther and Calvin in 
style and teaching - not the least of which was Luther's doctrine of intro­
spective religiosity; religion proper as that paradoxically incommunicable 
communion with God - both theologians emphatically concurred in their 
mutual abhorence of secular rebellion. Though virtually an ecclesiastical 
anarchist, Luther, even more than Calvin, deferred to the offices (if not 
the incumbent officers) of temporal stability as the guardians of Christian 
civility. His obsessional loathing of crowds and distrust of the peasantry 
fuelled an already inconsistent conception of civil authority as essential­
ly holy: that mechanism by which personal religiosity is enhanced through
collective stability.12 "It is in no wise proper for anyone who would be 
a Christian to set himself up against his government," warned Luther, 
"whether it act justly or unjustly."
"There are no better works than to obey and serve all those 
who are set over us as superiors. For this reason also 
disobedience is a greater sin than murder, unchastity, theft, 
and dishonesty, and all that these may include."14
The explicit imperative of obedience common to both Luther and Calvin, en­
meshing the citizen and the state to the exclusion of the Church, manifes­
ted itself, on the one hand, as Luther's drive to recapture the primitive 
'purity' of early Christianity, and, on the other, Calvin's iconoclastic 
determination to shed the 'Word' of 'Metaphor', of accumulated clerical 
accrescences that, firstly, challenged the literal authority of revelation 
and, secondly, sullied the simple harmony of the sacred covenant, the Word. 
The urge to simplify and purify, however, carried with it great risks. The 
tension between church and state during the later middle ages had focused 
on the struggle for mundane political ascendancy; the authority of the 
church as the custodian of doctrine went unchallenged, since it was the 
implementation of doctrine, not its formulation, that was in dispute. What
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male the Reformation a political revolution rather than an exercise in 
dissent, or a mere adjunct to rebellion, was the conscious transformation 
of the sacerdotal/regnal conflict into a 'crisis of faith', that is, a 
questioning of the church's 'right', firstly, to formulate doctrine; 
secondly, to definitively arbitrate in doctrinal matters; thirdly, to stra­
tify the clergy in the tradition of Peter rather than levelling it in the 
tradition of Christ; fourthly, to monopolise the maintenance and dispensa­
tion of the sacraments; and, fifthly, to serve as the medium, indeed, the 
subject of faith. Combined, these aspects of papal Catholicism comprised 
the 'visible' church so ably defended by Aquinas as the link between divine 
grace and the temporal world, forged in the crucifixion, tempered by the 
sacraments, and polished by the 'chosen community', as it were, through 
whom divine truth is interpreted and communicated.
As the medium of salvation, then, the church stood with God as the 
subject of faith (salvation being its object) through whose authority reve­
lation acquired veracity and, consequently, divinity. The individual 
believer does not confront God in a 'personal' relationship on a daily 
basis; rather, so dogma has it, he is ushered into the mystical body of 
Christ via the rites, whose sanctity lies in the idea of the church as His 
temporal incarnation. Revelation is thus unavailable to the individual 
outside of this eternal, unchallengeable authority since it consists in 
nothing other than the ecclesiastically endorsed record of divine inter­
vention in the affairs of men, and of forewarned events and circumstances 
on earth and elsewhere. To question this total authority, to throw into 
doubt this unity of belief, was to make problematical not only the unique 
canonical domination of revelation, but also, most importantly, to cast 
into uncertainty the totality of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the 
spiritual import of temporal affairs. That is to say, no matter what 
tensions characterized the relationship between the sacerdotal and the 
regnal within the community of the church, it was the sacred fellowship of 
the church that encompassed the laity, not vice versa. The vast cathedral 
chambers of catholicity enclosed nations and utterly humbled individuals. 
The church, not individual conscience, was the dispensation of God. Grace 
was the prerogative of ecclesiastical authority as received through the 
sacraments. To talk of irresistible grace, salvation outside the church, 
was to shatter the mystery of that delicate balance between punishment and 
reward. Ultimately, the fear of individual freedom of conscience as the
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greatest affront to universality - that dread of particularity because its 
very smallness constitutes a challenge to the splendour of largeness - 
served as the catalyst for clerical reaction to the Reformers. It was the 
recognition that authority is total else it is nothing that brought down 
the charge of heresy on those who would draw a distinction between indivi­
dual conscience and the will of the church. Moreover, the circumvention 
of the church by the reformers through direct appeal to scripture as the 
embodiment of divine authority, as the word of God then and now, furnished 
worship with 'simplicity', 'purity' and 'certainty'. The mediation of 
priests muttering sacramental incantations no longer being required, salva­
tion became a function of people in 'direct' communion with God. "Every 
Christian is a priest," said Luther, "every believer is his own priest."15 
Only faith is required, faith in God and His Word. Though written with 
application to the church, St. Anselm's formulation of Augustine's anti­
rationalism neatly precis the spirit, if not the animus, of Reformation 
theology: "I do not try to understand in order that I may believe but I
believe so that I may understand. For I believe this too, that unless I 
had faith, I would not understand."15
In 'depoliticizing' religion - by setting apart the law of God, Gos­
pel, Church and state17 (as the embodiment of public order) - Luther sought 
to affirm the direct, 'primitive' relationship between God and man. Since 
humanity exhibits no uniformity of grace and faith the task of the true 
Christian, argued Luther, is to participate in the establishment of a pure, 
voluntary fellowship of believers whose immersion in the Gospel would 
(through personal example and the gradual increase in piety amongst men) 
alter the nature of political conduct. The suspension of the church in a 
web of canon law, indulgences and bureaucratic procedures represented for 
Luther the politicization of faith and, by implication, through reliance 
upon a system of sanctions, the denial of the unique power and authority 
of the Gospel. Luther's assault on the Church hierarchy was only in small 
part, and mainly at the beginning of his mission an attack on secularism, 
corruption, nepotism, bureaucratic rigidity; it was an attack, rather, on 
an institution that had dared to interpose itself between God and man and 
to claim the right of mediating in a situation in which no mediator, except 
Christ, was welcome. The political and economic profits accruing to con­
fessed Lutherans in Saxony, Hesse, Prussia and the imperial cities of 
Germany - and they were, for many, considerable - should not obscure the
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profound introspectiveness of Luther's teachings. The extremists who arose 
so widely in his wake testify to the emotions that Luther's preaching, his 
writings, his very presence unloosed in pious and disoriented men. If - 
as many reasoned after 1517 - there was to be no Pope, no separate priest­
hood, no pilgrimages, no interceding saints, there was no need for formal 
clerical institutions at all. Faith in God and a divine sign in man were 
all a true Christian needed; or, as others, less individualistic, put it: 
the communion of saints was sufficient unto itself.
However, this was not Luther's view, even though some of his early 
pronouncements could be interpreted in this way. Throughout, his ideal 
was the communion of saints, united in the invisible church of the faith­
ful. But the peasants' rebellions of 1524 and 1525, as well as inexorable 
political realities, drove Lutheran rulers, and Luther himself, into a less 
exalted conception of church and state. In a world of hostile neighbours 
and fanatics at home, the secular princes and city governments came to 
assume the position of little popes within their domains. No longer a 
universal autocracy governed by Rome, the church became a local tyranny 
governed by its duke or council. As Luther's political thought developed 
in response to calamitous political events, it became clear that the state 
must assume certain functions (notably education and what passed as 'wel­
fare ' ) that had once been the province of the Church, and must supervise, 
moreover, the good conduct and uniform practice of churchmen. Luther did 
not think rulers free from sin; on the contrary, he never tired of telling 
them they too were liable to damnation. But he did take seriously St. 
Paul's injunction that the powers that be are ordained of God; it follows, 
then, that a Christian owes his state obedience and nothing but obedience.
A true Christian is free, but Luther interpreted this freedom in a subjec­
tive sense: a Christian is free in his heart, no matter how oppressive
the regime under which he might live and suffer. Thus Luther, the great 
liberator, became the uncomfortable proponent of state churches subservient 
to state governments.
From the perspective of personal (Christian) religious conscience, 
however, Luther attacked the Roman Church as the defender of Gesellschaft 
legalism and enemy of Gemeinschaft intimacy in matters of belief. Insofar 
as the church had become, through Aquinas and the 'realists', the vehicle 
for ratio in theology, it had betrayed the four principles of Christian
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belief as identified by all the dissenters and around which Reformation 
theology developed: the unique authority of the scriptures, the priest­
hood of all believers, justification by faith alone, and, pursuant to solo 
fide, good works not as religious acts entered in some salvational ledger 
but as the natural by-product of 'Christian liberty':
"Behold, from faith thus flow forth love and joy in the 
Lord, and from love and a joyful, willing, and free mind 
that serves one's neighbour willingly and takes no account 
of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, of gain 
or loss."18
As mentioned, Luther's rebellious progression, from the relatively moderate 
protest at Wittenberg to the irreparable breach at Worms, represented much 
more than a fundamental break with papal authority over corruption, bureau­
cratization and the centrality of scripture. Paradoxically, in the light 
of Luther's condescending attitude towards common folk, the heart of the 
Lutheran revolution lay in the revival of Wycliffe's notion of the invis­
ible church as a communion of spiritually free men.18 "The Christian man 
is of all men the most free because he is not dominated by rules and does 
not pretend that he is carrying out laws," writes Roland Bainton by way of 
paraphrasing Luther's The Freedom of the Christian Man and The Sermon on 
Good Works,
"He is simply giving expression to his gratitude to God 
and to his love for his neighbour. The Christian man is 
of all men the most bound, but the obligation laid ines­
capably upon him is from within. The essence of Christian 
morality is the imitation of Christ, not in the medieval 
sense of doing just what Christ did but rather in behaving 
after the pattern of Christ, who, being rich, for our sakes 
became poor; who, being on an equality with God, for us took 
the form of a servant and a felon; being innocent, yet on our 
behalf, he assumed guilt which was not his own. Even so must 
the Christian become a Christ to his neighbour, so identify­
ing himself with the neighbour as even to assume guilt for 
which there is no personal responsibility. This ideal also 
can never be adequately attained. The Christian is bound 
every day to fail, yet he is not sunk. He is at once a 
sinner and yet saved. If he makes no pretense to goodness 
but in humility and gratitude endeavours to conform himself 
to the divine purpose, he will be able to carry on despite 
every shortcoming."28
The essence of this doctrine is participation in the way of the Word; in-
gression into the Word's life- (and after-life-) force by participating in
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daily activities with an awareness that through faith one enters Christ's 
corpus mysticum. Individuals do not so much serve as priests unto them­
selves in this fellowship; rather, each believer is a priest to his bro­
thers, all of whom, through acceptance of Christ, are eligible for free 
forgiveness. The community of Christians, then, serves as the locus of 
God's Word, the mysteries of which silently permeate the deeds of each 
believer as he relates to his fellows. Without fellowship there can be no 
communion, and without that there can be no salvation. It is the bond that 
liberates.
Likewise, according to Luther, the bond of civility as epitomized in 
the state is a 'liberating enslavement'. The state is essentially holy, 
in that its divinely appointed function is to facilitate stable, harmonious 
relations between men. Luther "paves the way for the exalted theory of the 
State entertained by Hegel," wrote Figgis, "(He) is as much the spiritual 
ancestor of the high theory of the State, as the Jesuits ... are of the 
narrower, utilitarian theory."21 Regardless of Luther's ecclesiastical 
libertarianism, it may be said without fear of contradiction that in the 
realm of public affairs he recoiled more from anarchy than tyranny. And, 
given his dependence upon the temporal powers of Saxony, Luther needed 
little reminding that the ready fusion of necessity and convenience - as 
in the need to survive and the fortunate concurrence of ripe circumstances 
- generate a theology all their own. Unlike the Calvinists, the followers 
of Luther (as distinct from his early peasant admirers) found themselves 
in the happy situation of princely favour and a milieu disposed toward 
spiritual revolution. The rapid alignment of forces against the church 
and the crumbling Holy Roman Empire generated a crusading atmosphere con­
ducive to hastily rationalized marriages of convenience. Moreover, it 
seemed only natural that in the battle with Antichrist the forces of right­
eousness should be elevated to a quasi-divine plane, at least. Hence 
Luther's beatification of princely potentates as the guardians of God's 
earthly realm. The political kingdom is secular and rational, asserted 
Luther; the religious kingdom embraces spiritual faith freely attained.
Each is God's work; each must function in its own manner.22 The lay powers 
were thereby sanctified by Luther in direct inverse relation to his laiti- 
zation of the ecclesia.
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II
Calvin departed from Luther, and the sectarian chiliasts teeming in 
the latter's germinal wake, on two related grounds, both largely derived 
from a methodological principle rooted in what might be termed an epi- 
stemic, rather than a Gnostic, conception of divine authority. The two 
grounds for departure were really opposite extensions of Calvin's notion of 
'order'. The first extension was in the direction of the 'private', the 
uniquely individual apprehension of the Spirit as developed by Luther under 
the influence of the nominalists. Individual conscience is, as it were, 
suffused with the Holy Spirit, yet, because of God's gift of 'free will' it 
is open to corruption; it is vulnerable precisely because the human (inten­
tional) aspect of salvation resides in the bringing of sinful man into 
communion with God. It is the self-conscious, reflective movement of man 
into that which is truly his soul, the knowledge of which is rendered him 
through revelation, that promotes (though does not necessarily guarantee) 
his regeneration and, ultimately, salvation. Salvation is made possible, 
in the first place, by God's preordination from all eternity certain of 
mankind through grace to salvation and eternal life. But, if eternity is 
to be achieved, each man must embark upon his own journey to complete the 
cycle (from God's initial appointment to residence in Paradise) since few 
are certain of their election until the circle is closed. God's order is 
perfect, in that it is God's order, and history is the saga of its comple­
tion. The universe is, literally, God's 'activity', as both the product 
of his intention and the object of his attention. Likewise, 'predestina­
tion' is the 'action' by which God immutably determined all events: the
realization of purpose, not merely a statement of will.
Where Luther was seemingly overwhelmed by the mysteries of faith - 
"Old sorrow stirs, the wounds again have smarted, Life's labyrinth before 
my vision lies"23 - Calvin projected faith into a broader framework bounded 
by the totality of God's activity in relation to man: the order of things.
Predestination, then, served not as the seminal principle of Calvinism, but 
as the logical and practical implication of Calvin's syllogistic reasoning 
from God's omnipotent majesty through the nature of things to a profile of 
salvation and the role of everyman. Concerned as he was with release from 
guilt and the peaceful reconciliation of the soul with God's will, Luther 
stopped at just that point where Calvin departed into the farther reaches
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of Reformed theology. It was almost as if the purgation of guilt and the 
ecstasy of peace in faith exhausted Luther, making it necessary for him to 
stop in the midst of faith, as it were, incapable of delving into its 
practical ramifications. Calvin, on the other hand, was not content 
merely to inquire of its prerequisites; he sought to fathom the implica­
tions of justification by grace (through faith) and, in so doing, make 
available a public ecclesiology within which to situate a Christian soteri- 
ology. Insofar as this endeavour negated the priesthood of all Christians, 
it devalued the Lutheran emphasis on individual conscience as spiritual 
guide and critic, and engendered the first serious rift between the two 
reformers. God and His glory stand above salvation as the focus of Christ­
ian ambitions, contended Calvin - justification from the free gift of God 
alone, to praise the glory of His grace.
The formulation of an all-embracing Christian ecclesiology flowed 
naturally from Calvin's analysis of the Spirit and man, and represented 
the second extension of the idea of 'order'. The fusion of the two king­
doms, ecclesiastical and civil, within a single moral schema meant for 
Calvin an affirmation of the Spirit in human conduct: that the church
polity comprising as it does a Christian commonwealth may, indeed, must 
influence its doppel-g'anger, the secular polity, in accordance with the 
Word. The true church thus constitutes the living fusion of Spirit and 
Word: an organism not only in its teleology but in its internal coherence
as well. The uneasy plurality of Luther's two kingdoms intimated a diminu­
tion of God's authority - though, needless to say, Luther emphatically 
declared otherwise24 - and nurtured in its introversion an egoism utterly 
repugnant to Calvin. Obedience to the gospel, not personal reconciliation 
with God, marks Christian duty, and only through relentless individual 
sacrifice to the rigours of obedience would the visible church thrive.
The supreme intangibility of Lutheranism was thus set aside for the most 
palpable of all churches. Moreover, the almost schizophrenic tensions 
induced by parallel participation in two distinct polities, demanded of 
the Luteran, were initially relieved and then re-channelled by Calvin. It 
made no sense for Calvin to talk of the 'confusion' of two kingdoms, there 
being only one Kingdom, one Monarch. His mortal agents rise and fall in 
accordance with His will, and if it be the way of things that there are 
kings and citizens then it is the rinternal ' logic of this system3 not its 
raison d fetre3 that is liable to human analysis. Men, Christian or other-
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wise, are in need of government because God predisposed them towards 
civility.25 The ’integrity' of man, which is properly analogous to the 
order of the world, is reflected in the soul which, through its capacity 
to transcend nature, makes man central in the order of creation. There is 
an 'integrity of order', then, that arises from the mundane teleology of 
the world, superimposed on the mechanics of life as the divinely appointed 
'function' of nature, namely, human well-being. "The whole order of the 
world is arranged to serve the felicity of man," asserted Calvin, "Cert­
ainly, if anything in heaven or on earth opposes man, the integrity of 
order collapses."25 To say, with Luther, that "(if) all the world were 
composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, no prince, king, 
lord, sword or law would be needed"2  ^would be, according to Calvin, a 
denial of the essential humanity of the believer. Man is the noblest of 
God's creations precisely because he possesses ratio, religio and politia.
It is in the condition and development of the ordinem politicum that man 
demonstrates his rationality, its textures, uses and abuses. "Just as man 
was made for meditation upon the heavenly life," argues Calvin, "so it is 
certain that knowledge of it was impressed on the soul.
"And certainly man would be destitute of the principal use 
of his understanding if his felicity, the perfection of 
which is to be united with God, were hidden from him; whence 
the principal action of the soul is to aspire thither. There­
fore, the more anyone seeks to approach to God, the more he 
proves himself to be endowed with reason."28
The order of man, then, the imago Dei, is the product of God's gift 
of reason and its realization. Activity is the key here, the construction, 
maintenance and pursuit of human order as the exercise of God's gift; an 
aspect of religio just as important as oonscientia and the sensus divinita- 
tis. Each individual is party to the ordo politicus by virtue of his huma­
nity, which entails the further responsibility of protecting and enhancing 
the innate imago Dei as the determining of human agency in the world. That 
is to say, human integrity flows from the conscienceful nurturing of the 
imago Dei, being that which in man reflects the divine glory and, therefore, 
justice:
"As God in the beginning formed us according to his image, 
that he might excite our minds to a desire for virtue and 
to meditation upon the heavenly life, so, lest the great 
nobility of our race, which distinguishes us from brute
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beasts, be buried by our indolence, it behooves us to recog­
nize that we were provided with reason and understanding, so 
that by leading a holy and honest life, we may press on to 
the appointed end of a blessed immortality."29
The oomptexio oppositoriwn of the two extensions of order, the private 
and the public, manifests itself in the ordinatio Dei, the Word. However, 
the living reality of the Spirit and the Word is realized in human agency, 
in the affairs of men as servants imbued with the Will of their Master.
"God acts among the angels and demons just as among the inhabitants of 
earth"30: His order is complete in every respect; consequently, as parties
to this process of completion, or fulfilment, men conjoin that which is 
ultimately subjective and that which is unrepentently public. The realm of 
conscience is the realm of politics. Yet, since the Fall and the subse­
quent withdrawal of the Spirit from public participation in worldly affairs 
to remain 'hidden', working 'quietly' to avert utter chaos - man has sunk 
into confusion and inertia. Hence the necessity for righteous men to re­
establish human integrity through the reconstruction of ius civilis, just 
civility. As God ordained the Fall, so did he ordain man's struggle to 
transform the world. But, given that "man falls, therefore, the providence 
of God so ordaining; but he falls by his own fault"31, man must wrestle 
with free will and the "secret impulse of the Spirit". Free will is a 
loaded gift wanting of special attention lest its benefits turn to sorrows. 
Discipline and obedience to the essence of the Word: herein lies the
regeneration of integrity, in the confluxion of the visible and invisible 
churches.
The methodological principle underpinning Calvin's notion of the order 
of man as the reflection of divine glory is the singular authority of 
revelation: as the "essential Word" of God, as the sole expression of
ordinatio Dei. Whereas Luther began with solo fide and thence developed 
his soteriology, Calvin began with knowledge of the "infinite fulness of 
God" as the prerequisite to personal knowledge and matters of faith.32 
Luther could find no way of determining personal election and, weighed down 
by this insecurity, was incapable of escaping the struggle for faith and 
certitude. The need to be 'reborn', as it were, so utterly intangible and 
subjective, virtually overshadowed the pre-eminence of God - as though the 
believing were more profound than the belief. In sharp contrast, Calvin 
shied away from the deeply subjective, constantly focusing attention upon
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that which can be apprehended. The sincere profession of faith, coupled 
with a rigorously self-conscious Christian deportment and love of the 
sacraments, sufficed the Calvinist's thirst for certitude, though it did 
not grant him certainty. The glorification of God is man's telos, said 
Calvin, not the attainment of salvation. Be content with what one can 
know and do, and further these capacities with the utmost vigour. Salva­
tion as a means, then, not as an end, is Calvin's message: God chose man,
man did not choose Him, and each stage of salvation is an unfolding of 
this Choice. As ordinatio Dei the Scriptures serve as the "true touch­
stone whereby all doctrines must be tried"33 and, in collaboration with 
the Spirit uniquely tender an understanding of faith: "What God pronounces
through men, he seals on our hearts by His Spirit. Thus faith is built on 
no other foundation than God himself."34 In other words, with regard to 
faith and all matters exegetical, Scripture provides the sole source and 
'principle' for procedure, substantively and methodologically.
The question of theological methodology, or, rather, the bundle of 
problems concerning the principles and methods of a valid Christian theo­
logy served as one of the crucial turning points around which the Reforma­
tion coalesced and in terms of which Calvin, in particular, assailed the 
Church of Rome. Principal among Calvin's objections to the conduct of the 
papacy and its canonist bureaucracy was the conflation of Scripture and 
papal authority. The Scriptures, for Calvin, are superior to dogma, not 
only because they constitute God's message to man but because man is not 
entitled or empowered by God to fashion doctrine:
"God deprives man of the power of producing any new doctrine 
in order that He alone may be our master in spiritual teach­
ing, as He alone is true, and can neither lie nor deceive.
This reason applies not less to the whole Church than to every 
individual believer."35
The Church councils, however,
"at their own caprice, and in contempt of the word of God... 
coin doctrines to which they ... demand our assent, declaring 
that no man can be Christian unless he assent to all their 
dogmas, affirmative as well as negative, if not with explicit, 
at least with implicit faith, because it belongs to the Church 
to frame new articles of faith."35
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The root of dissension is clear: God's sovereignty entails the inviolabi­
lity of his unique doctrine as revealed in Scripture; consequently, any 
attempt at framing new doctrines directly calls into question God's perfect 
Mastery. "If faith depends upon the word of God alone," asks Calvin, "if 
it regards and reclines on it alone, what place is left for any word of 
man?"37 In doctrinal matters, it is God who is active, not man, and it is 
His 'movement' that is traced by conceptually impotent observers. Man is 
doctrinally passive, according to Calvin, and must seek to utilize Scrip­
ture as given, not to reshape it.
The problem immediately presented itself: if the doctrinal methodo­
logy of the Church floundered on a basic principle of procedure, what 
alternative method of procedure was available to theologians? The answer 
was simple and devastating. Since the Church could not serve as a well- 
spring of doctrinal authority, Scripture must stand alone as dogma. By 
presenting two initially compatible and interdependent realms of authority 
with regard to the Will of God as first conflicting and then mutually ex­
clusive perspectives, Calvin shattered the very unity in universality upon 
which the Church rested. What were hitherto considered consanguine were 
in future to be regarded as exact opposites, and the balance of the Christ­
ian world, determined as it was by the harmony of overlapping spheres of 
authority, had been upset. Indeed, the very basis of belief for many 
Christians - the Church as paternal guide - had been rendered problemati­
cal. Unable and unwilling to explore the maze of theology, most people 
then (as now) were content to be guided by the 'guardians' of the Word, as 
it were, and craved instruction in what to believe. Religious belief for 
many rests as much, if not more so, on the authority of the guardians as 
it does on personal commitment to the deity. Calvin's assault upon the 
authority of the Roman Church thus constituted an attack against the foun­
dations of religious belief for most people: they had been set adrift in
the vortex of uncertainty from which the Church had for so long protected 
them. Such tension could not be long sustained and a new refuge of autho­
rity had to be found, which, once more brought Calvin full circle to the 
unchallengeable supremacy and uniqueness of Scripture. The task, then, 
was to 'package' Scripture, so to speak, so as to make the authority of 
the Church superfluous. Moreover, the urgent task of all the reformers 
vas to establish a viable basis for civil harmony against the divisive 
energies released by the fissuring of an entrenched universal authority.
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The Church was not merely one force among many in Christendom: it Was
Christendom, and presided over the many forces of its various aspects. The 
pope may indulge in the struggles of the arena as one of a number of comba­
tants, but the Church as idea (if not in practice) stood above the conflict: 
it knitted the fabric of Europe after its own pattern and constituted, un­
til the Reformation, the embodiment of Europe itself. Denial of the Church 
was tantamount to rejection of the unity of Christendom and, consequently, 
the feudal order that transcended national boundaries. The real political 
problem raised by the Reformation, argues Garrett Mattingly,
"was how to re-create a sense of moral unity in a world whose 
sense of religious solidarity has been lost, how to find ethical 
bonds strong enough to bind those monstrous amoral leviathans, 
the sovereign states, now freed from the restraint of religious 
sanctions, how to subordinate to the general good the egotistic 
power-drives of organisms which, by the very law of their being, 
seek only safety and aggrandizement. The Reformation had raised 
this question but it had never solved it...."38
However, the question supposedly posited by the Reformation had been 
formulated long before Luther. Conjectured and considered solutions had 
been in the air throughout the so-called 'Dark Ages', more often than not 
extinguished in a u t o s - d a - , or occasionally, as with Ockham, Wyclif and 
Marsilius, quietly preserved and later refashioned. Leviathan was not a 
product of the Reformation; rather, its apologists sought to harness the 
winds of change to their advantage: to ground the post-feudal order in
'legitimate' doctrinal soil. Given the rush of ideas and events in the 
early sixteenth century, the need to supplant canon law and assert the 
singular sovereignty of the state in its domain necessarily entailed, more 
often than not simultaneously, the temporal legitimation of propitious 
spiritual heresies and ecclesiastical legitimation of secular heterodoxy. 
Res publica Christiana had succumbed to the Prince. Protestantism no more 
parented Leviathan than it gave rise to capitalism. It did, however, in 
certain parts of Europe and at critical times nourish both. Via this con­
sequential mid-wifery did it assist in making northern Europe "the forge of 
the human race"38 and a cockpit of dissension. At the eye of the storm lay 
one idea amongst many (novel in its application if not its advocacy) that 
constituted the calm kernel of surrounding turbulence: disciplined person­
al participation in a full Christian life. The Calvinist imperative of 
conscientious labour in public affairs negated passivity as a public vir­
tue. Obedience, then, not as compliant inertia but as self-controlled
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participation founded in knowledge and application of the Apostle's Creed. 
"A Man's whole Life is but a Conversion", wrote James Fraser,1+0 echoing 
Calvin's dictum that "Believers, while they make progress in the faith, 
continually aspire to fresh additions of the Spirit."41 Motion, activity, 
a quickening of the desire to know and articulate personal discoveries 
made of each Calvinist a potential rebel, dictator, preacher or guardian, 
but never a slave:
"They felt themselves to be living in an age of chaos and 
crime and sought to train conscience to be permanently on 
guard, permanently at war, against sin. Debate in Puritan 
congregations was never a free and easy exchange of ideas; 
the need for vigilance, the pressures of war were too great 
to allow for friendly disagreement. What lay behind the 
warfare of the saints? Two things above all: a fierce
antagonism to the traditional world and the prevailing pat­
tern of human relation and a keen and perhaps not unrealis­
tic anxiety about human wickedness and the dangers of social 
disorder. The saints attempted to fasten upon the knecks of 
all mankind the yoke of a new political discipline - imper­
sonal and ideological, not founded upon loyalty or affection, 
no more open to spontaneity than chaos and crime. This 
discipline was not dependent upon the authority of kings and 
lords or upon the obedience of childlike and trustful sub­
jects. Puritans sought to make it voluntary, like the con­
tract itself, the subject of individual and collective will­
fulness. But voluntary or not, its keynote was repression."42
Disciplined popular responsibility in public affairs, grounded in citizen­
ship rather than mere membership of society or traditional function, i.e. 
duty qua man, not duty qua serf, is the critical notion that sets Calvin's 
theological politics apart from Luther's. For the latter it was a Chris­
tian's duty to endure evil rather than to resist it, while for the former,
"we ought to take the same care of our brethren's bodies as 
we take of our own; for they are members of our body; and 
that, as no part of our body is touched by any feeling of 
pain which is not spread among all the rest, so we ought not 
to allow a brother to be affected by any evil, without being 
touched with compassion for him."43
Humanity entails human, i.e. 'species', responsibilities, according to 
Calvin, and nowhere is this burden more pronounced than in the preaching 
of doctrine:
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"for the Holy Spirit has so regulated the writings which 
he has dictated to the prophets and apostles that he de­
tracts nothing from the order instituted by himself; and 
the order is, that constant exhortation should be heard 
in the church from the mouth of pastors."1*4
As the organum of the Spirit the preacher 'interprets' Scripture, that is, 
simplifies it in plain language so as to "penetrate to the consciences of 
men, to make them see Christ crucified, and feel the shedding of his 
blood."45 Yet preaching must be effectively heard so "that believers 
should exercise themselves in good works".45 In other words, preaching 
as illocutionary activity is fulfilled in resultant perlocutionary acts: 
the 'sense' of preaching, as it were, lies in what men do in its wake. 
Through the preacher the Word becomes incarnate in civil action. This con­
trasts with the Catholic view that the priest presents the Word and what 
action one takes is dependent upon one's place in the order of things. For 
Calvin, all men are equal in that the Word makes uniform3 direct and imme­
diate demands upon them. Once more, activity fulfils the Word, as though 
good works necessarily flow from the acceptance of a divinely ordained 
practical syllogism. Without pursuing an Aristotelian analogy (Calvin was 
not much taken with Aristotle) it may be said that Calvin took good exege- 
tics to be the clear explication of the 'logic' of Scripture, insofar as 
this entails sorting out exactly what is required of the believer in lead­
ing a good, i.e. 'holy', life. This does not mean that men must thereby 
subject the Word to their critical scrutiny, but, rather, that men must 
assess "whether it is His word that is set before them, or ... human in­
ventions."47 Discernment, then, precedes participation. How else could 
discipline serve as a bridle to restrain and a spur to arouse lest it be 
derived from "the Spirit of Wisdom?"48 The argument is necessarily symmet­
rical because each premise is prefaced by an enthymeme acknowledging a 
single Will as the font and end of all things. Providence renders history 
pleonastic as the unfolding arithmetic of an established equation. The 
syllogism, so to speak, lies embedded in Scripture, awaiting practical 
action to round it out; yet before this can take place each premise must be 
articulated and publicized. Participation thus entails "a twofold examina­
tion of doctrine, private and public"48: the private involving matters of 
personal faith, the public performances required by faith.
The keystone underpinning participation, from the Calvinist perspec-
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tive, is God's authorship of the universe. Divine will, manifest in crea­
tion ex nihilo, becomes authority as revealed in the Word. Knowledge of 
God's authorship, then, unlocks in part the mysteries of divine authority 
and, by entailment (explicitly in revelation and implicitly in the doctrine 
of imago Dei) the bounds of human 'authority'. The Word intimates the 
Spirit to man: it instructs man in the knowledge of God and the knowledge
of himself. In other words, it makes the receptive audience party to the 
divine scheme of things and, therefore, an instrument of order. Reitera­
ting the Petrarchan theme of docta pietas (learned piety) long advocated by 
those within the Humanist tradition of Bude, Nicolas of Cusa and Erasmus, 
Calvin emphasised scholarship as the counter to Catholicism's doctrine of 
'implicit faith' (the possibility of faith without knowledge). Knowledge 
would instil piety, and this knowledge was to be found in the Scriptures 
via careful reading and devout interpretation. Though hardly an admirer of 
Robert Gaguin, Calvin no doubt approved of the former's assault on the 
medieval exegetes and their elegant obscurantism. "We should actively re­
joice in the felicity of this age," chanted Gaguin, "in which, although 
many other things have perished, many men of genius are nevertheless in­
cited, like Prometheus, to seize the splendid torch of wisdom from the 
heavens."50 'Seizure', unthinkable; 'utilization', certainly. Calvin's 
pedagogy was Humanist in its passion but of dogmatic orientation. Circum­
spect analogies never let one forget that Calvin sought a distillation of 
Christian teachings, not a more ornate classical metaphor. Order rooted in 
divine authority is the Calvinist obsession - a fixation shared by all the 
Humanists - yet it is a totality for Calvin, alien to the latent pluralism 
of Petrarch and the scandalous libertarianism of Pico della Mirandola. Man 
is not free to move among all possibilities, to shape himself as he pleases, 
thundered Calvin, yet man can be holy in his worldly calling. A profound 
shift in emphasis and utter rejection of breezy joie de viwe but, ironi­
cally, a similar practical goal: a world of Godly order achieved through
personal reflection upon the nature of things and a faith steeped in know­
ledge .51
"Faith consists not in ignorance," declared Calvin, "but in knowled­
ge."52 The reciprocity of Word and Spirit discerned in revelation makes 
possible sober faith, as distinct from "visions or oracles in the clouds"53 
We must be careful, however, not to confuse 'knowledge' with 'reason' in 
Calvin's lexicon. Reason is subject to the Word and may be invoked when
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consonant with revelation. Knowledge is faith:54 faith in Christ as the 
mediator between God and man as revealed in Gospel. What we can ’know', 
then, is limited to God's will with regard to man. One 'knows' the Word by 
reading it, believing it and, finally, acting upon it.55 "He who knows how 
to use the Scriptures properly, is in want of nothing for salvation, or for 
a holy life."56 Though this summation appears paradoxical in the light of 
Calvin's providential doctrine, it need not be regarded as enigmatic when 
stood against his reflection on the avoidance of 'disgrace': "I think we
are in no danger, if we simply maintain what the Scripture delivers."57 
That is to say, within the limits of what we do 'know' there is only one 
way to approach grace. God's intentions outside the bounds of knowledge 
necessarily determine what will be, but that is beyond our faith. Given 
what we know, the pursuit of God's order is the one avenue to grace avail­
able to us: it falls within the scope of revealed authority and delegated
right (the righteousness with which each man capitalizes on his knowledge). 
Not so much 'cognition', then, but 'persuasion' as the hallmark of know­
ledge, since one 'knows' Scripture but cannot rationally proceed into it, 
as it were, and confront its historical content. We are persuaded by the 
veracity of God, not by a demonstration of reason: "The knowledge of
faith", wrote Calvin, "consists more in certainty than in comprehension."58 
The entire argument seemingly devolves into an intricate redundancy focused 
upon the initial premise of divine omnipotence. From this first step we 
move to the second premise of divine revelation as the singular public ex­
pression of God's will, and then a third premise outlining God's demand for 
His glorification in the restoration of worldly order. The conclusion 
drawn from the above is encapsulated in the deceptively simple demand that 
each man should be made to live a fully Christian life. Yet, a fully 
Christian life is the glorification of God as set forth in the Word of the 
Creator. Because faith is certain it is called knowledge by Calvin; and it 
is certain because it derives from the font of all knowledge. The absolute 
authority of Scripture leaves no room for doubt. And, as we shall see, 
with the fulfilment of the covenant Calvin's ecclesiological circle is com­
plete .
The 'church' for Calvin is the 'history' of God's reign among men, not 
to be identified with 'Romanism' or exclusively conceived of as a 'visible' 
institution. It is, in other words, an ecclesiae collectione, a gathering 
together of "people to call upon God."59 The need for this coming together59
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stemmed from the Fall and the precarious position in which man's rebellion 
placed God's order. As the centre-piece of mundane order, man embodies the 
divinely-inspired possibility of righteousness: the voluntary submission
of free will to justice. Yet the Fall placed all terrestrial order in jeo­
pardy; it disturbed the balance of creation and gave rise to what lay nas­
cent in the providential scheme: the restoration of human dignity through
the perpetual resurrection of faith. In this continuity of belief from 
generation to generation lies the thread of the church: "As all things
were created for the sake of man, so all men were destined to be of use to 
the church."60 Beginning with the Abrahamic covenant the church grew from 
the general election of the people of Israel as a nation separated from 
other nations: a people profoundly aware of their inviolable communion
with God.61 In this reception of His seed into His faith by way of general 
election God made possible the future salvation of all mankind. The cove­
nant brought the church into being3 and3 in so doing3 made public the 
principles of order underpinning human relations and the mutual responsi­
bilities weighing upon God and man. The tenuous supremacy of harmony over 
division, order over chaos, was thus codified in deontic terms as a bond of 
obligations binding individuals and communities to the ordinatio Dei. The 
Fall and subsequent rebellions notwithstanding, the covenant remains etern­
al and inviolable as the public marriage of ordinatio and ordo; for the 
covenant flows from the mercy of God, argued Calvin, not from human dig­
nity. 6 2
"When order was trodden under foot, the covenant was made 
void. Why indeed was the covenant continued, and what was 
its design, if not that all things should aptly and right­
ly be joined together among themselves? Thus in the church, 
we see that God is concerned for order...."63
The covenantical inheritance of Israel, the progeny of the patriarch 
Abraham,64 served as a seed within a matrix. The promise of universal 
salvation must therefore focus upon the fruit of the matrix as the guide to 
redemption. The advent of Christ, according to Calvin, and, indeed, the 
vast majority of Christian theologians, widened the scope of general elec­
tion to embrace all nations and make salvation available, if so ordained, 
to a mankind now grafted, so to speak, onto genus Abrahae. Yet, within the 
context of this general election there is a more restricted degree of elec­
tion arising from God's taking "to himself out of that multitude those whom
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he wished: and these are the sons of promise, these are the remnants of 
gratuitous favour."65 Individuals are granted salvation (though the offer 
is given in 'secret', as it were) by way of God determining in himself what 
he wishes (or wished) to become of each man. Awareness of this particular 
election comes by way of a 'call' into the covenantal community - presum­
ably a moment of perspicuous introspection - which becomes an 'effectual* 
calling when subjective accommodation with the Spirit realizes itself as an 
'objective' condition manifest in regenerative activity, i.e. continuous 
labour on behalf of order and the illumination of the Spirit. Faith does 
not underpin election, since it arises from God's will, but faith makes 
possible an intimation of election through its facilitation of the call, 
should it be there for any individual. The knowledge embedded in faith, 
or, rather, constitutive of faith, is ultimately intuitive and flows from 
total spontaneous immersion in the Word as God's glorification and the 
nourishment of order.
"Thus God's covenant is established with us, because we 
have been once reconciled by the death of Christ; and at 
the same time the effect of the Holy Spirit is added, be­
cause God inscribes the law upon our hearts, and thus his 
covenant is not engraved on stones, but in hearts of flesh."66
Erich Voegelin (in The New Science of Politics) 67 characterizes 
Calvin's work as "the first deliberately created Gnostic koran," the 
borrowed term 'koran' here denoting a work that serves "the double purpose 
of a guide to the right reading of Scripture and of an authentic formula-
68tion of truth that... (makes) recourse to earlier literature unnecessary". 
"A man who can write such a koran", writes Voegelin,
"a man who can break with the intellectual tradition of man­
kind because he lives in the faith that a new truth and a 
new world begin with him, must be in a peculiar pneumopatho- 
logical (sic) state.69 Hooker, who was supremely conscious 
of tradition, had a fine sensitiveness for this twist of 
mind. In his cautiously subdued characterization of Calvin 
he opened with the sober statement: 'His bringing up was in
the study of civil law': he then built up with some malice:
'Divine knowledge he gathered, not by hearing or reading so 
much, as by teaching others'; and he concluded on the deva­
stating sentence: 'For, though thousands were debtors to him,
as touching knowledge in that kind; yet he (was debtor) to 
none but only to God, the author of the most blessed fountain, 
the Book of Life, and of the admirable dexterity of wit."76
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While Calvin's work may be adequately described as 'koranic' in part - 
he sought to give instruction in the Word but not to the exclusion of all 
previous wisdom and certainly not in competition with the early Christian 
church - its location in the mainstream of 'revolutionary* Gnosticism rep­
resents a critical misplacement of the work in to to and a serious miscon­
ception of Calvin's christology. The trinitarian eschatology of Joachim of 
Flora is nowhere to be found in Calvin's work. History, for Calvin, is the 
product of the ordinatio Dei and grows organically, as it were, out of the 
order of creation. The Spirit, which proceeds from the Father and the Son, 
is "spread abroad through all parts of the world" and "preserves that which 
he formed out of nothing"71, yet the Spirit operates within the context of 
"those things which (God) has decreed in his counsel."72 The trinity is 
not superimposed on history, rather it underlies history, firstly, in God 
as the Creator, secondly, in the Son as the Redeemer, and, thirdly, in the 
Spirit as that which "sustains, quickens and vivifies all things in heaven 
and on earth."73 The Calvinist enterprise stood in direct opposition to 
Joachite anthropopatheia, militating against the projection of human pas­
sions and modes of life onto the deity and then back into worldly affairs 
under a mystical mantle. Calvin regarded all such projection and reflexi- 
vity as a reflection of man's linguistic impoverishment and the necessity 
of accommodating divine intention, the limitations of language and lowly 
human understanding.74 Consequently, any attempt to 'mythologise' God, 
particularly in response to millenarian aspirations, met with a distinctly 
Augustinian disdain. 'Christ in his church' was as powerful an image for 
Calvin as it was for Augustine; the difference between the two lay in the 
former's reconstruction, rather redefinition of the church as the human 
organism of order organically related to its participants, not, as August­
ine arguably would have it, the church as but a skeleton to provide niches 
for the faithful. The Joachite pursuit of symbols derived from an esoteric 
knowledge remained alien to a system founded on eminently communicable 
notions rooted in everyman's capacity to apprehend his 'essential' being. 
The 'saints' were not prophets or leaders in the messianic sense; nor was 
their understanding of the Word necessarily peculiar to themselves. More­
over, they were deemed capable by their fellow communicants properly to 
interpret the Spirit within the Word and translate its intentions into 
rules of behaviour. Indeed, the very structure of the Institutes sprang 
from a tacit rejection of gnosis in favour of pistis, a faith identified 
with epist&me. "True and substantial wisdom principally consists of two
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parts", wrote Calvin, "the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of our­
selves."75 In answering the problems posed by this double-faceted know­
ledge Calvin identified the boundaries of divinely ordained realms of 
authority, theologically and temporally. No more could be said, as it 
were, though it could be stated more clearly; and it was to the task of 
clarification that Calvin principally addressed himself. Pursuant to this 
labour was the mission or propagating the Word and in so doing furthering 
the efficaceous restoration of order in the world.
Despite a similar emphasis upon salvation, the Gnostics and Calvinists 
differed in virtually every other respect. One is closer to the mark in 
depicting Calvin and his followers as 'Kerygmatics1, people devoted to the 
proclamation of that which is supposedly evidential rather than mystic 
dualists offering an otherwise hidden glimpse of a reality existent on two 
planes, those of the world and God, with man tentatively poised between the 
two as the product of both. The negative God of the Gnostics, completely 
removed from the natural order, generating no natural law, supreme yet 
transmundane, touching man only at the point of salvation is more the stuff 
of a Puritan incubus than a Calvinist sermon.
Similarly, one must reject Karl Jaspers' musings on the 'Protestant'
world view as Gnostic dramaticism. "History was a sequence of acts of
\human pride and obduracy", wrote Jaspers,
"In the world there could be no guidance other than faith - 
a faith detached from the world, which allowed man a secular 
existence in the world but put his proper life elsewhere.
Reason itself was corrupt, and the only truth lay in world­
less isolation or in common prayer...."75
Nowhere can be found a better example of the confusion generated by con­
flating Luther and Calvin and calling the product 'Protestantism'. For all 
their similarities they remained disparate thinkers and practitioners, 
Luther always verging on the Gnostic, indeed, Manichean brink of a temporal 
dualism perhaps ultimately resolvable in Armaggedon; while Calvin systema­
tically wove a monistic cosmogony, relentlessly tying together seemingly 
incompatible threads certain of the consistency and strength of the under­
lying pattern. As Walzer put it, in practical terms "(the) Lutheran saint, 
in his pursuit of the invisible kingdom of heaven, turned away from poli-
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tics and left the kingdom of earth, as Luther himself wrote, 'to anyone who 
wants to take it.' Calvin was driven by his worldly and organizational 
commitments to 'take' the earthly kingdom, and to transform it."77
Calvin's deity informs the universe, His creation, at each stage and 
in each aspect of its being. Man, as the centrepiece of this universe is 
no more free to relinquish his temporal responsibilities than God is free 
to be anything less than omnipotent and omnicausative (even in restraint). 
The tension pervading man's condition springs from the dichotomous circum­
stances of his existence: as God's creation and effigy. As a most marvel­
lous self-directing creature man must struggle with those Faustian impulses 
towards complete autonomy and self-gratification; while in humble awareness 
of the divine image resident within him man senses a personal involvement 
in the natural-supernatural nexus. To 'know thyself', then, is at once to 
know one's 'self' and God, and thereby reconcile divergent aspects of human 
integrity in a rapidly enlarging and dislocating post-Fail world, a world 
always threatening to devour the 'image' yet forever offering salvation.
The conditions of salvation, however, demand complete submission to the 
authority of creation, as authorship and legislature, further demanding a 
knowledge of the divine 'common law', as it were, and its enforcement. The 
esoteric, universal 'knowledge' of the Gnostics thus evaporates in Calvin's 
hands, wherein knowledge becomes, to all intents and purposes, an intelli­
gent empirical familiarity with and acceptance of the Word, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, an honest assessment and disciplining of one's 
self. The combination of 'faith', 'knowledge', 'authority', 'reason' and 
'control' is therefore quite simple for Calvin, requiring no obscure formu­
lations or hidden information. How, indeed, could there be further rele­
vant information hidden from man's gaze lest we consider the Word to be in­
complete, or this slice of time a moment in our 'becoming', so to speak, 
dependent upon some future revelation in order to secure our 'being'.
Given Calvin's refusal to consider the former, the latter supposition is 
simply taken as possible (the very conception of certainty is rendered 
problematic because what is certain is dependent upon the contingency of 
God's will), and construed, if only by implication, as a further reason for 
placing one's faith in God qua God and not God qua anything else, however 
characterized, as 'Him', 'Creator', 'Love', 'Authority'. In the end there 
is no grand dynamism of opposing and reciprocating wills, but only one Will 
that creates, separates, connects and redeems in a single world. It
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f a s h io n e d  i n  i t s  own image t h a t  w hich  i s  a t  once m ost d i s t a n t  from and most 
l i k e  i t s e l f ,  g e n e r a t i n g  a c y c le  o f  e x i s t e n c e  u n iq u e ly  c a p a b le  o f  o r g a n i s i n g  
e x p e r i e n c e  and p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  moments o f  s e l f - a w a k e n i n g .  And i n  th e  
c l e a r e s t  moments o f  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  i t  i s  u n d e r s to o d  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be tw een  c r e a t o r  and c r e a t u r e  i s  n o t  c o e r c iv e  b u t  f r e e .  P e rh ap s  t h i s ,  above 
a l l  e l s e  i n  C a lv in  i s  t h e . h a r d e s t  a p p re h e n s io n  t o  a r t i c u l a t e ,  y e t  once 
a c c e p t e d  a l l  e l s e  f low s  w i t h o u t  q u e s t i o n .  "One f o o t  he c e n t e r d ,  and th e  
o t h e r  t u r n e d " ,  w ro te  M i l to n ,  "Round th ro u g h  t h e  v a s t  p r o f u n d i t i e  o b s c u r e . .
II
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APPENDIX ONE
Notes
1. quoted by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Glencoe, 1971, p.232, f.n. 64, ch.IV
2. It is interesting to consider Descartes on this point: there are
no final causes in physics because we do not know the aims of God.
3. if only in the sense of being a prime mover admitting of no secon­
dary causes.
4. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialektik, in Sammtliche Werke, ed.
L. Jonas, Berlin, 1839, Div.III, Vol.IV, Pt.II, Appendix A, p.328. 
(trans. G. Spiegler)
"Immanence... presupposes transcendence as a category of dif­
ferentiation in the sense that individuality and mutuality are 
simultaneously embraced, and God and man represent distinct though 
related categories." B. E. Meland, Faith and Culture, New York,
1953, p.58
5. Dialektik, Op Cit, p.328
6. "Duns had largely followed Avicenna in his concepts of univocal 
being and his proofs of God. It was when he came to examine God's 
relation to what was outside Him that he broke off sharply. Like 
Henry of Ghent, Duns refused to see any meeting-point between God 
as necessary being and the contingent being of His creatures, ex­
cept through God's will. Where Avicenna had made possible being 
necessary, since God Himself acted necessarily, Duns and Henry of 
Ghent made it radically contingent, lacking in itself any raison 
d'etre. This conviction that the contingent could not lead back to 
the necessary had... led Duns to reject any but abstract notions 
for proof of God. It led him, equally, to make all knowledge of 
God stop this side of His will. Beyond expressing God's will to 
create, this world could offer no explanation of His ways; it cer­
tainly could not specify the way in which God worked. Consequently, 
there is a discontinuity between the divine and the created which is 
absent from the much more precise order of St. Thomas. Duns in no 
way subscribed to the latter's specification of the relation between 
first and second cause to describe God and His creatures."
Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham, Ringwood,
Victoria, 1970, pp 266-267
7. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Edinburgh, 1958, Vol.3, p.148
8. Ibid., p.133
9. Rudolph Bultmann, History and Eschatology: the Presence of Eternity,
New York, 1962, pp 6-7
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10. Though a sentimental romantic in the mould of Racine, Paul Valery 
produced the occasional aphorism that would have done Calvin proud* 
However, 'due respect' for Calvin's memory prevents one omitting men­
tion of Bismarck's earlier and much plagiarized definition of politics 
as "the doctrine of the possible". While a nominal Lutheran of deist 
conviction and nuptially politic adherence to Pietism, Count Otto, one 
might say, had a natural Calvinist sensibility unknown in the author 
of 'Pomegrantes'.
11. Adopting what we would now regard as a Hobbesian position on
natural man, Calvin saw post-Fail humanity as a disorganized mass of 
isolated, fearful beasts (see Sermons upon the Fifth Book of Moses, 
London, 1574, sermon 36). Only complete obedience to God can restore 
the natural order of things; indeed, the natural order itself being 
nothing other than a reflection of God's will, all things are merely 
divinely ordained facts, from the wind and waves to the state. Conse­
quently, it is God who creates and destroys princes: the Fall did not 
generate political man, God did. And since God's will is beyond 
human calculation, Calvin was forced to justify even the most vicious 
despot by protesting to his fellows "yet would God honour him, he 
knoweth why: therefore must I be content to be subject". (Sermons
on the Epistles of St. Paul to Timothy and Titus, London, 1579, sermon 
46, on Timothy). Legitimacy did not concern Calvin since it was 
naturally granted to the strong. Obedience intrigued him, though it 
is no more problematical than legitimacy, springing as it does entire­
ly from forcefulness: "So long as he will have them to reign... kings
are armed with authority from God, in that they are able... to retain 
under their hand and at their appointment multitudes of men..." 
(Commentaries Upon the Prophet Daniel, London, 1570); "It belongeth 
not to us to be inquisitive by what right and title a prince reigneth 
... and whether he have it by good and lawful inheritance..."
(Timothy and Titus, sermon 46, on Timothy); "To us it ought to 
suffice that they do rule. For they have not ascended into this 
estate by their own strength, but they are placed by the hand of God."
(A Commentary upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, Lon don,
1583.)
Commenting on Jeremiah's call for Jerusalem's surrender to the 
Chaldeans, Calvin drew the so-called 'Hobbesian' conclusion that 
sovereignty commands obedience only insofar as it can enforce obed­
ience: "Though ... the people had pledged to the end their faith to
the king, yet as God had now delivered the city to the Chaldeans, the 
obligation of the oath ceased; for when governments are changed, what­
ever the subjects had promised is no longer binding... for it is not 
in the power of the people to set up princes, because it belongs to 
God to change governments as he please." (Commentaries on the Book 
of the Prophet Jeremiah, Edinburgh, 1850.)
All quotations are from chapter two of Michael Walzer's excellent 
study on the political import of Calvinist doctrine, The Revolution 
of the Saints: a study in the origins of radical politics, New York,
1974.
12. Works of Martin Luther, ed. C. M. Jacobs, Philadelphia, 1915-32,
Vol.4, p.32, quoted by Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity
and Innovation in Western Political Thought, Boston, I960, p.158
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13. "The princes of this world are gods, the common people are Satan, 
through whom God sometimes does what at other times he does directly 
through Satan, that is, makes rebellion as a punishment for the 
people's sins.
"I would rather suffer a prince doing wrong than a people doing 
right."
Luther, quoted by Preserved Smith, The Age of the Reformation, New 
York, 1920, p.594
14. "On Good Works", trans. W. A. Lambert, Weimar, 1888, Vol.6, p.250
15. "Preface to Latin Writings", in John Dillenberger, ed., Martin Luther; 
Selections from His Writings, New York, 1961, p.408
16. St. Anselm, Proslogion, trans. M. J. Charlesworth, Oxford, 1965, I
17. The law of God is identified, by Luther, with the commandments and
is largely Old Testamental. Of itself it is not a means to salvation, 
since it makes no provision for forgiveness: it commands and pre­
scribes punishments for breaches of the law. The Gospel, however, 
according to Luther, opens the way to salvation; for in it lies 
Christ's message of free forgiveness. In other words, the Gospel 
reveals the Holy Spirit which, through its influence upon individual 
conscience, serves as the agency of divine grace.
18. "Preface to Latin Writings", Dillenberger, Op Cit, pp 75-76
19. See K. B. McFarlane, John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English 
Nonconformity, London, 1952.
20. Roland Bainton, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, Boston,
1956, pp 52-53
21. J. N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414-1625,
New York, 1960, p.77
22. Immediate political considerations aside, the divine basis of 
secular authority so enthusiastically supported by Luther as part 
of God's order arose, somewhat ironically, out of Luther's complete 
rejection of Augustinian ovdo as an immanent natural force cementing 
the universe. Despite Augustine's rejection of politics as a self- 
sustaining, necessarily auto-regulative facet of social life, he 
carefully placed the political order within the broader divine scheme 
of things. Given God's omnipotence, the mere existence of the politi­
cal order necessitates some good Reason, other than sheer malevolence, 
for the fact of evil. Within the concordia of the universe all crea­
tion plays a part in the ineluctable movement towards an eventual 
harmonious end. Luther, however, "reduced ovdo from an immanent to
a formal principle without real viability", writes Sheldon Wolin, 
prefacing a quotation from Luther:
"Order is an outward thing. Be it as good as it may, 
it can fall into misuse. Then it is no longer order but 
disorder. So no order has any intrinsic worth of its own, 
as hitherto Popish Order has been though to have. But all
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order has its life, worth, strength, and virtue 
in right use; else it is worthless and fit for 
nothing."
"In abandoning the concept of ordo as the sustaining principle 
within a larger pattern of meaning, Luther deprived the political 
order of the moral sustenance flowing from this more comprehensive 
whole. The lack of integration between the political order and the 
divine order produced a marked tension within Luther's conception 
of government. The political order appeared as a distinctly fragile 
achievement, precarious, unstable, and prone to upset. At the same 
time, the vulnerability of this order created the need for a power­
ful, repressive authority. In other words, it was not the political 
order itself that was sustained by a divine principle; it was the 
secular power upholding order that was divinely derived. It was no 
idle boast of Luther's to assert that he had praised temporal govern­
ment more highly than anyone since Augustine. Such praise was neces­
sary once the political order had been extracted from its cosmic con­
text. The divine element in political authority was inevitably 
transformed from a sustaining principle into a repressive, coercive 
one.
"Luther's attachment to temporal authority, then, was not the 
product of a particular stage in his development but was rooted in 
the conviction that the fallen world of man was fundamentally order­
less ."
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, Op Cit, pp 157-158
23. Goethe, Faust, trans. P. Wayne, Ringwood, Victoria, 1975, Vol.I, p .29
24. "It is true that Christians so far as they are concerned are sub­
ject to neither law nor sword and need neither: but first take heed
and fill the world with real Christians before ruling it in a Chris­
tian and evangelical manner. This you will never accomplish: for
the world and the masses are and always will be unchristian, although 
they are all baptized and are nominally Christian.... Therefore it is 
out of the question that there should be a common Christian government 
over the whole world, nay, even over one land or company of people 
since the wicked always outnumber the good. Hence a man who would 
venture to govern an entire country or world with the gospel would be 
like a shepherd who should place in one fold, wolves, lions, eagles 
and sheep together and say "Help yourselves, and be good and peaceful 
among yourselves; the fold is open: there is plenty of food: have
no fear of dogs and clubs." The sheep indeed would keep the peace 
and would allow themselves to be fed and governed in peace - but they 
would not live long! Nor would any beast keep from molesting another" 
(Works of Martin Luther, ed. Jacobs, Op Cit, Vol.3, p.237) Compare 
with Calvin: "(The) external administration of the word is necessary
if we wish to be disciples.... In vain will they boast of secret 
revelations, for the Spirit does not teach any but those who submit 
to the ministry of the church, and consequently, they are disciples 
of the devil and not of God, who reject the order which he has appoin­
ted." (Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. G. Baum,
E. Cunitz, E. Reuss, Berlin., 1863-1900, trans. T.H.L. Parker, Edin­
burgh, 1959 - , "Commentary on Isaiah", 54. 13, CO.37, p.276)
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25. "...God has provided the soul of man with a mind by which he
might distinguish good from evil, just from unjust, and that, by 
the guiding light of reason he might see what ought to be followed 
and what ought to be avoided.... To this he added the will, in the 
possession of which is choice. By these excellent gifts he distin­
guished the first condition of man, so that reason, understanding, 
wisdom and judgment, might suffice not only for the government of 
earthly life, but also might transcend even to God and eternal 
felicity. Then he added choice, which directs the appetite and 
controls all organic movements: and thus will should agree alto­
gether with the government of reason. In this integrity man was 
empowered with free will, by which, if he wished, he could have 
obtained eternal life." (Institutes of the Christian Religion, in 
Ioannis Calvini opera selecta, ed. P. Barth and G. Niesel, Munich, 
1926-36, trans. F. L. Battles, Philadelphia, 1960, Book I, chapter 
xv, section 8)
26. "Commentary on the Psalms", 8» 6, CO.31, p.94
27. Works of Martin Luther, ed. Jacobs, Op Cit, Vol.3, p.234
28. Institutes, I, xv, 6. "It remains nevertheless that some seed of 
political order is universally sown. And this is sufficient proof, 
that in the constitution of this life, no man is destitute of the 
light of reason." Institutes, II, ii, 13
29. Ibid., II, i, 1
30. "Commentary on Daniel", 4*35, CO.XL, p.689
31. Institutes, III, xxxii, 8
32. "It is plain that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of 
himself, without having first contemplated the divine character, 
and then descended to the consideration of his own." Ibid., I, i, 2
33. "Commentary, I John", 4*1, CO.LV, p.347
34. "Commentary on Genesis", 50*24, CO.XXIII, p.622
35. Institutes, IV, viii, 19
36. Ibid., IV, viii, 19
37. Ibid., IV, iii, 9
38. G. Mattingly, ed., J. N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to 
Grotius: 1414-1625, Seven Studies, New York, 1970, p.xxii
39. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, New York, 1949, p.268
40. Memoirs of the Life of the very Reverend Mr, James Fraser of Brea, 
Minister of the Gospel at Culross...., Edinburgh, 1738, p.91, 
quoted by O. C. Watkins, The Puritan Experience: Studies in Spiritual 
Autobiography, New York, 1972, p.40
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41. "Commentary on John", 7*38, CO.XLVII, p.181
42. Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, Op Cit, p.302
43. Institutes, IV, xvii, 38
44.
45.
46.
"Commentary on Hebrews", 13*22, CO LV, p.198 
"Commentary on Galations", 3*1 CO L, pp 202-203 
"Commentary on Titus", 3*8, CO LII, p.433
47. "Commentary, I Corinthians", 14*29, CO XLIX, p.529
48. "...unless the Spirit of Wisdom is present, to have God's word in 
our hands will avail little or nothing, for its meaning will not 
appear to us.... That we may be fit judges, we must necessarily 
be guided by the Spirit of discernment.... But the Spirit will 
only so guide us to a right discrimination, when we render all our. 
thoughts subject to God's word." "Commentary, I John", 4*1, CO LV, 
pp 347-348
49. Ibid., p.348
50. quoted by E. F. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, London, 1958, 
p.94
51. "For, till men are sensible that they owe everything to God (an 
awareness dependent on both the knowledge of self and of God), that 
they are supported by his paternal care, that he is the Author of 
all the blessings they enjoy, and that nothing should be sought 
independently of him, they will never voluntarily submit to his 
authority." Institutes, I, ii, 1
52. Ibid., III, ii, 2
53. "Commentary on John", 15*27, CO XLVII, p.354
54. "For the apprehension of faith is not confined to our knowing that 
there is a God, but chiefly consists in our understanding what is his 
disposition towards us. For it is not of so much importance to us to 
know what he is in himself, as what he is willing to be to us. We 
find, therefore, that faith is a knowledge of the will of God respec­
ting us, received from his word. And the foundation of this is a 
previous persuasion of the divine veracity; any doubt of which being 
entertained in the mind, the authority of the word will be dubious 
and weak, or rather it will be of no authority at all. Nor is it 
sufficient to believe that the veracity of God is incapable of decep­
tion or falsehood, unless you also admit, as beyond all doubt, that 
whatever proceeds from him is sacred and inviolable truth." 
Institutes, III, ii, 6
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souls." The Practical Writings of the English puritans, Lond. 1951. 
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them. This was the meaning of Luther's peca fortiter: the hope which 
in this world sustains our spirit amidst unavoidable sin lay solely 
in faith in redemption outside the world. The world was not an
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altogether hostile anti-principle; but in its present state of 
corruption due to the fall it scarcely differed in essence from 
that old Gnostic concept." Ibid.
77. The Revolution of the Saints, Op Cit, p.26
APPENDIX TWO
The decline of authoritative Scripture as the sole source of guidance 
and inspiration in theology reflected more than the diminished influence of 
orthodox Calvinism; it heralded, in the late seventeenth and early eight­
eenth centuries, the emergence of a new Protestant methodology founded upon 
'reason' rather than external authority as the formal principle of proce­
dure in theological activity. In a very important sense, faith in reason's 
ability to determine and appropriate truth for itself had deposed faith in 
an external authority to sanction the truth. As it was to be with all 
avenues of human endeavour, theology was smitten by the persuasively simple 
metaphor of 'science', at first in the mould of Cartesian rationalism and 
later in the fusion of the empirical and the rational that characterized 
Kant's 'criticism'. On the one hand there was a fascination with the order 
of nature, its patterns and principles; while, on the other there was a 
determined, if not always profound belief in the capacity of rationality to 
evoke truth through introspection. Though distinct interests, when merged 
these two lines of thought constituted the thread of rationalism (properly 
so called) as epitomized in Spinoza's summation: the order of nature is
the order of thought.
Human understanding, according to the common tenets of rationalism, is 
amenable to thoroughgoing analysis and elucidation along logical, if not 
mathematical, parameters in a similar fashion to the later Newtonian 
physics. Indeed, the Newtonian model, albeit fashioned after the seminal 
rationalists had developed their theories, furnished the prime example of 
rationalist aspirations with its enmeshing of explanation and logically 
necessary laws in a universal, internally coherent mathematical system.
Not that reason lay outside or was merely incidental to the philosophy/ 
theology of the Middle Ages: if nothing else, the works of Aquinas repre­
sent a sustained attempt to integrate divine revelation and reason. Nor 
should the early Reformers be seen as trenchant anti-rationalists focussing 
all attention upon Christ. The Stoic emphasis upon natural religion in­
fluenced Calvin as deeply as did the evangelism of St. Paul. Yet it is 
clear that 'reason' as it was understood by the Scholastics meant something 
other, or at least, performed a different role, in the rationalism of 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Aquinas, for example, regarded reason as
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the wherewithal to abstract from the existence of contingent being the 
necessity of its dependence upon God. Reason is a type of intellectual 
activity by which one moves discursively between facts. The fact of con­
tingency is not apprehended a priori, but is grasped a posteriori through 
the senses. Reason does not contribute from its own store, as it were, 
the material out of which the demonstration of the existence of God and 
the understanding of His salvation are to be fashioned. One begins with 
sensation as the font of all knowledge and then proceeds, in a cumulative 
fashion (asoutlined by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics) to build 
sensation upon sensation and integrate successive data in unified memories 
which constitute sense experience. This set of experiences generates, by 
way of discrimination and induction, a primitive understanding out of which 
grows reasoning: the apprehension of connections and reduction to basic
principles.
Now, in the new ('rationalist') approach reason was not demonstrating 
so much from the world, as from reason itself. The rationalists sought 
not to verify judgements by reference to experience in a reductive fashion, 
but, rather, to reveal the power of a priori reason to embrace truths about 
the world. Descartes' cogito implicitly assumes that the possibility of 
thought provides thinkers with a datum over and above the content of the 
thoughts themselves.
The Cartesian rupturing of monism set reason apart from the physical 
world in such a way that only God may reconcile the mental and the corpo­
real. From this approach there follows a new methodological conception.
We know of God as a consequence of reason reflecting upon itself (that is 
to say, from reason's reflection upon its own thinking in the Cartesian 
sense, the fact that it thinks) rather than as an entailment of what is 
thought about in thinking (i.e., the world as we perceive it). In this 
way, as Barth would say, theism has become anthropomorphic. This line of 
argumentation presupposes, of course, that reason possesses within and of 
itself information about God and the world: Descartes' 'innate ideas'.
Since for Descartes the idea of God is neither adventitious nor factitious, 
it must have been implanted in our psyches by God when fashioning the 
human mind. In his letter on the "Programme of Regius" he makes the point 
even more explicitly:
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"He (Regius) proceeds in article xiv, to affirm that the 
very idea of God which is in us arises not from our faculty 
of thinking, which is innate, but from divine revelation, or 
tradition, or the observation of things. We shall easily 
discover the error of this assertion, if we consider that a 
thing can be said to be from another, either because that 
other is its proximate and primary cause, or because it is 
simply the remote and accidental, which, in truth, gives 
occasion to the primary to produce its own effect at one time 
rather than at another.... It cannot be doubted but that tra­
dition or the observation of things is the remote cause, in­
viting us to attend to the idea of God which we possess, and 
to exhibit it in presence to our thought. But that it is the 
proximate cause of that idea can be alleged only by one that 
we can know nothing of God beyond the word God, or the corpo­
real figure exhibited to us by painters in their representa­
tions of God.... And indeed, it is manifest to everyone that 
sight properly and by itself presents nothing except pictures, 
and hearing nothing but words or sounds; so that all which we 
think beyond these words or pictures, as the significates of 
them, are represented to us by ideas coming to us from no 
other source than our faculty of thinking, and therefore natu­
ral to it; that is always existing in us in power."1
This letter has been quoted at length because it reveals three essen­
tial characteristics of rationalist thought as it bears upon theological 
method. It is because these characteristics manifest themselves in 
Descartes' thought in a radical way that he can be regarded as the first 
flower of rationalism in theology.
Firstly, it is being claimed that our conception of God springs from 
the faculty of thinking itself rather than from the objects of thought. 
Divine revelation, tradition, and 'the observation of things' are at most 
the occasions upon which we attend to the idea of God which is in itself 
proper to reason. God is known in our having the capacity to think, not 
as a contingent product of the chance realization of that capacity. Resi­
dent in the activity of thought, then, is the necessary and sufficient 
material out of which thought reveals and fashions eternal verities.
The second characteristic of rationalist thought which is foreshadowed 
in the Cartesian passage is a clear-cut nominalism with regard to percep­
tion not found in Aristotelian metaphysics or Thomist 'natural theology'. 
Whereas Aquinas had erected his natural theology upon a 'realist' metaphy­
sics, Descartes set the pattern for a thoroughgoing nominalism. He takes 
it that the five senses present to us nothing but bare sense-data (indeed,
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he considers this is manifest to everyone). Consequently, when empirical 
investigation can yield no more than this, there is nothing left which can 
inform us of significant connexions between these sense-data but the facul­
ty of thinking - this is his argument.2 While 'realist' ontology regarded 
universals as objective existences which inhered in particulars, nominalism, 
especially as developed by Roscelin, William of Ockham and Nicolas of 
Autrecourt, regarded universality as a property of language, and abstrac­
tions as predicate terms which refer to contingent facts about individuals. 
The generalizing and categorial nature of language fosters the use of uni­
versals in thought and parlance, thereby generating the illusion of univer­
sal substances; but, argued the nominalists, only 'primary substances' 
(concrete individuals) and singular sensible qualities constitute the 
world. Relations between objects of reference are not themselves entities 
but merely modes of connexion which, through affirmative copulae, imply 
factual conditions enmeshing objects. Descartes argued that otherwise 
isolated and incoherent messages are connected and placed in context by 
the faculty of thinking - a development of Ockham's nominalism supplemented 
with a simplified form of Augustinian Platonism at the level of God, the 
self, and geometry. The strength of this rationalist position was that the 
crucial issue of the informativeness of any idea could be provided only by 
reason which, when used properly, is that faculty by means of which we 
perceive ideas clearly and distinctly. Yet, insofar as the intelligent use 
of words, according to Descartes, assumes prior possession of innate ideas, 
we are presented not with the Chomskian argument that what is innate is the 
capacity to acquire concepts upon which the intelligent use of words is 
premissed; rather, Descartes posits the presence of concepts as quasi-pic­
tures - "intrinsically incoherent entities, combining as they do the pro­
perties of material and immaterial images"3 - thereby reviving the Platonic 
forms, identified with the ideas in the mind of God by Augustine, and now 
rendered immanent through a doctrine of the imago Dei.
Though a strident nominalism in its outright rejection of extant uni­
versals, Cartesian epistemology nevertheless smacks of the moderate nomina­
lism of Peter Abelard: a qualified Platonism that locates universals in
the ’deep-structure' of the mind, as it were, rather than in the 'object­
ive' world beyond, and apprehended by the senses. In opposition to the 
realists, for whom genera and species had existential status, Abelard adop­
ted Aristotle's perspective on the universal as that which can be predica-
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ted of several things, like man, whereas the individual is that which can­
not be predicated. "Thus the universal was not a word qua word," writes 
Gordon Leff, "but a word which could be predicated of things."5 Whereas 
Ockham was to locate the universal in the structure of language as a rule- 
governed enterprise, Abelard "made knowledge of the universal come through 
intellectual activity. Through our minds working upon the things encoun­
tered in the senses we are able to distinguish their common status. In 
the final analysis, the universal is a concept which the mind abstracts 
from the individual: 'because all clear understanding seems to derive from
individuals, when we have grasped them through the senses we recall them 
through the intellect'."6 Descartes inverted Abelard's ontology to the 
extent that whereas Abelard regarded univerals as resident in sensible 
things (though representative of concepts comprehensible only when abstrac­
ted from sensible things), Descartes regarded universals as incorporeal, 
innate ideas which the mind projects onto sensible things, imposing its 
order on the flux of sensation. Thus, for both Abelard and Descartes the 
universal is exclusively derived from particulars - where Abelard consider­
ed individuals as sensible things and Descartes talked of clear and dis­
tinct ideas - and once abstracted the universal is independent of 'real' 
things; though for Abelard this independence is notional - a logical con­
cept - while for Descartes it is transcendental: of the mind and its
realm.
Nominalism in Descartes' hands had thus opened the gates of intellec­
tion to rationalist enquiry. To the extent that he fashioned a philosophy 
of heuristics focused on discovery and problem-solving as the hallmarks of 
rational activity, Descartes anchored his metaphysics in a universal mathe­
matics of indubitable truths: a Euclidean philosophy of mind premissed
upon a structure of elements uniform in clarity, distinctness and, of 
course, veridicality. Intuition was given a structure and, consequently, 
laid open to 'scientific' investigation. Since "science in its entirety", 
says Descartes in the second rule of the Rules for the Direction of Mind, 
"is true and evident ... (and) arithmetic and geometry alone are freer from 
any taint of falsity and uncertainty ... (it follows) that in our search 
for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object 
about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstra­
tions of Arithmetic and Geometry."7 The noetic element in Descartes so 
completely overwhelms the perceptual that the central image dominating his
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work is not that of man confronting the world (as with Aristotle), but, 
rather, the mind confronting its own ideas. What for Aristotle represented 
the last and most difficult stage of analysis was for Descartes merely pre- 
fatorial. And in this meditating upon ideas rather than demonstrating and 
proceeding from premises lies the crux of the empirical rebuttal of Carte- 
sianism: in escaping a Thomist realism of sensible things Descartes opted
for an Augustinian realism of the transcendental. His rationalism and 
nominalism were incompatible.
Hume emphasized this incompatibility by showing that if one adheres to 
a nominalist conception of the objects of knowledge, then it is logically 
impossible to derive necessary natural laws from human experience. Presen­
ting his case as a commonsensical expansion on the derivation of ideas from 
discrete, simple impressions which associate in a somewhat gravitational 
fashion, Hume argued that all we really 'know' are separable impressions, 
the ideas they generate and the picture of the world that naturally flows 
from their 'chemistry'. Consequently, the basic building blocks of a 
Humean empiricist epistemology are the 'units' of experience itself: the
generative impressions that give rise to ideas. Gone are the transcendent 
Cartesian clear and distinct ideas as quasi-pictorial suspensions of mind 
and matter: an implied 'ectoplasmic' organum. Rather, Hume steers us
clear of introspective odysseys and tries not to rearrange the 'furniture 
of the mind', as it were, but asks us to relax in the armchair of what is 
immediately at hand. As atoms of experience, then, ideas form lattice 
structures through constant conjunction and create a world of habitually 
convivial images. Here surely lie the seeds of an evolutionary conception 
of human nature, founded as it is on man's phylogenetic characteristics 
and their survivability: we are what we are, we believe what we believe
because inherently meaningless fluxions of chance and 'necessity' have 
generated circumstances which by accident, indifference and/or suitability 
have remained with us and through sheer survival have accrued unto them­
selves the respect and mystique uniquely borne of success. To dig deeper 
than the crust of sentience is to excavate a philosophical grave, for we 
are no more than bundles of impressions, argues Hume, and even the associa­
tive chemistry that gives rise to particular clusters we identify as 
'minds' and 'personalities' is beyond our certain comprehension. We are, 
in short, sentient packages of self-confirming customariness.
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Unwittingly, Hume vindicated and elevated the radical nominalism of 
Nicolas of Autrecourt, if not with regard to the ontological status of the 
objects of knowledge then surely insofar as the nature of causality and 
certitude are concerned. The reduction of all necessity to contingency and 
the collapse of all inference into habituation renders the entailments of 
'cause' and 'effect' meaningless. To argue for the existence of substances 
or causes from perception, by this view, is to pursue a trivial circularity: 
to beg the question in an argument rooted in semantics, not tangibles. The 
very heart of the rationalist enterprise as enunciated by Descartes, had 
been pierced and rendered useless: namely, that the apprehension of cer­
tainty from logical necessities operating on the nature of things is a
O"fine imaginary republic of which a man may form a plan in his closet,"0 
neither self-evident nor ineluctable, but established conjecture contingent 
on perception and custom. Science, then, not as true and evident cognition 
but as the topography of ignorance.
Consequently, the very strength of the rationalist position - its 
nominalism - was also its fatal weakness. As Descartes' thought was deve­
loped, especially by the British empiricists, the incompatibility of the 
rationalism with the nominalism became more and more obvious. First there 
was Locke, distilling out the Platonist element in Descartes' thought, who 
attacked the whole concept of innate ideas and asserted that the mind is a 
tabula rasa. Then Berkeley attacked the concept of abstract ideas, a con­
cept which in Locke had made do for the lack of real universals which could 
correlate the objects of experience. Finally, Hume showed that when one 
regards the objects of one's knowledge in this nominalistic way, the possi­
bility of arriving at laws which are necessary and certain must be surren­
dered. The strength of the rationalist position, indeed its raison d'etre 
and the faith which sustained it, was the goal of the certainty attending 
logical necessity. This Hume showed to be vain, and therein lies his im­
portance. We have drawn attention to the attractiveness of mathematics 
felt in this period, and the revolutions in scientific procedure wrought 
by Newtonian physics. When once the concept of 'necessary law' was attack­
ed, the philosophic justification for the new procedure seemed gravely 
threatened. So grave was the threat that Kant was stirred from his "dogma­
tic slumbers" and felt driven to devote himself to the elaboration of a 
scheme which would salvage necessary laws from the Humean wreck.
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The third characteristic of rationalist thought, pervasive in rationa­
lism and empiricism alike despite divergent emphases and ambitions, is the 
assumption that all men possess and are generically defined by an immutab­
le, ineluctable 'human nature'. In the passage quoted, Descartes refers 
time and again to what he calls the thinking faculty. This term is but one 
application of his fundamental position in which mind is properly called 
'mental substance'. It is the assumption of rationalism that all men every­
where are endowed with a 'human nature' which is basically unchanging and 
applies to everybody. As Collingwood has said, in his discussion of the 
eighteenth century historians, "(They) assumed that human nature had exist­
ed ever since the creation of the world exactly as it existed amongst 
themselves. Human nature was conceived substantialistically as something 
static and permanent, an unvarying substratum underlying the course of his­
torical changes and all human activities. History never repeated itself 
but human nature remained eternally unaltered."g
It is this presupposition of an unchanging, rational human nature 
which is common to the leading thinkers of the period; it is the foundation 
upon which their systems of thought were to be built, and, in particular, 
it is the foundation which provided the ground for the new approach to 
theology. Not only is it important that we see this for its own sake, but, 
further, it is this which explains why rationalism still flourished after 
the British had done away with the concept of innate ideas. If Descartes' 
innate ideas were natural as potentialities of the faculty of thinking, 
i.e. to the human mind as such, spiritual substance, everywhere and always, 
so likewise the Lockean human understanding is assumed to be everywhere the 
same. Locke holds out before himself the ideal typical rationalist:
"Though God has given us no innate ideas of Himself- 
though He has stamped no original characters on our minds, 
wherein we may read His being; yet, having furnished us 
with those faculties our minds are endowed with He hath 
not left Himself without witness; since we have sense, 
perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of 
Him as long as we carry ourselves about us.... But though 
this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and 
though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathe­
matical certainty; yet it requires thought and attention, 
and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of 
it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we 
shall be as uncertain and as ignorant of this as of other 
propositions which are in themselves capable of clear 
demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable
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of knowing, i.e. being certain, that there is a God, and 
how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no 
farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we 
have of our own existence."10
So it was in following Locke that the English philosophical theists 
(and, in many ways, their opponents) developed the rationalist tradition. 
Having rejected the concept of innate ideas, however, the concern was not 
so much with unfolding from the resources of the mind eternal truths about 
God, as with the witness to Him, indubitably in nature. The empirical 
tradition which was developing in England meant that thinkers were more 
'open' to nature in this way. This is clear in the fact that the favourite 
theistic proof of the time was not the Ontological Argument but the Physico- 
Theological, the argument from design. As Locke expressed the belief: "The 
works of Nature everywhere sufficiently evidence a Deity."
This emphasis on reason and nature meant that the reasonableness of 
Christianity was of prime importance. The insistence upon the reasonable­
ness of Christianity in fact provided Locke with the title for his specifi­
cally theological work, a work which some regard as the first Deist litera­
ture, though it is but the fruit of an age which agreed that the Biblical 
teachings need only to be properly expounded in order that they be seen as 
plain and intelligible. Flowing from this rationalist emphasis was a great 
impatience with elaborate doctrinal system-making. A few simply truths, 
rationally demonstrable, were all that was necessary. With doctrine redu­
ced to a minimum, and this demonstrated (to the satisfaction of the times) 
as the intention of the Bible, such a simple dogmatic foundation required 
some supplementation, and the universal tendency of the times was to find 
it in a vigorous type of ethics, and a zealously charitable programme. 
Morality was assumed to be the proper content of Christianity, rather than 
the absurd and fruitless speculations of the theologians of previous times. 
This was especially true of the Latitudinarians, but not of them only; this 
moralism became almost an axiom of theology. Having minimized the specula­
tive element in religion, the Latitudinarians were free to emphasize its 
practical implications. In stressing our moral duty, they fortified man's 
faltering purposes by reminding him of the consequences of good works. It 
was wise to be sober and pious, because virtue brings its own reward. This 
is true in this world, and immediate advantage is reinforced by the pros­
pect of eternal bliss. This stressing of moral duty was not really a new
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theological theme; rather3 it was a variation on the same theme of man's 
inherent rationality3 with its consequent certain knowledge of natural 
laws.
It can easily be seen that there was inherent in the rationalists a 
spirit which, while it was welcomed by theologians, generally speaking, as 
an ally to bolster an unsure faith, in time would turn against theological 
study as it had been understood, namely, as a function of the Christian 
Church. This spirit manifested itself in the French encyclopaedists, and 
especially in the English Deist movement - from Locke's attempt to do no 
more than disentangle the simple assertion of the Bible of Jesus' Messiah- 
ship, leaving aside all else, through Collins' attack upon ecclesiastical 
superstition and priestcraft, to Tom Paine's sweeping claim that "the idea 
that God sent Jesus Christ to publish, as they say, the glad tidings to all 
nations, from one end of the world to the other, is consistent only with 
the ignorance of those who knew nothing of the extent of the world, and who 
believe, as those world-saviours believed... that the earth was flat like 
a trencher."11 In the place of traditional dogmatics, with its intricate 
systems of doctrines, relying upon Scripture as some sort of unique record, 
theology becomes simply an apologia for rational conduct. If the Reformers 
were in danger of dissolving dogmatics into Scripture, now the pendulum had 
swung the other way. Talk about God had nothing whatever to do with Church 
or Bible. Yet, a theology is possible: "Are we to have no word of God - 
no revelation? I answer, Yes; there is a revelation. The word of God is 
the creation we behold: and it is in this word, which no human interven­
tion can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."12 
And again:
"Religion, therefore, (is) the belief of a God and the prac­
tice of moral truth... The belief of a God, so far from 
having anything of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most 
easy because it arises to us... out of necessity. And the 
practice of moral truth, or, in other words, a practical 
imitation of the Goodness of God, is no other than our acting 
towards each other as he acts benignly to all."13
Nowadays, Paine's easy optimism seems ironical. As far back as 1739, 
David Hume had published his Treatise of Human Nature, in which, interalia, 
he delivered a forthright attack upon the concept of spiritual substance. 
Thus the fundamental assumption of the rationalists was in danger from
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Hume, not only by his attack upon the concept of necessary natural laws, 
but by his reduction of both material and spiritual substance. As Hume 
put it: "We have no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection
of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we talk or 
reason concerning it. The idea of a substance... is nothing but a collec­
tion of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a par­
ticular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to our­
selves or others, that collection. m1 14 And with this attack upon substance 
there properly goes a rejection of the idea of 'human nature' - reason - 
as some sort of fixed, metaphysical entity able to generate necessary exi­
stential truths. In fact, Collingwood complains that "his attack on the 
idea of spiritual substance should, if successful, demolish this conception 
of human nature as something solid and permanent and uniform; but it did 
nothing of the kind, because Hume substituted for the idea of spiritual 
substance the idea of constant laws of association.1,15 It was these laws, 
now mental rather than 'natural', into which substance had been dissolved. 
But not only did Hume attack, albeit in an inconsistent fashion, this idea 
of Reason as a permanent entity, he savaged the physico-theological argu­
ment beloved by the rationalists of the second, more empiricist phase, in 
his Dialogues Concerning natural Religion, published in 1779. Tom Paine's 
"most easy belief" had been shown to be not so easy after all - fifteen 
years before he ventured to say so!
Not only was rationalist theology shown to be self-contradictory by 
Hume, Kant, for all his attempts to salvage necessary laws, delivered 
Reason a crippling blow. It is the burden of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason to deny the possibility of Reason's dealing with the transcendent, 
which he takes to be Reason's illusion, as distinct from the 'Understand­
ing's' knowledge of empirical phenomena. Many have remarked on how Kant's 
thought is both continuous with the rationalists and yet spells out their 
defeat. We will content ourselves, for the moment, with noting this fact 
in one instance relevant to our argument.
"Reason, like understanding, can be employed in a merely formal, that 
is logical manner, wherein abstracts from all content of knowledge," writes 
Kant. "But it is also capable of a real use, since it contains within 
itself the source of certain concepts and principles, which it does not 
borrow from the senses or from the landerstanding. "16 Here is a statement
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o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  'R e a s o n '  w hich  h a s ,  i n  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm s , dom ina ted  two c e n ­
t u r i e s '  t h i n k i n g .  Y e t K a n t ' s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l i e s  i n  t h a t  he w en t  on t o  a sk  
t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  "Can we i s o l a t e  r e a s o n ,  and i s  i t ,  so r e g a r d e d ,  an in d e p e n d ­
e n t  s o u rc e  o f  c o n c e p t s  and judgm en ts  w hich s p r i n g  from i t  a l o n e ,  and by 
means o f  w hich  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  o b j e c t s ;  o r  i s  i t  a m ere ly  s u b o r d i n a t e  f a c u l t y  
f o r  im p o s in g  on g iv e n  modes o f  know ledge a c e r t a i n  form , c a l l e d  l o g i c a l  -  a 
f a c u l t y  th ro u g h  w hich w hat i s  known by th e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  i s  d e te rm in e d  in  
i t s  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ,  lo w er  r u l e s  b e in g  b r o u g h t  u n d e r  h i g h e r ,  a s  f a r  a s  t h i s  
can  be done th ro u g h  p r o c e s s e s  o f  c o m p a r is o n . " 17 And to  h i s  q u e s t i o n  K ant 
g i v e s  a  v e ry  s t r o n g  answ er i n  f a v o u r  o f  h i s  second  a l t e r n a t i v e .  The demand 
o f  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  be b r o u g h t  i n t o  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  i t s e l f  i s  
m e re ly  a s u b j e c t i v e  law f o r  t h e  o r d e r l y  management o f  th e  p o s s e s s i o n s  o f  
o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  and  d oes  n o t  p r e s c r i b e  any law f o r  o b j e c t s .  -The r a t i o ­
n a l i s t s  r e a l l y  w an ted  b o th  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  th e  f i r s t  t o  g iv e  them  a 
s o u rc e  o f  d a t a ,  and  th e  second  to  p r o v id e  a fram e o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  b o th  w i th  
a  ' t r a n s c e n d e n t '  a p p l i c a t i o n .  K an t  d e n ie s  t h e  f i r s t  and r e s t r i c t s  t h e  
se co n d  to  th e  ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ' ,  w hich  i s  a lw ays  d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g .
From t h i s  fu n d am e n ta l  p o s i t i o n ,  K a n t ' s  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e o lo g y  c o u ld  have 
b een  a n t i c i p a t e d .  " I  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  employ r e a s o n  i n  t h e o ­
lo g y  i n  any m e re ly  s p e c u l a t i v e  m anner a r e  a l t o g e t h e r  f r u i t l e s s  and by t h e i r  
v e ry  n a t u r e  n u l l  and v o i d , "  w r i t e s  K a n t ,  "and  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i t s
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employm ent i n  th e  s tu d y  o f  n a t u r e  do n o t  l e a d  to  any th e o lo g y  w h a t s o e v e r . "  
Thus w i th  one f e l l  swoop, K an t  a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  n a t u r a l  t h e o lo g y  w hat was im­
p l i c i t  i n  Hume's a t t a c k  upon th e  a rgum en t from d e s ig n .  He showed how a l l  
t h e  a rg u m e n ts  o f  h i s  day re d u c e d  t o  t h r e e ,  w hich i n  t u r n ,  he th o u g h ,  r e d u ­
ced  t o  one :  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  a rg u m e n t.  In  t h i s  way, he s o u g h t  t o  show th e
r a t i o n a l i s t  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a l l  t h e  n a t u r a l  th e o lo g y  w hich  had  been  th e  
f a s h i o n  i n  th e  p r e c e d in g  c e n t u r y  and a h a l f .  In  t h i s ,  K an t i s  a n a l y s i n g  
and r e b u t t i n g  th e  W o lf f ia n  th e o lo g y  o f  t h e  p e r i o d .  As Kemp-Smith s u g g e s t s ,  
w hat K an t i s  d o in g  h e r e  i s  " a s  i t  w e re ,  r e c a l l i n g  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  w i t h o u t  
sym pathy , th e  l e s s o n s  o f  h i s  s t u d e n t  y e a r s .  They e n a b le  him t o  r e n d e r  
d e f i n i t e ,  by way o f  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  outcome o f  h i s  own C r i t i c a l  t e a c h i n g . " 1^
The e f f e c t  was d e v a s t a t i n g .  A f t e r  th e  s t r u g g l e s  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y  t h e  t h e o l o g i a n s  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  Germany, 
welcomed r a t i o n a l i s t  t h e o lo g y  a s  t h e  h e a v e n - s e n t  ro c k  o f  c e r t a i n t y  upon
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which to found their doctrine. Now this rock of Wolffian rationalism was 
dissolving into shifting sand under the Kantian storm, and thus endangering 
the whole structure built upon it. It was imperative that, on the one 
hand, some new source of unshakeable data be elaborated, and, on the other, 
some new frame of reference be forthcoming in terms of which such data 
could be interpreted.
Kant had his own answers to these needs; and the formal structure of 
his inter-related answers shows just how much he was still a child of the 
Enlightenment. Indeed, in Kant the spirit of the eighteenth century had 
not only reached maturity and beyond, it had quite simply come to terms 
with itself. The pure rationalism of Kant's theology - despite the illu­
sion inevitably attending reason's efforts to know what is the case through 
transcendent concepts unrelated to intuitions - manifests itself when Kant 
goes on to assert that a proposition like "God exists" is a necessary pos­
tulate of reason, although now it is reason in its practical employment, no 
longer speculative. Here again, the simplicity of the rationalist position 
shows through. The concept 'God' is considered proper to reason, only now 
with the restriction that to reason in its theoretic employment, the con­
cept is but an ideal, a regulative idea, a heuristic principle. The exis­
tence of the object of this concept, i.e. 'God Himself' (and here is Kant's 
departure from pure rationalism) is a subjective necessity demanded by 
reason faced with the need to act, to decide a moral issue. Thus there 
comes to the forefront of theological discussion the word 'subjective', 
which was to be a key term in all subsequent thinking. The simplicity of 
which we complain lies in that Reason, albeit now 'practical reason', is 
able to and does produce of itself both the basic data for permissible talk 
about God, and, further, its own frame of reference.
Yet, insofar as Kant has here explicitly avowed practical reason as 
the proper sphere in which theological construction can operate, he has 
raised to the level of a fundamental principle of methodology which was but 
the assumed content of the thought of the period before him. No longer is 
morality the principal and focal concern of religion; now morality is just 
one of the criteria of meaningful theological statements - one of the 
defining rules of the game. In this regard Kant elaborated a programme 
upon which the nineteenth century theologians could go to work. Neverthe­
less, despite what has just been said, there is a real sense in which Kant
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s t a n d s  a t  t h e  end o f  a l i n e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  a n o t h e r .  F o r ,  
by and  l a r g e ,  th e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n tu r y  d i d  n o t  f o l lo w  th e  r a t i o n a l i s m  s t i l l  
i n h e r e n t  i n  K a n t ' s  th e o lo g y  o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  d i d  n o t  
f o l l o w  him i n  h i s  fu n d a m e n ta l  c o n v ic t i o n  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  knowledge s p ra n g  
simply from c e r t a i n  i n n a t e  c o n c e p t s  and s u b j e c t i v e  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  r e a s o n ,  
though  th e  g e n e r a l  te n d e n c y  was t o  h o ld  t h a t  r e l i g i o n  was s t i l l  i n  a s e n se  
i n n a t e .  B u t i n  a v e r y  i n t e r e s t i n g  way, s u b s e q u e n t  t h e o l o g i a n s  to o k  up th e  
p ro b le m  o f  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  knowledge f o r  th e o lo g y .  They b e ­
came aware t h a t  no m a t t e r  how s t r o n g l y  a m o r a l i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  was p u t  
upon r e l i g i o n ,  s t i l l  and  a l l ,  i f  t h i s  r e l i g i o n  was t o  c o u n t  a t  a l l  a s  
C h r i s t i a n ,  i t  was a l s o  in v o lv e d  i n  m aking some r a t h e r  s p e c i a l  h i s t o r i c a l  
a s s e r t i o n s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  K an t l i e s  i n  h i s  r e f u s i n g  t o  Reason th e  
r i g h t  t o  make e x i s t e n t i a l  c la im s  on b e h a l f  o f  c o n c e p t s .  Theology had  s im p­
l y  been  assumed to  be m aking su ch  c la im s ;  i t s  b u s i n e s s  was w i th  f a c t s ,  
a d m i t t e d l y  n o t  t h e  same s o r t  o f  f a c t s  a s  th o s e  o f  s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e ,  i n d e e d ,  
a r a t h e r  p e c u l i a r  s o r t  o f  ' f a c t ' ,  b u t  s t i l l  a f a c t .  The dilemma K an t s e t  
t h e o lo g y  was how to  m a in ta in  i t s  c la im  t o  be making f a c t u a l  a s s e r t i o n s ,  
when i t  was n o t  w i t h i n  th e  p r o v in c e  o f  Reason t o  speak  a b o u t  'w h a t  i s ' ,  to  
make s t a t e m e n t s  im p ly in g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  p u r e l y  t r a n s c e n ­
d e n t  c o n c e p t s .  K an t t r i e d  t o  i n j e c t  t h i s  f a c t u a l  e le m e n t ,  t h i s  c o n t a c t  
w i th  e x i s t e n c e ,  by means o f  h i s  ' P r a c t i c a l  P r o o f ' .  Y e t ,  a n o th e r  way o u t  o f  
t h e  dilemma l a y  n e a r  a t  hand : h i s t o r i c a l  a s s e r t i o n s  make f a c t u a l  c l a im s .
C ould  n o t  h i s t o r y  s u p p ly  w hat r e a s o n  la c k e d ?  The q u e s t i o n ,  how ever, does  
n o t  y i e l d  a s im p le  answ er;  h i s t o r y ,  i t  was im m e d ia te ly  o b v io u s ,  i s  n o t  t h e ­
o lo g y .  One l i n e  a lo n g  w hich  h i s t o r y  seemed r e l e v a n t  was t o  p r o v id e  t h a t  
w hich  would peg  t h e  scheme (w h a te v e r  i t  was) down to  r e a l i t y .  H i s t o r y  
c e r t i f i e d  th e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  scheme; h i s t o r y  p r o v id e d  th e  e v id e n c e  w hich 
p ro v e d  th e  f a i t h ;  h i s t o r y  was a l i v i n g  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  dogm atic  scheme. 
T h is  was t h e  new p o s s i b i l i t y  w hich  s u g g e s te d  i t s e l f ,  a p o s s i b i l i t y  w hich  
a g a in  opened  up t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e o l o g i c a l  method a f t e r  t h e  a p p a r e n t  
dem ise  o f  Reason .
The n i n e t e e n t h  c e n tu r y  saw th e  r i s e  o f  h i s t o r y  a s  a d i s t i n c t  and 
r e s p e c t a b l e  d i s c i p l i n e .  There  had  been  f o r e r u n n e r s  o f  t h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e .
The e i g h t e e n t h  c e n tu r y  p ro d u c e d  Hume's History o f  England and G ib b o n 's  The 
Deoline and Fall o f  the Homan Empire. There  was i n  th e  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  
E n l ig h te n m e n t  t h e m s e lv e s  an a w a re n e ss  t h a t  c u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s  b e a r i n g  upon 
th e  l i f e ,  h a b i t s  and custom s o f  p e o p le  were w or thy  o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
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Voltaire was well aware of this, and Montesquieu placed emphasis upon mate­
rial conditions such as climate as influences in the development of a 
people or nation. Yet the historians of the eighteenth century (and here 
Gibbon affords a typical example) on the whole were merely applying to the 
writing of history a method similar to what theologians had been employing 
all along. The role of historical investigation was to provide an illus­
tration or proof of an intellectual scheme held on other grounds. What the 
system was, and what grounds were admitted, was the real question at issue. 
According to Bolingbroke, history is philosophy teaching us by examples how 
we ought to conduct ourselves in the situations of public and private 
life.20 It was out of this way of thinking that the notion of a philosophy 
of history, i.e. of a history which would at once be factually accurate and 
at the same time philosophically illuminating, was to take its rise.
Applied to theology, history was taken to demonstrate the development with­
in the course of events what was to be said about God.
The gradual movement from rationalism to historism (in Meinecke's 
sense), then, signified more than a shift in methodology or attention paid 
to facts and circumstances; it reflected a change in the language of theo­
logy and, ultimately, politics. The imago Dei as a universal common deno­
minator, as the essence of 'human nature', had itself been transcended by 
the nominalism common to both rationalism and empiricism. "The essence of 
historism is the substitution of a process of individualising observation 
for a generalising view of human forces in history," writes Friedrich 
Meinecke,
"This does not mean that the historical method excludes 
altogether any attempt to find general laws and types in 
human life. It has to make use of this approach and blend 
it with a feeling for the individual; and this sense of 
individuality was something new that it created. This 
does not mean that up till then the individual elements in 
mankind and the social and cultural structures created by 
man had been totally ignored. But it was precisely the 
deepest-moving forces of history, the human mind and soul, 
that had been held captive by a judgement that confined 
itself to general terms. Man, it was maintained, with his 
reason and his passions, his virtues and his vices, had 
remained basically the same in all periods of which we have 
any knowledge. This opinion was right enough at heart, but 
did not grasp the profound changes and the variety of forms 
undergone by the spiritual and intellectual life of indivi­
dual men and human communities, in spite of the existence 
of a permanent foundation of basic human qualities. In
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particular, it was the prevailing concept of Natural Law, 
handed down from antiquity, which confirmed this belief 
in the stability of human nature and above all of human 
reason. Accordingly, it was held that the pronouncements 
of reason, though they could certainly be obscured by 
passions and by ignorance, did nevertheless, wherever 
they could free themselves from these hindrances, speak 
with the same voice and utter the same timeless and abso­
lutely valid truths, which were in harmony with those 
prevailing in the universe as a whole."21
As a central element in the mythopoesy of rationalism, Calvinism pro­
vided both the ideological and theological justification for the rise of 9 
new theory of natural law: a theory of the imago Dei and the Word as the
blending of faith and reason. It had served to legitimize and, in part, 
generate both a qualified nominalist conception of the world and a statist 
conception of human nature; fertile ground for the generation of contracta­
rian theories of civility and order. Yet the strong rationalist undertones 
of contractarianism - a qualified nominalism coupled with universal reason 
and a static conception of human nature - were lost in a post-Kantian world 
committed to historist paradigms of thought and action. Regardless of and 
in many ways blind to its parentage, the new outlook regarded the products 
of rationalist and quasi-rationalist thought as the fruit of a beneficent 
or sceptical naivety; either way, the matrix of contractarianism, its com­
mon assumptions and symbols, were now lost in a new set of paradigms and 
tropes. The critical point, however, is not so much the demise of contrac­
tarianism as its rise in the wake of Reformation thought as a blending of 
the new theology of conscience and the rationalist (and quasi-rationalist, 
i.e. Lockean) commitment to a sophisticated version of the imago Dei. And, 
when reduced to its fundamental premises, this was little more than the 
'natural' integrity to be found in the rational community of language
users.
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APPENDIX THREE
I
Plato, it cannot be denied, was an enthusiast of 'political participa­
tion'. But just what did this imply? In Plato's 'fully just polis', each 
individual plays his part, attends exclusively to his prescribed task and 
stays unobtrusively in place. Participation was to ta hautou prattein, "to 
do that which belongs to one's part".1 Aristotle felt less the lure of 
Spartan bivouacs; his concern for freedom and individual uniqueness makes 
the Politics (in contradistinction to the Republic) an unlikely progenitor 
of totalitarian political theory. Nonetheless, Aristotle too is quite 
explicit about the idea that men can only realize themselves as parts of a 
political whole: "The polis is a compound, like any other whole made up of
parts, and these are the citizens which compose it."2
Of course, this idea of participation was not an invention of philoso­
phers. The colloquial word politeia, for example, meant citizenship, the 
citizen body, the constitution, political life and the general structure of 
the polis. As Victor Ehrenberg summarizes this point:
"The use of the same word for individual participation in 
the state and for its general structure shows that the 
participation was not in the main a purely legal act between 
individual and state; it reflected the vital adherence of the 
individual to the citizen body, as also to the other communi­
ties inside the state..., (he) therewith was bound to them, 
bound to religion and soil."3
In modern industrial society, in contrast, "vital adherence" to the 
polity seems irredeemably lost. The political arena, having dwindled to 
the status of a life-space among life-spaces, is primarily bureaucratic or 
administrative and thus hardly a whole - much less a moral whole - of which 
we are the constituent parts. As Vico says, "citizens have become aliens 
in their own nations."14 In fact, modern liberal ideas about the kind of 
'participation' which produces legitimacy usually boil down to suffrage; 
the act of voting, moreover, is the occasional approval or disapproval of 
an administrative team by a public whose life is chiefly and focally 'out­
side' politics, in other life-spaces like family, employment and so forth.
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There is no longer any question of a morally and humanly fulfilling parti­
cipation 'inside' the political system. The un-Greekness of this histori­
cally compelling reinterpretation of 'political participation' is inescap­
able: no man can 'realize' himself through mass ballot voting. As a
consequence, the Hellenic ideal of a "full time voter"5 sounds either silly 
or sinister to modern ears.
The Greek idea of 'representation' is also unlike its modern echo. 
Plato's guardians, the maiores partes, are said to 'represent' the whole 
polis since they alone have intuitive access to community - integrating 
nous. According to Aristotle, the worthiest and most authoritative members 
of a polis are 'representative' of the whole in the sense that they embody 
its essential qualities in the highest degree.5 In both cases, the goals 
and interests of the "finest members" are said to coincide with the goals 
and interests of the collectivity (to koin£ symphevon) 7 Implicit at least 
in Plato's commitment to a 'common interest' is the portentous suggestion 
that all inner cleavages and failures to reach total consensus are funda­
mentally unsocial. Every polity worthy of the name, so Plato suggests, has 
a 'common good', and the noetically informed and skillful leader will know 
how to steer the state according to its univocal directives. One is remin­
ded of Robespierre's habit, while addressing the Assembly, of prefacing his 
statements with the remark that since there was only one morality and one 
conscience he was sure that everyone in the room would agree with what he 
was about to say.8 In fact, the modern liberal idea of elective represen­
tation has both anti-Platonic and anti-Robespierrean connotations. It 
might be said to rest on the assumption that political unanimity, in highly 
differentiated societies, is a structural unlikelihood. To enforce this 
point, one might say that an absence of social cleavages and disagreement 
today seems eerily unsocial. It suggests conformism under threat of etat­
ist coercion and violence. Sociality, in Vico's 'age of men', has more to 
do with conflicting positions, compromise and reciprocal readjustment than 
with any fictional consensus omnium. The Peace of Westphalia ushered in 
Europe's 'age of men' and bequested to modernity that coexistence without 
a common nous called 'religious toleration'. Indeed, there no longer 
seems to be a single and homogeneous goal of total society which a compact 
political elite could 'represent' or picture within its admirable self.
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We can summarize these points in the following (provisory) simplifica­
tions. Both Plato and Aristotle affirmed a unity of ethics and politics 
which, renewed in modem contexts, can only lead to a totalitarian 'integ­
ration' of society. To explain what is apophradic about twentieth century 
politicians who want to 'make the citizens good', we must trace (following 
Vico) the historical displacement involved in the gradual de-moralization 
of political legitimacy which accompanied the shrinking status of politics 
to that of just another life-space among life-spaces. Both Plato and 
Aristotle (each in his own way) thought legitimacy to be based on moral 
arrangements which may misleadingly be called 'participation' and 'repre­
sentation'. Both thought social institutions to be 'legitimate', for 
example, if role tasks were distributed not on the archaic basis of lineage 
status but rather in accord with either natural talent or achieved merit. 
Those bom with cobblers' souls must end up as cobblers. Those who evince 
slavish traits (e.g., who fail to commit suicide upon being captured by the 
enemy) deserve to be slaves. The most attractive aspect of this idea was 
formulated by Pericles: "when it is a question of putting one person
before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not 
membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man 
possesses."9 Thus, the moral dimension of 'part-playing' or 'instrumental' 
participation has its subtlest and (to the modern mind) most attractive 
expression in the idea of citizenship among equals. As we read in the 
Politics, the good and valuable life is the life in which a citizen 'reali­
zes' himself, in which he uniquely actualizes his human potential for 
happiness and nobility. This sort of self-realization, of course, is 
dependent on speech, action and (most importantly) on the general context 
of reciprocity which is designated by the word politeia. For Aristotle, 
the citizen is inside the polis, just as a part is inside its whole.
In Plato, furthermore, political authority is considered legitimate 
only if social cohesion or 'wholeness' is guaranteed by the centralization 
of resources which accompanies the institutionalized belief that a ruler's 
interests are coextensive with the interests of the 'body politic'. The 
moral dimension of such 'representation' (where the 'higher' parts consti­
tute the essence of the whole) is again rooted in the idea of a single 
common good or shared nous which integrates the community. A similar idea 
underlies the old topos of the polity as an enlarged 'body', as an organism 
with feet, arms, heart, head and a single 'highest' goal. The way the
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Republic echoes the tribal origins of the polis, in fact, has not been 
overlooked, nor have Plato's flirtations with Sparta. In archaic Gemein­
schaften the totem may be said to perform something like a 'representative' 
function, unifying the clan and guaranteeing value-unanimity among members. 
And there is something irrepressibly totemic about Plato's priesthood of 
guardians.
Whatever 'legitimacy' can mean in the modern world, it can no longer 
mean what either Plato or Aristotle thought it meant. The idea that poli­
tics can 'make the citizens good', can make men virtuous and free, is 
simply obsolete. When, in the modem age, a thinker like Rousseau claims 
that politics should make men virtuous, he clearly calls down the Vichian 
charge of apophrades on his head. Plato's ideals of bureaucratically 
organized role ascription and governmental holism, far from legitimating 
present day regimes and social orders, are more likely to be signs of 
illegitimacy at its most oppressive. It may well be that, in modernity, 
only totalitarianism can make a show at 'integrating' ethics and politics. 
It does this by subjugating the diverse life-spaces of a highly differen­
tiated Gesellschaft to political coordination. The process of Gleichschal­
tung is nourished and supported by the illusion that the totalitarian 
regime has revived the common nous. This illusion is called propaganda or 
the 'ideological integration' of society.
To understand what is apophradic about both identifying ethical action 
with political action and resurrecting the common nous, we need only con­
sider the following four characteristics of the Hellenic polis which, for 
structural reasons, cannot be reproduced within modern states: (1) the
identity of the political state and total society, (2) the working identity 
of the citizens with the state, (3) the embedding of all religious, artis­
tic and scientific life in the political context, and, most important of 
all, (4) the small number of citizens, all mutually acquainted. Precisely 
because the first three are dependent on the fourth, it is not their real­
ity which is reproduced in totalitarian societies but only their enticing 
semblence. Every Gemeinschaft exhibits some kind of value-unanimity; when 
the rulers of a modern mass Gesellschaft proclaim ethical homogeneity for 
their state, however, our Vichian good sense tells us that something has
gone wrong.
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Nothing above is meant to deny the fact that readjusted, concepts of 
representation and participation remain indispensable. Obviously enough, 
they have content in the sense that they allow us to grasp real structures 
of modem political systems. Nonetheless, the generally unthematized dis­
crepancy of what they can mean and what they vestigally suggest has tended 
to produce confusion in the theory of legitimacy. By exploring this dis­
crepancy we can come to understand what is attractive and irrational about 
totalitarianism. We must therefore continue to trace the ’meaning shifts' 
within Vico's mental dictionary of humankind. It seems clear, first of 
all, that apophradic attempts to retrieve the moral substance of Greek 
political philosophy ('to make the citizens good') in modern contexts have 
always had unpleasant implications. By investigating the structural 
reason why modern liberal concepts of 'representation' and 'participation' 
are quite unlike their Greek antecedents it will be possible to correct 
some of the misunderstandings which tend to bolster totalitarian pseudo­
legitimacy. Without turning immediately to an examination of the way these 
ideas have been and should be reinterpreted for them to make sense in 
modern society, we must first focus on their original status and function 
in the works of Plato and Aristotle.
II
The Roman concept of ius, at least insofar as it implies the posses­
sion of private right, was more or less foreign to the Greeks. Certainly 
neither Plato nor Aristotle thought of ius as a central aspect of 
dikaiosyne or 'justice'. Until late antiquity at any rate, 'citizenship' 
in a polis probably never meant anything like a legal guarantee of each 
individual's freedom of choice or liberum arbitrium. In fact, Hellenic 
citizenship might by understood as a high-culture revival (and transforma­
tion) of archaic kinship and family membership - which is not to deny the 
social evolutionary breach between tribes and poleis; such an analogy is 
only meant to lay emphasis on 'being a member'. Dikaiosyne, at any rate, 
suggests less that men have rights to protection or non-impingement than 
that they have obligations to participate or play their parts. In the 
classical theory of natural law, rights were strictly subordinate to 
duties.10 The 'truly just polis' would guarantee every man his merited 
eligibilities to office, generalship and so forth. Feeling 'free', one
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might say, had more to do with fraternity and solidarity than with the 
absence of collective interference in the 'private affairs' of an indivi­
dual.
The emphasis here falls on the shared or common quality of the bios 
dikaios as even the non-philosophizing Greeks seem to have conceived it. 
Societas and communitas are the traditional Latin translations of the 
Greek koinonia or 'association'. The noun koinonia, in turn, comes from 
the adjective koinos, meaning precisely 'shared' or 'common'. Thus a 
koinonia was colloquially understood as an association based on something 
men shared in common - something quite reminiscent of archaic kinship and 
quite unlike a Hobbesian need for protection against one's fellows. The 
only good life was the political life, the collective and collaborative 
life of the polis. Such an idea, at any rate, lay behind the political 
theories of Plato and Aristotle.
In his Memorabilia, Xenophon relates a fascinating encounter between 
Socrates and the sophist Aristippus. Their conversation turns precisely 
on the Hellenic idea that the life worth living is always the bios koinos, 
the collective life of citizen-interaction within a polis. Aristippus 
rejects this viewpoint. The responsibilities of ruling, he argues, make 
it a form of slavery; the constraints of being ruled are even more unbear­
able. All political 'participation', he concludes, is vile servitude. 
Freedom, in contrast, is reserved for the metic, the alien, the rootless 
freeman with no citizenship and no assigned place. "I do not shut myself 
up in the four corners of a community (politeia)," pronounces Xenophon's 
Aristippus, "but am a stranger in every land."11
Socrates answers: yes, political life is difficult; but a life with­
out friendship (philia in the special Greek sense of a 'public virtue'), 
without partners and allies and without laws is more wretched still. Vae 
soli! Woe to he who is alone!
Although Aristippus' position may seem plausible to modem readers 
(recalling Vico's "citizens have become aliens in their own nations"), it 
is blatantly perverse in the Socratic-Athenian context. Today there is 
nothing uncommon about being deracine, being a kind of wayfaring alien or 
metic. And just as politics has become a kind of housekeeping, so has
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friendship become focally private. What we share with others has perhaps 
less to do with institutionalized values (common norms) than with a very- 
personal sense of being co-voyagers in a precarious, fragmented and tradi­
tionless world. Socrates' warning is likewise out of step with today's 
social reality. Freedom has now taken on all the ambiguous implications 
of 'freedom in the traffic'. In spite of important differences between 
Mill and Epictetus (which we will discuss in Part VI) there is a surface 
similarity between their respective ideas of 'negative freedom'.12 Super­
ficially speaking, at least, Aristippus was a modern man before his time.
Amidst all the political disillusionment of the fourth century, in 
fact, his kind of argument remained unconvincing to restoration-oriented 
Greeks like Plato and Aristotle. The polis kai he koinonia he politike13 
had a tightly knit and all-encompassing quality which, for these two philo­
sophers, at least, seems to have resisted even the havoc wrought by the 
Peloponnesian War. Nostalgists have no qualms about praising the 'integra­
ted life' which lingered on in fourth century Athens; and this was not mere 
fancy on their part, though it may reflect a naive confidence in the rep­
resentativeness of Plato and Aristotle.
Putting fourth century developments aside for a moment, Thucydides' 
version of Pericles' funeral oration probably can be taken as the most 
representative articulation of the influential ideal of political wholeness 
or value-unanimity among citizens. The crux of Pericles' praise of the 
politically integrated life is formulated by Thucydides as follows: "We do
not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his 
own business. We say that he has no business here at all."14 In connec­
tion with a testament such as this, one should recall that, in the Hellenic 
polis, all aspects of life were politicized. Art was civic art; religion 
was civic religion. This meant that writers like Tyrtaeus could comfort­
ably treat the polis as if it were a divine principle, indeed, as if it 
were a god.15 Since the Gemeinschaft was considered the condition for the 
possibility of human life in general, Aristippus' heresy may be said to lie 
in a kind of 'transcendental denial'.
With late antiquity, of course, counter-current tendencies and atti­
tudes emerged. Aristippus' position probably looked less and less absurd 
as pre-Peloppenesian War legitimacy faded out of memory. Still, it does
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not seem reductionist to say that there is nothing less typically Hellenic 
than the 'contractarian' attitude which Popper admires in Lycophron, that 
the polis may best be regarded as an instrument for protecting citizens 
from mutual damage.16 Probably many Greeks beside Plato and Aristotle 
would have reacted to this idea with astonishment. Modern man might even 
catch a glimpse of this astonishment by considering the weirdness of Kant's 
assumption that marriage is essentially a relation of contract and ex­
change. Hegel, one recalls, was quite indignant at this suggestion. In­
stitutions like the Hellenic polis and the modem family do not simply pro­
tect rights; they provide otherwise unattainable possibilities for self- 
realization. This explains how they (as institutions) can have 'moral' 
content; they are media for creative collaboration, not mechanisms for 
possessive solitude.17
With the emergence of modernity, as Vico makes clear, the (Hobbesian 
and Lockean) 'contractarian' 'de-moralization' of politics becomes compel­
ling. Living the larger portion of their lives in the non-political con­
texts of family, economy, religion, education, art, science, law, and so 
forth, modern burghers tend to approach the polity from the 'outside'. The 
old argument against Locke, which Macpherson just repeats, is that indivi­
duals are first constituted by society and hence it is nonsense to speak of 
their agreeing to terms for 'joining' society. Weber persuasively argues 
that 'individualist self-interest' is itself the product of a particular 
social ethos.18 Thinking and speaking subjects, of course, cannot agree to 
'establish' society - because they would not be competent 'subjects' unless 
society already existed. Competence in reasoning and speaking presupposes 
a period of interaction with communicative partners. However, this argu­
ment is sound, but only so far as it goes. We can feel the compelling 
quality of Lockean 'contractarianism', in other words, even without putting 
Locke before Aristotle. It is not a question of 'argument' here, but of a 
far-reaching transformation in the structure of society. With the collapse 
of the Hellenic polis, it was no longer realistic to identify polity and 
total society. To be sure, men were still originally constituted as 
'social' beings - say, as members of Augustine's civitas Dei. But as mem­
bers of the pagan polity there was now a great deal of sense saying that 
they could only exist 'by contract'.
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Confusion about the disappearance of antiquity and the (eventual) 
emergence of modernity can be detected not only among the 'organic society' 
critics of Lockean contractarianism; it also led the most acute advocates 
of protectionist individualism astray. In fact, nineteenth century indi­
vidualists like Jakob Burckhardt and Numa-Denys Fustel de Coulange reacted 
to Periclean ideals with what may seem to more recent readers an exaggera­
ted sense of outrage and repulsion. Horrified by the encroachments of the 
modem mass state upon private freedoms, both of these writers were driven 
to one-sided and reductive readings of antiquity. Consider Fustel de 
Coulange's descriptions of the polis:
"The state allowed no man to be indifferent to its interests; 
the philosopher or the studious man had no right to live 
apart. He was obliged to vote in the assembly, and be magi­
strate in his turn. At a time when discords were frequent, 
the Athenian law permitted no one to remain neutral; he must 
take sides with one or the other party. Against one who 
attempted to remain indifferent, and not side with either 
faction, and to appear calm, the law pronounced the punish­
ment of exile with confiscation of property."19
Echoing Aristippus, Fustel de Coulange adds that the Greeks, rulers 
as well as ruled, were "enslaved to the state". The collectivist polis did 
not merely impinge on privacy; it made privacy anathema. Such is the spi­
rit in which Fustel retells Plutarch's anecdote about the Spartan mothers, 
rejoicing when they hear their sons have died in war for Sparta, weeping 
at the news of their sons' survival. It really does seem like a 'reversal 
of natural sentiments'. However, like most appeals to the 'natural', this 
one involves an unsupportable commitment to anthropological constants 
which are thought to underlie human history. Just because one has a hard 
time taking patriotic rhetoric seriously, is no sign that one is more deep­
ly 'natural' than Pericles or Brasidas. It might mean that one is more 
true to the social evolutionary peculiarities of modernity, especially to 
the inevitable 'demoralization' of the public sphere, than modem emulators 
of ancient ideals like Rousseau and Marx. It seems quite probable that an 
ancient Greek could have thought, and would have been justified in thinking, 
the 'common life' to be the focus of ethical action. If modern students 
have a hard time thinking this, it is partly because they do not live in a 
polis and do not participate in the bios koinos in the original sense.
This demoralization of public space, in fact, is the main motive behind the 
modern reinterpretation of the concept of legitimacy.
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It is important to have a clear idea of these historical underpinnings 
of both ancient and modern political theory before we turn directly to 
Plato and Aristotle. As the quotation from Fustel shows, sociological dis­
crepancies between antiquity and modernity are often revealed in half- 
erroneous accusations which modems make against the ancients. The Repub­
lic, for example, has often been accused of denying 'liberal* Athenian 
ideals such as equality under law and erecting in their place a rigid 
elitism or benign epistemological despotism. Plato's ideal ruler is a 
social therapist and without him the citizen-patients could never cure 
themselves. In fact, this description has a good deal of truth to it.
Yet, what really offends the modern Lockean 'contractarian' reader of the 
Republic is probably less a peculiarity of Platonism than something perva­
sively Greek. In fact, it probably boils down to an anti-individualist 
affirmation of the moral primacy of the polis. Consider in this regard 
Burckhardt's caustic remarks on Plato's Laws:
"Plato presented the details of this state so minutely 
that he betrayed his desire to make the inward and outward 
life of the individual absolutely subservient to the polis.
Man was not only to be barred from the sea, which brought 
so many vile and variegated customs, but also from his own 
imagination so that the whole community would have to say 
and sing the same thing for a whole lifetime."20
Regardless of what his fellow Greeks thought of Plato's flirtations 
with Sparta, very few of them questioned the civic sanctity of communal 
hymns. Burckhardt, on the other hand, had been disgusted by petty polit­
icking and had transformed himself from a civis into something like a 
wandering monk who sang in the night. He felt himself camped in the inter­
stices of mammoth and impersonal life-spaces like economics and politics, 
systems largely devoid of moral substance, and he exercised his droit de 
vivve Ö part. By the mid-nineteenth century, it does not seem unreasonable 
to say, the life of an observant outsider may have been as much of a 'good 
life' as was available to a complex human being.
Now, the startling transformation from an implausible Aristippus to a 
convincing Burckhardt is deeply rooted in Western history, specifically in 
the enormous increase in life-space differentiation. We have suggested how 
the shift to modernity compelled a radical rethinking of what politics 
could be; in the rest of this appendix we want to explain how two ideas
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which are still influential in political philosophy (that the state can be 
’subjectified' as a 'family' or colloquy, and that the individual can 'rea­
lize' himself through political participation) were developed in the con­
spicuously pre-modern context of the Hellenic city-state.
Ill
One of the basic ideas of the Republic is that there is no way to con­
ceive of a just man unless we think of him as inhabiting a just polis. The 
implication, of course, is that ethics and politics are one. When Cephalus 
(the metic) begins the dialogue by defining justice as "giving every man 
his due and speaking the truth", Socrates (the citizen) counters by adding 
"according to the context".21 On the surface, to be sure, what Socrates 
means by 'context' is nothing more than the mental state of one's partner 
or interlocutor. The just man does not tell truths indiscriminately to 
madmen nor return weapons to them without precaution. Yet the broader and 
subtler implication of this opening interchange lies in the suggestion that 
a citizen can know something forever hidden to a metic: that there is no
justice outside the context of a shared political life.
Indeed, the rest of Book I has just this thrust. Thrasymachus' self­
ish tyrant may 'believe' that his strategic egoism is conducive to the best 
possible life. But then again, he may err. From Plato's viewpoint, 
obviously enough, he does err.22 The common life, the life of political 
partnership and philia, is objectively better and happier than a narrow 
life of pursuing one's own exclusive advantage.
As a consequence, the overarching analogy between soul and polis which 
dominates the Republic should be understood as follows: an individual can
never achieve homonoia (being 'of one mind', 'in agreement with oneself') 
unless he cooperates in a harmonious polis. A polis achieves such homonoia, 
in turn, when all its members participate in a common nous. Hence, pursu­
ing one's own advantage to the disadvantage of one's fellows is said to 
provoke ataxia -  uprising, faction, or revolution. At the very outset,
Plato insists that ataxia (within either the individual or the polis) 
impedes coherent action. Setting aside for the moment Plato's noetic 
appeal to timeless (and hence pre-political) Forms, his most persistent
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argument against injustice is that it is 'dysfunctional'. It splinters the 
homonoia, both civic and personal, necessary for coherent action.23
Citizenship, it bears repeating, was normally conceived by the Greeks 
as more closely related to family membership than to our contractual pos­
session of private rights. It allowed for 'positive freedom' (self-reali­
zation in the brotherhood of the state) rather than mere 'negative freedom' 
(absence of impingements by the administrators of the state). Thus, Plato 
very wittily associates Glaucon's hypothetical protectionist-contractarian 
theory of the polity with the hyper-individualist tale of the 'invisibili- 
zing ring'.21+ Membership in a polis-family, Plator suggests, requires 
visibility. To exist as a partner or citizen meant to exist in 'public 
space', since there could be no eudaimonia without an open bearing of one's 
responsibilities toward others.
Modern man, of course, can be politically invisible and yet lead a 
fully moral and 'happy' life. As Burckhardt and Fustel suggest, we even 
live better out of range of megaphones and flashbulbs. Decisive for what 
we take to be the self-misinterpretation of modernity, however, is the 
apophradic acceptance of the Greek 'identification' of polity and society. 
The logical result of such an identification is a dualism between public 
and private - terms which are taken to be mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive. The great advantage of reconceptualizing society as a loose 
nexus of life-spaces (of which politics is now just one life-space) is 
that it allows us to accept Aristotle's general thesis that freedom and 
self-realization require contexts of intersubjectivity and communicative 
collaboration without forcing us into an apophradic interpretation of these 
various contexts as all 'ultimately political'. Indeed, it is a question 
of finding a theoretical framework adequate to modern man's experience that 
non-political life, far from being necessarily private or mono-logical, can 
be intricately communicative and social. In fact, politics itself has 
become a life-space dominated by instrumental responses and routines, 
thereby discouraging or eliminating completely 'political' self-realization 
in Aristotle's sense.
For the Hellenic Gemeinschaft, on the other hand, a modern distinction 
between polity and society (not to speak of a more complex life-space 
analysis) would have been apophradic in the anticipatory sense. According
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to the main argument of the Republic, for example, every denunciation of 
public cooperation was a glorification of private egoism. And such a crude 
choice seems inherent to the structure of the city-state itself. At least 
in his role as secular political philosopher, Plato viewed the (Glauconian) 
contractarian affirmation of 'invisible' self-seeking as perverse, and even 
treasonable. He makes it clear that pre-political individualism is a ludi­
crous human deformation and one which will eventually avenge itself on its 
misguided proponents.
There is a strong current of thought in Plato's dialogues which 
resists an affirmation either of the 'primacy' of the polis or of the com­
plete coincidence of ethics and politics. This counter-current can be most 
easily discerned in Plato's preference for contemplation over action. The 
noetic intuition of Forms is simply not a communal act. And if 'justice' 
is identical with 'knowing the just' (rather than, as Aristotle would have 
it, 'acting justly'), then there can be no good reason for the philosopher- 
kings to redescend into the confusing world below. Emblematic of this 
difficulty is Alcibides' depiction of Socrates' trance at Potidaea.
Although Socrates' military virtue testifies to his civic loyalty and 
enthusiasm, his solitary 'dialogues' with his daemon are conspicuously pre- 
political. In Arendt's terms, we see in Socrates an intersection of 
immortality and eternity, of this-worldly glory and other-worldly redemp­
tion. Here lies the crucial dissimilarity between two ways of 'denying' 
politics, between Socrates in a trance and Aristippus on the highway. Con­
templation of eternal truth cannot be conflated with crude self-assertive­
ness, since the former is awe-struck by the same common nous which the 
latter ignores. Yet, the Socratic intersection of timelessness and tempo­
rality did seem to put great strain on the old primacy of the polis.
The enticements of timelessness and the contemplative life, in any 
case, never fully erased Plato's commitment to the unity of ethics and pol­
itics, though it certainly makes this commitment harder to understand, 
especially for a reader with Christianity in the back of his mind. After 
viewing eternity, why plunge back into this vale of tears? Trying to 
answer such a question, Plato clearly flounders.
Socrates noetic trance, in sum, even understood as distinct from 
Aristippus' reticence, is not the whole story of the Republic. The much
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belaboured ideas of specialization, division of labour and mutual exchange 
of services, for example, can only be understood in relation to Plato's 
impassioned desire to guarantee political homonoia - citizen participation 
in the common nous or the communal suppression of faction. Education, 
organized in such a way so as to allow each individual to 'realize' his 
inborn nature, would serve chiefly to unify and coordinate the polis. To 
modern students like Burckhardt and Fustel, of course, paideia inevitably 
seems like indoctrination, like grim state manipulation. Yet it can hardly 
have suggested anything like that to Plato, perhaps not even to his most 
anti-Spartan contemporaries. Plato seems to have believed that there was 
nothing more wretched than a polis afflicted with cleavages - unless it was 
the affiliate factor of men who had not found their suitable slots in the 
Gemeinschaft. For the 'baser' member of the polity, in fact, Plato quite 
emphatically subordinated the contemplation of truth to unified action or 
political cohesion. In order to ensure unity and piety, he was willing to 
deceive the city's children on the matter of potentially unsettling cosmo­
logical truths. It may be the case that gods break rules, encroach upon 
each other's functions and even castrate their fathers. Yet children must 
not be taught to associate duplicity, faction and treachery with the div­
ine.25 Whatever threatens 'the integrated city', hole he polis, must be 
expunged.25 And this is explicitly said to include 'the truth'. Pedagogic 
prudence such as this strongly tempers any Platonic suggestion of the pri­
macy of noetic contemplation.
Throughout the Republic, finally, Plato associates variety with 
disease.27 This recalls Burckhardt's remark about the Laws. Any man who 
oversteps the strictures of specialization, who does more than one job, is 
ailing. Plato calls him, with an evident intent of withering irony, the 
diplous pai pollaplous aner, the "twofold or manifold man".25 Seamless 
unity, both political and personal, characterizes the good and healthy 
life. The totalitarian implications of this idea hardly need by emphasi­
zed; but an additional point can be made about these unending attacks on 
role-shifters and versatile busybodies. Plato uses the word polypragmön 
('meddlesome') to refer to the man who irresponsibly abandons his ascribed 
place. Polypragmön, however, is the same word which Socrates uses in the 
Apology to characterize his own activity as a political gadfly.25 Meddle­
someness, in this context, results from listening to one's pre-political 
daemon. This is just another way of suggesting that (at times) Plato was
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willing to sacrifice much for his ideal of an integrated and harmonious 
life in an integrated and harmonious polis.
In spite of his otherworldliness, Plato clearly sent three political 
messages to posterity: (1) that there is no apolitical morality; (2) that
the highest good is the cohesive soul in a cohesive polis; and (3) that 
every man must fulfill his pre-established function by playing his proper 
part in the life of the polis.
IV
Perhaps the most salient thread running through the Politics is 
Aristotle's polemic against Plato's conflation of the oikos and the polis, 
the household and the sphere of politics proper.30 Yet, while rejecting 
Plato's means, Aristotle reaffirms Plato's goals. In fact, one of the 
basic thrusts of Aristotle's political writings lies in his attempt to re­
establish the moral legitimacy of the polis in the face of the (in the 
fourth century) widespread sophistical distinction between nomos and 
physis, between 'convention' and 'nature'. The very appearance of 'teach­
ers of virtue' like the sophists, of course, reflected a new uncertainty of 
the principle of tradition, an uncertainty which Plato hoped to correct 
through noetic 'tethering'. "Just and fine actions", we read in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, "which political science investigates, admit of much 
variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may he thought to exist 
only by convention and not by nature."3* The distinction between nomos 
and physis first became threatening with the large-scale erosion of 
unquestioned mores and religious beliefs - an erosion usually accompanied, 
as Vico knew, by spreading literacy. In the case of Greece, the shift from 
an agrarian to a commercial economy undermined the old dynastic and monar­
chical values. Democracy probably became a significant force only after 
money began to outweigh noble lineage as the chief source of social pres­
tige and power. The 'equality' of buyers and sellers introduced by the new 
economic developments influenced political structures as well.
According to Plato, the collapse of the principle of tradition requir­
es a strenuous effort on the part of philosophy to "defend the being of the 
gods".32 By granting noetic acquaintance with the Form of Justice to his
462
philosopher-kings, Plato hoped to put physis back into nomos. He hoped to 
certify post-conventional norms which would have the same sort of unques­
tionable certainty that tradition had before critical and emancipatory 
thought arose. Plato, of course, was not conservative; he did not defend 
the 'code of honour' of the declining landed aristocracy against the rising 
commercial class trained by sophists like Protagoras, Gorgias and 
Thrasymachus. The values he defended were 'eternal', not traditional.
What he objected to in the sophists was their denial of a common nous, 
their refusal to admit a principle (any principle) which might guarantee 
the coordination and unity of the polis. However, Plato's noetic strategy 
landed him in the paradoxical position of having to affirm extra-political 
truth at the same time as he was subordinating all individual life to the 
holistic solidarity of the state. As we have seen, he was ultimately 
unable to resolve this tension.
Aristotle, in any case, avoids the problems which accrue to ontologi­
cal restorations. Indeed, the nature of his anti-Platonism is revealed 
best in his important distinction between speculative philosophy and prac­
tical philosophy. Practical philosophy is prudent; it does not attempt to 
ground the post-traditional legitimacy of the polis on the purely specula­
tive idea of a "good which is universally predicable of goods and is cap­
able of separate and independent existence.^ Instead, practical philoso­
phy appeals to the prudential idea that the good, just or legitimate polity 
is a moral whole or Gemeinschaft through which individual parts (citizens) 
actualize their unique potentialities for humanity and freedom. Aristotle 
agrees with Plato on the idea that ethics and politics are one, but he 
views political life as dominated by language (lexis) and reciprocity 
rather than by organization, paideia and craftsmanlike manipulation.
Keeping neo-Hellenic (i.e. apophradic) thinkers like Rousseau and Marx in 
mind, we may say that Aristotle thought that the state could be 'subjecti­
fied' as a dialogue, though not, like Plato, as a family. The Politics, 
in other words, presents a much subtler and more freedom-oriented concept 
of 'participation' than we found in the Republic. Breaking away from 
Plato's to ta hautou prattein, Aristotle locates liberty in the capacity 
'to rule and be ruled in turn'. Aristotle, as it were, introduces a 'two­
fold man', what Plato decried as a dissolute role-shifter, into the heart 
of political life. For Aristotle, this capacity to rule and be ruled in 
turn means an alternative to invariable and pedagogic hierarchy. It
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permits the reciprocity or freedom among equals which might serve as a 
'customary* background for uniquely individual acts of greatness and 
nobility. Aristotle distinguishes himself from Plato precisely because 
of his ultimate concern with the self-realization of the unique (and not 
just functionally replaceable) individual. Yet, because he too identifies 
polity with society, Aristotle claims that this unique individual realizes 
himself as a part within the political whole.
Indeed, the first principle of Aristotle's political writings is the 
idea that the individual can never actualize his potential for eleutheria 
and eudaimonia, for 'freedom' and 'felicity', outside political praxis. 
Along with Socrates he dismisses Aristippus. There is nothing more anti- 
Aristotelian, in fact, than Kant's distinction between Moralität and 
Legalität. For Kant, the locus of moral behaviour (and this is the typi­
cally modern notion even though it was foreshadowed by thinkers of late 
antiquity and explicitly promulgated by Augustine) is the inwardness of 
the free individual. Something of the sort, of course, is reflected in 
Fustel's droit de vivre ä part. Such 'inward morality' is thought to 
remain untainted by the legality of 'merely' outward actions. One factor 
in the shifting of ethical significance away from active participation in 
a worldly community and into an interior domus of contemplation and privacy 
was the post-classical emergence of the idea of infinity. The apolitical 
or contemplative strand in Plato's works, as discussed, may be symbolized 
-by Socrates' 'private' dialogues with his pre-political daemon. Once the 
daemon is replaced by 'infinity', in any case, religious experience must 
make a complete break with politics. For Augustine, since finitude and 
infinity were heterogeneous and uncombinable domains, the promise to 
'realize' God's city on earth was heretical. Such an idea explains the 
obsolescence of civic religion. Kant's distinction between legality and 
morality is in this same tradition, although it reflects the even more 
radical emphasis which Protestantism put on privity, the privacy of con­
science. Locke believed the individual to be fully 'realized' prior to 
his entrance into the political sphere. Although we have argued that the 
pre-political constitution of the individual occurs in various quasi-auto- 
nomous life-spaces of an advanced Gesellschaft, it is clear that Locke 
himself believed the 'initial constitution' to take place in private 
communion with God. Since 'de-politicized religion' is a rather late 
achievement of social evolution, however, there does not seem to be any
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deep incongruity between these two interpretations of contractarianism in 
modernity.
Aristotle's practical philosophy, in contrast to all such develop­
ments, leaves no room for the 'invisible Church' of moral inwardness. Only 
within the institutional and legal space of politics can man be a moral 
being at all. Indeed, Aristotle's concern for individual uniqueness did 
nothing to temper his contempt for 'individualism', a contempt explained 
by his simultaneous characterization of ethics as "the philosophy of all
Isthat appertains to man",34 and as "political science" or methodas politike. 
The study of humanity, freedom and felicity is, to be sure, a matter for 
ethics, but ethics, in turn, is always political. This 'identification of 
politics and ethics' follows from Aristotle's two claims that (1) 'ethical 
action' can only occur in a space of intersubjective and communicative 
relations, and (2) the sole locus of speech-oriented inter-subjectivity is 
political action.
It is crucial to understand how thoroughly Aristotle's argument here 
depends on the Hellenic refusal to differentiate between polity and socie­
ty. Aristotle knew, of course, that women, slaves and metics were excluded 
from public or political space. He knew that the oikos was necessary for 
politics without being included in politics. The reason he nevertheless 
regarded the political sphere as identical with the whole polis was that 
political action 'represents' what is finest and most essential in man: 
it is the only dimension in which man can be free. Thus, it is the only 
dimension which a truly 'human science' will take seriously.
The inherent fuzziness of the modern idea of political freedom stems 
in part from this unexamined Greek heritage, a heritage dependent on a now 
apophradic identification of polity and society. Aristotle, of course, 
locates the substance and content of political praxis in eleuthevia, 
usually translated as 'freedom'. A man is free, he says in the Metaphysics, 
who "exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another."38 Formula­
tions like this, unfortunately, sound deceptively Kantian; they even sug­
gest some idea of inward autonomy and self-sufficiency. One must recall, 
however, Aristotle's explicit statements to the effect that the apolis37 
(the man who can live without a political community) is either a beast or 
a god - but at any rate he is not a man.38 Gregory Vlastos overlooks such
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statements, for example, and ends up attributing to Aristotle (though not 
to Plato) a position like K a n t ' s . S u c h  misreadings are part of an apo- 
phradic attempt in modern political philosophy to 'reconstruct' private 
conscience within the domain of politics - an attempt to reconcile Kant and 
Aristotle. This projected reconstruction rests on a spurious conflation of 
antiquity and modernity. Perhaps most distressing of all is Vlastos' fail­
ure to see how Kant's universalistic and 'inward' ethics clashes with the 
'patriotic' and public morality of Aristotle's Gemeinschaft.
To show that Aristotle's moral philosophy has no place for Kantian 
inwardness, at any rate is fairly simple. In the Nichomachean Ethics, when 
discussing the highest good (that which men choose for its own sake and not 
for the sake of something else), Aristotle introduces his principle of 
eudaimonia. However, he is quick to warn against individualist misinterp­
retations of the 'self-sufficiency' (autarchia) implicit in this concept of 
man's final good: "By self-sufficiency we do not mean that which is suffi­
cient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life; it embraces 
parents, children, wife and in general friends and fellow citizens, since 
man is born for citizenship."4® Thus, there is no freedom, happiness or 
excellence within the narrow confines of the 'solitary life' (bion monöten) 
Only a citizen can be eleuthevos or 'free'. In a provisory fashion, how­
ever, we may say that Aristotelian eleuthevia refers to a non-reductive 
balance of individuality and community, of spontaneity and shared norms, 
of flexibility and tradition. It means realizing one's unique individua­
lity by having it recognized in a public or political space sustained by 
rational moves and custom.
Thus, an indispensable key to the understanding of Aristotle's identi­
fication of ethics and politics lies in the Greek concept of ethos. In 
Homer and Herodotus, gthos means the 'habitual abode of animals'. Thus, 
Aristotle's ethos or 'custom' carries within it the vestigial connotation 
of 'a locus of habitual behaviour'. He says that the ethikos ('the 
ethical') comes from ethos only by a "slight variation".41 This toying 
with etymologies is only meant to underline the self-evidence with which 
Aristotle presumes ethics to be embedded in an institutionally and habitual 
ly organized social world. We will discuss below how Aristotle's idea of 
respectful yet flexible relation to the past is meant as an answer to the 
sophists' critique of tradition. Here it is only important to note that,
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in spite of this relaxing of the rigid bonds of usage, Aristotle even 
believed that ethics could be uprooted from ethos and (for instance) be 
based instead on the pure principles of Platonic speculation. Thus, when 
Vico objected to the 'conceit' of philosophers who thought they could free 
men from tradition and prejudice and reconstruct human relations on the 
lucid basis of reason alone, he was being quite Aristotelian (as well as 
de Maistrean, Burkean and so on). Again and again Aristotle stresses the 
idea that custom, usage, habit and tradition make up the matrix out of 
which freedom and the good life can grow.42 Again and again Aristotle com­
plains about a young man trying to become good by listening to lectures 
on the good. Goodness, he insists, only emerges with habituation.43 
"Legislators make citizens good by forming good habits in them"44; "We get 
the virtues by first exercising them"45; "We become good by doing just 
acts"45. The genesis of maintenance of virtue, as a consequence, depends 
at least as much on 'prejudice' as it does on reason. Thus, the 'ethical 
contexts' (habitual and pre-reflective matrices) of the household and the 
city are said to undergird the moral life. Ethos, in this elemental sense, 
embraces all civic institutions which bear the burden of patterned beha­
viour: the family, the cult of the gods, burial rites, festivals and such.
While these 'infra-political' institutions only gain full ethical signifi­
cance when put in relation to political praxis, praxis itself depends on 
these habitual contexts and ways of life.
To be sure, Aristotle does speak of a kind of 'political justice' 
which can be called 'natural'.47 Yet this concept has little in common 
with the Stoic idea of 'natural law' and even less with the eighteenth 
century idea of 'the rights of man'. Rather than attempt to out-manoeuvre 
the sophists by appealing to the 'purely natural', Aristotle rejects any 
clear-cut opposition between physis and nomos. Language {lexis) , for 
example, is said to bridge the gap: "Nature... makes nothing in vain, and
man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech."48 
The idea that language is 'natural' contains the key to the distinction 
between classical and modern doctrines of natural law. Aristotle's concept 
of political legitimacy, in any case, rests on the idea that the polis 
allows nature to come to her highest fulfillment in praxis and freedom. 
Modern theories of natural right, in contrast, presume a sharp recoil from 
the naturwüchsig context of usage, habit, tradition and custom, a context 
where the taken-for-grantedness of shared norms makes disagreement possible.
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Habermas is a good example." In his attempt to re-ground politics in 'the 
truth', he follows Grotius; he tries to tether a theory of political jus­
tice to 'post-conventional' insights of universal 'Reason'. Government, as 
Locke expressed this same project, should be regulated "not by old custom, 
but by true reason".50 Habermas' attempt to construe the concept of legi­
timacy from a 'universal rational' perspective allows for no ultimate dis­
agreements: Reason does not appeal to what 'is', but rather to what
'should be*. The stark contrast with Aristotle's cautious 'embedding' of 
freedom in tradition is revealing. Habermas, in fact, is eventually forced 
toward the conclusion that there has never been a legitimate regime in 
history. Theories such as his tempt one toward renewing the old retort 
against scepticism: if you have a concept of 'knowledge' such that no one
can be said to know anything, there may be as much wrong with your concept 
as there is with mankind. As Vico suggests, if modem natural right 
theories generate a concept of legitimacy such that no regime or social 
order has ever been legitimate, there is just as likely to be something 
erroneous with the concept (the natural law of philosophers) as misguided 
about history (the natural law of the gentes).
Habermas, not unlike Grotius, wants to 'ground' moral and political 
action on a concept of good not immanent in existing institutions.51 To 
this extent Habermas too is Platonic. Aristotle, in contrast, rejected 
Plato's 'rationalist' answer to the sophists, and opted instead for a 
concept of good substantially rooted in custom, usage and habit. He knew, 
of course, "that men in general desire the good and not merely what their 
fathers had".52 Yet this insight did not destroy his commitment to the 
embedding of political ideals in the context of custom: "the law has no
power to command obedience except that of habit which can only be given by 
time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the 
power of the law."53 Moreover, "customary laws have more weight and relate 
to more important matters than written laws."59 According to Aristotle one 
can 'ground' ideals in a habitual and customary context without binding 
oneself to a dogmatic adherence to the past.
Perhaps this subtle 'embedding' of ethics in ethos is the greatest 
obstacle which a modem reader must confront when reading Aristotle's 
political writings. Because of our non-teleological concept of nature, we 
tend to associate 'habit' with automation and mindlessness - a modem
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identification which makes Aristotle doubly obscure. In order to under­
stand Aristotle's unification of ethics and politics in the concept of 
praxis, we must grasp the difficult idea of 'rational habit': a difficulty
emblematic of the rift between ancients and moderns. 'Conscience', we 
believe, is beyond habit; it is a listening to our inner voice - a pre­
social or post-conventional access to truth. The idea of a conscious and 
voluntary acceptance of 'rational' institutions by autonomous individuals 
is a post-Hellenic emergence: germinally Christian but for practical
purposes modern. Indeed, as Hegel says, the Greeks were quite distressed 
on the initial appearance of 'subjectivity'. Plato was so frightened by 
the ataxia-provoking possibilities of 'conscience' that he wished to ban 
meddlesome gadflies who paid too much heed to their pre-political daemons. 
When we read the Politics we are struck at how the 'integration' of the 
individual and the state is dependent on a more basic integration of the 
good in the habitual. Aristotle never tires of relating this 'unmodern ' 
point: "Men must be trained and habituated before they can do acts of
goodness as members of the polis should do."55 His unification of the 
ethical and institutional is based on a teleological concept of nature.
As a source of legitimation, this concept served as something like a func­
tional equivalent for conscience.
The Latin word natura has a root which means 'to be born'. For this 
reason, too, the phrase lex naturae suggests a binding of legality to what 
already exists. Physis, in contrast, contains no such surreptitious pri­
vileging of 'origins'. It refers instead to the whole process of self­
movement and growth, and even has its focal emphasis in the telos or com­
pletion of such a process. "The nature of a thing is its end," Aristotle 
says, "and what each thing is when it is fully developed, we call its 
nature, whether we are speaking of a man or a horse or a family."55 Both 
language and reason are in this sense 'natural'. And the polis is not 
legitimate simply because it conforms to old habits but because (in rela­
tion to habits) it is the culmination and fulfillment of nature in human 
reason and freedom; or, rather, it creates the conditions for the possibi­
lity of nature's potential being fully actualized in this way. Man is by 
nature an animal intended to achieve his telos in a polis. According to 
Aristotle, the natural condition of mankind, far from being pre-political, 
is the life of reciprocity and human fulfillment in civil society.
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Indeed, Aristotle's idea of physis cannot be understood without 
reference to the categories of potentiality and actuality. Taken together, 
these two concepts allow Aristotle to find it natural for men to both 
honour tradition and want the good rather than merely what their fathers 
had. Rational politics is found in a balance between authority and 
liberty, tradition and flexibility, continuity and discontinuity with the 
past. Since nature is actuality, it cannot be discerned in the inchoate 
twitchings of origins or mere potentiality. The 'naturalness' of the 
polis lies in the fact that it allows citizens to 'realize' their unique 
natures as speaking and reasoning beings, in glorious words and deeds.
Its justification lies in nature's innermost telos: freedom through
praxis. Grounding ethics in ethos, therefore, does not mean restricting 
men to mechanical habit, but means, rather, opening to them a complex 
tradition which allows for both collaboration and individual uniqueness.
Plato, one recalls, thought that "the men of old were better than 
ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods."57 Aristotle was, in spite of his 
belief that ethics was inseparable from ethos, much less pious: "The
earliest known human beings, whether they were born out of the earth or 
were the survivors of some cataclysm, were in all probability similar to 
ordinary or even foolish people today.... It would therefore be an 
absurdity to rest contented with their notions."58 Early philosophy, he 
says elsewhere, "is on all subjects like one who stammers, since it is 
young and in its beginning."58 Early institutions are similar to early 
philosophy - they are rudimentary or undeveloped. They organize society 
as if it were an enlarged oikos. Thus, even though they secure survival 
by optimizing man's labour, primitive institutions do not embody the telos 
of nature. They provide for the actualization for some of man's potential 
- particularly for his biological potential to survive. But they provide 
no room for the actualization of man's nature as a reasoning and speaking 
animal, as both collaborative and unique. Thus, they do not allow man to 
be free. For this reason, Aristotle regards societies 'previous' to the 
polis (and he includes the great Eastern empires here) as essentially 
barbaric; they thwart the deepest promptings of nature.
In spite of his radical rejection of pre-political forms of life, 
Aristotle is very cautious about rewriting laws once the polis has come 
into existence. Once the institutionalized space for praxis emerges,
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political philosophy must realize that its structural stability depends on 
the maintenance of a generalized commitment or loyalty to the supporting 
matrix of custom. Without the background of a common tradition, Aristotle 
realistically argues, meaningful disagreement (and hence political praxis 
in general) would be impossible to sustain.
Distinctive of Aristotle's political philosophy is the association of 
'freedom' with praxis. But what is praxis? It is, first of all, 
Aristotle's way of steering a middle path between Plato and the sophists. 
The concept of praxis allows Aristotle to keep the moral content of poli­
tics without appealing to a noetic guarantee. He makes this (in purpose 
pro-Platonic) point, in his famous polemic against Plato's conflation of 
political rule with household mastery: "When it comes to politics, most
men (erroneously) think that mastery or despotic government is statesman­
ship."^ Here, as elsewhere, common opinion is misled. There is no room 
for freedom in the household; while freedom is the very essence of politi­
cal (as opposed to prepolitical) life. The household is the locus of man's 
physical labour; he works there to sustain his biological life. Struggling 
for biological survival is not distinctive of man, for it is an activity 
which he shares with the lower beasts; it expresses animal subjugation to 
the necessities of nature and can be performed in solitude. Hence, the 
oikos is the focus of unfreedom or slavery. Not merely the subjects of 
despotism are to be considered unfree like slaves, since the despot himself 
is unfree - he is like a household master with no communicative sphere out­
side the instrumental and labouring activity of the household. "The life 
of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing 
grand and noble in having the use of a slave; or in issuing commands about 
necessary things."61 Political life is distinguished from despotic rule 
on the grounds that a "true" polis is a "community of freemen".62 Partner­
ship in freedom (which allows for the 'appearance' in public space of a 
citizen's unique individuality) is the core of Aristotelian politics; and 
"authority over freemen differs as much from authority over slaves as the 
man who is naturally a freeman does from a natural slave."63 In his 
genetic account, at the beginning of the Polities, of how the polis arose 
from pre-political village and family life, Aristotle means to trace the 
evolutionary emergence of freedom. While political freedom is an innova­
tion, it is also the actualization of nature's previously untapped poten­
tial. In order to deepen our understanding of the breach between antiquity
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and modernity, it is crucial to explore this idea a bit further.
Eleutheria minimally means freedom from everyday duties connected with 
biological survival. This is why, as Hannah Arendt has explained, entrance 
to the 'public space' of politics was restricted to household heads.64 
Freed from the burdens of natural necessity, they alone had time and energy 
to participate in politics. As long as the tasks of 'mere life' were borne 
by others, citizens could afford to devote themselves to the 'good life'. 
Aristotle calls the polis the koindnia teteios, "the final and perfect 
association."65 To say that man is a 'political animal' or a 'rational 
animal' is to imply that the tetos of man is in politics or reason. Yet, 
an ineluctable condition for the possibility of achieving this tetos lies 
in the 'animal' half of the formula. Survival may be worth little without 
freedom; but there is no freedom at all without survival. The polis, 
Aristotle says, "originates for the sake of mere life, but it exists for 
the sake of the good life."66 The "supreme goal of everything", we read 
elsewhere in the Politics,"is the enjoyment of partnership in a good life 
and the felicity thereby attainable."67 Enjoyment of the partnership in 
the good life, so the implication goes, requires slave labour. It presup­
poses that biological survival is secured by 'living tools'.
Thus the negative aspect of eteutheria and praxis is release (not 
"from the violence of others"66 but) from the burden of natural necessity. 
The positive side is (not unencumbered private appropriation, but) partner­
ship in the good life. The anti-Platonic force of the idea of 'partner­
ship' is expressed in the famous phrase: ho de bios praxis3 ou poiSsis -
life is communicative action, not instrumental production.66 As has been 
said, the oikos is the proper place for fabrication and for the securing of 
biological life. By conflating the polis and the household, according to 
Aristotle, Plato left life essentially unfree. This is most readily seen 
in the idea of guardianship as a kind of pedagogic poiesis or techne. The 
distinctive quality of 'craft' is that it begins with fixed goals, and then 
sets out to manipulate concrete processes in order to realize these goals. 
Plato's guardians have no qualms about 'poetic manipulation; they catch a 
swift glimpse of 'goodness' and proceed to implement it on the malleable 
children.76 The background metaphor, of course, is always that of the 
craftsman. The potter begins with an idea of 'circularity' in his head and 
then proceeds to shape the clay before him into a plate. The plate is an
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approximation to an ideal - so are the children.
Behind Aristotle's insistence on the distinction between action and 
production lies his vigorous repudiation of Plato's Republic. We can 
recognize no "partnership in the good life" in the manipulative and peda­
gogic relation between guardian and polis dweller (no more than in that 
between potter and plate). Indeed, Aristotle distinguishes legitimate 
("right": orthai) from illegitimate ("deformed": parekbaseis) cities on
the ground that legitimate polities are constituted "according to the 
strict principles of justice".73 Aristotle's idea of justice and legiti­
macy, in other words, depends upon an elemental dichotomy between partner­
ship and manipulation, praxis and poiesis, communicative action and strate­
gic or instrumental action. Just poleis are governed "according to the 
common interest"72, which allows for individuality and disagreement, while 
despoties are governed according to the private (craftsmanlike) interest 
of a consensus-enforcing ruler or faction.73 'Common interest', in 
Aristotle, refers to a common interest of the citizens in individual self- 
realization and the freedom to disagree. It is not a common interest in 
survival, requiring spontaneous unanimity. If it were, then dogs and 
slaves could have a polis. As a consequence, Aristotle's idea of 'shared 
advantage' does not imply the coercive homogeneity of perspectives required 
by the Republic. Background homonoia is borne by custom and language - 
two media which permit disagreement and concordia discors.
A polis, for Aristotle, is an intersubjective 'agora' where all 
'naturally' free men can realize their distinct individuality in praxis and 
lexis. This actualization of one's uniqueness in combative collaboration 
with fellow citizens is what Aristotle means by freedom and felicity. It 
is partnership in the good life. As we have seen, a basic principle here 
is that a citizen should be able both to rule and be ruled. A citizen 74
"should know how to govern like a freeman and how to obey like a freeman". 
It is this mutuality or reciprocity which distinguishes Aristotelian praxis 
from the poiesis of Platonic guardianship. Reciprocity in politics, 
furthermore, has little to do with partnership in production; the joint and 
co-ordinated effort to ensure survival is not free reciprocity but collec­
tive slavery. To repeat Aristotle's words: "A polis exists for the sake 
of a good life, and not for the sake of mere life; if mere life were its 
object, slaves and brute animals might form a polis, but they cannot, for
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they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice."75 As a 
consequence of this kind of reasoning, Aristotle dismisses the contractar­
ian theory of Lycophron as absurd. Lycophron, one recalls, thought the 
polis to be a conventional association adhered to for the sake of mutual 
defense - "a guarantor of men's rights against one another".76 For 
Aristotle, it would be ludicrous to regard the polis as essentially an 
organ of defensive survival. Rather, its fundamental telos resides in 
"making the citizens good and just."77 There is nothing craftsmanlike in 
this 'making', since it never obstructs the citizens' access to prohairesis 
or "free and purposive choice". This is why the moral content of the 
political life must always be distinguished from the merely strategic 
relations of 'exchange' and 'alliance'.
"If two different sites could be united in one," writes 
Aristotle, "so that the polis of Megara and that of Corinth 
were embraced by a single wall, that would not make a single 
polis - even though marriage is one of the forms of social 
life which are characteristic of a polis. Nor would it make 
a polis if a number of persons - living at a distance from 
one another, but not at so great a distance that they could 
still associate - had a common system of laws to prevent 
their injuring one another in the course of exchange. We 
can imagine, for instance, one being a carpenter, another a 
farmer, a third a shoemaker, and others producing other 
goods; and we can imagine a total number as many as 10,000.
But if these people were associated in nothing further than 
matters such as exchange and alliance, they would still have 
failed to reach the stage of a polis."78
The main point of Aristotle's argument is that, in merely instrumental 
or strategic relations, the 'character of interaction' is qualitatively the 
same before and after their union. Activity is primarily instrumental (and 
not communicative) in both phases: each party is primarily concerned with
securing biological survival by defense against aggression and outside 
interference. Lycophron's argument, in fact, recalls Locke's claim that 
men "join and unite into a community" for the sake of "their comfortably 
safe and peaceable living among one another, in a secure enjoyment of their 
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it."78 For 
Aristotle, in stark contrast, such an ideal is the telos of slavery and 
unfreedom. Free political life, from his viewpoint, can never be a mere 
"association of place",80 for the purpose of preventing mutual damage and 
the easing of exchange. Lockean goals are far from being the purposes of 
the polis, though Aristotle admits them as conditiones sine quibus non.
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Regardless, "all of them together do not constitute a polis, which is a 
community of families in the good life, for the sake of a perfect and self-
sufficing existence."81 "By this," Aristotle adds, "we mean a happy and
honourable life" {to zen eudaimonds kai katas) ,82 Kalos ('honourably', 
'beautifully', 'nobly') refers precisely to that quality of communicative 
partnership which, for Aristotle, distinguishes it most dramatically from 
instrumental action or slavery. "It is for the sake of beautiful and noble
actions," he says, "and not for the sake of merely surviving together that
political associations exist."88
Perhaps it is easiest to explain in the logic of Aristotle's identifi­
cation of 'freedom' with "memorable words and deeds", against the back­
ground of the distinction between immortality and eternity. Here again we 
follow Hannah Arendt. The concept of 'eternity', of course, is most 
familiar to us in the Christian idea of nunc starts: God is a 'standing
now'. He inhabits a dimension utterly outside all temporal relations; He 
is one; He is otherworldly; His infinity makes Him incommensurable with 
finite thought and action. Since Hellenic polytheism lacked the idea of 
infinity, the Greeks could not conceive of gods as utterly unlike men. 
Homer's gods live in time; they just never die. They are 'immortal' rather 
than 'eternal', for immortality connotes permanence of duration through 
time rather than transcendence beyond time. Because it posits an insuper­
able breach between, firstly, worldly multiplicity and finitude, and, 
secondly, divine unity and infinity, Christianity can never be a civic 
religion. From the standpoint of eternity, moreover, all worldly action is 
levelled to a common triviality; 'Political excellence' becomes an unthink­
able ideal. For the Greeks, in contrast, the possibility remained open for 
heroes to achieve godlike immortality. Furthermore, because of the poly­
theistic organization of the cosmos, political disagreement and incongruity 
was perfectly consonant with a shared nous.
Linked with this idea that an individual might achieve immortality, is 
the Hellenic conviction (which anticipates Pico) that man alone is threat­
ened by morality and utter extinction. Like men, animals are a conjunction 
of form and matter. When an animal dies, however, its matter continues to 
exist as a decomposing corpse, while its form continues to exist in the 
species: animal death destroys nothing essential. Human death, on the
other hand, involves the destruction of an individual, of a creature whose
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very form lies in a unique and irreplaceable 'life story'. Within the his­
tory of his life a man could achieve, through noble words and deeds, a 
lasting place in human memory. Indeed, only because the automatism of 
species-immortality is irrelevant for unique individuals, can we speak 
meaningfully about morality. Since only the polis provides a medium for 
preserving the memory of great words and deeds, only the citizen of a polis 
is faced with the sort of death that may (by an effort towards excellence) 
lose its fatal sting.
Against the threat of traceless annihilation, in other words, the free 
citizen in a free polis turns toward a speranza dell'altezza, the hope of a 
fame for greatness which will last in human memory. This hope distinguish­
es human freedom in praxis and lexis from the grubby routine of production 
and survival. Glory, moreover, depends upon 'partnership in freedom', 
since heroic praxis could only leave a unique trace within an agonistic 
community of equals.
At one point above we described eleutheria as "combative collabora­
tion". This is the sense in which Greek politics locates human freedom in 
a mediating, alternative inflexible tradition and traditionless flexibil­
ity. Perhaps we can shed more light on the idea of traditional flexibil­
ity (or flexible tradition) by suggesting how eleutheria may be said to 
depend on communicative intersubjectivity even without reference to 'being 
immortalized' (athanatizesthai) in human memory. Remaining close to him­
self (to his daemon perhaps), a man may thwart the routine and conventional 
expectations which press down upon him in everyday life. Thus, he may 
realize his individuality through public encounters in new and surprising 
ways. Opening himself to the equally new and surprising acts of others, 
moreover, an individual can outwit his own inherent tendencies to sink back 
into the repetitive and inert. In Greece, it seems, this sort of 'comba­
tive collaboration' made sense against the background of a polytheistic 
cosmos. Ego and alter could conceive of each other as separate centres of 
effort, sentience and thought, as inhabiting incongruous perspectives and 
yet as belonging to the same universe. Lexis, in fact, always preserves a 
citizen's capacity to say "no!". What is so remarkable about political 
dialogue in Thucydides, for example, is the way that two speeches which 
completely contradict one another will both seem reasonable and true. Per­
haps, one might say that eleutheria was possible in Greek politics precise-
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ly because two men could disagree and both be right; that is to say, both 
contributing to a truth-revealing dialectic.
V
As we have seen, by distinguishing between praxis and poesis,
Aristotle avoids the manipulating coerciveness which characterizes Plato's 
Republic. Politics is not a 'ruling over', he clearly claims, but a 
'ruling with'. Just this shift, of course, allowed Aristotle to defend 
the 'moral' underpinnings of political experience against the attack of 
sophists like Antiphon. By locating man's telos in a "partnership in the 
good life", Aristotle made it plain that the split between nomos and physis 
(which, in spite of his rejection of the sophists' position, Plato had 
accepted), was wrongly conceived. Romos, according to Aristotle, is the 
institutionalized matrix of custom, tradition, habit and written law which 
makes possible man's actualization of his natural potential - the agonistic 
struggle of freemen to win glory in immortal words and deeds.
The moral content of politics, at any rate, remains a common theme in 
both Plato and Aristotle. The major breach between them does not destroy 
this underlying affinity. Likewise, it is not surprising to read a passage 
like this in the Politics: "We must not suppose that any one of the citi­
zens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the polis, and the care of 
each part is inseparable from the care of the whole."84 In spite of his 
accusation that Plato's ideal city is "too unified",85 Aristotle never 
questions the basic analysis of the polis as a whole made out of parts. In 
a passage quoted at the beginning of this appendix, he says: "The polis is 
a compound, like any other whole made up of parts, and these are the citi­
zens which compose it."88 The first consequence of this conception is 
clear: the living parts cannot exist without the living whole. What
ultimately distinguishes Aristotle from Plato is the former's subtle idea 
that homonoia may be achieved through nomos and lexis without suppressing 
incongruous perspectives and disagreement: homonoia as both the consist­
ency and unity of dialectical exchange.
In modern times, it has been suggested, the only institutional wholes 
which can 'contain' individuals as if they were parts are prisons and
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asylums for the insane, what Erving Goffman terms 'total institutions'.87 
Normally, we now understand social life-spaces as interaction contexts 
which an 'individual' may enter and leave. Modernity, we may say, has 
universalized the position and ideals of Aristippus. Aristotle's repudia­
tion of Aristippus (and thus his distance from modernity) is implicit in 
his lamenting Lycophron's contractarian position. The moral primacy 
which he attributes to the polis, moreover, depends on his firm conviction 
that men belong to a city in the same way that parts 'belong' to a whole. 
Aristotle judges suicide to be wrong, as we have seen, "on the ground that 
the man who destroys himself is treating the polis unjustly."88 Such 
arguments, it should now be clear, are absolutely central to his defense 
of the continuity of physis and nomos.
The original plausibility of analyzing the polity as a whole made out 
of parts, one should recall, was secured by the fact that a Hellenic polis 
might actually be eusunoptos or 'easily surveyable'. A polis might even be 
small enough for a town crier to be heard from every point. "If the citi­
zens of a polis are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit", 
Aristotle reminds us, "then they must know each other's characters."88
The analysis of the polis as a whole made out of parts also underlies 
Aristotle's most notable discussion of the difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate regimes. Monarchies and aristocracies as 'polities' are 
legitimate, he argues, while tyrannies, oligarchies and democracies are 
not. This distinction rests on the notion that legitimate rulers represent 
the common interests of all 'members' of the city. Illegitimate rulers, in 
contrast, are said to represent only their own advantage, while disregard­
ing the interest of the 'whole' collective.88 This contrast will occupy us 
at the beginning of Part Seven. Aristotle justifies the authority of a 
master over his slaves in a similar manner, however, and this justification 
is important here. He says that the slave is actually a 'part' of his 
master, his living tool.81 In this case, a whole/part schematization 
offers a 'theory of legitimacy' (a morally binding 'ground' for a relation­
ship of authority) which conspicuously extends to the pre-conditions of 
'partnership in freedom'.
In his theory of praxis and lexis, as we have seen, Aristotle grounds 
the 'legitimacy' of the polis on the unity of physis and nomos visible in 
combative collaboration or partnership in the good life. The question
478
which modern readers are bound to ask is how can Aristotle justify slavery 
or domination over non-partners? In response to this kind of problem, of 
course, Aristotle refers us to doctrines like that of the 'natural slave'. 
The slave is 'naturally' part of his master, a 'lower part' of the oikos. 
The idea of 'higher' or 'lower', according to Aristotle, is a necessary 
aspect of all wholes made out of parts: "In all things which form a compo­
site whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, 
a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light."92 
This distinction, Aristotle goes on to say, "originates in the constitution 
of the universe."93 What he seems to mean is that it originates in the 
inevitable organization of all things into wholes made out of parts.
In Part Two we gave the following diagrammatic rendering of the self- 
interpretation of Gemeinschaft:
WHOLE «--------------- *- ENDS
PARTS -t--------------- *- MEANS
Reconstructing this diagramme in accord with Aristotle's claim that "a 
polis or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the 
most authoritative element in it",94 we get the following scheme:
HIGHER 4---------- WHOLE ----------------- ENDS
LOWER -t----------- *- PARTS •«------------- *- MEANS
The legitimacy which Aristotle attributes to slavery and slave-holding is 
based on a belief that the ends of the whole society are realized in the 
praxis and lexis of citizens freed from the natural necessity of daily 
labour. That lower creatures serve as self-sacrificing means to this 
worthy end is perfectly 'natural' according to the whole/part schematiza- 
tion of society, a schematization which in turn depends on a generally- 
accepted identification of society and polity.
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Because of our commitment to universalistic norms, of course, we now 
find slavery quite unjustifiable. But what was delegitimated by the Stoic- 
Christian idea of 'universal humanity' was not so much the privileging of 
some over others, but rather the more basic idea that man is a part belong­
ing to a political whole. The increasing post-Hellenic differentiation 
between polity (one life-space) and society (the sum or loose nexus of all 
life-spaces) has rendered our schematization of Gemeinschaft quite obsol­
ete. Nonetheless, the power of ancient notions is stronger than one might 
think. In Part Seven we will pursue the importance of such Hellenic apo- 
phrades in the development of modern political thought.
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APPENDIX FOUR
I
The fundamental notion underpinning Kant's moral theory is the concept 
of 'duty'. This concept, he says, "has real legislative authority for our 
actions"1; following a practical law which commands absolutely and without 
further motive is doing one's duty. The notion of a concept having real 
legislative authority for actions is a thoroughly Kantian one. From his 
analysis of the concept,Kant derives the formal characterization of rules 
of action which specify actions as duties; and he develops a theory to 
account for the 'motivational efficacy' of the concept itself, as contained 
in pure practical reason. Within the concept of duty is that of a law for 
actions, arising from pure reason, the recognition of which immediately 
provides an incentive for compliance with the law. This incentive is 
totally distinct from sensual incentives and is represented by the law as 
'outweighing' the latter.2 It may, however, be insufficient to guarantee 
compliance. The concept of duty also contains the possibility of conflict 
between the incentive provided by the law and other motives. Thus it in­
cludes the notion of constraint by the law (or by the agent's consciousness 
of the law as authoritative). The concept of duty, then, provides a con­
straint by and in accordance with a law to which all sensually-based 
incentives must be subordinated. Kant insists, however, that although we 
necessarily are constrained by this incentive, we may choose to make it a 
sufficient incentive, or alternatively, to take no account of it in our 
decisions to act in various ways. Thus: "...an incentive can determine
the will to action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into 
his maxim."3
The concept of duty is applicable only to finite beings who possess 
practical reason. Such beings are conscious of a law which prescribes 
actions as rationally (morally) necessary, and they thereby have a (possib­
ly sufficient) incentive to comply with the law. The law is conceived as 
overriding - or conditioning the validity of - the demands of inclination 
and personal interest. Owing to the influence of incentives founded in 
desire, however, practical motivation by the law constitutes a constraint. 
In the case of a purely rational being for whom the incentive provided by
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the law is always sufficient, the concept of duty must be replaced by the 
concept of morality. For both a purely rational being and a man, "reason 
exhibits (the moral law) as a ground of determination completely indepen­
dent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition."14 This 
'exhibition' constitutes a sufficient incentive for a purely rational 
being, while for men the possibility of opposition from other incentives 
makes the moral incentive a constraint. Consequently, for Kant, the con­
cept of duty is the concept of constraint by and in aceovdance with laws 
which represent actions as rationally necessary. This constraining incen­
tive is "reverence for the law". In prescribing actions as rationally 
necessary, then, reason determines the will through the idea of duty and 
the 'reverence' which this idea immediately evokes.
The concept of obligation is contained in that of duty, according to 
Kant. We are given two explicit definitions of 'obligation', however, 
which are not obviously equivalent. Kant says first that "the dependence 
of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessi- 
tation) is obligation".5 The principle of autonomy (as we shall see in 
section III below) both defines rational (moral) agency and provides the 
formal standard for judging the rightness of actions. The human will 
'depends on' this principle in the sense that the will itself and the 
actions it chooses to perform are judged in accordance with the principle: 
if the will is determined by the rational incentive, it is 'good'; if 
actions accord with this principle, they are 'right'. But the principle of 
autonomy provides these criteria for judging agents and their actions 
because the will depends on the principle in a different sense: the
principle is the supreme 'law of causality of pure reason'. As such, it 
necessarily imposes its demands on the will by providing a constraining 
incentive. Thus, on this first definition, the Kantian sense of 'obliga­
tion' refers to the 'dynamic', quasi-causal relation between the principle 
of autonomy and the human will.
Elsewhere, however, Kant says "obligation is the necessity of a free 
action under a categorical imperative of reason".6 This definition is 
directly concerned with judgements that an action required by a particular 
moral rule is to be performed. That is, there is obligation - an agent is 
under an obligation - when some applicable rule requires that he perform a 
specific action. There is no implication of constraint by the rational
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incentive, or of the "dependence of the will" on the principle of autonomy 
(although, of course, the necessity of the action is not due to the speci­
fic needs and interests of the agent).
The two definitions of obligation might be distinguished further in 
terms of the conditions under which obligations are discharged. Where 
obligation is "the dependence of the will on the principle of autonomy", 
one 'discharges' the obligation by being virtuous, i.e. by having incorpo­
rated the rational incentive into one's most general maxim; by being dis­
posed to be sufficiently motivated by this incentive, to do what the law 
requires. Where obligation is "the necessity of a free action under a 
categorical imperative of reason", the obligation is discharged by perform­
ing the rationally necessary action, whatever the effective incentive.
This distinction, as we shall see, is the basis of Kant's distinction 
between broad and strict obligation - imperfect and perfect duty. A duty, 
or one's duty, is the content o r 'matter' of (an) obligation; it is what is 
required by reason. Particular duties, however, are derived from the 
general notion of duty in two ways - one based on its provision of a crite­
rion of rational agency, sufficient constraint by the rational incentive; 
the other on its provision of a criterion of right, permissible or ration­
ally necessary action. In the first case, one's duty consists in the 
choice of particular actions. To each of these 'kinds' of duties there 
correspond two different senses in which a moral agent can be under an 
obligation. The grounds of obligation in each case will differ, but not 
simply with respect to what (actions, events, states of affairs) constitute 
such grounds; the notion of a 'ground of obligation' itself differs. The 
ground of what for Kant is broad or 'ethical' obligation - imperfect duties 
- is pure reason issuing constraining commands: a kind of metaphysical or
noumenal ground. The ground(s) of strict (generally juridical or 'legal') 
obligation(s) - of perfect duties - are the rights of persons (generally 
the rights of others) which are determined by particular rules that define 
moral relationships among persons.
We must now consider the fuller theory of practical rationality Kant 
provides: the general notion of 'practical necessitation' of which moral
necessitation, i.e. obligation, is a species; and then his derivation of 
the supreme principle of morality from the concept of moral necessitation.
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II
As the subject of obligation, the human will must be conceived as 
having desires and inclinations which provide incentives, i.e. which ground 
particular subjective ends that vector human actions. In addition, the 
will must be seen as having within its ambience, as it were, the comprehen­
sive end of its own happiness, the conception of which is constituted by a 
systematic structuring of various personal ends.
Morality, according to Kant, does not require the rejection of all 
sensual incentives, but only their subordination to the rational incentive 
and the directives of pure practical reason. In fact, he tells us that 
reason has an essential concern with individual happiness:
"Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the 
world of sense, and to this extent, his reason certainly 
has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his 
sensuous nature, to attend to its interests and to form 
practical maxims with a view to attaining the happiness 
of this, and where possible, of a future life."7
We can consider different 'parts' or 'degrees' of rational agency,
Kant continues, as well as different kinds of considerations which might 
enter into the justification of actions. First, we can consider the 
rationality of performing a particular action, given that the agent has 
some specific purpose or intention. The agent is rational insofar as he 
acts owing to his recognition that the action is 'objectively necessary' 
for attaining his end. Second, we can consider the rationality of perform­
ing a particular action on the hypothesis that the agent has a particular 
conception of happiness. If he considers all the desire-based incentives 
which influence his decision, and acts on a maxim which is likely to lead 
to the greatest overall satisfaction, he is thus far rational. Finally, 
we can consider the rationality of acting in accordance with the moral law. 
If all sensually-based incentives, as well as an individual's comprehensive 
conception of happiness are examined, and maxims grounded in these are 
restricted owing to his recognition of and respect for the law, then an 
individual is fully rational.
With respect to each 'level' of rationality, the human will is con­
strained by and in accordance with practical rules or principles, i.e. it
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is practically necessitated. In the first two cases this necessitation is 
conditional. On the hypothesis that an agent has a specific optional end, 
or a particular conception of happiness, the practical principles specify 
actions which are, in some sense, ’rationally necessary'. And an agent is 
rational (to some extent) if his recognition of the rule's applicability 
moves him to act accordingly. In the third case, however, the necessita­
tion is unconditional. The practical principles specify actions that are 
necessary irrespective of the agent's personal ends and his conception of 
happiness .
Necessitation, generally, is a relation between (1) an objective prac­
tical rule which represents some (kind of) action as rationally necessary, 
and (2) a will which is provided with an incentive to act in accordance 
with the rule by its recognition of the rule as applicable, but which can 
choose to act solely on incentives grounded in desire and inclination (i.e. 
without proper evaluation of these incentives or of the nature and conse­
quences of the proposed action). From the relation of necessitation we can 
abstract the notion of a principle which represents an action as rationally 
necessary and provides rational beings with an incentive to perform the 
action. That is, we can abstract this notion from the possibility of con­
flict with (purely) sensually-based incentives. Kant performs this abstra­
ction by presenting his model of a purely rational or 'holy' will, and the 
principles in accordance with which such a will acts. The model he con­
structs, however, is not entirely perspicuous. It is not clear whether:
(a) a purely rational will has no desires or inclinations;
(b) only particular contingent desires and inclinations are 
excluded from the concept, each being a possible condi­
tion of any rational will;
(c) the desires and inclinations of a purely rational will 
are necessarily consistent with all rational and/or 
moral requirements.
We are told that the purely rational will is "incapable of any maxims 
which conflict with the moral law"8; that such a will is "a power to choose 
only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be prac­
tically necessary, that is, to be good."8 This is true of the purely 
rational will because "reason infallibly determines the will"10; because 
"in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only
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by the concept of the good."11 This does not yet entail, however, that a 
purely rational will has no desires or inclinations. For even in an imper­
fectly rational being, for example, man, the "will is affected but not 
determined by impulses... but it can nevertheless be determined to actions 
by pure Will".12 The human will is "pathologically affected - though not 
pathologically-determined - and thus still free".13
Nonetheless, Kant often seems to be saying that susceptibility to the 
influence of desires and inclinations is sufficient to exclude men from the 
ranks of the holy: "... though we can suppose that men as rational beings
have a pure will, since they are affected by wants and sensuous motives, we 
cannot suppose them to have a holy will, a will incapable of any maxims 
which conflict with the moral law"lt+; "... the concept of duty... includes 
that of a good will, exposed, however, to certain subjective limitations 
and obstacles".15 These limitations and obstacles are the presence of 
needs and inclinations: "Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to
all the commands of duty... - the counterweight of his need and inclina­
tions, whose total satisfaction he grasps under the name of 'happiness'."15
Before accepting (a), we must look at the evidence for (c) . In the 
case of men, Kant says, "...reason solely by itself is not sufficient to 
determine the will17; ...the will is exposed also to subjective conditions
(certain impulsions) which do not always harmonize with the objective ones;
18...in a word, the will is not in itself completely in accord with reason.." 
And further, "The essential point in all determination of the will through 
the moral law is this: as a free will, and thus not only without co-opera­
ting with sensuous impulses, but even rejecting all of them and checking 
all inclinations so far as they could be antagonistic to the law, it is 
determined merely by the law."18 It is possible, then, that in the case 
of a purely rational will, either: (1) as a matter of incredible coinci­
dence (or 'metaphysical necessity') all desires and inclinations are 
entirely consistent with the law, none ever ground incentives to act con­
trary to the law, or (2) Reason can obliterate any desires which might 
ground such incentives before they have any influence on the will.
The first is implausible given Kant's accounts of desire, i.e. how 
desire arises and influences choice. The second is untenable for two 
reasons. First, it is unclear how reason could even come to be concerned
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with such desires without their presence being somehow felt. Second, in 
speaking of the conflict of reason and desire in man, Kant explicitly says 
that "reason commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with dis­
regard and neglect of these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims (which 
refuse to be suppressed by any command). "20
The weight of evidence, then, seems to support (a): that a purely
rational being has no desires or inclinations which provide incentives.
It is not simply that a purely rational being can always appraise incent­
ives arising from its sensual side, accepting and acting from them or not, 
in accordance with rational principles, but that there are no such incent­
ives. Nonetheless, Kant includes the principle of promoting one's own 
happiness in his model of a purely rational will. Moreover, maxims con­
structed in accordance with this principle, as well as with objective rules 
of skill - i.e. maxims of rationally seeking various 'optional' ends - are 
possible maxims of a purely rational will. We must, then, regard various 
ends as possible purposes for a purely rational will, without considering 
their source in sensibility. That is, we must consider all possible ends 
as objects which a purely rational will might regard as 'objectively good', 
and then determine what follows with respect to its maxims, i.e. what 
actions would then be derivatively good. (This is not to say that in pos­
tulating a particular object of will we may conclude that the action is 
itself 'rationally necessary'; only when the object of will21 is itself 
categorically necessary can we make such an inference.)
The absence of desire or inclination in Kant's model of a purely 
rational will precludes sensual incentives influencing (and a fortiori, 
determining) the will, but it need not preclude the will's having various 
purposes in acting, or our hypothetically positing such purposes, in order 
to articulate Kant's conception of rational agency. We must remember that 
the purely rational will is intended to serve as a model of rational agency 
- an ideal against which human rationality is to be compared and evaluated. 
Since reason is concerned, in the latter case, with various ends (suggested 
by, and also in conflict with, desire and inclination) the model of the 
purely rational will must provide criteria for rational action given the 
presence of particular ('optional') interests, and given the (naturally) 
unavoidable interest men have in their own happiness.
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A purely rational will, then, is characterized by its maxims. A 
maxim, according to Kant, "is a subjective principle of action" containing 
"a practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions 
of the subject (often his ignorance or,again,his inclinations): it is thus
a principle on which a subject acts."22 Different kinds or orders of 
maxims can be distinguished. An agent 'appeals' to higher order maxims in 
constructing more specific lower order maxims. In most cases, when Kant 
speaks of maxims, they have the form: "When I am in circumstance C, I will
do A in order to bring about E." Maxims having this form are 'first-order' 
maxims. An agent's having such a maxim can completely explain his perform­
ance of a particular action. (First order maxims may take a slightly more 
general form, as when they express personal policies, e.g. "whenever I can 
do something to promote E (ceteris paribus) I will do it." The citing of 
such a maxim, however, must be accompanied by additional information - e.g. 
the agent's beliefs about his situation - in order to constitute an explan­
ation of some action.
Citing maxims serves an explanatory function. The maxims of a purely 
rational being, however, are such that his acting on these maxims is always 
rational, and his actions always justified. The explanation of this is 
found in the higher order maxims which guide his construction of first- 
order maxims. First, a purely rational being who acts purposively has the 
'second order maxim': "when I intend to bring about some state of affairs,
I will act so as to (most) effectively bring about this state of affairs, 
given the circumstances in which I act." More concisely formulated: "if I
will an end, I will the (most effective) means to that end." This second 
order maxim is a 'principle of the will' of a purely rational being, in 
accordance with which first order maxims are structured (that is to say, 
given particular purposes). It is partly definitive of rational agency in 
that at the very least a rational agent will choose to act so as to effec­
tively realize the purpose he has in acting. He will reflect on the nature 
of his aim and how he can best reach it, and he will act in accordance with 
the results of this reflection. An interest in performing particular 
actions is provided by and in accordance with this principle, however, only 
when the will has specific purposes and first order maxims are structured 
in terms of the principle. Regarding all possible ends as possible purpo­
ses of a purely rational being, each of the constructed first order maxims 
would constitute a hypothetical objective principle: a principle on which
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every purely rational being would act, on the hypothesis that he wills a 
particular end (conceived as in some way 'good').
Second, a purely rational will is conceived as having the comprehen­
sive, composite end of personal happiness. This end obviously admits of 
great variety depending on the more limited and objective ends a rational 
being seeks, and their relative importance to him. Although no particular 
conception of happiness is contained in the concept of a purely rational 
will, we can posit the second-order maxim: "I will so act as to (most
fully) promote my own happiness." This principle guides the construction 
and ordering - as well as the internal structuring - of first order maxims.
On the hypothesis that a purely rational being has some particular 
conception of happiness, some system of ends, his first order maxims will 
reflect this conception. For example, in his maxirri'in C, I will do A in 
order to attain E", C may include the condition that doing A does not pre­
clude his attaining some more important objectives; or action on any maxim 
aimed at realizing some end may be precluded owing to the second-order 
principle of the will, as being incompatible with the agent's particular 
conception of happiness.
Kant claims that reason "has a responsibility" to guide the construc­
tion of maxims so that a person can most fully realize personal happiness. 
One's happiness is thus an objectively worthwhile end, and an agent who 
acts in order to realize this end acts for good (though not necessarily 
sufficient) reasons. Nonetheless he is not rational in so acting unless 
he acts because he recognizes this end as objectively worthwhile, and not 
simply because he is influenced by sensual incentives to seek its various 
constituent objectives and satisfactions. There are good reasons for 
acting on maxims constructed and ordered in accordance with the second 
order assertoric principle. An agent is rational in so acting, however, 
only if he constructs and acts on these maxims as a consequence of his 
recognition of the validity (and applicability) of the principle. Once 
again, this second order principle provides an incentive for acting, and 
makes particular actions 'rationally necessary' only through specific first 
order maxims. These first order maxims (hypothetical objective principles) 
are maxims on which any rational being necessarily acts, on the hypothesis 
that his happiness is constituted in a particular way. Therefore, 'reason'
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determines the purely rational will through hypothetical objective princip­
les in two ways. First, the recognition that maxims must be constructed so 
that action will effectively accomplish one's purpose in acting, providing 
an incentive for structuring first order maxims and so for acting in 
various ways, i.e. reason generates problematic hypothetical principles. 
Second, the recognition that ends must be systematically organized provides 
an incentive for constructing (or rejecting) first order maxims - and so 
for acting - in various ways (assertoric hypothetical principles). Given 
the particular ends which a rational being has, reason prescribes an 
organization of these ends and directs the construction of maxims so that 
they can be most fully realized. A purely rational being determined exclu­
sively by reason is motivated by his recognition of the rules and counsels 
of reason to act only on those material maxims23 which have been conceived 
and constructed in accordance with these rules and counsels.
We may recall that the necessity with which the will of a purely 
rational being accords with particular (hypothetical) principles is not any 
kind of causal necessity. A purely rational being chooses to construct 
first order maxims (and so chooses to act) in accordance with these princi­
ples, i.e. he chooses to act only on those material maxims which are in 
accord with problematic principles. The capacity of a rational being to 
do this, that is, to 'wait on rational confirmation' of a material maxim 
before adopting and acting on it, suggests (although it does not yet 
entail) the capacity to be sufficiently motivated to adopt maxims and to 
act from a purely rational incentive alone.
If a purely rational being has this capacity, and if there is a 
second order maxim of the will which provides such an incentive, the re­
strictions placed on first order maxims constructed in accordance with it 
would be categorical, i.e. they would presuppose no contingent end, but 
would be unconditionally valid for the will of every rational being. In 
excluding all consideration of contingent ends, and yet placing restric­
tions on the construction of first order maxims, the second order categori­
cal principle would make certain actions (or forbearances) categorically 
necessary. This principle would condition the constitution of an agent's 
conception of happiness - that is, the rationally permissible structure 
and content of this comprehensive end - by restricting the actions through 
which he may seek happiness. Thus, if there is such a categorical princip-
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le, it provides an incentive for subordinating all particular personal ends 
and the comprehensive end of personal happiness to its dictates.
A categorical second-order maxim would be the supreme principle of a 
purely rational will, making particular actions categorically necessary (or 
impossible) for every rational being, irrespective of possible contingent 
differences among them, and thus restricting the constitution and pursuit 
of personal happiness.2t+ Although we can consider the possibility of a 
second-order categorical principle, we cannot yet determine what (kinds of) 
actions such a principle makes categorically necessary, i.e. precisely how 
this principle restricts the construction of first-order maxims. But we 
can derive the principle's general form from the notion of a rational being 
acting from 'reverence for the law' which involves the provision, by pure 
practical reason, of a sufficient incentive to restrict material maxims in 
accordance with a categorically (and thus universally) valid principle: in
accordance with law.
The supreme principle of a purely rational will would be entirely 
formal: all first-order maxims must be possible maxims for any rational
being. The recognition that some personal end - even the comprehensive end 
of personal happiness - could be furthered by some action must never by 
itself be sufficient incentive for performing it. Every maxim grounded in 
particular ends (and structured in accordance with problematic principles) 
must be such that any rational being could act on the maxim. In thus 
'testing' all maxims of seeking particular ends before adopting and acting 
on them, one manifests the ability to act from a purely rational incentive: 
one is a fully rational agent. Therefore, if there is a second-order 
categorical principle it will have the form: "all my first-order maxims
will be such that I can will them to be universal law."25
It should be emphasized, however, that material maxims which are in 
accord with this second-order principle are not for this reason alone them­
selves categorically necessary. Neither the ends nor the actions 'contain­
ed' in these maxims need be categorically necessary. This is not, as it 
might appear, inconsistent with our initial characterization of the catego­
rical principle as making certain actions categorically necessary. There 
will be certain first-order categorical principles which specify particular 
actions as categorically necessary. These, however, are derived from the
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supreme principle of a purely rational will, conceived as the supreme 
principle of rational agency. This principle consists in the evaluation 
of all maxims as laws binding on all rational beings, and only indirectly 
as having specific content. A purely rational will has a (sufficient) 
rational incentive to perform categorically necessary actions if and only 
if these are specified by applicable first-order categorical principles.26
In summary, a purely rational will is characterized in terms of the 
three second-order maxims or principles and the (possible or necessary) 
first-order maxims constructed on the basis of these. In addition to being 
subjective principles (i.e. maxims) of a purely rational will, however, 
they are objective practical principles in that any rational being (condi­
tional upon his personal ends) is provided with an incentive to accord with 
them immediately upon recognizing their rational validity and applicability.
The human will differs from a purely rational will in that the incen­
tives of practical reason (both empirical and pure practical reason) are 
not necessarily sufficient in guiding action, that is, the human will does 
not necessarily accord with objective practical principles in constructing 
its first-order maxims. In recognizing the validity of these principles, 
however, the will nonetheless 'experiences' rational incentives in the form 
of constraint. The will is forced to construct, structure and restrict its 
first-order maxims (and so to act) in accordance with these principles 
which are now to be viewed as commands or imperatives and expressed in 
terms of 'ought'i "By this they mark the relation of an objective law of 
reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue 
of its subjective constitution...."27
"The practical rule is always a product of reason....
This rule ... is an imperative for a being whose reason is 
not the sole determinant of the will. It is a rule charac­
terized by an 'ought' which expresses the objective necessi- 
tation of the act and indicates that, if reason completely 
determined the will, the action would without exception take' 
place according to the rule."28
However, this depiction of imperatives is misleading for several 
reasons. First, with respect to every imperative - categorical as well as 
hypothetical - it must be presupposed that incentives are provided by the 
agent's 'sensual nature'. Second, in the case of both kinds of hypotheti-
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cal imperative, no rule is applicable to an agent unless he has some parti­
cular purpose or comprehensive system of ends. Moreover, the applicability 
of a rule does not of itself establish that the action specified is (all 
things considered) necessary. For some particular purpose might have to be 
abandoned in light of prudential considerations, and some important aspect 
of one's happiness might have to be sacrificed if the moral imperative so 
commands.
This problem does not arise for a purely rational being, since the 
categorical imperative conditions its conception and pursuit of happiness, 
which in turn conditions the particular purposes such a being has in act­
ing. In the case of a man, however, not only can he choose to ignore the 
demands of morality in order to serve his interest, but he can choose not 
to do what he knows to be necessary to achieve some particular end, allow­
ing himself to be moved by, say, an immediate aversion to the requisite 
action; or he can choose to pursue an objective of (acknowledged) lesser 
importance to which desire directs him, and thus to violate some precept 
of prudence.
It is not the case, however, that some technical imperative is appli­
cable and 'necessitates' the will only if the purpose grounding the impera­
tive's applicability is morally permissible and compatible with the agent's 
happiness; or that pragmatic imperatives necessitate only if action in 
accordance with them is morally permissible. A man's actions are not just­
ified, he does not act fully rationally, unless these conditions are placed 
on his pursuit of particular ends and happiness. But we may nonetheless 
speak of necessitation and of the applicability of various hypothetical 
imperatives without considering these further conditions.
Kant holds that all imperatives "say that something would be good to 
do or to leave undone... to a will which does not always do a thing because 
it has been informed that this is a good thing to do",30, but that 
"(W)illing in accordance with these three kinds of principle is... distin­
guished by a dissimilarity in the necessitation of the will."30 Thus, 
maintaining some common, generic notion of necessitation, we must account 
for the fact that although all imperatives specify some action as good to 
do, the necessitation to performance differs among the three kinds of 
imperative. Kant says in the Lectures that "to each of the three types of
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imperatives, there is a corresponding type of good..."; problematic impera­
tives say "that a thing is good as a means to some optional end"; pragmatic 
imperatives concern goodness as a means to a determinate (and universally 
embraced) end: personal happiness; moral good is "the goodness of an
action in and for itself."31 In the Groundwork, however, he distinguishes 
the three kinds of imperative in a different way: "Every practical law
represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary for a sub­
ject whose actions are determined by reason. Hence all imperatives are 
formulae for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with 
the principle of a will in some sense good."32
In the light of these passages, it is possible to suggest, first, that 
the different ways in which an action may be good are derived from the 
different senses in which a will may be good; and, second, that the dis­
similarity in necessitation can also be understood in this way.
The goodness of a will is a function of its being effectively deter­
mined by reason in constructing and acting on maxims. A will which struc­
tures its maxims in accordance with the second-order problematic principle 
(and thus acts on first-order problematic principles) is determined by 
reason insofar as sensual incentives, grounded in need or desire, are not 
sufficient for acting.33 In acting in accord with problematic principles 
the rational and sensual incentives are conjoined in the maxim of acting. 
The rule is applicable, and so its recognition constrains incompletely 
rational beings, only if there is some particular desire-based incentive 
(establishing a subjective end of 'relative' worth). If this constraint 
is effective, the will manifests that goodness constituted by one aspect 
of rational agency: the internal structuring of maxims for the realization
of one's purpose in acting.
Similarly, if a will organizes and acts on maxims in accordance with 
the second-order pragmatic principle (and thus acts on first-order pragma­
tic principles), desire-based incentives are themselves evaluated and 
ordered - and possibly rejected as grounds for acting. The will is more 
extensively determined by reason in that the action specified by pragmatic 
principles, which incompletely rational beings are constrained to perform, 
is conditioned by the system of ends which constitute individual happiness. 
Necessitation is, again, partly derived through sensual incentives. But
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the constraint to appraise these incentives relative to one another further 
restricts the role of desire and inclination in determining action. Final­
ly, when a will accords with the second-order categorical principle it is 
completely good: it is determined to act by reason irrespective of and
possibly in conflict with all sensual incentives. When it acts on first- 
order categorical principles it is completely determined by reason; the 
rational incentive is by itself sufficient. The constraint in each case 
differs in that the will is determined by reason to varying degrees.^ The 
necessity of the three kinds of principles, however, differs in that each 
concerns different aspects of rationality: (a) rationality in selecting
means to various (optional) ends; (b) rationality in acting so as to maxi­
mize one's satisfaction; (c) rationality in subordinating one's own satis­
faction to objectively valid ends in accordance with universally valid, 
categorically binding laws.
It follows, then, that actions in accordance with problematic impera­
tives are necessary (i.e. good) as means to (optional) ends; actions in 
accord with assetoric imperatives are necessary (good) as means to the 
natural (and permissible) end of personal happiness. Actions in accordance 
with these principles, however, are not rationally necessary in themselves; 
they are not categorically required by reason. And men are not constrained 
solely by reason to perform just these actions, since the necessity of 
acting in accordance with them presupposes various sensual incentives.
Only in the case of categorical imperatives does reason represent certain 
actions as good-in-themselves and constrains the will (with no admixture of 
sensual incentives). Only in the case of necessitation by and in accord­
ance with categorical imperatives, then, is there obligation. However, 
this necessitation cannot be derived solely from the theory of rational 
agency outlined here. To explain Kant's position we must consider his 
general analyses of duty and obligation: duty takes no account of the sub­
jective differences among men in issuing prescriptions; and the constrain­
ing incentive of the concept of duty admits (and so requires) no admixture 
of sensual incentives for its effectiveness. Thus, only practical necessi­
tation by and in accordance with categorical imperatives constitutes 
obligation.
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III
The second-order categorical imperative "in general only expresses 
what obligation is...: Act according to a maxim which can at the same
time be valid as a universal law!"35 The formula of the supreme categori­
cal imperative is arrived at by an analysis of the 'ordinary' concept of 
duty, which contains the notion of constraint in accordance with law. The 
law commands that certain actions be performed without regard to whether 
or not inclination or interest would be served by obedience. In so doing, 
it accompanies its command with a constraining incentive.33
When a man believes he is under an obligation, argues Kant, he recog­
nizes a 'law' which commands him to perform a particular action irrespec­
tive of his inclinations and needs. In acknowledging this command orig is 
aware of one's ability to comply with the law from no other motive than 
that it is the law. Consequently, obligation entails the efficacy of the 
mere recognition of law as a sufficient incentive to act. Moreover, the 
recognition of the command (and its provision of an incentive) is not 
conditional upon any supporting subjective incentives which might contin­
gently provide motivation for acting as the law directs. It follows that 
the law must be viewed as commanding all beings who may be conscious of 
the law (as command), i.e. the law must be viewed as commanding universally 
(and necessarily) .
The experience of obligation, then, is constituted by being constrain­
ed to act in a particular way by one's recognition of a universally and 
necessarily binding law; by acknowledging the applicability of a law as 
providing a sufficient and 'overriding' reason to act; by acknowledging 
the law as supremely authoritative.
A person is obliged to perform a particular action when some such 
supremely authoritative law is applicable, that is, when the law immediate­
ly provides an incentive which can and should be sufficient. One is a 
possible subject of obligation generally, however, insofar as one recog­
nizes the taw as supremely authoritative and regards obedience to law as 
his duty. If we abstract from all particular authoritative laws and con­
sider the supreme formal imperative addressed to a will which is such a 
possible subject of obligation, we arrive at the second-order categorical
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imperative: "act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should he a universal law. "37 This principle, as the 
supreme principle of duty, contains only the formal notion of being obliged 
in accordance with supremely authoritative laws, and thus of having suffi­
cient reason and possibly sufficient motivation to obey simply upon recog­
nizing the applicability of such a law. A will which is completely in
accord with duty will fulfil all its duties from the motive of respect for
38the law, a "feeling (which is)... self-produced by a rational concept...."
Having an obligation, then, entails the necessity of acting from a 
purely rational incentive which is not grounded in any contingent end which 
might or might not be embraced by any man. Yet, Kant says that the will 
can be provided with an incentive to act only through the representation 
of some end. The possibility of a categorical imperative, the reality of 
obligation, requires that the rational incentive contain an end in order 
that men be able to obey the law without recourse to sensual incentives: 
"If... there is to be a supreme practical principle and - so far as the 
human will is concerned - a categorical imperative, it must be such that 
from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for everyone, be­
cause it is an end-in-itself, it forms an objective principle of the will 
and can consequently serve as a practical law."39 Only such an "end-in- 
itself" "could be a ground of determinate laws... in it alone would there 
be the ground of a possible categorical imperative."40
The end-in-itself which Kant settles upon, and which generates his 
second (major) formulation of 'the' categorical imperative, is rational 
nature’. "Rational nature exists as an end-in-itself. "41 This is, he says,
"an objective principle, from which, as a supreme practical 
ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will.
The practical imperative will therefore be as follows: Act
in such a way that you always treat humanity3 whether in 
your own p e r s o n o r  in the person of any other3 never simply 
as a means} but always at the same time as an end. "42
Kant's argument for this formulation of the categorical imperative 
seems to be this: choice is possible only if the representation of some
end supplies a subjective ground of volition. If men can act from a purely 
rational incentive, then there must be an objectively valid end, which is
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an end for every rational being, independently of all subjective, contin­
gent features that distinguish one rational being from another. Such an 
end would ground the possibility of a categorical imperative by giving con­
tent to the purely rational incentive. Moreover, it would ground particu­
lar laws in much the same way as personal (contingent) ends ground maxims 
of realizing these ends for a purely rational being.
This cannot be quite right, however. For Kant repeatedly insists that 
the moral law is not grounded in the value of some state of affairs reali­
zed or promoted through actions. The end at issue is what Kant calls an 
"end-in-itself". Like the usual kind of end, the representation of an end- 
in-itself can be a subjective ground determining the will. Like such ends, 
it has value. But unlike ends generally, its representation does not serve 
as an incentive to act in order to promote or realize it: for it is a 
setf-existent end; and unlike ends generally, its value is not dependent 
on the subjective constitution (the personal ends) of this or that rational 
being. It has absolute unconditioned value and is an object of reverence.
Kant's explicit arguments for why the end-in-itself is not to be pro­
moted but is a self-existent end are not entirely persuasive. Beginning 
(at times) with the premise that an end-in-itself must have absolute uncon­
ditional value, he claims that "the value of all objects that can be produ­
ced by our actions is always conditioned."45 The reason he gives is that 
"All the objects of inclination have only a conditioned value? for if there 
were not these inclinations and the needs grounded on them, their object 
would be valueless....";44 and "ends that a rational being adopts arbitra­
rily as effects of his actions (material ends) are in every case only rela­
tive; for it is solely their relation to special characteristics in the 
subject's power of appetition which gives them their value."45
This is obviously inadequate. The value of some end might not be 
grounded in inclination or need, i.e. its value might not derive from its 
being conducive to satisfaction. Even so, it might, as a matter of fact, 
by an object of someone's inclination, and it could be something which 
might be realized or promoted by men's acting in various ways. Kant could 
argue, however, that an end-in-itself must be a self-existent end because 
its representation is to provide a purely rational incentive to act; be­
cause action from this incentive constitutes the moral worth of agents:
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t h e  u n c o n d i t io n e d  v a lu e  o f  a good w i l l .  For  he s a y s :
" R a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  s e p a r a t e s  i t s e l f  o u t  from  a l l  o t h e r  
t h i n g s  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  s e t s  i t s e l f  an e nd . An end 
would th u s  be th e  m a t t e r  o f  e v e ry  good w i l l .  B u t in  th e  
I d e a  o f  a w i l l  which i s  a b s o l u t e l y  good -  good w i t h o u t  
any  q u a l i f y i n g  c o n d i t i o n  (nam ely , t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  a t t a i n  
t h i s  o r  t h a t  end) -  t h e r e  m ust be co m p le te  a b s t r a c t i o n  from 
e v e ry  end t h a t  h a s  t o  be  -produced, (as  so m e th in g  w hich would 
make e v e ry  w i l l  o n ly  r e l a t i v e l y  g o o d ) . Hence th e  end must 
be h e r e  c o n c e iv e d ,  n o t  a s  an end  to  be p ro d u c e d ,  b u t  as a 
se lf-ex isten t end. "45
" . . . a l l  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  ( a g r e e a b l e  s t a t e s  and even th e  promo­
t i o n  o f  h a p p in e s s  i n  o t h e r s )  c o u ld  have been  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  
by o t h e r  c a u s e s  a s  w e l l ,  and c o n s e q u e n t ly  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  
d i d  n o t  r e q u i r e  th e  w i l l  o f  a r a t i o n a l  b e in g ,  i n  w h ich ,  
how ever ,  th e  h i g h e s t  and u n c o n d i t io n e d  good can a lo n e  be 
found .
I f  t h e  end  whose r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s u b j e c t i v e l y  d e te r m in e s  a good w i l l  
were some s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  t o  be r e a l i z e d  by a c t i n g  i n  v a r i o u s  w ays, th en  
th e  w i l l  w hich  a c t e d  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  would have o n ly  i n s t r u m e n t a l  v a lu e  -  
d e p e n d in g  on i t s  s u c c e s s  i n  r e a l i z i n g  t h e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s .  A good w i l l  i s  
good, how ever , by v i r t u e  o f  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  a c t  from duty o r  from reverence 
for the law. Thus, i t  would seem t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  g round  d e te r m in in g  a good 
w i l l  m ust be t h e  idea o f law. I n  some p l a c e s  K an t e x p l i c i t l y  s a y s  a s  much:
"Only so m e th in g  w hich  i s  c o n jo in e d  w i th  my w i l l  s o l e l y  
a s  a g round  and n e v e r  a s  an e f f e c t  -  so m e th in g  w hich  does  
n o t  s e r v e  my i n c l i n a t i o n ,  b u t  o u tw e ig h s  i t  o r  a t  l e a s t  
l e a v e s  i t  e n t i r e l y  o u t  o f  a c c o u n t  i n  my c h o ic e  -  and t h e r e ­
f o r e  o n ly  b a r e  law f o r  i t s  own s a k e ,  can be an o b j e c t  o f  
r e v e r e n c e  and t h e r e - w i t h  a command. " 1*8
" . . . t h e  o b j e c t  o f  r e v e r e n c e  i s  t h e  idea o f the law i n  i t ­
s e l f ,  which admittedly is  present only in a rational being 
-  so  f a r  a s  i t ,  and n o t  an e x p e c te d  r e s u l t ,  i s  t h e  g round 
d e te r m i n in g  th e  w i l l . . . .  T h is  i d e a  a lo n e  can  c o n s t i t u t e  
t h a t  p r e e m in e n t  good w hich  we c a l l  m o ra l ,  a good w hich i s  
a l r e a d y  p r e s e n t  i n  th e  p e r s o n  a c t i n g  on t h i s  i d e a  and h a s  
n o t  t o  be a w a i te d  m e re ly  from  t h e  r e s u l t . ' ,t+8
T h is  fo rm a l  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  r a t i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e  m igh t  be r e c o n ­
c i l e d  w i th  K a n t ' s  n o t i o n  o f  an e n d - i n - i t s e l f  a s  f o l l o w s :  t h e  o b j e c t  whose
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  d e te r m in e s  a good w i l l  i s  n o t  s im p ly  th e  i d e a  o f  law  b u t  t h e
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idea of the necessity of willing in accordance with the law, or the idea of 
a being who is determined by and in accordance with law - i.e. of a ration­
al being 'legislating' through its maxims and subject to no law which it 
does not itself 'make'.5  ^ This distillation of Rousseau's conception of 
the 'citizen' (see section III of Part IV) presumes that reverence for 
rational nature is the subjective ground determining a good will; rational 
personality is the end-in-itself which both Rousseau and Kant seek. It is 
as members of the sovereign, as 'citizens' (for both Rousseau and Kant), 
that the discrete personalities, though subjects of a supreme authority, 
"obey only themselves and remain as free as before." In the form of sove­
reignty, neither liberty nor one's rational ends can be alienated. The 
individual cannot surrender his essential humanity - the right to fashion 
his own destiny, to obey only himself.
Noting the similarity between the expressions "end-in-itself" and 
"thing-in-itself", the former might be construed as the noumenal ground of 
all ends (or, as Kant says, "the subject of all ends"). These ends are the 
various objectives consciously adopted by a rational being. The ground of 
all ends - of the free (i.e. "spontaneous") construction of maxims - is the 
noumenal self: pure practical reason which somehow ("incomprehensively")
constrains men through its representation in human consciousness. Rational 
personality is thus an end in the sense that the idea of rational personal­
ity can determine the will. It is as an end-in-itself, however, in that it 
is the noumenal ground of all ends.
This end-in-itself has unconditioned and absolute value because it is 
necessarily represented as an object of reverence. "Reverence", writes 
Kant, "is properly awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love". 
Although individuals might value certain things as a consequence of their 
conception of happiness, they are constrained t,0 . recognize the limitation 
imposed on the ends they seek (and their actions in pursuit of these ends) 
by the idea of personality. They thus regard rational personality as of 
unconditional worth, as conditioning all personal and merely contingent 
valuations. In establishing the unconditioned value of rational nature - 
in ascribing a unique dignity to persons - some content is given to the 
categorical imperative. Assuming the existence of (other) rational beings 
who we may affect by our actions, the moral law places restrictions on how 
we may treat them: "Rational beings... are called persons because their
505
nature already marks them out as ends-in-themselves - that is, as something 
which ought not to be used merely as means - and consequently imposes to 
that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them...."52 Obviously, 
the notions of an end-in-itself and of rational nature as the ground of a 
categorical imperative have undergone a change. Rational nature now is 
not simply the noumenal ground of all ends; the idea of rational nature is 
not simply the subjective ground determining a good will. As a ground of 
determinate taws, rational nature "must be...conceived only negatively - 
that is, as an end against which we should never act, and consequently as 
one which in all our willings, we must never rate merely as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end."53
Thus, the fact that there are (other) rational beings who are (also) 
ends-in-themselves provides reasons for particular restrictions on maxims. 
What needs to be emphasised here is the multiple role of the notion of an 
end-in-itself: rational nature is an end-in-itself in that it is the
noumenal ground of all ends. Consequently, it is the source of the con­
straint to restrict maxims in accordance with the law and thus the subjec­
tive ground determining a good will. As something of unconditioned value, 
however, it is akin to the more usual notion of an end: the content of
moral requirements is comprised by actions or omissions which are object­
ively necessary in order that persons be treated as ends-in-themselves - 
although rules grounded in the unconditioned worth of rational nature do 
not require actions as a means of producing this 'end'.
From the notion of rational nature as the ground of the possibility 
of a categorical imperative, i.e. as pure practical (legislative) reason, 
Kant derives his third (major) formulation of the categorical imperative. 
The categorical imperative, he says, requires that a rational being always 
choose "his maxims from the point of view of himself and also of every 
other rational being - as a maker of law...."5t+ The three formulations of 
the categorical imperative are concerned with different components of the 
concept of duty: (a) the universality of moral requirements; (b) a general
characterisation of the content of moral requirements - relating to our 
dealings with (other) rational beings; (c) the condition under which beings 
are subject to moral requirements, which is also the condition of their 
having moral worth. They appear to be equivalent as a consequence of the 
ambiguity in the notions of end and ground which we have been examining.
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I n  e x p l i c i t l y  r e l a t i n g  t h e  t h r e e ,  K an t  s a y s :
"The p r i n c i p l e  'So a c t  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  e v e ry  r a t i o n a l  b e in g  
(b o th  t o  y o u r s e l f  and to  o t h e r s )  t h a t  he may a t  t h e  same t im e  
c o u n t  in  y o u r  maxim a s  an e n d - i n - h i m s e l f ' i s  t h u s  a t  bo t tom  
th e  same a s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  'A c t  on a maxim w hich a t  t h e  same 
t im e  c o n t a i n s  i n  i t s e l f  i t s  own u n i v e r s a l  v a l i d i t y  f o r  e v e ry  
r a t i o n a l  b e i n g ' . Fo r  to  sa y  t h a t  i n  u s in g  means t o  e v e ry  end 
I  o u g h t  t o  r e s t r i c t  my maxim by t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  
a l s o  be u n i v e r s a l l y  v a l i d  a s  a law  f o r  e v e ry  s u b j e c t  i s  j u s t  
t h e  same as  t o  say  t h i s :  t h a t  a s u b j e c t  o f  e n d s ,  nam ely ,  a
r a t i o n a l  b e in g  h i m s e l f ,  m ust be made th e  g round  f o r  a l l  maxims 
o f  a c t i o n ,  n e v e r  merely as  a m eans, b u t  a s  a supreme c o n d i t i o n  
r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  use  o f  e v e ry  means -  t h a t  i s ,  a lw ays  a l s o  a s  
an e n d . . . .  Now from t h i s  i t  u n q u e s t i o n a b ly  f o l lo w s  t h a t  e v e ry  
r a t i o n a l  b e in g ,  a s  an e n d - i n - h i m s e l f ,  m ust be a b le  to  r e g a r d  
h i m s e l f  a s  a l s o  t h e  maker o f  u n i v e r s a l  law i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any 
law  w h a te v e r  t o  w hich he may be s u b j e c t e d ;  f o r  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  f i t n e s s  o f  h i s  maxims t o  make u n i v e r s a l  law t h a t  marks him 
o u t  a s  an e n d - i n - h i m s e l f . " 55
R a t i o n a l  b e in g s  a r e  e n d s - i n - t h e m s e lv e s  b e c a u s e  th e y  p o s s e s s  p r a c t i c a l  
r e a s o n  and so  have t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  l e g i s l a t e  th ro u g h  t h e i r  maxims. Thus 
r a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  grounds t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c a t e g o r i c a l  im p e r a t iv e  i n  t h a t  
o b l i g a t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  o n ly  i f  t h e r e  a r e  b e in g s  who p o s s e s s  p r a c t i c a l  
r e a s o n .  R a t io n a l  n a t u r e  i s  t h e  end  o f  m ora l  a c t i o n ,  how ever, i n  two 
s e n s e s :  (a) i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  p r o v id e s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  ground  o f  a d h e re n c e
t o  th e  law -  i . e .  t h e  p u re  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n  o f  e a ch  man c o n s t r a i n s  him t o  
comply w i th  t h e  law ; (b) t h e  s t a t u s  o f  a l l  p e r s o n s  a s  e n d s - i n - t h e m s e lv e s  
o b j e c t i v e l y  g rounds  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  law : we m u st ,  i n  a l l  o u r  a c t i o n s ,
a c c o rd  a l l  r a t i o n a l  b e in g s  such  t r e a t m e n t  a s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e i r  
s t a t u s  a s  e n d s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s  -  a s  o f  u n c o n d i t io n e d  and a b s o lu t e  w o r th ,  as  
subject to no law to which they cannot "ra tiona lly  assent".
A lthough  we do n o t  y e t  know w ha t  i s  in v o lv e d  i n  t r e a t i n g  o t h e r s  (o r  
o u r s e l v e s )  a s  e n d s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s ,  we may d i s t i n g u i s h  t h r e e  s e n s e s  i n  which 
r a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  i s  t h e  'g r o u n d '  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r i c a l  i m p e r a t iv e :  (1) t h e
e x i s t e n c e  o f  p u re  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n  w i t h i n  e v e ry  man i s  t h e  ground  o f  t h e  
p o ss ib il i ty  o f  a c a t e g o r i c a l  i m p e r a t iv e ;  (2) p u re  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n  i s  t h e  
noumenal source o f  t h e  law  and o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  w hich  men e x p e r i e n c e .
Thus i t  i s  t h e  g ro u n d ^ o f  o b l i g a t i o n  -  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  con ­
s t r a i n t  t o  do w hat t h e y  r e g a r d  a s  t h e i r  d u ty ;  (3) r a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o b j e c t ­
i v e l y  g ro u n d s 2  p a r t i c u l a r  c a t e g o r i c a l  i m p e r a t iv e s  w hich r e q u i r e  o r  p r o h i b i t  
s p e c i f i c  k in d s  o f  a c t i o n s .  (The g ro u n d 2  o f  an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  keep  a
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contract, for example, is the fact that failure to do so would constitute 
treating another as a mere means to one's personal satisfaction.) As a 
consequence of this ambiguity the three formulations are not equivalent - 
although they are all derived from Kant's analysis of the concept of duty, 
and are related to one another in much the way Kant says they are. Kant's 
fourth (major) formulation of the categorical imperative is as follows: 
"every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a 
law-making member in (a) universal kingdom of ends."56 From the require­
ment to treat all men as ends-in-themselves, in accordance with objective 
laws grounded in the will of each, "there arises (the notion of) a systema­
tic union of rational beings under common objective laws - that is, a king­
dom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such 
beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom is called a kingdom 
of ends (which is admittedly only an ideal)."57 Thus, Kant says, "morality 
consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone 
a kingdom of ends is possible."58 A kingdom of ends would actually exist
if the maxims "which the categorical imperative prescribes as a rule for
all rational beings... were universally followed". 58 There would then be a 
"whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational
beings as ends-in-themselves and also of the personal ends which each may
set before himself)...."80
In a kingdom of ends men would freely pursue their own (material) 
ends, in accordance with maxims restricted by and constructed in accordance 
with, laws grounded in rational personality. So far as men restrict their 
actions in light of the respect due others, the personal ends of each would 
themselves have objective value81 and each would pursue his own ends (as 
well as assisting others in need) as objectively valuable ends.
IV
Kant's distinction between two 'kinds' of obligation (juridical and 
ethical) is best understood in light of his conception of a kingdom of 
ends. Conceived as legislators in such a kingdom, men are constrained by 
their own pure practical reason to construct and restrict their maxims in 
accordance with the second-order categorical imperative. Their obligation 
is groundedi in pure practical reason. The end contained in the rational 
incentive is the 'immanent end' of manifesting pure rational (moral) 
agency, i.e. being strong in one's resolve to act from respect for the law.
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The doctrine of virtue elaborates on this conception of obligation, which 
consists in being constrained by one's consciousness of duty.
Conceived primarily as subjects in a possible kingdom of ends, men's 
exercise of external freedom - what they may permissibly do - is restricted 
by laws grounded2 in the reciprocal claims of men on one another. That is, 
these laws are grounded2 in the wills of others as restrictive ends-in- 
themselves which must never be treated as mere means. Laws of external 
freedom delimit permissible action by specifying what sorts of actions are 
necessary and what sorts forbidden in light of this restriction; i.e. in 
light of the rights of others, as ends-in-themselves, to exercise external 
freedom within the limits imposed by the laws. The right to exercise (law­
ful) external freedom, however, is an authorization to oppose interference 
with this exercise. It is an "authorization to compel" those who would un­
lawfully interfere with its exercise. Thus, to say that someone has a 
right to another's performance (or omission) of a particular kind of action 
"means only that the use of coercion to make anyone do this is entirely 
compatible with everyone's freedom, including the freedom of the person 
coerced... in accordance with universal laws."®2
Men are obliged "through the wills of others" (in accordance with laws 
binding all) in the sense that others may justifiably compel compliance 
with these laws. The right which stems from the rational personality of 
others, grounding2 particular laws, is also immediately an authorization to 
compel. These laws are conceived as carrying an incentive with them, name­
ly, compulsion. Moreover, the obligation to comply with them is itself 
grounded in the tegitimacy of compulsion to compliance. Thus:
"Ethics discusses all obligations - those of charity and 
generosity as well as those of indebtedness - and consi­
ders them all together but from the standpoint of the 
inner grounds of impulsion, it reflects on their origins 
in duty and in the nature of things themselves, not in 
compulsion. Jurisprudence, however, is not concerned 
with the discharge of obligation from duty, but from 
compulsion; it considers them in their relation to com­
pulsion, and stresses the sanctions of compulsion."®3
The concepts of justice and juridical obligation are abstractions from 
the full concept of duty. As members of a community of (incompletely)
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rational beings, men have obligations in accordance with the "laws of 
reciprocal coercion". The formal principle of these laws, "the universal 
law of Justice", is contained in the notion of freedom of action under 
common laws binding all members of such a community: "act externally in
such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom 
of everyone according to a universal law."6l+ Since this law formulates a 
categorical restriction on action as a consequence of the universal right 
to external freedom, "strict justice can also be represented as the possi­
bility of a general reciprocal use of coercion that is consistent with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with universal laws."65 The doctrine of 
justice, then, concerns the first principle (and derivative laws) of justi­
fied coercion within a community of (incompletely) rational beings. Parti­
cular categorical imperatives grounded2 in the rights of others are con­
firmed by reason and specify strict or perfect duties. The justness of 
coercion and obligation are mutually entailed.
Juridical duty and juridical obligation can be considered in abstrac­
tion from the rational incentive which accompanies every categorical 
imperative of reason. Although the supreme principle of justice is con­
tained in reason and laws of reciprocal coercion are confirmed by reason 
as categorical imperatives, men are obliged to perform particular actions 
(their juridical duties) by the will of others, i.e. other's authorization 
to compel. Consequently, men can completely discharge their obligations - 
'do their duty' - simply by performing the required actions, whatever their 
reasons for doing so.
Having considered only the formal principle of juridical obligation, 
we have yet to determine how particular laws of reciprocal coercion are 
derived. Since these laws are aimed at restricting the exercise of exter­
nal freedom so that conflict is avoided and 'equal' freedom enjoyed by all, 
Kant applies the supreme principle to the (empirically) necessary condi­
tions under which men make use of their external freedom, and from which 
the possibility of conflict arises.
In order to exercise external freedom (i.e. act on maxims aimed at 
achieving various ends) a man must make use of objects. Although a person 
has a natural right to pursue his own ends, free from physical coercion and 
constraint (so long as this pursuit leaves others similarly free), he can
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reasonably hope to attain these ends only if he can rely on the availabili­
ty of "objects of choice" which he may not always physically possess. That 
is, he must be able to have property: de jure possession, consisting in a
right to dispose of the object possessed as he chooses. This right exclu­
des all others from using the object; it is an 'authorization to compel' 
others not to interfere with one's own (lawful) use of it.
Thus, there must be some way for men to acquire rights to the exclu­
sive use of objects. Kant formulates this condition in what he calls "the 
juridical postulate of practical reason": "it is possible to have any and
every external object of my will as my property."55 This is, he says, "a 
permissive law of practical reason" which "confers on us an authorization 
... to impose an obligation on all others - an obligation that they other­
wise would not have had - to refrain from using certain objects of our will 
because we were the first to take possession of them."57
These obligations, however, are not imposed by a 'unilateral act of 
will' in which a person simply announces his exclusive possession of and 
right to some object. The possibility of acquiring rights and imposing 
obligations must be grounded in a categorical imperative reciprocally 
binding all men. That is, if any person's claim to the exclusive use of 
an object is valid, and imposes obligations on others (to refrain from 
interfering with his use of the object) this claim must be made in accord­
ance with a rule enabling all men to acquire rights and impose obligations:
"When I declare (by word or deed), 'I will that an external 
object shall be mine', I thereby declare it obligatory for 
everyone else to refrain from (using) the object of my will..
.. Included in this claim, however, is an acknowledgement of 
being reciprocally bound to everyone else to (exercise) a 
similar and equal constraint with respect to what is theirs."55
Moreover, men may impose obligations on one another only if the 'pro­
cedural rule'55 by which they do so satisfies certain conditions. Although 
their use of the procedure will be primarily a function of their individual 
needs and interests, the procedure itself must (minimally) be such that 
everyone could 'rationally assent to it'.75 In addition, the rule must be 
publicly known so that it can be effectively used by everyone, and there 
must be some public (centralized) executive agency assuring that property
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rights, legitimately acquired, will be respected. Those (procedural) rules 
which satisfy these conditions enable individuals to establish moral ('jur­
idical') relationships amongst themselves. They specify ways that men can 
be obliged by the wilt of another, and thus to another. In other words, 
they specify civil obligations.
Kant's notion of an 'object of choice' is quite broad. In addition 
to physical objects, it includes "the will of another with respect to a 
particular act" and "the status of another in relation to me".71 In the 
first place, my possession of an object of choice is constituted by the 
performance of a particular action by a particular person. I have a right 
to this performance and may legitimately compel anyone who would unjustly 
deprive me of it, not to do so.72 Since it is (primarily) the person whose 
performance I own who could deprive me of this possession - by not perform­
ing the action - we might say that my right is against the person whose 
choice I own: he is under an obligation to me to perform the action.
More directly: if I have made use of a 'just procedure' for attaining
rights and imposing obligations on (particular) others, then the rule con­
stitutes a law for all men, and the person whose choice I come to "own" is 
obliged to perform a particular action. His obligation is through or 'by' 
my will in that he is under an obligation to me by virtue of my right (i.e. 
my authorization to compel or to demand coercive measures) to his perform­
ance of the action. A clear case of a rule in accordance with which we can 
come to "own the choice of another", and which fits the basic schema for 
the acquisition of property rights, would be that requiring some return for 
gifts. With respect to other persons, e.g., rules defining sanctioned 
practices of promising or contracting, the schema of claiming some object 
as one's own by making use of a just procedure, and thereby placing others 
under an obligation, is not entirely appropriate. For it is generally some 
voluntary action on the part of the person under the obligation that 
results in the obligation and the corresponding right (cf. Part I) . Promi­
sing involves placing oneself under an obligation to someone, to perform or 
refrain from some action. Contracting involves placing oneself under an 
obligation to someone to do something in order that (or, provided that) the 
latter places himself under a reciprocal obligation. Nonetheless, (just) 
rules defining practices of promising or contracting, enabling persons to 
voluntarily undertake obligations, are obvious candidates for public,
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reciprocally-binding rules in accordance with which rights and obligations 
are created. (Such rules serve to "expand the freedom" of every person by 
enhancing his ability to rationally plan and organize his life.)
The objects of choice constituted by the "status of another in rela­
tion to me" might include the possession of another person insofar as I may 
command them or generally guide their lives - as in the case of wives, 
children and servants. This would (probably) involve more or less structu­
red, more or less official public rules according to which those who depend 
on others for their well-being are obliged to those who care for or protect 
them. The claim to possession might consist in actually providing others 
with the necessities of life.
In discussing the necessity of acknowledging that one is reciprocally 
bound by others' acquisition of the objects of their choice, Kant says, "I 
am not bound to leave what is another's (property) untouched if everyone 
else does not in turn guarantee with regard to what is mine that he will 
act in accordance with exactly the same principle."73 This guarantee does 
not derive simply from the principle being a product of legislation by the 
will of all, i.e. by what Kant calls, in a manner reminiscent of Rousseau, 
a "collective (common) universal will". It is not sufficient that the rule 
be in accord with the supreme principle of justice, enable the 'expansion' 
of external freedom and therefore be, in a sense, a (derivative) product of 
the pure practical reason of every man. In addition, the Will which legis­
lates must be backed by coercive power. The condition under which men are 
subject to "general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed 
by power is a civil society", a society under a civil constitution. "A 
civil constitution... provides the juridical condition under which each 
person's property is secured and guaranteed to him."7Lf
A civil constitution and the positive laws made in accordance with it 
provide publicly sanctioned rules, enabling the members of the society to 
acquire rights and impose obligations with respect to one another. They 
provide for settling conflicts about rights and ensure that the decisions 
of the public judiciary are carried out. Thus, only if there is public 
legislation, representative of or expressing the collective will of all 
members of the society; authorized agencies for interpreting the laws and 
deciding particular cases which fall under them; and some executive power
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to enforce these decisions, is there the requisite guarantee of reciproc­
ity. Only then do rules - either officially sanctioned positive laws or 
’socially' sanctioned moral rules - establish particular moral relations 
among men. Only under these conditions can individuals (come to) be under 
obligations to one another to perform particular actions in accordance 
with these rules.75 Thus, particular categorical imperatives are derived 
from the supreme principle of right and particular actions (or omissions) 
entailed by these imperatives are obligatory.
These categorical imperatives can be viewed as positive laws in a 
kingdom of ends. They give content to the requirement that each respect 
the innate right of others to exercise their freedom (so far as this does 
not violate the rights of others), by constituting (sanctioned) rules 
facilitating entry into particular moral relationships through which indi­
viduals acquire 'contingent' rights and obligations.
The categorical imperative requires that our actions be compatible 
with (i.e. accord with) rules which would regulate human interaction in a 
possible kingdom of ends. We can conceive of a kingdom of ends as a union 
of rational beings under laws which - at least in their underlying princip­
le - issue from the "collective Will", and which define and regulate 
relations between persons as ends and means, e.g. how people may enter 
moral relationships in order to serve individual and shared interests. The 
categorical imperative commands that our actions accord with these laws so 
that, for example, we keep our agreements, respect the property rights of 
others, and so forth. Within an actual civil society, then - a juridical 
condition - we will be placed under obligations by one another in accord­
ance with those particular positive laws (and socially sanctioned moral 
rules) which correspond to the sanctioned laws of a possible kingdom of 
ends.
For our purposes, then, the critical features of juridical obligations 
and juridical duties are as follows:
(1) Juridical obligation is obligation in accordance with laws 
of universal reciprocal coercion, and particular juridical 
laws are justified as such.
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(2) Juridical obligations are grounded2 in the wills of others, 
i.e. their rights, their authorization to compel. Conse­
quently, juridical obligation is always obligation to 
another, insofar as one is bound to perform a particular 
action in virtue of another's (or others') authorization
to compel (or, more accurately: his authorization to
initiate public coercive measures to compel performance).
(3) Juridical obligation is fully discharged by the performance 
of a particular (kind of) action, which is one's juridical 
duty, whatever one's reasons for performing the action. Of 
course, juridical obligation carries an incentive - compul­
sion - which could be sufficient. Moreover, the content of 
juridical obligation is not determined by the needs and 
interests of the subject, except, perhaps, in some but not 
all instances of self-imposed obligation. Even in these 
cases, however, one's obligation is not conditional upon any 
possible benefit to be derived from discharging it. Thus, 
juridical obligations can also be discharged from the motive 
of respect for the law.
(4) Juridical obligation is strict in that the law leaves no 
latitude for choice in determining what is one's juridical 
duty; juridical duty is perfect in that its content consists 
in the performance of fully determinate actions.
V
The subject of obligation(s) - the obligee - is in all cases some 
being who is incompletely rational, i.e. one who possesses 'pure practical 
reason' but is strongly influenced by desire and inclination. Such a being 
might construct maxims with a view only to personal satisfaction without 
considering the objective Value of this satisfaction, or he might rationally 
appraise his personal objectives in light of his participation in a commun­
ity of rational beings who are the source, as well as the subjects, of laws 
binding on all.
Although the subject of obligation must always be regarded as a member 
of such a community, as the subject of juridical obligations, he is princi-
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pally viewed by Kant as bound in accordance with laws of reciprocal coer­
cion: laws which derive from the "common collective will of all", and with
which men may compel one another to comply. As a subject of ethical or 
moral obligation, a person is conceived primarily as legislating through 
his maxims: seeking ends and acting as he does because he recognizes the
end to be objectively valuable and the action either rationally permissible 
or categorically necessary.
The subject of moral obligation is a being who regards himself as 
bound by laws which he recognizes as applicable to himself as a member of a 
community of rational beings; a being who, as it were, takes "the moral 
point of view" in deliberating and choosing to act. He is (morally) obli­
ged to perform particular actions when, from this point of view, he con­
cludes that he is bound to perform some action - either because he believes 
the action is required by some law of reciprocal coercion (i.e. because he 
respects the rights of others75) or because he believes he must now so act 
in order to promote the ends which are his duties. The subject of juridi­
cal obligation, however, is a person to whom some valid law of reciprocal 
coercion is applicable, whatever his beliefs or motivation. Such a law may 
be applicable as a consequence of (a) a juridical act by the subject or by 
another, whereby another comes to have a right against the subject, or (b) 
the subject's standing in some juridical relation to others, which grounds 
rights against him (e.g. rights to corporal freedom within the laws of a 
civil society.
The ground^ of an obligation is its noumenal ground: pure practical 
reason as the source of the constraining categorical imperative. Since 
obligation entails the existence of such a 'legislative faculty', it 
grounds the possibility of a categorical imperative. Moreover, (in con­
junction with specific judgements of duty) it is the ground} or moral obli­
gation: it is the ground of a person's being obliged (i.e. constrained)
here and now to perform a particular action. The groundS2 of obligations 
are, generally, the rights of others, as a consequence of which particular 
categorical imperatives prescribing determinate kinds of actions are justi­
fied.
Generally, the ground of particular juridical obligations is that 
state of affairs, action or event in terms of which some particular rule
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(law) of reciprocal coercion is applicable to an agent. The applicability 
of such a rule to an agent entails the existence of a right against him - 
an authorization to compel. Thus the ground of a juridical obligation is 
also the ground of some right (of another, or others generally) against the 
subject. Although Kant insists that "justice... cannot be conceived of as 
composed of two parts, namely, the obligation implied by a law and the 
authorization that someone has, by virtue of obligating another through his 
will, to use coercion to make the other fulfil (his obligation)..."77, 
there is reason to regard a state of affairs as grounding an obligation qua 
grounding a right against the subject. For juridical rules are not merely 
necessary restrictions uniting actions with the supreme principle of right 
(a second-order categorical imperative definitive of 'external freedom 
under law'). Rather, they are justified as particular (derivative) rules 
of reciprocal coercion, i.e. others must in fact be authorized to compel 
compliance with these rules in order that the rules are binding. This is 
the hallmark of juridical obligation.
The state of affairs which grounds particular obligations (qua ground­
ing particular rights) might be the performance of some action by the sub­
ject or 'partner' - the obligor - which establishes particular moral rela­
tionships in accordance with a valid juridical rule (e.g. making a promise, 
acquiring property). It might be the existence of a natural, social, 
institutional or political relationship which, in accordance with a valid 
juridical rule, constitutes a moral relationship defined in terms of 
various rights and duties. In some of these cases, notably the last, the 
relationship may exist among all members of a society. The 'partner' may 
be broadly construed as the state, representing the common collective will 
which is authorized to compel compliance with various rules.
Particular states of affairs (actions, events) ground juridical obli­
gations only if there are public rules which are recognized and generally 
'enforced' within a civil society (to which both subject and partner 
belong); specifying these states of affairs as establishing obligations 
(having a specific content and owed to some particular person or to the 
state as representative of the common collective will). In validating 
certain states of affairs as grounds of obligation, then, our concern is 
with the validation of particular rules which specify these states of 
affairs as grounds of obligation. These rules are binding on individuals 
to whom they apply only within civil society, under public law. As dis-
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cussed in Part I as the 'problem of order', this condition provides the 
necessary guarantee of reciprocity, i.e. the assurance that juridical 
rules - comprised by positive law and (purely) moral rules - will generally 
be observed.
Kant's analysis of the concept of duty figures significantly in the 
justification of both juridical and moral obligation. Interestingly, it 
illuminates the Rousseauan influence permeating Kant's ethical thought, 
for, from this analysis is derived, firstly, the notion of a community of 
rational beings under common laws, regulating and restricting action, and, 
secondly, a conception of 'personality' which must be presupposed if men 
are to be subject to moral requirements.
If there are any moral requirements to act in certain ways, they must 
be grounded in laws binding all rational beings irrespective of subjective, 
contingent differences between them. These laws are derived - in conjunc­
tion with empirical premises about the subjects of obligation and the cir­
cumstances in which they interact - from an analysis of "external freedom 
under law", i.e. the formal principle of justice: "Act externally in such
a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of 
everyone according to a universal law".78 The laws specify restrictions 
which ensure that men's "exercise of external freedom" will not lead to 
conflict.
For Kant, the critical problem underpinning what we have termed civil 
obligation is as follows: in order that the rules of civil conduct specify
how men ought, unconditionally, to act - in order that men be held respon­
sible for complying or not with these rules - it must be supposed that they 
have the capacity to act from the motive of respect for the law: that men
can be sufficiently motivated by their recognition of some action as 
obligatory. For moral rules are not justified by reference to the needs 
or interests of any or all persons; if men ought unconditionally to comply 
with them, men must be capable of obedience when no personal need or 
interest prompts them to obey: even when all desire and interest run
counter to moral directives. The capacity to act from respect for the law 
- to act (solely) for the reason that some action is one's duty - is the 
core of Kant's conception of personality78 and, by implication, citizen­
ship. That is to say, Kant considers the true citizen to be synonymous
518
with rational man, and insofar as men are irrational so it follows that 
their civility is 'spoilt'.
Particular rules of juridical obligation are justified in terms of 
the formal principle of justice if they place reciprocal restrictions on 
permissible action so as to prevent conflict in men's exercise of external 
freedom. The obligation to act in accordance with such rules, however, is 
grounded2 in the innate right of each and all to freedom of action within 
the limits of these rules; i.e. in the legitimacy of their actively oppos­
ing anyone who would limit their freedom in violation of these rules. 
Particular rules of juridical obligation, then, are essentially rules with 
which individuals may justifiably be compelled to comply. If the sanction 
of coercion is insufficient to guarantee general conformity to a particular 
rule, then the rule does not bind any individual and therefore any coercion 
to adherence is not permissible. If the rule is not one to which everyone 
could "rationally assent" then, again, no coercion to compliance is justi­
fied.
Men have obligations in accordance with juridical rules, then, only 
if:
(a) there is some reasonable assurance that most will usually 
comply with them. This assurance, the guarantee of reci­
procity, is provided by the general juridical condition: 
civil society under public law - the condition of order.
(b) the rules are such that all citizens could rationally 
assent to them - the condition of civility.
Both these conditions, for Kant as for Rousseau, are contained in the 
justificatory requirement that the source of coercion be a common, collec­
tive, powerful Will. The rules enforced by such a will are rules which 
place reciprocal limitations on civil intercourse. However, the condition 
of the content of juridical rules - that they be rules to which all could 
rationally assent - is not adequately explained by Kant. Presumably, juri­
dical rules which meet this condition will provide the substantive content 
of the formal prescription to treat men always as ends-in-themselves, i.e. 
they will specify in what such 'treatment' consists. But this does not 
take us very far.
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The content of juridical rules is made somewhat more determinate by- 
Kant's derivation of the juridical postulate of practical reason. "It is
80possible to have any and every external object of my will as my property." 
The rational exercise of external freedom entails the possibility of de 
dure possession of objects, that is, property. Since no one is bound to 
leave another's possessions untouched if he is not assured that others will 
do the same with respect to what is his, property is, strictly, impossible 
outside the context of civil society. Civil society provides the necessary 
assurance of actual reciprocity in respecting individuals' claims to posse­
ssion, Juridical rules, binding within civil society under public law are, 
then, rules according to which individuals have or acquire property. As 
rational beings capable of purposeful action - which involves the use of, 
and the possibility of owning, objects - and as human beings who may con­
flict with one another in their claims to possession, men can rationally 
assent to there being (procedures and) rules (enabling and) protecting the 
acquisition of property.
Nonetheless, the justification of particular juridical rules is still 
incomplete. For rules which enable men to acquire property might yet be 
unjust owing to the procedures or qualifications for acquiring property. 
These rules would not satisfy the material justificatory condition, i.e. 
that all could rationally assent to them. For they would be rules in 
accordance with which some will be treated primarily as means to the satis­
faction of others.
In justifying the grounds of moral obligation a particular conception 
of moral worth is justified. Two things are involved in this: first, 'the
reality' of moral obligation, i.e. the possibility of pure reason being 
practical must be established, and it must be shown that determination of 
the will by pure reason involves having dispositions to seek the several 
ends which are duties. Second, it must be argued that having these dispo­
sitions - as a consequence of sufficient rational constraint - constitutes 
virtue or moral goodness.
Moral obligation, regarded formally as self-constraint by the recogni­
tion (belief) that some (kind of) action is one's duty, is 'justified' by 
showing that its possibility is presupposed by the validity of any moral 
rules categorically requiring or prohibiting particular actions. Thus,
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Kant argues that if men are subject to moral requirements pure reason must 
be practical. The possession of pure practical reason, moreover, makes men 
the authors (as well as the subjects) of all value and of all moral require­
ments. Their capacity to be morally obliged - to "legislate through their 
maxims" - is, then, the source of their dignity. In discharging moral 
obligations, in manifesting this capacity to act from duty, they have moral 
worth.
If we then take into account (a) that men have a capacity for virtue,
(b) that they have the capacity, generally, to propose and pursue various 
personal objectives, and (c) that they have the necessary and natural end 
of their own happiness, then being sufficiently constrained by respect for 
the law involves adopting maxims of (a) seeking their own moral perfection, 
(b) developing their natural talents, and (c) seeking the happiness of 
others. Thus the ground of moral obligation - constraint by pure practical 
reason to adopt maxims of seeking the ends which are duties - is the ground 
of an individual's having moral worth. It is the noumenal ground which, in 
conjunction with particular judgements of duty made by an agent, establish­
es particular moral obligations: the felt constraint to perform particular
actions believed to be one's duty.
VI
"...Kant achieved the same methodological transformation 
in the concept of the social contract as he had carried out 
in the interpretation of Rousseau's "state of nature", writes 
Ernst Cassirer, "He transformed both from an 'experience' 
into an 'idea'. He believed that he had thereby taken nothing 
from their value, but had in a strict sense grounded and 
secured this value."®2
Patrick Riley neatly summarizes Kant's "quasi-contractarian politics" 
when he points out "that Kant's whole system... 'works' if his moral philo­
sophy works, since politics only creates a context for morality or ensures 
that moral laws will be obeyed for nonmoral reasons."
"There is thus in Kant no problem of 'political obligation' 
through consent, contract, promise, and so on, as there is in 
Hobbes and Rousseau: objective moral law is ultimate, and
politics not only creates a context for it, but even enforces
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part of it, at least insofar as external conduct is con­
cerned. One is thus obliquely obliged to the political order 
without explicit voluntary acts. This is true despite the 
fact that... Kant is the one member of the contractarian 
school who arrives at a conception of will adequate to account 
for the possibility of consent, promise, and obligation as in­
telligible ideas, and who could have developed a theory of 
political obligation based on consent and promise. Nonetheless, 
one has political obligations in Kant not in virtue of consent 
and promise, but in virtue of obeying dictates of duty commanded 
by the categorical imperative.... When Kant says that state laws 
must be conceived as the product of a (hypothetical) general 
will of the whole people as sovereign, this must be understood 
within a natural law context; indeed, he defines natural laws as 
'those to which an obligation can be recognized a priori by rea­
son without external legislation', whereas 'positive' laws are 
those which 'would neither obligate nore be laws without actual 
external legislation'. Now the public legal order will certain­
ly make and enforce positive laws; it will also enforce (though 
it will not make) some natural laws, though it cannot require 
that men abstain from violating politically enforced natural 
laws for moral reasons (i.e., because of duty itself). But if 
consent, or rather the Idea of it, is also to be important in 
Kant, one would have to say that for him those laws are legiti­
mate which could have been consented to by a mature rational 
people and which are congruent with natural law."83
For Kant, then, the Idea of the social contract does not address the 
question "why is one under an obligation to obey the law?"; rather, it is 
a heuristic device that helps us to ascertain whether or not a civil law 
is just. "It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has 
undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame 
his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united 
will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can 
claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will. This 
is the test of the rightfulness of every public law."8l+ As an idea of 
reason, then, the social contract is a model of rational choice, codifying 
as it were the conditions of civility and order. Kant's conception there­
fore is not so much contractarian - since the contract metaphor is a mere 
gloss to his moral theory - as it is a refinement of Rousseau's hypotheti­
cal contractarian method.
Kant's principal concern lay with the autonomy of rational beings. 
Yet, like Rousseau, Kant was confronted with the problem of reconciling 
autonomy and authority: of justifying the state in the face of man's
'right to freedom'. It is only because each person, as an end-in-himself
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is the source - the noumenal ground - of universal principles of duty that 
each is bound by and in accordance with them. It is only because there are 
other persons who are also ends-in-themselves, and who we can affect by our 
actions in the world, that these principles place certain reciprocal re­
strictions on permissible action. The justifiability of state coercion 
must therefore be consistent with individual moral autonomy. And this 
consistency is achieved, according to Kant, following Rousseau, by ground­
ing etatist coercion in the 'general will' of each citizen. In the end, 
the state is a projection of the rational will as embodied in the categori­
cal imperative. The fundamental problem of political philosophy was not 
Kant's concern for, properly, his employment of the contract metaphor was 
merely illustrative of his ethical doctrine. The metaphor, as it were, 
illuminated the "kingdom of ends" into which the de jure state had dis­
solved.
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Notes
1. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, New York, 
1964, p .92; hereafter cited as Groundwork.
2. "It is... the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious as 
soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first presents itself 
to us; ... reason exhibits it as a ground of determination which is 
completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous 
condition..."
Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck, New York, 1956, p.29
3. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. H. Greene and 
H. H. Hudson, New York, 1960, p.19
4. Critique of Practical Reason, Op Cit, p.29
5. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.107
6. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, trans. J. Ellington, New York, 
1964, p.21
7. Critique of Practical Reason, Op Cit, p.63
8. Ibid., p.32
9. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.80
10. Ibid., p.80
11. Ibid., p.81
12. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd, New York, 1964, 
p. 13
13. Critique of Practical Reason, Op Cit, p.32
14. Ibid., p.32
15. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.65
16. Ibid., p.73
17. Note the 'contrast* with what Kant says in the Metaphysical Elements 
of Justice, p .13
18. Groundwork, Op Cit, pp 412-413
19. Critique of Practical Reason, Op Cit, p.75. Emphasis added
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20. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.73
21. The notion of an 'object of will' must remain ambiguous at this point; 
see section III.
22. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.88n. This definition applies to both purely 
rational and human beings.
23. None of the maxims of a purely rational will are strictly material 
maxims. The term applies primarily to maxims of a human will: a 
material maxim is adopted and acted upon as a consequence of sensual 
incentives, or as Kant sometimes puts it, "from the motive of self- 
love". All first-order maxims specify a particular kind of action, a 
purpose in acting and a characterization of the circumstances in which 
the agent performs the action for this purpose. But if an agent has 
(and acts on) a maxim because he blieves that accomplishing the pur­
pose is instrumental to or constitutive of personal satisfaction, then 
the maxim is a material maxim.
If, on the other hand, the incentive is "reverence for the law", 
the maxim is a formal maxim which legislative reason requires that the 
agent adopt and act upon. Formal maxims can also contain a material 
element - some purpose in acting - but then the purpose is itself 
'rationally valid', and it is the agent's purpose in acting because he 
recognizes its rational validity.
There are difficulties with this distinction, however. For example, 
(anticipating the discussion to follow) Kant often refers to the 
second-order categorical principle of the will as a 'formal maxim'.
Some material maxims - which have been confirmed by reason - will con­
tain "ends which are duties", i.e. ends which men are rationally 
necessitated to seek. Others, however, will be aimed at individual 
happiness, specifying actions which are in accord with the formal 
maxim. Personal happiness might be an agent's end, partly because he 
recognizes it to be one among several rationally valid ends. Nonethe­
less, the particular constitution of his happiness is determined by 
particular sensually-based incentives; he might act to promote his 
happiness - i.e. on maxims aimed at this end - only if the end and the 
action are confirmed by reason, but specific sensual incentives are 
also necessary. It is unclear, then, whether particular maxims of 
seeking one's happiness (when they are first confirmed by reason) are 
material or formal maxims.
24. Owing to the hierarchical ordering of the three second-order objective 
principles, all the first order maxims of a.purely rational will are 
such that: (a) all actions are justified and (b) his choosing to act 
(on these maxims) is fully rational. For a purely rational being acts 
in accordance with an applicable problematic principle only if his end 
and the prescribed action are consistent with the second-order asser- 
toric principle. The maxims constructed in accordance with the latter 
are subject to conditions placed on actions by the second-order cate­
gorical principle, the supreme principle of the will.
Kant's characterization of the second-order categorical principle 
as involving the 'universalisation' of all one's maxims might initial­
ly seem arbitrary. For although a categorical principle cannot pre-
25.
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scribe a particular material end on the grounds of individual (or even 
universal) "susceptibility to pleasure in (the idea of) the realiza­
tion of the end", all that is contained in the concept of a categori­
cal principle is that it provides an incentive for the will, indepen­
dent of and 'outweighing' all incentives grounded in desire and 
inclination. Such a principle might prescribe a particular end, for 
example, human happiness generally, or 'the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number'. As the supreme principle of a purely rational will, 
all maxims would be constructed with this restrictive (and ampliative) 
principle in view, and a purely rational will would thus choose to act 
from a purely rational incentive.
The concept of a supreme categorical principle does not preclude 
its having this particular content, but neither does it entail it.
Even if it could be established that pure reason does 'confirm' such 
an end as rationally necessary (Kant tries to establish this in his 
Doctrine of Virtue), construction of maxims and action in pursuit of 
this end manifest the ability to act from a purely rational incentive 
only if the incentive is recognition of the law (as requiring the 
pursuit of this end). The concept of a second-order categorical 
principle entails only the subordination of all contingent ends to 
law, i.e. to son^law or system of laws to which a rational agent is 
subject in common with other rational beings. In saying that the 
supreme principle of a purely rational will is that all maxims can be 
willed to be universal law, Kant is saying that the construction of 
all maxims is conditioned by their compatibility with such a system of 
laws (and with a rational being's capacity to be categorically deter­
mined by the idea of law.)
26. There seems to be a lack of symmetry between first-order hypothetical 
and first-order categorical principles, in that the latter are of the 
form, "in C I will do A", rather than "in C I will do A, in order to 
attain E". This is due to Kant's derivation of the supreme principle 
from an analysis of the notion of 'being obliged to perform a specific 
action'. He does not, of course, leave the matter here. As we shall 
see in our discussion of his formulation(s) of the 'categorical imper­
ative', and his Doctrine of Virtue, the provision of an end (or system 
of ends) by reason is necessary in order that the rational incentive 
be sufficient.
27. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.81. Kant is not entirely consistent in his use 
of the term 'law'. Sometimes, as in this passage, all objective prac­
tical principles are called 'laws'. Generally, however, he explicitly 
distinguishes rules of skill, counsels (or precepts) of prudence, and 
laws of morality.
28. Critique of Practical Reason, Op Cit, p.18
29. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.81
3°. Ibid.., p.84
31. Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, New York, 1963, p.15
32. Groundwork, Op Cit, p.82
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33. Any action on sensual incentives requires some conceptualization of 
the kind of action one would perform, and how this would satisfy the 
desire grounding the incentive. Thus reason has a role in the con­
struction of all material maxims. Nonetheless, conflicting desires 
and impulses might influence the will to act inappropriately to the 
purpose.
34. In speaking of the goodness of a will we assume that the will 
accords with reason; in speaking of constraint we consider only the 
rational incentive which may not in fact sufficiently determine the 
structuring, ordering or adoption of maxims.
35. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Op Cit, p .25
36. "Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands
of duty presented to him by reason and so worthy of esteem - the 
counterweight of his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction 
he grasps under the name of 'happiness'. But reason, without promis­
ing anything to inclination, enjoins its commands relentlessly, and 
therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect of these turbulent 
and seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be suppressed by any 
command.)" Groundwork, Op Cit, p.73
37. Ibid., p .88; "Here bare conformity to universal law as such (without 
having as its base any law prescribing particular actions) is what 
serves the will as its principle...", Ibid, p.70
38. Ibid., p . 69n
39. Ibid., p . 96
40. Ibid., p.95.
rH Ibid., p.96
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p.95
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p.105
47. Ibid., p.69
00 Ibid., p. 68
49. Ibid., p.69
50. A person
ions are not 'pathologically' determined. He is subject to no rule 
which he has not 'made' in that he will not act in accordance with a 
rule (prescribing actions as means to some end) unless he has made the 
end his own.
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52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60. 
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68. 
69.
Groundwork, Op Cit, p.69n
Ibid., p .96
Ibid., p.105
Ibid., p.106
Ibid., p.105
Ibid., p.106
Ibid., p.107
Ibid., p.101
Ibid., p.106
Ibid., p.101
The personal ends of individuals, conceived and pursued consistent­
ly with the moral law, have 'objective value' in the sense that the 
possibility of promoting or realizing these ends provides good reasons 
for acting - for both the individual and others. This is not to say 
that the individual or others ought(categorically) to do whatever they 
can to promote these ends. Promoting one's own ends is rationally 
permissible, promoting the ends of others, desirable (when personal 
sacrifice is required it is perhaps 'praiseworthy').
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Op Cit, p.37
Lectures on Ethics, Op Cit, p.33
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Op Cit, p.35
Ibid., p.36 
Ibid., p.52 
Ibid., p.53 
Ibid., p.64
Valid procedural rules enabling persons to acquire rights and 
impose obligations (i.e. to create moral relationships) are obviously 
not the same as particular categorical imperatives requiring or pro­
hibiting certain kinds of actions. c.f. Part I and H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law, Op Cit, chs. 3 & 5. Since our concern is the justifi­
cation of ascriptions of obligations we will, for the sake of simpli­
city, regard the obligations arising from the use of the former as 
specified by categorical imperatives of hypothetical form. c.f. Lewis 
White Beck, "Apodictic Imperatives", in Kant; Foundations of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, Text and Critical Essays, ed. R. P. Wolff, New 
York, 1969, pp 134-162
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70. It is not altogether clear what this condition comes to. Some
insight might be gained by considering the rationale behind the 
supreme principle of justice: we must, in all our actions, never
treat persons as mere means but always (at the same time) as ends-in- 
themselves. Action in accordance with rules establishing rights and 
imposing obligations (including the discharge of these obligations 
and the coercion justified by these rights) must not involve treating 
persons as mere means. A rule which was essentially or consistently 
prejudicial to the interests of those under an obligation - i.e. which 
imposed obligations on and thus limited the freedom of some group of 
persons, and by which some privileged group acquired rights (from 
which they may be supposed to benefit) - would be one in accordance 
with which the latter consistently treated the former (primarily) as 
means to their own ends. Such rules might be 'reciprocal' in a formal 
sense, in principle enabling anyone to acquire rights and impose 
obligations and binding all to whom they are applicable. Nonetheless, 
a rule might as a matter of fact regularly impose 'obligations' on 
some group and accord 'rights' to another owing to what might be 
called (not too happily) "morally irrelevant characteristics" (see 
Part Vj Rawls) . For example, there might be a rule for the acquisi­
tion of property which was prejudicial against those who lacked social 
'position', aristocratic ancestry, or money. Although the 'rights' 
and 'obligations' established in accordance with the rule might be 
'reciprocal' in a formal sense (i.e. the rich and positioned are 
required not to interfere with others' use of their meagre holdings), 
the rule, in effect, allows some to treat others primarily as means to 
their own ends.
Kant's own interpretation of the condition, at least with respect 
to the justness of positive laws, is looser (and even less illumina­
ting) : "if the law is such that a whole people could not possibly
agree to it (for example, if it.stated that a certain class of sub­
jects must be privileged as a hereditary ruling class), it is unjust; 
but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is 
our duty to consider the law as just, even if the people is at present 
in such a position or attitude of mind that it would probably refuse 
its consent if it were consulted." Worse still: "... so long as it
is not self-contradictory to say that an entire people could agree to 
such a law, however painful it might seem, then the law is in harmony 
with right." Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, Cambridge, 
1977, pp 79, 80-81
71. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Op Cit, p.54
72. Or, perhaps, I may demand that he be compelled by those who have
authority to apply sanctions: "... no one can coerce anyone else
other than through the public law and its executor...." Kant* s 
Political Writings, Op Cit, p.75. It is not altogether clear, how­
ever, what I am authorized to do in virtue of my having a purely moral 
right, which is not grounded in positive law.
73. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Op Cit, p.64
74. Ibid., p.65
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75. Kant distinguishes 'Public Law' from 'Private Law'. Private Law 
concerns moral (and legal) relations among individuals; Public Law 
concerns the authoritative interpretation and enforcement of some 
aspects of private law and the maintenance of the juridical condition 
of civil society. A juridical condition (i.e. a civil society under 
public law) is necessary for the validity of all rules which specify 
obligations, or which empower individuals to assume rights and impose 
obligations. These rules include not only all forms of positive 
private law, but private law which is not officially sanctioned (i.e. 
purely moral rules), as well as that part of public law which imposes 
obligations on all members of society and which is necessary for main­
taining the juridical condition (e.g. laws relating to taxation, mili­
tary service, etc.).
A juridical condition of civil society is necessary in order to 
justify coercion in accordance with legislatively-determined rules.
For these rules are the products of, and coercion is exercised by, a 
"collective, universal (common) and powerful Will." Moreover, actual 
general adherence to laws of reciprocal coercion assured by generally 
effective sanctions is necessary in order that individuals be bound by 
these laws. This is implied in Kant's characterization of the (only) 
innate right of all men, viz., "freedom (independence from the con­
straint of another's will) insofar as it is compatible with the free­
dom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law... (which 
contains within it) innate equality, that is, independence from being 
bound by others to do more than one can also reciprocally bind them 
to do...." (Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Op Cit, pp 43-44)
In the absence of actual, assured general conformity to rules which 
are formally just, an individual who discharges his 'obligation' 
restricts his own freedom and benefits others who do not restrict 
their freedom in accordance with rules. Thus, a person who obeys a 
rule under such conditions is being used by others as a mere means to 
their own ends. He cannot be under an obligation to do this.
76. In this context, a right must not be regarded so much as an autho­
rization to compel, but as the ground of this authorization: the
dignity of persons and "the capacity to obligate others to a duty, 
that is, the concept of a right....". Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice, Op Cit, p.45
77. Ibid., p. 36
00t"- Ibid., p.35
79. From this Kant derives his conceptions of virtue and moral obliga­
tion. Both the formal criteria of right action and moral worth are 
derived from the notion of duty, or of being subject to moral require­
ments. More accurately, the first derives from an analysis of these 
concepts in terms of the universality and necessity of moral require­
ments and their 'overriding' all considerations of self-interest. The 
second issues from a deduction of the metaphysical presuppositions of 
the validity of concepts. It might seem, then, that, as with Rousseau, 
in justifying Kant's conception of right or obligatory action we must 
also justify the conception of personality which it presupposes. It 
is not altogether clear, however, that the two are as inseparably
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c o n n e c te d  as  K ant b e l i e v e s .  We c a n ,  i n  any c a s e ,  d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  
fo rm a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r i g h t  -  d e r i v e d  from  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  o b lig a to ry  
a c tio n  and s e r v i n g  a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  p r i n c i p l e  o f  h i s  
t h e o r y  o f  j u r i d i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  -  from  h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  v i r t u e  and 
m ora l  o b l i g a t i o n .
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APPENDIX FIVE
The first two questions of the test for legitimacy evoke the contrac­
tarian method, and lead us to consider whether or not we are members of an 
effective moral order. However, these two material considerations are 
transparently hollow if explored independently of the third, since the 
proper application of the method, as we shall see in section III of the 
text, requires an analysis of citizenship or participation within a poli­
tical order: for, although founded in law, the capacity of the individual
to participate in public affairs is made effective (or rendered ineffec­
tual) by the physical and psychological resources at his disposal. The 
problem confronting Rousseau becomes further complicated if we add to it 
the problem of autonomy. Authentic participation in a moral order must be 
autonomous (self-actuated and controlled) according to Rousseau, otherwise 
it is impossible to fully reconcile liberty and authority. Autonomy, 
however, as we understand the term, necessarily implies freedom of con­
science in paedeutic and economic matters i.e. an order of autonomous 
persons is characterized by a free market of goods and ideas. Rousseau 
certainly had nothing like this in mind - the autonomy he outlines does 
not focus on private wills, but, rather, on the general will resident in 
each citizen. Yet, if it is true to say that Rousseau concerned himself 
with the moi commun - that aspect of the self which not only gains susten­
ance from but completely identifies with its social milieu - it is equally 
true to say that he did so because of its conspicuous absence in his 
milieu. One cannot talk to slaves as if they were free men, Rousseau seems 
to be saying, therefore, if one wishes to enlighten the slave about freedom 
one must appeal to the seeds of liberty within the slave's self-awareness.
The seeds of liberty within the mind of modern man, contends Rousseau, 
are those general notions of civic virtue which we all recognize and 
applaud in others but subject to egocentrism, the moi humain, in ourselves. 
Although they are not completely congruent with autonomy - that is to say, 
autonomy consists in more than these alone - the civic virtues are all we 
can palpably analyse and promote as the groundwork for some future auton­
omy. Consequently, we detect in all Rousseau's political works the over- 
protective zealotry of a guardian of innocent souls, forever mindful of 
corrupting forces and sermonizing on the dangers of self-indulgence. We
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are, in short, most delicate creatures. "As for men like me", laments 
Rousseau,
"whose passions have destroyed their original simplicity, 
who can no longer subsist on plants or acorns, or live 
without laws and magistrates, ...those who discover, in 
the design of giving human actions at the start a morality 
which they must otherwise have been so long in acquiring, 
the reason for a precept in itself indifferent and inex­
plicable on every other system; those, in short, who are 
persuaded that the Divine Being has called all mankind to 
be partakers in the happiness and perfection of celestial 
intelligences, all these will endeavour to merit the 
eternal prize they are to expect from the practice of 
those virtues, which they make themselves follow in learn­
ing to know them. They will respect the sacred bonds of 
their respective communities; they will love their fellow- 
citizens, and serve them with all their might: they will
scrupulously obey the laws, and all those who make or 
administer them; they will particularly honour those wise 
and good princes, who find means of preventing, curing, or 
even palliating all these evils and abuses, by which we are 
constantly threatened; they will animate the zeal of their 
deserving rulers, by showing them... the importance of their 
office and the severity of their duty. But they will not 
therefore have less contempt for a constitution that cannot 
support itself without the aid of so many splendid charac­
ters, much oftener wished for than found; and from which, 
notwithstanding all their pains and solicitude, there always 
arise more real calamities than even apparent advantages."1
The above quotation presents us with the three central aspects of 
Rousseau's political philosophy addressed to the possibilities of human 
development. First, the starting point: man as he is; second, the goal:
man as he ought to be; third, the hiatus dividing what is and what ought 
to be: the transitional phase during which the contractarian method will
be rigorously applied, by ukass if necessary, in order to better promote 
its future voluntary application. Naturally, it is assumed that the move­
ment towards a moral order will entail the planned restructuring of extant 
institutions so that, with the passage of time, people will develop the 
capacity to be autonomous. Assuming the transitional order is itself moral 
in outlook, despite its necessarily authoritarian practices, the realiza­
tion of an autonomous citizenry will make all laws redundant. This is not 
to say that there will be no laws, but that all the institutions of govern­
ment will reflect the virtues of the citizenry. The reign of the general 
will in spirit, as well as in practice, will ensure the sovereignty of good; 
the law will flow from each as from all.
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It is possible that Rousseau did not actually believe that the 
achievement of a moral order is possible. However, he certainly did 
believe that we should act as though it is possible, in much the same way 
that an honest man pursues the ideal of an utterly veracious society in 
full cognizance of its unattainability. The honest man furthers his ideal 
by telling the truth, because, firstly, it is the right thing to do and, 
secondly, in so doing he brings reality that much closer to the (moral) 
ideal. In other words, in an important sense the pursuit becomes its own 
objective, providing that the end thoroughly suffuses the means. The end 
is realizable in part for each person insofar as his life is faithful to 
its tenets. If compromises need be made in order to materially advance 
the end in some way, theymust be considered with the uttmost gravity.
That is to say, should any compromise be made it must be seen to genuinely 
promote the ideal. The risks, of course, are considerable. In many ways 
the analogy illuminates Rousseau's equivocations over the attainability of 
a truly just society. If the city on the hill is more than a dream 
Rousseau can confidently advocate a draconian transitional period. But, 
if it is forever to remain a dream the transitional period itself becomes 
an incubus. The less palpable the vision the less distasteful ought to be 
the compromises made on its behalf. If, then, full autonomy is a heady 
fantasy never to be experienced outside elegant salons, it seems to follow 
that one should be especially wary about any sacrifices undertaken towards 
its realization. Moreover, it follows that one should go about one's busi­
ness as the honest man does, by being as free, rational and reasonable as 
one can be in the given circumstances, seeking to alter one's environment 
only in a positive way be incrementally enhancing the autonomy of each 
citizen as a member of an increasingly, though not entirely, moral order. 
"Do you want me to tell you a pretty paradox?" asks a sympathetic but 
cynical Diderot,
"I am convinced that there can be no real happiness for 
mankind except in a social state in which there would be no 
king, nor magistrate, nor priest, nor laws, nor thine, 
nor mine, nor personal property, nor real property, nor 
vices, nor virtues. And that social state is devilishly 
ideal."2
It would all be so much easier if each nation could start anew. But 
political beginnings entail political endings, and it is on this question 
of revolution that Rousseau is most ambivalent. Can one be certain that
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revolution means change, or is it merely a degenerate society's coming full 
circle, surrendering what little it has in the hope of gaining everything? 
Rousseau did not know; and in his bewilderment he grew ambivalent about all 
philosophical certitude. The ultimate disappointment of the Considerations 
on the Government of Poland is not its seemingly conservative qualification 
of all that is said in the Social Contract, but its utter resignation to 
the brute facts of political reality. Whereas in Emile and the Social 
Contract we are presented with an inspired, if problematical, vision of 
man's perfectibility, in Poland and The Confessions we receive an insular 
perspective, guarded and frustrated, painfully aware that perfection is 
utopian and utopia perfect precisely because they are nowhere to be found.
So men must cling to the Spartan ways of their cantons and shun all but the 
most utilitarian trappings of urban culture, argues Rousseau, lest they 
lose what little harmony and happiness is available to them. In retrospect, 
the Social Contract, like Emile and the Second Discourse, reduces to a 
seminal mythopoem, perhaps the most challenging, if not the most original 
epic in the literary tradition of social engineering: fertile and imagina­
tive, but creative only when regarded as a heuristic device, chilling when 
considered a manifesto.
The paradox ushered in by the tests of legitimacy thus threatens to 
become a vicious circle. If engaged in wholeheartedly, the practical pur­
suit of a tangible moral order leads, if not to a cancellation of the first 
two tests at least to a drastic revision in favour of the third, i.e. 
radical egalitarianism. If abandoned entirely, we are left with a chimeri­
cal notion of justice devoid of substance. The answer, however, does not 
lie in a reductive moderation that endeavours to maneouvre both extremes 
towards the centre. Such a compromise is ultimately trivial and misleading. 
The point of the tests of legitimacy is to ascertain whether or not civil 
societies and their various institutions are genuinely committed to what 
has been broadly characterized as an 'equality of right', roughly, a con­
vention of common political, juridical and institutional privileges and 
expectations. The questions asked may be interpreted as tests of adequacy, 
the critical assumption being that inalienable liberty generates a moral 
agency of equal worth in all persons deserving of common and unbiased 
regard. The crucial issue here is not so much the blending of various 
criteria employed to achieve a harmony of interests, but, rather, what con­
stitutes moral agency in the first place. In other words, Rousseau asks us
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to consider what it is to he a moral agent in civil society. Insofar as he 
regards the end of morality rather than morality per se as the principal 
issue in political philosophy, Rousseau qualifies, better, defines 'auton­
omy' in terms of certain central prescriptions which, in turn, arise from 
his generative axiom. Consequently, in order to discuss man qua citizen we 
must consider man qua moral agent. But, we are cautioned, in moving from 
one set of deliberations to the other we must not automatically assume that 
we are necessarily dealing with the same persons in different roles, or 
that the pursuit of one orientation does not influence the nature of the 
other.
Chronologically, man is 'political' before he is 'moral', contends 
Rousseau. That is to say, moral agency arises in a civil context. How­
ever, once developed, moral awareness influences and critically reflects 
upon political life. Yet, one's awareness is largely determined by one's 
lifestyle: the experiences and opportunities afforded by the civil order.
Therefore, any friction between man qua citizen and man qua moral agent 
must reflect a contradiction within the civil order. The existential 
priority of the civil order over moral agency means that, providing the 
civil order consistently and coherently encourages the growth of reason in 
action (moral behaviour), it will serve as a creative crucible of human 
potentialities and nurture a complementary, 'rounded' moral agency. The 
opposite would arise, of course, should the civil order degenerate into a 
repressive despotism. No longer would society by its very nature promote 
reason in action; rather, it would foster a system of bondage that chains 
men to a stunted, internally-incoherent quasi-humanity. The upshot of this 
perspective is that a repressive order would necessarily fashion a shadowy 
moral agency incapable of reconciling liberty and authority. Either men 
would surrender their passion for liberty or repression would become the 
signal feature of society: power, more than authority, would determine the
course of events.
But why, one may ask, would people become aware of their impoverished 
condition if this was all they knew? Rousseau here assumes, as does Kant, 
that there is a species-determined, psychological substratum on which all 
reason is founded: what we might call our essential humanity. This is
particularly manifest in what is presumed to be an implicit sense of civic 
virtue underpinning both the general will and Kant's general principle of
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perfecting humanity in others. There is, Kant and Rousseau clearly seem to 
be saying, a common reliance upon what might be termed beneficent verstehen 
as the root notion of 'humanity'. That is to say, above the common species 
characteristics that passively determine our 'humanity' there exists in 
each of us a benevolent empathetic understanding that, when alleged to ex­
press itself naturally, regards other persons as ends in themselves, such 
that one takes their ends as one's own. To be fully human, then, is to 
actively further the happiness of others, insofar as humanity as an end in 
itself involves the end all share in common, namely, happiness. The idea 
'humanity' has an imperative embedded within it, Rousseau and Kant argue, 
that lends all actions a deeper purposiveness than immediate personal con­
cerns. Rationality, as the self-consciously intentional aspect of thought 
and behaviour, demands we take into account the happiness of others when 
constructing, reforming or administering human associations. We necessar­
ily consider others when formulating proposals for our well-being, so the 
argument goes, since our well-being is bound up with our humanity. "The 
maxim of common interest", writes Kant, " - of beneficence towards the 
needy - is a universal duty of men, and indeed for this reason: that men
are to be considered fellow-men - that is, rational beings with needs, 
united by nature in one dwelling-place for the purpose of helping one 
another."3
Autonomy is thus bounded by the parameters of moral agency which are, 
in turn, determined by our essential humanity and civil condition. Autono­
my, therefore, cannot properly be regarded as the mere absence of restraint 
in matters of volition; rather, it must be viewed as a certain freedom in 
the realm of normative discourse qualified in daily life by considerable 
civic responsibilities. In practical matters, man qua citizen overshadows 
man qua moral agent, not by comparison but through the former's absorption 
of the latter. The citizen is a moral agent, and vice versa; yet moral 
agency is enmeshed in a network of communal considerations so pervasive and 
utterly central to the proper conduct of human affairs that to talk of a 
moral agent stripped of civil obligations is to discuss an abstract notion 
divorced from practical reality. The meaning or end of moral agency in 
civil society, then, is citizenship: authentic participation in the
affairs of the civil order. The truly autonomous person, by implication, 
is a citizen of a moral order or 'just society'. Moreover, it is clear 
that if autonomy is uniquely attainable in a moral order, as the only
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possible matrix for a rounded moral agency, the pursuit of autonomy must 
initially reside in the enhancement of citizenship. The nexus here intima­
ted between the ideal and the tangible provides a very important clue to 
the enigma of the Social Contract i.e. the attempt to realize autonomy 
through the imposition of rules of conduct upon persons otherwise predis­
posed towards conservative, self-interested insularity.
The metaphysical, or at least, metaethical category of moral order is 
premised upon the empirical condition of citizenship. In other words, the 
concrete realities of life in the State, their texture, modes of express­
ion, rootedness and complexity, ultimately determine the nature and poten­
tial of the ideal. Such considerations go beyond even the vital questions 
of paedeutic and economic circumstances, embracing matters of communal 
involvement in institutional decisional procedures, dominant public virtues 
and, most importantly, the encoded rules of conduct by which the State is 
governed and administered. Through manipulating the public manifestations 
of civil life, it is held, the ideal is made at least theoretically 
possible. The formulae on which such manipulations ought to be based, 
according to Rousseau's reckoning, bear a remarkable similarity to the 
utilitarian calculi of Bentham, if not Mill, and render Rousseau perhaps 
the most engaging and stimulating (quasi-)utilitarian in French political 
philosophy.
On the surface nothing could seem further from the truth. Rousseau 
nowhere formulates hedonistic or felicitous calculi and bitterly denounces 
'vacuous' pleasures bought at the cost of liberty and virtue. Yet, it may 
be seen that Rousseau fashioned, at the very least, a quasi-utilitarian 
doctrine founded not on hedonistic criteria but, rather, oriented towards 
civic virtues and citizenship. In other words, Rousseau presents us with 
an outline of what might be termed a 'civic utilitarianism' according to 
which 'the greatest good for the greatest number' is identified with 'the 
greatest citizenship for the greatest number of citizens'. The distribu­
tion of utilities, then, by this scheme, does not primarily focus upon the 
dispersion of the good things of life in order to maximize the 'happiness' 
of the citizenry. On the contrary, the entire emphasis falls upon the dis­
persion of civic responsibilities and privileges in order to ensure the 
maximum feasible participation of each citizen in the life of the polity. 
True happiness, it is argued, flows from the realization of authentic
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citizenship: the thrust of political endeavour ought not to fall upon the
simplistic distribution of resources in order to grant immediate pleasure 
and contentment, but, rather, must fashion civil life so that each person 
in participating in that life may achieve his own happiness.
Happiness, for civil man, is the fruit of moral agency, argues 
Rousseau. It can be neither legislated nor solicited, but must spring from 
the heart and reason of free men. All that governments can do, or ought to 
do, according to Rousseau, is mould civil life in accordance with the 
principles of citizenship. Yet, because it is the case that moral notions 
arise only in a civil context - that man qua citizen precedes or is at 
least contemperaneous with man qua moral agent - the civil order is itself 
the font of justice. Justice, by this view, is a consequence of civil 
society and its sanctioned rules of conduct: law. Therefore, since civil
society is necessarily prior to morality, natural law cannot possibly serve 
as the foundation of society. Society 'denatured' man, as it were, trans­
forming an otherwise blithe, dull and unfettered spirit into a troubled, 
self-aware and, most importantly, self-monitoring calculator of interests, 
personal and communal. Man evolved into a reflective being who retrospec­
tively composed a rationale for his transformation. Insofar as 'natural 
right' may be said to predate society, argues Rousseau in Emile, it is a 
label we apply to what men did, must have done by our reckoning, as a bio­
logical and environmentally-determined response to the world: not, as the
natural lawyers would have it, by rational, conscienceful reflection. The 
'right' to life, for example, derives from the universal desire for survi­
val, not from an appreciation of 'God's will' or deep understanding of 
ethics. Likewise, the notion of 'property' emerged not from some concep­
tion of God's gift to man to, as Locke puts it, "make use of it to the best 
advantages of life", but, rather from man's response to the relative 
scarcity of land, or some such similar circumstance, by which individuals 
enclosed and defended territory considered necessary for their survival.
As human associations formed and grew around this novelty - sovereignty 
over something founded in force - the innovation became a commonplace and 
then, over time, accepted practice or tradition. The stabilization of the 
'tradition' - its sanctification, as it were - promoted the creation of 
"law", the pantheon of 'rights' as determined by convention and coercion. 
"The love of men derived from the love of oneself", writes Rousseau "is the 
principle of all human justice."4 Society, as the most inclusive set of
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of conventions arising from self-preservation, is itself the pragmatic 
rationale for justice. That is to say, the delicate balance required to 
maintain civil associations demands not only the calculation of private 
interests conducive to immediate survival but equally necessitates the 
formulation of general principles in terms of which the security and advan­
cement of all will enhance the well-being of each.
Though human sentiments remain much the same throughout the course of 
evolution, man's nature becomes more complex and invests the "true affec­
tions of the soul" with reason. Mankind's "primitive affections" thereby 
experience an "ordered development" which does not so much transform them 
into something other than they were originally as it refines and nurtures 
latent capacities. Natural rights, by this reading of Rousseau, are not 
lost, or at least cannot be lost, so long as man remains essentially human; 
for such rights are themselves derivative generalizations of what is 
regarded as the core of human nature. However, as human nature changes so 
does its attendant set of 'rights', or natural capacities and motivations. 
What was once purely instinctual gradually adapts to a world no longer 
amenable to spontaneous and uninhibited behaviour: reasoned natural right
supercedes primitive natural right as social man irreversibly evolves out 
of primitive man.
In a perfectly Aristotelian fashion, Rousseau conceives of 'natural 
right' as an expression of 'purposiveness' in being, not as it might 
readily be misunderstood, as the purpose of being. That is to say, it is 
meaningless or at best misleading to talk of the 'purpose of Nature' and 
then define the elements of Nature as parties to a superior teleology em­
bracing all physical being. Rather, the teleologically-identified whole in 
terms of which all being can be functionally described is 'Nature' 'itself'. 
The question to be asked, then, is not 'why Nature?', for Nature is the 
prime given needing of no further explanation than simple recognition and 
description, but 'how naturally?'. Consequently, talk of Nature as doing 
something is necessarily mistaken insofar as it proceeds from the assump­
tion that 'Nature', as an entity in itself, 'does' anything. What can 
properly be said is that particular entities undergo or partake in certain 
processes, or 'do' things, in accordance with their 'natures'. The idea of 
'Nature' is thus both a systemic and composite notion: it is composite in 
that it represents the most inclusive universal set of individual actuali-
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ties, potentialities, powers and circumstances; and it is systemic in that 
it is the most inclusive universal set of conditions in which actualities 
pertain and possibilities may be realized. Nature as a discrete entity 
does not exist, according to this view, therefore there cannot be a single, 
universal telos informing all existence, but, at a lower level, many tele 
derived from the essential nature of each individual. "He who considers 
things in their first growth and origin", wrote Aristotle, "whether a state 
or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them."^
Beginnings are replete with possibilities which unfold in contexts 
that inhibit and/or promote the growth of 'genetic' material. The history 
of such growth is the story of emerging 'needs' as determined by the urge 
to survive inherent in all living things. That which is natural to man, 
then, as an organism surviving and growing in certain contexts, is what 
best caters for his needs, in context. For Rousseau, 'natural right' is in 
this sense an a posteriori, entitlement stemming from species-determined and 
contextually-derived needs. It is an organic conception not only because 
it relates to the survival of the organism but, most importantly, because 
it places humanity in its 'natural' conceptual environments: as an element
of a broader system of being, on the one hand, and as a gregarious, tool- 
and language-using species on the other. If the 'purpose' of man is to do 
what men do well - be human in the full sense of the word - then 'natural 
right', according to this interpretation of Rousseau, is a formalization of 
the fundamental requirements for being truly human. The Second Discourse 
is therefore not so much an attempt to find 'natural man' as it is a state­
ment of what Rousseau considers to be 'natural' to man. Emile, as in many 
respects a highly imaginative and sophisticated supplement to the Second 
Discourse, focuses upon the individual as a species-bound creature and 
endeavours to outline the possibilities of personal’self-realization' with­
in a necessarily limited anthropological framework, i.e. men coming to 
understand and act upon what is natural to them - their essential humanity. 
Consequently, Emile is presented as a paedeutic work: its entire thrust is
in the direction of individuals developing and acquiring faculties and 
formulating judgements most suited to man's environmental/psychological/ 
biological dispositions and conditions. "This education comes to us from 
nature, men or things", states Rousseau,
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"The internal development of our faculties and organs is 
the education of nature; the use that we are taught to 
make of this development is the education of men; and the 
acquisition of our own experience on the objects affecting 
us is the education of things.
Man is thus not given perfection, but acquires it or at least pursues 
perfectibility in actualizing his potential. As a moral agent, then, man 
does no more than self-consciously act 'humanly1; and a moral order is no 
more than a social environment conducive to such activity. Phsyical nature 
is, at the most basic level, the crucible within which human nature is con­
ceived and unfolds: only when the two are in harmony may the latter
achieve fulfilment.
"It seems that things should be considered relatively in 
the physical order and absolutely in the moral order",
Rousseau confided to Voltaire, "the greatest idea I can 
make of Providence is that each material being is disposed 
in the best way possible in relation to the whole, and that 
each intelligent and sensate being (is disposed) in the 
best way possible in relation to himself; so that, for any­
one who feels his existence, it is better to exist than not 
to exist.. . . "7
Returning to Rousseau's 'civic utilitarianism', it may now be seen 
that the existential and aetiological priority of civil society over 
morality and justice equally applies to 'natural law'; that is to say, 
'natural law' is on the whole a conceptual distillation of the critical 
elements of human nature and human needs. The centrality of individual 
self-preservation remains inviolate, yet in the course of human evolution 
it undergoes a number of transformations the most significant of which is 
manifest as 'self-interest'. The difference between mere self-preservation 
and self-interest lies in the latter's inclusion of 'social' as well as 
purely immediate considerations in calculations of personal well-being. Of 
course, this is not to say that self-interest precludes selfishness or 
blatant abuse of the well-being of others; all that is meant, and this in 
itself is central, is that where self-preservation intimates a furtive, 
insular 'adrenal' response to threatening persons or things, self-interest 
necessarily takes into account the activities and circumstances of others 
not only as they directly impinge upon one's survival but also as they 
affect one's general, and, on occasion, particular well-being. Self- 
interest, then, is a function of personal calculi of social relations, as
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a sophisticated desire for self-preservation. The body of conventions con­
stantly flowing from and fueling these calculi inform the moral practices 
in which the citizenry participate, from which arise, in turn, different 
conceptions of human good and harm.
However, this is not to characterize Rousseau as a thoroughgoing 
ethical relativist. Certainly, he is Protagorean: man, for Rousseau, is
the measure not because each individual's beliefs and opinions in some way 
accurately reflect truth and goodness; rather, the argument goes, concep­
tions of truth and goodness arise from conventions generated by the inter­
action of personal opinions and beliefs. Yet, qualifying all this is the 
vital factor of 'human nature': what man is as an organism, as a species
being, as a social being. 'Natural law', though a reflection of aspects of 
'human nature' is presented as a body of imperatives precisely because the 
urge to survive is the most universal imperative known to man. It is the 
bedrock upon which all associative enterprises rest. Society, as both a 
convention and an efficient apparatus by which to formulate, implement and 
enforce conventions is therefore limited, in a very important sense, by 
human nature. Moreover, since human nature is characterized by Rousseau in 
terms of 'beneficent verstehen' as well as self-preservation, the logic of 
human conventions will ensure that personal interests are always firmly 
grounded in their communal matrix. If pure self-interest will not suffice 
to engender social harmony, then self-interest coupled with 'beneficent 
verstehen' will. "(It) is no more permissible to infringe natural laws by 
the social contract", writes Rousseau, "than it is permissible to infringe 
positive laws by the contracts of individuals."8 The social contract, then, 
considered as either a historical construct, or a statement of current 
obligations, or a prospective technique by which to determine obligations, 
must, according to Rousseau, cater for the central needs of each citizen in 
a manner agreeable to all citizens.
"Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself 
to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by 
means of such motives as offer of themselves," wrote Bentham,
"the art of legislation... teaches how a multitude ofnen, 
composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course 
which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness 
of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied by 
the legislator."8
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T h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  where t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s e e k s  t o  enhance  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  
th ro u g h  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u t i l i t y  t o  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t o r  s e e k s  t o  enhance  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  th e  
members o f  t h e  p o l i t y  th ro u g h  a more g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  same p r i n ­
c i p l e .  The t w i s t  w i th  R ousseau  l i e s  i n  h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  as  
more t h a n  ' l e g i t i m a t e '  o l i g a r c h y  (w he the r  e l e c t e d  o r  n o t ) :  t h e  s o v e r e i g n ,
f o r  R o u sse a u ,  i s  t h e  w i l l  o f  a l l  w hich  i s  t h e  o r d e r ,  th e  supreme r u l e  i n  
s o c i e t y .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  s o v e r e i g n t y  by t h i s  v iew  a t  once e n t a i l s  c i t i z e n ­
s h ip  ( n o t  mere membership) and  t h e  m ost im p o r t a n t  m u tua l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
c i t i z e n r y .  In  b e in g  a c i t i z e n ,  t h e n ,  one n a t u r a l l y  a d o p ts  t h e  s t a n c e  o f  
t h e  l e g i s l a t o r  an d ,  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  p u b l i c  c o n c e r n ,  d e l i b e r a t e s  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  
w i th  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l .  R o u s s e a u 's  m ora l  o r d e r  i s  t h u s  s i m i l a r  to  
B e n th a m 's  u t i l i t a r i a n  o r d e r  in  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c i t i z e n r y  a r e  
p a ra m o u n t .  However, one m ust a v o id  th e  t r a p  o f  c o n f l a t i n g  s i m i l a r i t i e s  and 
d e r i v i n g  an e q u iv a l e n c e  f o r  c l e a r l y  t h e  d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s  and  d i v e r g e n c e s ,  i f  
n o t  o u t r i g h t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ,  f o r c e  us t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  betw een  th e  two 
a p p ro a c h e s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  and p u rp o se  o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y .
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APPENDIX SIX
I
Rawls identifies two distinct sources of civil obligation, one speci­
fying the origin of obligations themselves and the other detailing the 
basis of our "natural duties". The difference between these two binding 
forces is crucial to the theory of justice as fairness. Civil obligations, 
Rawls explains, are derived from voluntary acts and associations:
"This principle holds that a person is required to do his 
part as defined by the rules of an institution when two 
conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or
fair), that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; 
and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of 
the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it 
offers to further one's interests. The main idea here is 
that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advan­
tageous cooperative venture according to rules, and this 
restricts their liberty in ways necessary to yield advan­
tages for all, those who have submitted to these restric­
tions have a right to similar acquiescence on the part of 
those who have benefitted from their submission.1
To this rather extensive definition of the foundation of civil obliga­
tion, Rawls adds the following clarifications: (1) obligation is a volun­
tary affair; (2) consent may be either expressed (as in a contract) or 
tacit (as in accepting benefits); (3) usually an institution or practice
define the set of expectations entailed by an obligation; and (4) obliga­
tions are usually owed to individuals. There are several things that are 
striking about Rawls' position. First, its grounds appear to be thoroughly 
utilitarian in nature. Having participated in the shared benefits of a 
cooperative enterprise, one is under an obligation to abide by the set of 
practices defining the behaviour necessary for the continuation of the 
scheme. Second, while the practices defining the relationship must be 
fair, the ultimate measure of that fact rests in equating the "goodness" or 
value of the project with the benefits themselves; in short, a sort of 
meta-utility seems to be established. It is not at all unusual to see the 
principle of utility at the foundation of a theory of obligation. In fact, 
Hume employs much the same argument to support the cooperative set of 
social and political institutions outlined in his works. It is, however, 
quite surprising to discover that Rawls' theory of obligation rests on a
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principle (of utility) that he sought to replace with his theory of justice 
as fairness.
The problem with this utilitarian underpinning of justice as fairness 
is not only that it contradicts Rawls' intention to improve on the utilita­
rian formula for "justice"; the more serious problem rests in the implica­
tions of using the "benefits received" argument as the basis of fidelity to 
the law. So far as those individuals who benefit from the arrangements 
defined by justice as fairness equally receive those benefits, Rawls' 
theory of obligation remains relatively stable. However, the difference 
principle of the second principle of justice allows for "inequality so long 
as any inequality benefits the least advantaged member of the society".2 
Were Rawls to end his argument at this point he would have articulated 
nothing less than a theory of differential obligation, whereby those who 
benefit the most from the status quo would have the greatest obligation to 
maintain and uphold the arrangements from which they derived their benefits. 
Conversely, a minority, either a 'natural minority' or an 'oppressed 
minority' would not be under an obligation to accept arrangements that pro­
vided for minimal increases in their level of expectations or no substan­
tial increase in their quality of life. A state founded on such a theory 
of obligation, however, would stand or fall on the very delicate balance 
between obedience and disobedience; and the sway of that balance would be 
dictated by the distribution of the social, economic and political rewards 
of the society. While the logical outcome of a theory of benefits received 
is a system of differential obligations, the other consequence of such a 
theory of obligation is an unstable, fragmented civil society. Thus, Rawls 
must introduce another category of forces, or "natural duties", from which 
to derive the obligation to obey the law.
As discussed in Part One and Part Five, most persons do not see them­
selves as bound to obey the law in anything other than a prudential sense. 
The Rawlsian individual, however, has a "natural duty" to support just or 
"nearly just" institutions. In fact, the list of "natural duties" is quite 
extensive: the duty to help another in need; the duty of civility (in the
sense of social etiquette); the duty not to do harm to another; the duty 
not to inflict unnecessary suffering; the duty of mutual aid; the duty to 
support and comply with just institutions and laws; the duty to further 
just arrangements not yet established; and, finally, the duty not to invoke
547
the faults of social arrangements as too ready an excuse for not complying 
with them, nor to exploit inevitable loopholes in the rules to advance our 
interests.3 This rather impressive list of natural duties, argues Rawls, 
offers the firm grounds for civil obligation sought by his theory. For 
while one is under an obligation to perform certain particular tasks, e.g., 
an official role or function, based on our voluntary acceptance of some 
position, one is generally bound, according to Rawls, to uphold political, 
social and legal arrangements as a consequence of our natural duty to obey 
just laws. Rawls sketches this two-edged sword of civil obligation in this 
way:
"It suffices to show that parties in this original 
position would agree to principles defining the natural 
duties which as formulated hold unconditionally. We 
should note that, since the principle of fairness may 
establish a bond to existing just arrangements, the 
obligation covered by it can support a tie already 
present that derives from the natural duty of justice.
Thus a person may have both a natural duty and an obli­
gation to comply with an institution to do his part.
The thing to observe here is that there are several ways 
in which one may be bound to political institutions.
R>r the most part the natural duty of justice is the 
more fundamental^ since it hinds citizens generally and 
requires no voluntary acts in order to apply.,,Lf
Given the centrality of these duties to the citizen's obligation to 
obey the laws of the state, one might properly inquire as to the sense in 
which they are at all 'natural'. Rawls suggests the following replies. On 
the one hand, Rawls argues that what he identifies as natural duties are 
merely those duties "that would be acknowledged (by persons) in the origi­
nal position".5 In this sense, one's duties to others and institutions 
serving society are notionally founded in expressions of moral sentiment 
flowing from the original position. Since persons in the original position 
are interested in maximizing their rational life plans, the moral senti­
ments they affirm are presumed to be those which would be accepted as 
mutual restrictions on the pursuit of self-interest. Much like Hart's 
'deduction' of natural rights from, among other things, the "mutuality of 
restriction", Rawlsian individuals are called upon to arrive at a list of 
rights and duties needed to ensure stable social relations.
If this is the correct explanation of the origin of 'natural' duties, 
it poses some serious problems for Rawls. For one thing, it appears to
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place the function, or existence, of particular moral sentiments (e.g., the 
duty of mutual aid) at the (notional) discretion of the participants in the 
original position. Given that persons recognize their desire to pursue 
rational life plans, what is called a "moral" duty assumes a particularly 
instrumental inflexion: it is not the moral quality of a duty that makes
it valuable, but, rather, it utility in advancing some interest. Given 
Rawls' contention that he has improved upon utilitarian or consequentialist 
moral theory this is a rather strange use of the term "natural". It is a 
concept more at home in the lexicon of the utilitarian who equates 'natur­
al' with 'individual benefit' or 'advantage', and then derives moral senti­
ments calculated to pursue particular interests.
Additionally, assuming that acknowledgement of one or another set of 
duties is left open to the individuals in the original position, it is un­
clear as to why some questions of human sentiment are open to such scrutiny 
and others are not. If Rawls is serious about permitting those in the 
original position to determine which "natural" duties will shape their 
lives, then it is entirely unclear as to why the Rawlsian presumptions 
about economic, acquisitive, and prudential man are to be taken as given.
In short, why is it that Rawls does not submit the entire question of the 
make-up of man's moral and social personality to the draftsmen of the 
original position? If individuals in the original position can acknowledge 
both positive (X should do Y) and negative (X should not do Y) "natural" 
duties, and Rawls says that they may£ why not ask them similarly to decide 
whether persons should be self-interested and/or acquisitive? These are 
not radically different questions to asking one to acknowledge the duty of 
mutual aid or the duty to be just. If one sort of alteration or adjustment 
can be made in the moral character of the Rawlsian individual by some kind 
of plebiscite in the original position, then other equally significant 
modifications in the human spirit ought to be considered as well.
Rawls might object that he did not have Hart's mutuality of restric­
tions in mind when he ennumerated the 'natural' duties of individuals in 
the well-ordered society. Instead, Rawls could insist, these duties are 
'natural' in the sense that they pertain to men qua men; that is, they are 
'natural' in the genetic sense of the term. It may simply be that acknow­
ledgement of these duties in the original position is a definitional clari­
fication of what one means by the term 'person'. In'an article entitled
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"Justice as Reciprocity", published before A Theory of Justice, but never­
theless dealing with the same theme, Rawls seems to equate "natural duties" 
with "personhood":
"To recognize another as a person one must respond to him 
in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected 
with the various prima facie duties. Acknowledging these 
duties in some degree, and so having the elements of moral­
ity, is not a matter of choice or of intuiting moral quali­
ties or a matter of the expression of feeling or attitudes 
....; it is simply the pursuance of one of the forms of 
conduct in which the recognition of others as persons is 
manifested."7
While this interpretation of the ’natural' origin of our duties is more in 
keeping with the ordinary use of the term 'natural', it is not without its 
problems or confusion.
Foremost of the problems associated with this construction of the 
"natural duty" to be just, for example, is that it appears to conflict with 
other descriptions of the Rawlsian individual. Rawls characterizes indivi­
duals in the original position as being overwhelmed, as it were, not by 
their natural duty to be just to one another, but rather, as Hobbes argued, 
by the potential threat each poses to the other.
"These individuals are roughly similar in physical and 
mental powers; or at any rate, their capacities are com­
parable in that no one among them can dominate the rest.
They are vulnerable to attack, and all are subject to
Ohaving their plans blocked by the united force of others."0
Couple this description with relative scarcity and the fear of other men 
that drives the Rawlsian individual to advocate the minimal risk strategy, 
and one has a somewhat different view of the Rawlsian creature. In any 
event, this does not sound like the same person who acknowledges the long 
list of natural duties to support and uphold justice and to aid others.
One cannot be "naturally" selfish and "naturally" other-regarding at the 
same time. It is not at all clear then that individuals 'enter into' the 
well-ordered society for any reason other than the minimal protection of 
their lives and property, or to preserve the conditions necessary to the 
advancement of their interests. Cooperation and mutual aid are not the 
attributes Rawls chose to highlight in his deduction of justice as fairness
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from the conditions of the original position. He writes:
"I shall emphasize this aspect of the circumstances of 
justice by assuming that the parties take no interest in 
one another's interests. I also suppose that men suffer 
various shortcomings of knowledge, thought and judgement. 
Their knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their powers 
of reasoning, memory, and attention are always limited, 
and their judgement is likely to be distorted by anxiety, 
bias, and preoccupation with their own affairs. Some of 
these defects spring from moral faults3 from selfishness 3 
and negligence; hut to a large degree3 they are simply 
part of men's natural situation.
It appears from Rawls' description that man's 'natural' situation is some­
what at odds with his 'natural' duties. What is more apparent is that 
while the economic view of man is necessary to the deduction of the princip­
les of justice, the socially responsible view of man is equally necessary 
to Rawls' formulation of his theory of obligation. If one has a natural 
duty to be just, then the principles of justice and the economic argument 
that serves to mildly coerce general acceptance are unnecessary. If, on 
the other hand, men legitimately find themselves in need of the principles 
of justice due to the natural conditions of adversity facing them in the 
world, then the utility of the principles of justice - not our natural duty 
to be just - will undergird our civil obligation. To try to have it both 
ways is to invite contradiction and confusion as to the grounds of our 
obligation to obey the law.
One final point emerges with regard to the natural or genetic status 
of our duty to comply with or promote just arrangements. Since these 
duties would be acknowledged by all men in the original position, it may be 
presumed that they all have a clear notion of how these 'duties' operate in 
practical situations. Yet, while it seems perfectly reasonable to assume 
that this information is commonly held by those in the original position, 
it is extremely difficult to understand how it is that one could go about 
choosing between these conflicting duties or giving one priority over 
another of them. It is true that Rawls argues for a lexical priority of 
the two principles of justice, insisting that liberty, the first principle, 
takes absolute priority over considerations of welfare found in the second 
principle. While this ordering may have the intuitive appeal that Rawls 
suggests it has, resolving conflicts between other natural duties may not
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be quite as simple - or universally accepted.10 For example, when our duty 
to comply with a just arrangement and our duty to oppose an unjust law con­
flict, the classic case of civil disobedience, Rawls confesses that 
"(t)here are no obvious rules for settling these questions".1* Rawls goes 
on to admit that "I do not know how this problem can be settled, or even 
whether a systematic solution formulating useful and practicable rules is 
possible."12 Perhaps Rawls is merely begrudgingly accepting Joel Fein- 
berg's charge that Rawls has lapsed into some sort of intuitionism in his 
theory of obligation. Feinberg puts it this way:
"To most persons who have struggled with moral dilemmas, I 
submit, the suggestion that Reason can provide a set of 
priority rules is astonishing.1,1 3
With an incomplete theory of 'natural' duties, Rawls attempts to 
demonstrate and justify the priority of our duty to comply with "nearly 
just" arrangements over our duty to oppose an unjust law. In trying to 
grapple with the question of civil disobedience, Rawls further underscores 
the unsatisfactory and problematical nature of his theory of natural 
duties. Not unlike his attempt to have moral development theories explain 
the choice of justice as fairness over time, Rawls' resort to our commonly- 
held natural duties to validate his theory of civil obligation falls short 
of its intended goal.
Rawls begins his efforts to resolve the problems of civil disobedien­
ce, or partial compliance theory, with the following definition:
"I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, 
non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to 
law usually done with the aim of bringing about change in 
the law or policies of the government."14
On the basis of these few words Rawls constructs a rather narrow conception 
of civil disobedience; it is, however, a view that is consonant with the 
goal of stabilizing the well-ordered society. Although this form of civil 
disobedience is alleged to have been derived from the principles of jus­
tice, it can be seen that it is surely not the only view that is consistent 
with justice as fairness or the original position. In addition, Rawls' 
theory of natural duties and his description of the original position sug­
gest that a rather different approach to these issues would be more accept-
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able to the Rawlsian individual.
In arriving at this theory of civil disobedience Rawls sets forth cer­
tain pre-conditions which ostensibly led him to his position: first, that
"it is taken for granted... that people in the original position know 
general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organisa­
tion and the laws of human psychology."15 Second, the political principle 
of "majority rule" is accepted and understood as a decision-making prac­
tice; it is accepted, Rawls argues, because there is no way of establishing 
which minority should rule over all others.16 What Rawls is able to derive 
from this body of information is that minorities - and anyone in the origi­
nal position might achieve minority status once the veil of ignorance is 
lifted - would insist on the means to communicate their dissent to the 
majority. In short, civil disobedience is necessary given the nature of 
the well-ordered or "nearly just" society.
Rawls' view is consistent with his belief in the rational nature of 
the choice of governing rules; the success of this conception of civil dis­
obedience rests on the assumption that the mere presentation of dissenting 
views will yield public attention and policy reevaluation. However, it is 
quite plausible that on the basis of the information supplied to them in 
the original position, i.e. data about the nature of the society and its 
citizens, persons would seek to legitimate more pervasive means of civil 
disobedience than Rawls has found acceptable. Rawls' thesis, crudely re­
stated, would counter that the duty to comply with "nearly just" institut­
ions, and to uphold the principles of justice behind these practices, takes 
precedence over our duty to oppose an unjust law. It is this balancing of 
interests and duties in the name of social stability that is so suspect in 
Rawls' theory of obligation.
II
Rawls recognizes that the "nearly just" society will suffer from many 
imperfections. While it is well-ordered in some senses, "serious viola­
tions do occur".17 The admission of the inevitability of serious violation 
in the non-ideal society governed by justice as fairness suggests an ambi-
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valence in the nature of Rawlsian man. Rawls argues that man can be 
characterized by his desire to advance just arrangements and just laws.
It is, of course, no accident that the common "sense of justice" coincides 
with the "natural duties" to uphold just institutions. For the moment, we 
will assume that this coincidence has a genetic origin rather than a con­
tingent relationship with the principles of justice. The ambivalence or 
even the contradiction that we wish to illuminate is that from these 
crystal clear senses of justice and the duty to perform justly one finds 
not a perfectly just society but one that is riddled by "serious injustic­
es". Throughout his work Rawls has operated on the hypothesis that men who 
possess the requisite sense of justice - and this includes all Rawlsian 
citizens according to his moral development theory - will choose principles 
of justice that reflect that sentiment. So far there is no problem. But 
once having established institutions and procedures that conform to those 
principles, the well-ordered society should be a perfectly just one, not a 
"nearly just" one. The source of this breakdown in the justice chain is 
quite revealing.
Rawls provides two explanations of this phenomenon. On the one hand, 
institutions are imperfect because they are administered by men. This 
seems not to solve the problem but merely to restate it. If men, not only 
in the original position but out of it, can be expected to abide by their 
sense of justice and their duty to obey just laws, then how is it that they 
cannot be counted on to create, maintain, and administer institutions that 
follow these instincts? Contrary to what would be an easy way out of this 
problem, Rawls does not deny that institutions are bound by the same sorts 
of duties or principles that constrain individuals.18 What Rawls therefore 
needs to explain, and it is not certain that his theory can help him here, 
is why it is that man and his institutions cannot be counted on to recog­
nize and to act on those sentiments that play a dominant role in the vali­
dation and stabilization of the theory of justice itself.
Several of the possible explanations for this divergence between men 
and institutions are open to examination. One key to this apparent incon­
sistency is suggested in an article by Rawls on the question of "Legal 
Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play".18 In this piece, Rawls argues that 
disagreements over the course of justice may result from an uneven distri­
bution of information, knowledge, or abilities. In spite of a similar
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sense of justice, Rawls explains,
"There will be disagreements because they (persons beyond 
the original position) will not approach issues with the 
same stock of information, they will regard different 
moral features of situations as carrying different weights, 
and so on."20
It is doubtful that the source of imperfect justice can be found in an 
uneven distribution of information or knowledge. As Rawls would hasten to 
tell us, the principles of justice - as is evident from the necessity of 
the veil of ignorance - do not require any specific knowledge at all. When 
one comes upon a question requiring a moral "balancing" Rawls admonishes 
us to lapse into "reflective equilibrium" - that is to suspend our particu­
lar knowledge and interest in the situation - and to consult our sense of 
justice.21 The whole notion of reflective equilibrium is to make available, 
theoretically to all individuals, a sort of moral neutrality in the face of 
possible temptation.
The entire purpose of Rawls' elaboration of a moral development theory 
was to demonstrate the universal presence of our sense of justice. Under 
such conditions, however, a differential in the information that one pos­
sesses should not cause an inconsistent or unjust application of justice as 
fairness.
A more plausible explanation of the existence of unjust arrangements 
comes from a close examination of the Rawlsian individual. In spite of 
Rawls' insistence at some points in A Theory of Justice that men are domin­
ated by their sense of justice and their natural duties to be just, the 
overwhelming premise of his principles of justice is that man is quite 
otherwise. That Rawls believes this to be the case is underscored by his 
description of the "Circumstances of Justice" in the following terms: 
"persons feel entitled to press their rights on each other"; that rational 
life plans are "aims of the self"; or that "his dominant interests are in
o ohimself, not merely, as they must always be, interests of a self".
Rawlsian men are portrayed at various times as being self-interested, 
acquisitive, negligent, and morally weak.23 They cannot be at the same 
time 'naturally' just, possessing an overwhelming and common sense of jus­
tice, a duty of mutual aid, of civility and the like. In fact, were they
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properly characterized as the latter, they would constitute the "society of 
saints" for whom Rawls acknowledges, no principles of justice are necessary.
The rather lengthy analysis offered above about the nature of the 
Rawlsian man is a necessary background against which to judge the theory of 
obligation that accompanies justice as fairness. The problem that justice 
as fairness sought to resolve, and that has crept up again unresolved in 
the discussion of civil disobedience, is the eternal dilemma of man's self 
interested nature. It is man's imperfection, or his imperfectability to 
call back to Augustine's insights, that makes Rawlsian society well-ordered 
but only "nearly just". Perhaps Hannah Arendt has captured what Rawls 
knows only too well but cannot readily admit for fear of sounding too much 
like Hobbes:
"Self-interest, when asked to yield to 'true' interest; 
that is, the interest of the world as distinguished from 
that of the self - will always reply, Near is my shirt, 
but nearer is my skin. That may not be particularly 
reasonable, but it is quite realistic; it is the not very 
noble but adequate response to the time discrepancy 
between men's private lives and the altogether different 
life expectancy of the public world."24
It is this "imperfection" that is exhibited in the "serious violations" 
of the principles of justice that disrupts the tranquil picture of the 
Rawlsian society. The best that Rawls can offer us, given his view of man, 
is justice in the form of fair decision-making practices for reconciling 
our competing interests. In a description of obligation reminiscent of a 
thoroughly utilitarian argument for justice as fairness, Rawls writes:
".... one can say that if the constitution is just, and if 
one has-accepted the benefits of its working and intends to 
continue to do so, and if the rules enacted are within 
certain limits, then one has an obligation, based on the 
principle of fair play, to obey when it comes one's turn."25
Or, more specifically on the question of civil disobedience and the founda­
tion of our natural duties to comply with an unjust law, Rawls writes in an 
earlier version of his "Civil Disobedience" chapter:
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"Assuming that the constitution is just and that we have 
accepted and plan to continue to accept its benefits, we 
have both an obligation and a natural duty (and in any 
case the duty) to comply with what the majority enacts 
even though it may be unjust. In this way we become 
bound to follow unjust laws, not always, of course, but 
provided the injustice does not exceed certain limits.
We recognize that we must run the risk of suffering from 
the defects of one another's sense of justice; and this 
burden we are prepared to carry as long as it is more or 
less evenly distributed or does not weigh too heavily."25
In spite of the fact that the majority may not choose the best policy, or 
may err on the side of injustice in its enforcement, the fairness of the 
practice of majority rule (and the benefits to be derived from that scheme 
of things) provides the foundation of our civil duties and obligation. As 
Brian Barry remarks, perhaps a little unfairly,
"What Rawls suggests, like many contract theorists and 
many who are not, is that morality is, at the minimum, a 
game of mutual informal coercion in which each person 
finds an advantage in helping to maintain the institutions 
even if it would sometimes pay him to be a 'free rider' and 
break the rules."27
What the foregoing discussion has been designed to demonstrate is that 
Rawls' theory of obligation is founded not on our natural duty to be just, 
but on our natural drive to pursue personal interests and to secure indivi­
dual benefits. Contrary to the notion that "pure procedural justice" is 
the end of the Rawlsian search and thus the grounds of our duty to obey the 
law, it is the mutual benefit derived from social cooperation that gives 
force to his theory of obligation. Since our duty to uphold just institu­
tions is, in part, based on the proper distribution of social rewards and 
responsibilities, that distributive pattern requires our careful scrutiny. 
Armed with the knowledge that each member of society is also out to further 
his own interests, Rawls' theory of civil disobedience - insofar as it is 
designed to ensure the ability of minorities to protect themselves - must 
be broad and pervasive, not narrow and restrictive.
557
III
Unfortunately, Rawls has not seen fit to provide individuals in the 
"nearly just" society with such a conception of civil disobedience. In­
stead, Rawls not only limits the acceptable forms of dissidence but he con­
fines the subject matter of dissent as well. Given the ability of citizens 
to make judgements about what is just or unjust, and consistent with their 
selection of both principles of justice in the original position, an appeal 
to the majority should be permitted in reference to either principle of 
justice. But such is not the case in Rawls' conception of civil disobed­
ience. His theory of disobedience falls into a problematic separation of 
economic and political liberty. Although the first principle takes lexical 
priority over the second, this ordering in no way diminishes the necessary 
interdependence of the two principles in achieving a just or fair social 
system. Clearly, then, the sense of justice and the theory of moral deve­
lopment attach to both principles of justice, and not simply to the first 
one. With this in mind, it is difficult to understand Rawls' reasons for 
limiting the appeal of civil disobedience to the first principle. Rawls 
explains:
"The violation of the principle of equal liberty is, then, 
the more appropriate object of civil disobedience. This 
principle defines the common status of citizenship in a 
constitutional regime and lies at the basis of the politi­
cal order. When it is fully honored the presumption is 
that other injustices, while persistent and significant, 
will not get out of hand."28
Perhaps Rawls' faith in the self-corrective nature of injustices flowing 
from the second principle is well-founded. It may be that remedying imper­
fections of the first principle will carry over to violations of the second 
principle, or the difference principle. Nowhere does Rawls show how con­
triving changes in equal opportunity, the major tenet of the first princi­
ple, will ensure just operation of the distributive dynamics of the dif­
ference principle. However, what is most surprising about this linkage is 
that it is only in his detailing of a theory of obligation that Rawls men­
tions this remarkable feature of the first principle of justice.
Further investigation reveals that the source of this anomaly is not 
something 'magical' in the second principle that justifies withdrawing it
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from p u b l i c  s c r u t i n y .  R a th e r ,  t h i s  a c t i o n  i s  n e c e s s i t a t e d ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  
Raw ls , by a f la w  i n  t h e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  j u s t i c e  on w hich t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
j u s t i c e  as  f a i r n e s s  i s  p r e m is e d .  Rawls o f f e r s  t h e  f o l l o w in g  i n s t r u c t i v e  
e x a m p le :
"Thus, u n l e s s  t a x  la w s ,  f o r  exam ple ,  a r e  c l e a r l y  d e s ig n e d  
t o  a t t a c k  o r  t o  a b r i d g e  a b a s i c  e q u a l  l i b e r t y ,  th e y  s h o u ld  
n o t  n o r m a l ly  be p r o t e s t e d  by c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .  The a p p e a l  
to  th e  p u b l i c ’s conception o f  j u s t i c e  i s  not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
c l e a r .
What i s  so t ro u b le s o m e  a b o u t  t h i s  r a t i o n a l e  i s  t h a t  i t  c o n f l i c t s  w i th  o t h e r  
t h i n g s  t h a t  Rawls h a s  s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  r o l e  and f u n c t i o n  o f  o u r  s e n se  o f  j u s ­
t i c e .  I t  i s  t h e  c l a r i t y  and c o m p e l l in g  f o r c e  o f  o u r  s e n se  o f  j u s t i c e  t h a t  
Rawls d e s c r i b e s  i n  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  m ora l  deve lopm en t and th e  a t t r a c t i o n  
o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e .  I n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  o n e ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  
in v o k e  th e  s e n s e  o f  j u s t i c e  and  o n e ' s  c l e a r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  d i c t a t e s  o f  
o u r  n a t u r a l  d u t i e s  p ro v e  t o  be e s s e n t i a l  i n g r e d i e n t s  in  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  j u s ­
t i c e  a s  f a i r n e s s  o v e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n c e p t io n s  o f  j u s t i c e .  R aw ls ' s u s p e n ­
s io n  o f  t h i s  c r i t i c a l  f a c u l t y  t o  e v a l u a t e  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s  o f  economic 
o r  d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  a p p e a r s  t o  be c a l c u l a t e d  t o  e n s u re  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  
s o c i a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e i r  j u s t i c e .  U n le ss  men l o s e  t h i s  e v a l u ­
a t i v e  a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  t r a n s m i g r a t i o n  from  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  w e l l -  
o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  t h e r e  seems no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  d e n y in g  i t s  a c t i v e  i n v o l ­
vement i n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .
Rawls a t t e m p t s  a n o t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  th e  w i th d ra w a l  o f  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
i s s u e s  from t h e  r e a lm  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .  He d o e s  n o t  t o t a l l y  ig n o re  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  can  be s e r i o u s  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e  
t h e r e  can  be c o r r e s p o n d in g ,  i f  n o t  more s e r i o u s ,  a b r id g e m e n ts  o f  t h e  second  
p r i n c i p l e .  But t h e  d e f e n s e  o f  t h i s  b i f u r c a t i o n  o f  econom ic and p o l i t i c a l  
l i b e r t y  d e r i v e s  from  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  w hat c o n s t i t u t e s  " j u s t i c e "  in  th e  
w o r ld  o f  econom ic p o l i c y . 3  ^ Rawls s t a t e s  h i s  c a s e  i n  t h i s  manner:
"There  i s  u s u a l l y  a  w ide ran g e  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  y e t  r a t i o n a l  
o p in io n  a s  t o  w h e th e r  t h i s  (second) p r i n c i p l e  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  
The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  i t  a p p l i e s  t o  economic and 
s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p o l i c i e s .  A c h o ic e  among t h e s e  
d e pends  upon th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and s p e c u l a t i v e  b e l i e f s  a s  w e l l  
a s  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a l l  o f  t h i s  s e a s o n e d  w i th  shrew d ju d g e ­
ment and p l a i n  h u n c h . " 31
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This justification, assuming it was allowed to filter through the veil of 
ignorance into the original position, makes one even more sceptical about 
the choice of this aspect of justice as fairness. If judgements about the 
economic justice of society are made on the basis of "shrewd judgement and 
plain hunch", then this is an even greater reason for those in the original 
position, for their own protection, to insist that these matters be subject 
to the appeal of civil disobedience.
The assumption that a faceless, dispassionate bureaucracy can properly 
administer the second principle is reminiscent of Weber's description of 
legal-rational authority. As Weber writes: "Bureaucratic administration
means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge.
This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational."32 The 
notion that policy administration by technocrats is pursued "without hatred 
or passions, and hence without affection or enthusiasm...." but nonetheless 
with "the highest degree of efficiency" and by "the most rational means 
known" seems to dominate Rawls' view of the operation of the second princi­
ple of justice.33 Yet, while this may be an inescapable aspect of modem 
social organization, it is misplaced as the guiding principle of a theory 
of civil disobedience. For example, while the statistical analysis of un­
employment is a technical matter, the actual level of unemployment is of no 
small concern to those whose interests, benefits, and obligations are 
directly affected by it. Furthermore, faith in the inexhaustible capacity 
of technical-bureaucratic knowledge to resolve problems flowing from the 
second principle seems totally unwarranted. It is not at all obvious that 
an evaluation or quantification of the distribution of primary social 
goods, one of the most important of which is self-respect,3l+ is possible.313 
Finally, the denial of the right to dissent on matters other than the first 
principle assumes the perfect administration of (or universal concurrence 
in) other economic and social policies and institutions not covered by 
either principle of justice. The assumption that there will be no cause to 
disagree with or be morally (or politically) offended by budget priorities, 
environmental pollution, educational or judicial policies, etc. is unlikely 
to gain widespread acceptance in the original position or beyond it.
To preclude civil disobedience from focusing on the 'justice' of econ­
omic distributions or the nature of social policy, as Rawls suggests, is a 
decision totally at odds with almost everything else that is known about
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the concerns of individuals in the original position. For instance, it 
must be commonly known in the original position that, as Rawls admits, it 
is close to impossible "to check the influence of self-interest and pre­
judice".36 Indeed, in the original position Rawls urges the "minimal risk 
strategy" on the participants; that is, Rawls advises them to choose a set 
or principles of justice as if one's worst enemy were assigning one a place 
in society. It is "rational prudence" that governs the choice of justice 
as fairness; a selection for which the primary motivation is a desire to 
protect oneself from other men, while at the same time permitting one to 
advance one's own rational life-plans. Rawls reminds us of the need to 
rememberthis characterization of human nature in the area of civil disobe­
dience when he cautions us against provoking "the harsh retaliation of the 
majority".37 With this approach having dominated the choice of justice as 
fairness, why is it that the Rawlsian individual should be convinced in 
matters of civil disobedience to accept the "good faith" of the majority?
If the minority (and anyone in the original position could be a member of 
a minority) cannot be assured that their protest on issues flowing from the 
first principle would be met with good faith, it seems untenable to ask 
them to accept on good faith, for purposes of the second principle, the 
majority's definition of what constitutes a "just" distribution. If Rawls 
wishes to rely on the dominance of self-interest and prudence in the choice 
of justice as fairness, then he cannot suddenly depend upon our 'natural' 
sentiments for justice when it comes to questions of civil disobedience.
IV
In the face of grave injustices, one's duty to obey the law and one's 
duty to promote justice conflict, and one may be required to break the law. 
This dilemma is implicit in Rawls' long list of 'natural' duties. But 
Rawls does not seem willing to deal with the full ramification of this in­
evitable conflict. For example, if one determines that a law is unjust and 
is compelled by one's moral convictions to break it, why should one be .. 
under an obligation, as Rawls insists,38 to submit to arrest or to pay the 
penalty. While a willingness to be arrested or to pay the penalty may be 
required to convince others of the sincerity of one's belief, it would not 
seem to be required by the nature of justice as fairness or under the guise 
of preserving the "nearly just" society. If one acknowledges that the law
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is unjust why is the penalty attached to violating that law suddenly just? 
Similarly, if one sincerely believes that a law violates the conception of 
justice on which the society is founded, then by violating the law - and 
exposing its injustice to the majority - one is contributing to the estab­
lishment of the 'just' order and not undermining it. The burden of justi­
fying one's choice of tactics, whether violent or non-violent, whether one 
resists or submits to the penalty, is a matter that should be left to the 
dissenter to explain in reference to particular acts and cases. The ques­
tions involved in any one case, let alone all the possible cases that Rawls 
would like to cover with his rules, are too complex and too diverse to 
resolve in advance in a narrow and restrictive way. Rawls would have been 
well advised to follow his own instincts when he wrote: "I do not know if
this problem (of conflicting duties) can be settled, or even whether a sys­
tematic solution formulating useful and practicable rules is possible."39 
In the final analysis an appeal to the various forms of civil disobedience 
may be the only resort - short of rebellion - available to the minority in 
the "nearly just" society; it would be foolish for them to agree to a 
restriction on all forms of violence or resistance under all circumstances 
and for all time.1+9
A final problem with Rawls' conception of civil disobedience is its 
inconsistent treatment of violence in the context of domestic affairs as 
opposed to international affairs. While Rawls steadfastly defends non­
violence in civil society, he becomes the proponent of the "just war" 
theory in international affairs. Given an external threat to the stability 
of the well-ordered or "nearly just" society, Rawls stands in defense of 
the state's use of force on behalf of its principles or its security. On 
the presumption of the equality of nations, Rawls asserts the principle of 
self-determination of all nations, and the related obligation (or is it a 
duty?) to help other nations maintain this right. Most importantly, Rawls 
is prepared to judge international conflicts by the guidelines provided by 
justice as fairness. While it is not at all certain how the conflicting 
claims of participants in the international community could be resolved by 
the principles of justice, the notion that this is possible gives rise to 
two problems: (1) Rawls has earlier criticized utilitarians for taking the
principles of utility from the realm of personal ethics and generalizing 
them to social principles. It seems rather obvious that Rawls is guilty of 
a similar jump from the well-ordered society into the international commu-
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nity, and (2) if there is such a thing as a just war and a just peace then 
there must be some criterion by which to recognize when one would be justi­
fied in using violence or force as a legitimate tactic in civil disobed­
ience. It cannot be very much more difficult to identify justifiable cases 
for violence in domestic affairs than it is to make the same determinations 
in international disputes.
Rawls indirectly tries to answer this last problem. True to the 
utilitarian spirit that in many ways characterizes his view of civil dis­
obedience, Rawls reminds us that the goal of a just war must be to bring 
justice and liberty to the international community:
"Even in a just war certain forms of violence are strictly 
inadmissible.... The aim of war is a just peace, and there­
fore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of 
peace or encourage contempt for human life that puts the 
safety of ourselves and mankind in jeopardy. "4 *
Now it is difficult enough, if not impossible, to know what justice as 
fairness prescribes in domestic affairs, but surely it is next to impos­
sible to resolve international conflict in a 'just' or 'fair' way by refe­
rence to justice as fairness. What would "equal opportunity" mean in the 
context of international affairs? In a dispute between Vietnam and her 
neighbours, or between the Arabs and Israelis, or between the oil producing 
and the oil consuming nations, is there any hope that justice as fairness 
could end the conflict in a way that would be regarded as 'just* by all the 
parties? Some of the things that the original position can assume away, 
and that international affairs can nevev escape, is history, culture, and 
national pride. Given the radical inequalities of economic, social or 
political, or natural resources, nations are in some irreconcilable way 
doomed to be partisans of one or another party in an international con­
flict. Joseph Margolis, in his "On Defending Violence and Destruction", 
captures the sense of equality that is most significant to parties to 
international conflict:
"And this means once again that we are, in a most profound 
sense, moral partisans, pitted against or joined to one an­
other solely in terms of our convictions - and that given 
the mounting evidence favoring our reliance on violence and 
destructive means, we had better understand the import of 
this radical equality of alternative ethical means."42
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While there may be a way of discovering, in a nuclear age, a means of em­
ploying violence without "jeopardizing ourselves and mankind", it is un­
likely that there will be any simple way of deciding when to deploy it. It 
is also highly unlikely that justice as fairness represents the solution to 
the use of violence in international affairs.
Whatever the contribution of justice as fairness to international con­
flict resolution, it is certain taht trying to determine the effect of 
limited violence in international affairs can be no more difficult than 
making the same judgement in cases of civil disobedience. Yet, in spite of 
this fact, Rawls imposes a disproportionately heavy burden on those seeking 
justice at home as opposed to those wishing to wage a "just" war abroad. 
Traditional "just war" theorists listed a long series of conditions on the 
use of the tools of warfare and enumerated a long list of preconditions to 
involvement in a war. Rawls requires no such demanding evaluation of the 
motives or likely effects of such actions. When the government feels the 
need to declare that liberty or justice is being threatened somewhere in 
the world, conscription - the legalization and organization of force - is 
the just calling of the people. Rawls explains:
"Conscription is permissible only if it is demanded for 
the defense of liberty itself, including here not only 
the liberties of the society in question, but also those 
of persons in other societies as well."1*3
If liberty is so prized a possession - at home and in other countries - and 
the resort to warfare is justified to preserve liberty all over the world, 
then there is no reason that any lesser means should be accepted by those 
in the original position or by those wishing to ensure their own liberty in 
the "nearly just" society. No interpretation of our 'natural' duties, 
moral development, or sense of justice can alter this fact. Rawls cannot 
tolerate the use of violence in international relations and then deny it as 
a tool to those seeking liberty and justice at home.
One can sense in the inconsistent treatment of violence as a tool of 
domestic reform and as a means of achieving liberty and justice abroad a 
tension within Rawls' conception of man. On the one hand, the use of force 
in international affairs is justified because corporate entities - nation­
states - cannot be expected to possess the same sense of justice as do
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i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s .  Thus, t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o r  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  h a v in g  t o  engage 
i n  a  j u s t  war t o  s e c u r e  l i b e r t y  and j u s t i c e .  In  s h o r t ,  c i t i z e n s  a r e  d e ­
f i n e d  by th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  s e n s e  o f  j u s t i c e ,  and n a t i o n s  by i t s  a b s e n c e .  
B u t ,  c l e a r l y ,  t h i s  i s  t h e  v e ry  same u n w a r ra n te d  d icho tom y t h a t  Rawls has  
drawn in  h i s  a rgum ent f o r  j u s t i c e  a s  f a i r n e s s .  Those in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i ­
t i o n  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  in  much t h e  same way a s  t h e  f o r e i g n e r  whose " s e n s e  o f  
j u s t i c e "  c a n n o t  be t r u s t e d .  L ike t h o s e  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  c i t i z e n s  
o f  o t h e r  s t a t e s  a r e  as  l i k e l y  t o  be b r u t a l  a s  k i n d ,  u n j u s t  a s  j u s t ,  c o m p e t i ­
t i v e  a s  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  and a n t i - s o c i a l  a s  s o c i a l ;  in  any c a s e ,  one m ust a lw ays 
be p r e p a r e d  t o  d e fe n d  o n e s e l f  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  a g g r e s s io n .
The p ro b le m , t h e n ,  o f  b r i n g i n g  j u s t i c e  and l i b e r t y  t o  members o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community i s  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y ,  n o t  c o n c e p t u a l l y ,  more d i f f i c u l t  
t h a n  b r i d g i n g  th e  gap betw een man in  th e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  and in  t h e  w e l l -  
o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y .  I f  human n a t u r e ,  b o th  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n  and in  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community, i s  p r o p e r l y  d e s c r i b e d  by Rawls, th e n  th e  ch an ce  o f  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  t r a n s f o r m in g  men i n t o  p e r s o n s  o r  n a t i o n s  p o s s e s s e d  by a s t r o n g  
s e n s e  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  u n d o u b te d ly  s l im .  The p o i n t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  t h a t  j u s t  a s  
Rawls c o u ld  n o t  employ m o ra l  d e v e lo p m en t  t h e o r y  t o  b r id g e  t h e  gap betw een 
h i s  two v iew s o f  man, s o ,  once  h a v in g  begun w i th  r a d i c a l  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  -  
e i t h e r  c o r p o r a t e  o r  p e r s o n a l  -  Rawls m ust be c o n t e n t  w i th  t h e  t y p e  o f  w orld  
t h a t  r e s u l t s .
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A Theory of Justice, Op Cit, p.480. Rawls seems to hold, along with 
other liberal theorists, that liberty, justice and majoritarian demo­
cracy are universally applicable concepts.
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APPENDIX SEVEN
Hegel chid Rousseau for a tendency which seems opposite to the one we 
have just emphasized. In spite of Rousseau's admiration for Sparta and the 
notorious on le forcera d'etre libre, Hegel regarded him as a protectionist, 
as another contractarian bent on defending the atomistic individual and his 
self-centred rights.1 This half-truth reveals the unsurpassed intensity of 
Hegel's dedication to the 'metaphysical' theory of the state. Like 
Rousseau, of course, Hegel had one eye on the Hellenic polis (where "politi­
cians incessantly talked about morals and virtue") and the other eye on the 
modern bürgerliche Gesellschaft (where politicians "talk only of business 
and money"). Much more systematically than Rousseau, Hegal aimed at a 
"reconciliation" ( l&rsöhnung) between antiquity and modernity, between the 
polit&s and the Bürger.
Doubtlessly, what enticed Hegel about the idea of substituting social 
function for private right was the example of the Greeks. The same influen­
ce was evident in his conception of philosophy's task as that of "always 
treating the part in its relation to the whole".2 It is quite important to 
keep this methodological commitment in mind, for it helps explain why Hegel 
felt compelled to 'sublate' the liberal principles of private right and 
societal differentiation into a pious and holistic &tatisme.
The basic goal of the Philosophy of Right is to recreate the "ethical 
totality" of the Hellenic polis in the midst of Gesellschaft: in a non-
contractarian way to transform the capitalist market into an agora. Indeed, 
Hegel does not want to 'impose' antiquity on modernity so much as to 'recon­
cile' the two. Or rather, he wants to show how the modern Rechtsstaat can 
be said to achieve this reconciliation. This ]fers’öhnung of two social types, 
in the final analysis, rests on what might be called a 'synthesis' of Plato 
and Locke. The possibility of synthesis, of course, depends on the fact 
that each synthesized term is deficient in some vital respect. What the 
Greeks lacked, according to Hegel, was the modern principle of subjectivity, 
a sense of the positive element in human particularity:
"The general principle that underlies Plato's ideal state 
violates the right of personality by forbidding the holding 
of private property. The idea of a pious or friendly or even
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compulsory brotherhood of men holding their goods in common 
and rejecting the principle of private property may readily 
present itself to the disposition which mistakes the true 
nature of the freedom of the mind and right and fails to 
apprehend it in its determinate moments."3
Such rebuffs of Hellenic holism sound reassuring to liberals, of course, as 
does the statement that "particular interests should not be put aside or 
completely suppressed" in the state.^ Yet the alternative Hegel sees to 
suppression is Aufhebung (what was missing in Locke) and that pricks the 
bubble of liberal consolation. What mitigates Hegel's concern for differen­
tiation, diversity and the satisfaction of individual needs in civil society 
is his capacity to view them all as "moments". Since individuality and the 
rights rooted in civil society are mere "abstractions", they need to be 
rewelded into the ethical totality which is the state. As a consequence, 
the categories employed by Locke to explain private right have been "trans­
cended" once we get to the "level" of politics. Echoing Aristotle, Hegel 
banishes contractarianism to the lower domains of a sublated oikos:
"The intrusion of this contractual relation, and the rela­
tionships concerning private property generally, into the 
relation between the individual and the state has been pro­
ductive of the greatest confusion in both consitutional law 
and public life. Just as at one time (in feudal Europe) 
private rights and duties were considered and maintained to 
be an unqualified private property of particular individuals, 
something contrasted with the right of the monarch and the 
state, so also in more recent times the rights of the monarch 
and the state have been regarded as the subject of a contract 
and as grounded in contract, as something embodying merely a 
common will and resulting from the arbitrariness of parties 
united into a state. However different these two points of 
view may be, they have this in common, that they have trans­
ferred the characteristics of private property into a sphere 
of a quite different and higher nature."5
This "higher sphere", of course, was the national state.
It is important to see exactly how Hegel views the classicizing (i.e. 
apophradic) subordination of civil society to the state. Some of the most 
interesting sections of the Philosophy of Right are dedicated to an explana­
tion of how egalitarian principles are "embedded" in the institutional ethos 
and structure of civil society. In this Rotund %vstandes Staat,6 he says, 
all men are equal since they meet each other as "persons with needs", a 
category not open to much refinement or differentiation of status. It is
in this context that the most famous phrase of the Philosophy of Right 
appears: "A man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because
he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian &c."7. Unfortunately, 
the liberal implications of this idea are cut short by the next sentence. 
There, Hegel goes on to say that liberal egalitarianism is "deficient" when 
converted into a "cosmopolitanism in opposition to the concrete life of the 
state". What Hegel scorns most is the old suggestion: fiat iustitia3
pereat Germania. No "justice" could ever undo a state, at least not if it 
originated in the "lower realms" of individuality and civil society. This 
follows from the idea that the state is the 'whole' of which individuals and 
institutions are the constituent 'parts'.
The force of Hegel's subordination of individuality and civil society 
to the state is most explicit in his discussion of war. Consider briefly 
Hegel's response to Kant:
"The ethical health of peoples is preserved in their 
indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; 
just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from 
the foulness which would be the product of prolonged, let 
alone 'perpetual' peace."8
War "sublates" the individual's (corrupt) consciousness of himself as a 
unit, as a self-seeking atom sharply distinguished from his fellow atoms. 
Hence, Hegel can describe "sacrifice" as "the substantial tie between the 
state and all its members", and (thus) as "a univeral duty".8 Lack of com­
prehension for patriotism and willingness to lose one's property and even 
one's life for the fatherland, so the argument goes, reveal the mean-spirit­
edness of contractarian-liberal theories of politics:
"an entirely distorted account of the demand for this 
sacrifice results from regarding the state as a mere 
civil society and from regarding its final end as only 
the security of individual life and property. This 
security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice 
of what is to be secured - on the contrary."10
Again, the underlying point is pro-Aristotelian and anti-Hobbesian. Like 
C.B. Macpherson in this century, Hegel argued for communal "belonging" and 
against possessive individualism. The subordination of the private oikos 
to the ethical polity signals the overcoming of "biological unfreedom". In
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dying for his fatherland, a patriot "spiritualizes" a natural necessity 
(death) by converting it into a freely chosen act of moral self-realization. 
Notice too how an individual's willingness to be sublated for the patria's 
greater good is meant to suggest a (Machiavellian) connection between 
centralized sovereignty and national defense:
"People unwilling or afraid to tolerate sovereignty at home 
have been subjugated from abroad, and they have struggled 
for their independence with the less glory and success the 
less they have been able previously to organize the powers 
of the state in home affairs - their freedom has died from 
the fear of dying."11
It should be emphasised that the Philosophy of Right is a fascinating­
ly ambiguous book. If it lies within the "Graeco-totalitarian" tradition of 
political thought, there is nothing crude about it. Hegel too has a theory 
of anachronism, and he cannot be caught so easily in the Vichian trap.
Still, his insistence on the idea that civil society is a \brlust der 
Sittlichkeit,12 though true, is unhappily mixed with the otiose conviction 
that a 'political' topping to the economic cake can bring back Sittlichkeit. 
Where Hegel parts ways with Vico is in his belief (stemming from the 
Enlightenment which he scorned) that Reason is "one" and that all human 
values are ultimately compatible. On the basis of such a notion, Hegel 
interpreted the Gang of history as fundamentally cumulative. There is pro­
gress because the past can be redeemed in the present.
Moreover, and in the same spirit, the idea that "public conditions are 
... to be regarded as all the more perfect the less (in comparison with what 
is arranged publicly) is left for an individual to do by himself as his pri­
vate inclination directs"1  ^ implies a kind of political regimentation of 
social life inconsistent with what most of us think of as freedom.14 Indeed, 
the highest virtue of Hegel's citizen15 may sound like bliss to the Maori, 
the Andamanese, the Yir Yorant, and even to the Greeks; yet for us it is 
more easily associated with Selbst-Aufopferung than with anything like 'free­
dom' as we understand it. One can always argue, of course, that at least 
Hegel understood our 'foundationless' freedom, our freedom in the traffic.
As a matter of fact, his repudiation of it, dedicated as he was to renewing 
eleutheria in the modern world, may well have been as much a moral as a 
theoretical failing.
572
APPENDIX SEVEN
Notes
1. The individualist core of Rousseau's general will, according to 
Hegel, suggests an overlooking of "the absolute infinity and 
rationality of the state" (Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox (trans.), 
Oxford, 1978, sec. 258). It reveals a Jacobin arrogance, so Hegel 
asserts, which claims a capacity to build up a society from the 
bare ideas of equality and liberty. Rousseau "reduces the union of 
individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something 
based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capric­
iously given express consent; and abstract reasoning proceeds to 
draw the logical inferences which destroy the absolute ly divine 
principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute 
authority. For this reason, when these abstract conclusions came 
into power, they afforded for the first time in human history the 
prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great 
actual state and its complete reconstruction ab initio on the 
basis of pure thought alone, after the destruction of all existing 
and given material. The will of its refounder was to give it what 
they alleged was a purely rational basis, but it was only abstract­
ions that were being used; and the experiment ended in the maximum 
frightfulness and terror" (sec. 258). Here we see two fundamental 
strands of Hegel's political thought: first, his critique of indiv­
idualism, and, second, his repudiation of traditionless "abstract­
ions". Both are aspects of Hegel's intended 'reconciliation' of 
antiquity and modernity.
2. Ibid., sec. 260
3. Ibid., sec.46
4. Ibid., sec. 261
5. Ibid., sec. 75
6. Ibid., sec. 183
7. Ibid., sec. 209
8. Ibid., sec. 324
9. - Ibid., sec. 325
10. Ibid., sec. 324
11. Ibid., sec. 324
12. Ibid., sec. 181
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13. Ibid., sec. 242
14. Hegel compares archaic "integration" with etatist "integration", 
"...in ancient times, the pyramids and other huge monuments in 
Egypt and Asia were constructed for public ends and the worker's 
task was not mediated through his private choice and particular 
interest. This interest invokes freedom of trade and commerce 
against control from above; but the more blindly it sinks into 
self-seeking aims, the more it requires such control to bring it 
back to the universal". Ibid., sec. 236
15. Ibid., sec. 261
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The major abstraction is the idea of man 
And major man is its exponent, abler 
In the abstract than in his singular,
More fecund as principle than particle,
Happy fecundity, flor-abundant force,
In being more than an exception, part,
Though an heroic part, of the commonal.
The major abstraction is the commonal,
The inanimate, difficult visage. Who is it?
What rabbi, grown furious with human wish,
What chieftain, walking by himself, crying 
Most miserable, most victorious,
Does not see these separate figures one by one, 
And yet see only one, in his old coat,
His slouching pantaloons, beyond the town,
Looking for what was, where it used to be? 
Cloudless the morning. It is he. The man 
In that old coat, those sagging pantaloons,
It is of him, ephebe, to make, to confect 
The final elegance, not to console 
Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound.
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